中國：失業長城——The great wall of unemployed

　　中國的真正失業率高於20%(經濟學家) 　　Nov 27th 2008　　From The Economist print edition　　薛曉璐 譯　　在中國，失業率的上升引發了人們關於社會不安定的恐慌。　　然而，中國的失業率到底有多高呢？　　據中國的人力資源和社會保障部部長尹蔚民說，中國的就業前景很「嚴峻」。特別嚴峻，事實上，在11月26日中國人民銀行不得不下調利率超過一個百分點（在11年內下調最高）來刺激增長。經濟增長放緩使得工廠不得不裁員，很多人越來越擔心這些日漸龐大的事業隊伍有天會走上街頭，使中國經濟增長奇蹟被瓦解。為了測估這種風險，我們必須了解失業率將會達到多高。　　測估的障礙是，中國官方提供的關於失業水平和趨勢的數字都是毫無意義的。在九十年代，政府用給工人提供「鐵飯碗」的形式或多或少的保證了充分就業。然而，國企的持續虧損使得政府只好在1996到2002年裁掉了1/3的國企員工，官方公布的失業率只是微幅走高。城市失業率，從九十年代中期的3%升為現今的4%。　　但是官方的失業率不包括國有企業下崗的工人。因而在本世紀初，當失業達到高峰時，它很嚴重的低估了真正的失業率。隨著時間推移，許多下崗工人再就業或者退休了，調查結果的扭曲將會減少。官方失業數據的另一個缺陷是，它只統計那些在勞動所登記為城鎮居民的人。大約1.3億的外來務工人員從鄉下來到城市，然而卻沒有正式的關於他們住在那裡的紀錄因而他們在數據統計時被忽略。一些本世紀早期的調查顯示，官方數據經過調整和增加了這兩個方面後顯示，真正的失業率將會超過10%——甚至會高於20%。　　如果失業率已經如此之高，那麼它將不會引起太大的經濟減速，將之推入危機。然而，最新的研究顯示失業率在本世紀初已經下降了很多。牛津大學的 阿爾伯特·帕克以及中國社會科學院的蔡方和杜陽（音譯）分析了中國2000年的人口普查和2005年的小普查（覆蓋人口的1%），其中包括外來務工人員。人口普查的原始數據表明，城市的總失業率已從2000年的8.1%下降為2005年的5.2%。但是2005年國際上的失業率低於4%。　　經濟學家們還運用了2005年五大城市的城市勞動力調查來核對和驗證。上圖證實了城市失業率（包括外來務工人員）已從2002年的7.3%下降為2005年的4.4%。然而外來務工人員的失業率比常住民的低，因為他們找不到工作就會回家。如上圖所示，除去外來務工者，城市失業率從11.1%降為6.7%自從2005年以來，失業毫無疑問的進一步下降。今年初，工廠老闆抱怨他們不能找到足夠的工人，同時工資的大幅增長也顯示勞動力供不應求。因而，在夏天中國經濟開始下滑之前，失業率大概只有3-4%。這些數據唯一重要的限制是中國的勞動力參與率（正在工作或正在找工作的）從2000年的69%降為65%。如果沮喪的工人因為找不到工作而放棄勞動，那麼這些失業率可能低估了他們所面臨的困難。　　但是，發現在五年內中國的失業率大幅下降還是很有意義的。右邊來自世界銀行最新中國經濟季報的圖表顯示，如果經濟滿負荷運行，GDP增長與其預估的潛在增長率相關。從2003到2007年，實際增長遠遠超過了其潛力，所以失業率確實應該下降。然而，世界銀行預測中國的GDP增長率將會在2008和2009年下降，這意味著失業率將會上升。預測GDP明年只增長7.5%，將是近20年內增速最慢，遠低於其9.5%的潛在增長率。一些工作已經消失，特別是南部，數千個小型出口企業在今年關閉。　　該是調整的時候了　　目前，中國的評論員正在關注中國的經濟是否能繼續保持每年8%的增幅。依據舊的經驗法則，為了經濟增長，必須在勞動力市場注入新的活力。但是8%的數據並沒有多少科學依據。在過去十年，大量投資和快速提高生產力使得GDP增長率持續上漲。也許這就是為什麼世界銀行估計在保持失業率穩定的情況下，中國現在的潛在增長率為9.5%　　就業與相應類型的經濟增長是同步的。較之過去，中國創造的工作機會越來越少。在八十年代，GDP每增長一個百分點，就業率就會增加0.3%。在過去十年，GDP增長一個百分點，平均只增加0.1%個就業機會。經濟增長帶來的工作機會變少了，因而為了減少失業率，經濟必須更快增長。　　現狀形成的一個原因是，較之創造更多就業機會的服務業，政府更傾向於像鋼鐵、機械等資本密集型產業。世界銀行的報告的主要作者路易·庫斯認為中國需要改變依靠工業、投資和出口的混合經濟增長方式，轉向服務和消費。要調整經濟結構，需要進一步緊縮財政，提高能源價格，取消傾向於製造業的扭曲的稅收制度，並打破服務業的各種枷鎖。　　更多的勞動密集型經濟增長會增加收入和消費，也將會有助於減少中國尷尬的大量外貿盈餘。然而更重要的是，這將使得更多的工人享受經濟飛速增長的利處，減少和防止將來社會動亂。　　The great wall of unemployed　　Nov 27th 2008　　From The Economist print edition　　原文網頁：http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12677296　　Joblessness in China is rising, prompting fears of social unrest. But how high is the true unemployment rate?　　THE employment outlook is 「grim」 according to Yin Weimin, China』s minister of human resources and social security. So grim, in fact, that on November 26th the People』s Bank of China slashed rates by more than a percentage point—the most in 11 years—to boost growth. The slowing economy has led factories to cut jobs, and there are mounting fears that the swelling ranks of the unemployed might one day take to the streets and disrupt China』s economic miracle. To assess such risks one must consider how high unemployment might rise.　　The snag is that both the level and trend of China』s official jobless figures are meaningless. Until the 1990s, the government more or less guaranteed full employment by providing every worker with an 「iron rice bowl」—a job for life. But when soaring losses at state-owned firms forced the government to lay off about one-third of all state employees between 1996 and 2002, the official unemployment rate rose only slightly. Today it is 4% in urban areas, up from 3% in the mid-1990s.　　But the official rate excludes workers laid off by state-owned firms. Thus at the start of this decade, when lay-offs peaked, it hugely understated true unemployment. Over time, as laid-off workers have found jobs or left the labour force, the distortion will have shrunk. Another flaw is that the official unemployment statistics cover only people who are registered as urban dwellers. An estimated 130m migrant workers have moved from the country to the cities, but there is no formal record that they live there, so they are ignored by the statisticians. After adjusting the official figures for these two factors, several studies earlier this decade concluded that the true unemployment rate was above 10%—and might be even as high as 20%.　　If unemployment is already so high, it would not take much of an economic slowdown to push it to crisis levels. However, a more recent study suggests that the jobless rate has fallen a lot since the start of this decade. Albert Park, of the University of Oxford, and Cai Fang and Du Yang, of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, have analysed China』s 2000 census and 2005 mini-census (covering 1% of the population), which include migrant workers. The raw census data suggest that the total urban jobless rate fell from 8.1% in 2000 to 5.2% in 2005. But when the jobless figures are adjusted to an internationally comparable definition, the rate in 2005 was less than 4%.

　　As a crosscheck, the economists also used the 2005 Urban Labour Survey of five big cities. This confirmed that the urban unemployment rate, including migrant workers, had indeed fallen—from 7.3% in 2002 to 4.4% in 2005 (see chart). But the rate for migrant workers is lower than for permanent residents because they return home if they cannot find work. As the chart also shows, excluding migrants, the urban unemployment rate fell from 11.1% to 6.7%. And since 2005, unemployment has undoubtedly fallen further. Earlier this year, factory bosses complained that they could not find enough workers; and faster real-wage growth also suggested that demand for labour was outpacing supply. Thus before China』s economy started to sputter this summer, its jobless rate was probably only 3-4%. One important qualification to these numbers is that China』s labour-force participation rate—ie, those in work or seeking it—fell to 65% in 2005 from 69% in 2000. If discouraged workers have left the labour force because they could not find a job, then the unemployment rate may understate the hardship they face.　　But the finding that unemployment has fallen sharply in China over the past five years makes sense. The right-hand chart, from the World Bank』s latest China Quarterly Update, shows GDP growth relative to its estimated potential growth rate if the economy operated at full capacity. From 2003 to 2007, actual growth ran ahead of potential, so unemployment should indeed have dropped. However, the bank expects China』s growth to fall below trend in 2008 and 2009, implying that unemployment will climb. The bank forecasts growth of only 7.5% next year, its slowest for almost 20 years and well below its estimated potential growth rate of around 9.5%. Jobs are already disappearing—especially in southern China, where thousands of small exporting firms have closed this year.　　Time to rebalance　　Chinese commentators are currently fixated upon whether the economy can continue to grow by at least 8% a year. That was the old rule of thumb for the growth needed to absorb new entrants into the labour market. But that 8% figure has little scientific basis. Over the past decade, the trend growth rate has increased as a result of heavy investment and faster improvements in productivity. Maybe that is why the World Bank reckons that China』s potential growth rate (ie, the rate needed to keep unemployment steady) is now about 9.5%.　　For employment, the type of growth matters as much as its pace. China is creating fewer new jobs than it used to. In the 1980s, each 1% increase in GDP led to a 0.3% rise in employment. Over the past decade, 1% GDP growth has yielded, on average, only a 0.1% gain in jobs. Growth has become less job-intensive, so the economy needs to grow faster to hold down unemployment.　　One reason for this is that the government has favoured capital-intensive industries, such as steel and machinery, rather than services which create more jobs. Louis Kuijs, the main author of the World Bank』s report, argues that China needs to shift the mix of its growth from industry, investment and exports to services and consumption. To adjust the structure of production requires a further strengthening of the yuan, raising the price of energy, scrapping distortions in the tax system which favour manufacturing, and removing various shackles on the services sector.　　More labour-intensive growth would also boost incomes and consumption and so help to reduce China』s embarrassingly large trade surplus. But most important, by allowing more workers to enjoy the rewards of rapid growth, it could help to prevent future social unrest.
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