【AEON】機器人的愛，你會接受嗎？

我們的戀人似乎愛著我們，似乎是自由地選擇了我們。但倘若機器人能模仿他們的行為，那麼我們能否繼續有力地否定機器感情的真實性呢？

機器人的愛，你會接受嗎？

譯者：李林治 & 張嫣

校對：徐唱

編輯：尹子夢

Embracing the robot

與機器人談場戀愛吧

本文選自AEON| 取經號原創翻譯

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Robot relationships need not be kinky, exploitative or fake. In fact they might give human relationships a helpful boost

機器人的感情不應是變態的、受人利用的、或是虛假的。事實上，與機器人的感情可能會有效地助益人際關係。

There is a heartbreaking scene in the middle of Blade Runner 2049 (2017). The hero of the movie, a replicant called K, lives a drab existence in a dystopian, future Los Angeles. The one bright spot in his life is his patient and sympathetic partner, Joi. They share many affectionate moments on screen. But then she is killed, in the midst of declaring her love, in one of the movie』s most gut-wrenching moments. I know I shed a tear when I first saw it.

電影《銀翼殺手2049》有一幕令人心碎。男主角複製人K獨自乏味地生活在未來的洛杉磯，一個反烏托邦世界裡。他生命中唯一的亮光是耐心且富有同情心的夥伴喬希。銀幕上，他們有著許多深情款款的鏡頭。但緊隨其後的便是喬希的「死亡」——她死在吐露愛意的中途，死在電影最令人撕心裂肺的瞬間。當我初次觀影，我也不禁落淚。

affectionate /??fek??n?t/adj. showing in agentleway that you love someone and care about them 充滿深情的

There is, however, something unusual about Joi. She is a mass-produced, artificially intelligent hologram, designed to be the perfect partner. She learns from her interactions with K, and shifts her personality to suit his moods. Her 『death』, such as it is, is due to the fact that she can exist only in the presence of a particular holographic emanator. When it is destroyed, so is she.

但是，喬希並不普通。她是批量出產的人工智慧全息像，出生便被設計為最佳的伴侶。她從與K的互動中學習，並轉換自己的性格來迎合K的情緒。她所謂的「死亡」是因為她只能依靠特定的全息投影設備而存在。當設備被破壞，那便是就是她的消失之時。

Joi would be little more than a science-fiction curio if it were not for the fact that real-world companies are trying to create versions of her. The Japanese company Gatebox, for instance, sells Azuma Hikari. 『She』 is a holographic AI, projected inside a cylindrical tube, who is intended to be an intimate companion. In an advertisement, we see her waking up her (male) user in affectionate tones and greeting him when he comes home at the end of the day. She provides a simulacrum of married life for the growing population of single Japanese men. And it』s not just emotional support that is on the cards – sex is, too. Although this is not a feature of Azuma Hikari, other companies are eagerly racing to create robotic lovers and sexual partners.

倘若現實世界的公司沒有費盡心機地創造如喬希一般的機器人，那麼她也不過就是科幻電影中的一件瑰寶。日本公司Gatebox販售了Azuma Hikari——意在成為人類親密伴侶、投影在圓柱管中的人工智慧全息像。廣告中，她在清晨用親昵的語調喚醒男主人，在主人下班回家時向他問好。她為越來越多的日本單身男性提供模擬的婚後生活。而且，不僅僅是情感支持，性服務也成為可能。儘管Azuma Hikari沒有這樣的功能，但其他公司正爭先恐後地開發機器愛人及其他機器性伴侶。

Is this a welcome development? A number of critics have voiced their concerns. They claim that relationships with robots would be fake and illusory: perceptual tricks, foisted on us by commercially driven corporations. They are also concerned about how these robotic partners will represent real people, particularly women, and the consequences that their use will have for society.

這是一種受歡迎的發展趨勢嗎？一部分批評家已經對此表示擔憂。他們表示，人機戀是虛假的，是一種幻想。它是認知上的錯覺，只是商業公司的營銷手段罷了。他們擔心這些機器人伴侶未來會替代真人，尤其是女性，也對人們使用機器人伴侶後產生的社會影響憂心忡忡。

Contrary to the critics, I believe our popular discourse about robotic relationships has become too dark and dystopian. We overstate the negatives and overlook the ways in which relationships with robots could complement and enhance existing human relationships.

與這些批評相反，我相信大眾對人機戀的看法還是過於黑暗且反面了。我們過分誇大人機戀的缺點，卻忽視了人機戀也能夠彌補甚至增進現存的人際關係。

Philosophers emphasise the need for mutual commitment in any meaningful relationship. It』s not enough for you to feel a strong, emotional attachment to another; they have to feel a similar attachment to you. Robots might be able to perform love, saying and doing all the right things, but performance is insufficient. Furthermore, even if the robot was capable of some genuine mutual commitment, it would have to give this commitment freely. Robots will not choose to love you; they will be programmed to love you, in order to serve the commercial interests of their corporate overlords.

哲學家們強調，若想戀愛關係有意義，相互承諾是必需的。僅僅是一方感受到與另一方的強烈的牽絆是不夠的，另一方也必須能感受到同樣的牽絆。機器人也許能表現出愛，能說好做好所有的事情，但只有表現是不夠的。此外，即便機器人能做出一些真誠的承諾，這些承諾也必須是基於自由的意志。機器人不會自發地選擇愛你，只是程序使然。而這也僅是為了滿足公司巨頭們的商業胃口。

This looks like a powerful set of objections to the possibility of robot-human love. But not all these objections are as persuasive as they first appear. After all, what convinces us that our fellow human beings satisfy the mutuality and free-choice conditions outlined above? It』s hard to see what the answer could be other than the fact that they go through certain behavioural motions that are suggestive of this: they act 『as if』 they love us and 『as if』 they have freely chosen us as their partners. If robots can mimic these behavioural motions, it』s not clear that we would have any ground for denying the genuineness of their affection. The philosopher Michael Hauskeller made this point rather well in Mythologies of Transhumanism (2016):

看起來，這些都是反對人機戀強有力的證據。但是，並非所有的證據都如表面所顯示的那樣具有說服力。歸根到底，是什麼讓我們深信人類在戀愛中滿足了上述的相互性和自由性呢？除了參照特定的行為，我們很難回答這個問題：他們「似乎」愛著我們，「好像」是自由地選擇了我們。但倘若機器人能模仿這些行為，那麼，我們能否繼續有力地否定機器感情的真實性呢？這將不得而知。哲學家Michael Hauskeller在Mythologies of Transhumanism（2016）一書很好地論述了這一觀點：

It is difficult to see what this love … should consist in, if not a certain kind of loving behaviour… if our lover』s behaviour toward us is unfailingly caring and loving, and respectful of our needs, then we would not really know what to make of the claim that they do not really love us at all, but only appear to do so.

如果沒有某種愛的表現方式，我們便很難感知愛的存在……如果我們的另一半始終如一地關切、愛護並尊重我們的需求，那麼我們便無法得知他們是否其實根本不愛我們，只是表現得如此而已。

The same goes for concerns about free choice. It is, of course, notoriously controversial whether or not humans have free choice, and not just the illusion of that; but if we need to believe that our lovers freely choose their ongoing commitment to us, then it is hard to know what could ground that belief other than certain behavioural indicators that are suggestive of this, eg their apparent willingness to break the commitment when we upset or disappoint them. There is no reason why such behavioural mimicry needs to be out of bounds for robots. Elsewhere, I have defended this view of human-robot relations under the label 『ethical behaviourism』, which is a position that holds that the ultimate epistemic grounding for our beliefs about the value of relationships lies in the detectable behavioural and functional patterns of our partners, not in some deeper metaphysical truths about their existence.

這樣的擔憂同時適用於自由選擇。當然，人類的自由選擇是否只是錯覺還飽受爭議。但如果要相信我們的愛人是基於自由意志自然而然地愛上我們，那除了某些能給出暗示的特定行為（如我們沮喪或對其失望時，他們明確地想要毀壞承諾），我們再無根據。同理，我們也沒有理由來懷疑模仿這些行為是超出機器人能力範圍的。此外，從「道德行為主義」這一點來看，我也堅決捍衛人機戀。「道德行為主義」者認為：人際關係的價值是基於另一半可觀察的行為及功能模式，而非基於在關於他們存在性的一些更深層的形而上真理。

notorious / n???t??ri?s/ adj. famousor well known for something bad臭名昭著的

Ethical behaviourism is a bitter pill for some. Even though he expresses the view well, Hauskeller, to take just one example, ultimately disagrees with it when it comes to human-robot relationships. He argues that the reason why behavioural patterns are enough to convince us that our human partners are in love with us is because we have no reason to doubt the sincerity of those behaviours. The problem with robots is that we do have such reasons:

道德行為主義對一些人來便是一種困擾了。例如Hauskeller，即便他很好地表述了上述想法，但他最終仍反對人機戀。他認為，行為模式之所以能讓我們相信，我們的另一半確實與我們墜入愛河，是因為我們沒有理由懷疑人類行為是否真誠。但是，機器人的問題在於，我們確實有充分理由去質疑它們的真實性：

As long as we have an alternative explanation for why the robot behaves that way (namely, that it has been designed and programmed to do so), we have no good reason to believe that its actions are expressive of anything at all.

只要我們能夠用另一種方式解釋機器人的行為模式（即它的設計及方案要求如此），我們便無法相信機器人的行為能自如地表達任意想法。

Put differently: (i) because the robot has a different developmental origin to a human lover and/or (ii) because it is ultimately programmed (and controlled) by others, who might have ulterior motives, there is no reason to think that you are in a meaningful relationship with it.

換句話說，（1）由於機器人與人類的發展起源不同，且/或（2）機器人最終是由他人預設或控制的，設計者可能利用機器人別有所圖。因此，人機戀是毫無意義的。

But (i) is difficult to justify in this context. Unless you think that biological tissue is magic, or you are a firm believer in mind-body dualism, there is little reason to doubt that a robot that is behaviourally and functionally equivalent to a human cannot sustain a meaningful relationship. There is, after all, every reason to suspect that we are programmed, by evolution and culture, to develop loving attachments to one another. It might be difficult to reverse-engineer our programming, but this is increasingly true of robots too, particularly when they are programmed with learning rules that help them to develop their own responses to the world.

但是，第一點難以被辯證。除非你認為人的生物組織是憑空出現的魔法，又或者你堅信身心二元論，否則不太可能質疑一個功能與行為都與人類無異的機器人無法保持有意義的聯結關係。畢竟，我們也完全有理由懷疑，人類是受文化進化「編碼」而成，從而誕生了一顆能夠彼此相愛的心。或許我們很難「逆向改變」，但機器人也越漸如此——尤其當它們被設置為能夠通過機器學習來改進對周圍世界的反饋時。

The second element (ii) provides more reason to doubt the meaningfulness of robot relationships, but two points arise. First, if the real concern is that the robot serves ulterior motives and that it might betray you at some later point, then we should remember that relationships with humans are fraught with similar risks. As the philosopher Alexander Nehamas points out in On Friendship (2016), this fragility and possibility of betrayal is often what makes human relationships so valuable. Second, if the concern is about the ownership and control, then we should remember that ownership and control are socially constructed facts that can be changed if we think it morally appropriate. Humans once owned and controlled other humans but we (or at least most of us) eventually saw the moral error in this practice. We might learn to see a similar moral error in owning and controlling robots, particularly if they are behaviourally indistinguishable from human lovers.

第二點讓我們有更多理由去質疑人機戀的意義，但同時我們也需要思考一下兩點。首先，如果我們真的擔心機器人會被人利用，擔心它會在將來的某天背叛我們，那麼我們也得記住人類的關係也面對著同樣的風險。正如哲學家亞歷山大·尼赫瑪斯在《論友誼》一書中指出，正是因為脆弱並存在被背叛的風險，人們的感情才顯得彌足珍貴。其次，如果我們擔心的是機器人的所有權和控制權，那麼我們得明白，這種我們認為道德正確的所有權和控制權是由社會建構的並不穩定的。一部分人類曾經也佔有並控制其他人類，但最終我們發現這是一種道德錯誤（至少大部分人是如此）。如果我們試圖佔有並控制機器人，特別是當機器人在行為上與人類伴侶無異時，我們也會發現自己在犯下同樣的道德錯誤。

ulterior motive/purpose etc. a reason for doing something that you deliberately hide in order to get anadvantagefor yourself 別有用心

The argument above is merely a defence of the philosophical possibility of robot lovers. There are obviously several technical and ethical obstacles that would need to be cleared in order to realise this possibility. One major ethical obstacle concerns how robots represent (or performatively mimic) human beings. If you look at the current crop of robotic partners, they seem to embody some problematic, gendered assumptions about the nature of love and sexual desire. Azuma Hikari, the holographic partner, represents a sexist ideal of the domestic housewife, and in the world of sex dolls and sexbot prototypes, things are even worse: we see a 『pornified』 ideal of female sexuality being represented and reinforced.

以上的觀點僅僅是在哲學層面對機器愛人的辯護。真正實現這種可能很明顯還需要解決一些技術和道德上的阻礙。其中一個主要的道德阻礙在於機器人如何代表（或者行為上模仿）人類。如果你觀察現在的機器人伴侶，他們似乎在關於愛和性慾的性別假設上存在問題。全息投影伴侶Azuma Hikari (因為前面用了英文，我這兒就follow了)代表了對於家庭主婦的性別歧視；而在性玩偶和性機器人的世界裡，情況則更糟：我們看到機器人呈現和加強了「色情化」的女性性徵。

This has a lot of people worried. For instance, Sinziana Gutiu, a lawyer in Vancouver specialising in cyberliability, is concerned that sexbots convey the image of women as sexual tools:

有很多人在擔心這個問題。例如森濟婭娜·古提——溫哥華網路責任專業的律師——擔心性愛機器人會傳達女人就是性工具的觀念：

To the user, the sex robot looks and feels like a real woman who is programmed into submission … The sex robot is an ever-consenting sexual partner …

對於用戶來說，性愛機器人就像一個因編程而服從的真實女人……性愛機器人永遠都會是一個心甘情願的性伴侶……

Gutiu thinks that this will enable users to 『act out rape fantasies and confirm rape myths』. Kathleen Richardson, a professor of ethics and culture of robotics at De Montfort University in Leicester and the co-founder of the Campaign Against Sex Robots, has similar concerns, arguing that sexbots effectively represent women as sexual commodities to be bought and sold. While both these critics draw a link between such representations and broader social consequences, others (myself included) focus specifically on the representations themselves. In this sense, the debate plays out much like the long-standing debates about the moral propriety of pornography.

古提認為，這將能夠使用戶『宣洩強姦的幻想並實現強姦的荒誕想法』。凱瑟琳·理查德森是萊斯特德蒙福特大學機器人倫理和文化專業的一名教授，她同時也是打擊性機器人運動的共同發起人。她同樣擔心性愛機器人把女性表現成待售的性商品。當這兩種批評將表現形式和深遠的社會結果聯繫起來時，其他人（包括我）則特別關注在表現形式本身。從這個角度看，這更像是長久以來關於色情影片道德問題的爭論。

Let』s set the concerns about consequences to one side for now, and consider whether there is something representationally disturbing about robot lovers. Do they necessarily convey or express problematic attitudes toward women (or men)? To answer that, we need to think about how symbolic practices and artefacts carry meaning in the first place. Their meaning is a function of their content, ie what they resemble (or, more importantly, what they are taken to resemble by others) and the context in which they are created, interpreted and used. There is a complex interplay between content and context when it comes to meaning. Content that seems offensive and derogatory in one context can be empowering and subversive in another. Videos and images that depict relationships of subordination and domination can be demeaning in certain contexts (eg, when produced and consumed by purveyors of mainstream hardcore pornography), but carry a more positive meaning in others (eg, when produced and consumed by members of the BDSM community or by proponents of 『feminist pornography』).

讓我們先把對於後果的擔憂放在一邊，想想機器情人是否有什麼明顯令人討厭的地方。他們真的傳達或表達了對女人（或男人）有問題的態度嗎？為了解答這個問題，我們需要思考象徵性行為和人工製品一開始是如何變得有意義的。他們的意義其實是內容的一種功能：例如他像什麼（或者，更重要的，他們被別人拿來比作什麼），以及他們在什麼背景下被創造、解讀和使用。在談及意義時，內容和背景之間存在一種複雜的相互作用。在一種背景下看起來冒犯和不敬的內容，在另一種背景下會變得有力和具有顛覆性。在某些背景下（比如，由主流硬派色情影片的贊助商所生產和消費的背景），描述主從和支配關係的錄像和圖片是有損人格的，但在其他背景下（比如，由BDSM社區成員或者『女權色情片』的支持者生產和消費的背景），它們有著更積極的意義。

derogatory / d??r?ɡ?t?ri/ adj. derogatoryremarks,attitudesetc. areinsultinganddisapproving 貶損的

This has implications for assessing the representational harms of robot lovers because neither their content nor the context in which they are used is fixed or immutable. It is almost certainly true that the current look and appearance of robot lovers is representationally problematic, particularly in the contexts in which they are produced, promoted and used. But it is possible to change this. We can learn here from the history of the 『feminist porn』 movement, a sub-culture within pornography that maintains that pornographic representations of women need not be derogatory or subordinating, and that they can play a positive role in sexual self-expression.

這會影響評估機器愛人的代表性傷害，因為他們所使用的內容和背景既不固定也並非不可改變。幾乎能確定的是，機器愛人的出現以及它現在的外觀是有問題的——尤其是在它們的生產、宣傳和使用的背景下。但這是有可能改變的。我們從『女權色情片』運動的歷史中學到，色情片內的次文化堅持認為，代表女人的色情產物不需要有冒犯之意，也不需要表示從屬關係。它們可以在性表達上起到積極的作用。

To do this, proponents of the feminist porn movement pursue three main strategies: (i) they try to change the content of porn, so that it is not always from the male gaze, and so that it depicts a more diverse range of activities and forms; (ii) they try to change the processes through which porn is created, making it more ethical and inclusive of female voices; and (iii) they try to change the contexts in which it is consumed, creating networks of feminist sex shops and discussion groups for marketing and interpreting the content.

為了傳達這一理念，女權色情片運動的支持者致力於三大戰略：（1）他們試圖改變色情片的內容，這樣一來就不會總是男性觀看者居多，而且還能顯得更多元；（2）他們試圖改變色情片的拍攝過程，讓它更合乎道德，包含更多女性的聲音；（3）他們試圖改變色情片的消費環境，創造出女權性商店網和討論小組，以此推銷和解讀他們的理念。

A similar set of strategies could be followed in the case of sexbots. We could work to change the representational forms of sexbots so that they include diverse female, male and non-binary body shapes, and follow behavioural scripts (pre-programmed or learned) that do not serve to reinforce negative stereotypes, and perhaps even promote positive ones. We could also seek to change the processes through which sexbots get created and designed, encouraging a more diverse range of voices in the process. To this end, we could work to promote women who are already active in sextech. Finally, we could also create better contexts for the marketing and use of sex robots. This would require greater 『consciousness raising』 around the problems of gendered harassment and inequality, and a greater sensitivity to the representational harms that could be implicated by this technology.

機器愛人可以遵循類似的戰略。我們可以努力改變機器愛人所代表的樣子，以此包含形形色色的女性、男性、或非二元身體；同時我們可以（通過默認程序或機器學習）讓機器愛人符合行為規範——減弱負面的固定模式、甚至宣傳積極正面的模式。我們還可以改變設計和生產機器愛人的過程、鼓勵製造過程中多元化的聲音。為此目的，我們可以努力宣傳那些已經活躍在性科技領域的女性。最後，我們還能為推銷和使用性機器人創造更好的環境。這需要人們提升對性騷擾和不平等問題的意識，也需要人們對可能會遭受此技術牽連的代表性問題更加敏感

We are already starting to do this, but it is undoubtedly an uphill battle that requires more effort. Given this difficulty, it is going to be tempting to slip back into calling for bans on the production of such content, but censorious attitudes are unlikely to be successful. We have always used technology for the purposes of sexual stimulation and gratification, and we will continue to do so in the future.

我們已經開始做這件事。但這場漫長而艱難的戰鬥無疑需要更多努力。由於這樣的困難，退回到呼籲禁止生產那種產品是很吸引人的。但是一昧批評的態度是不太可能會成功的。一直以來，我們都通過技術來達到性刺激和性滿足，而以後我們依舊會如此。

Concerns about the representational harms of robots often translate into concerns about their consequences. If robots represent or express misogynistic attitudes, the worry is that these attitudes will get reinforced in how users interact with real people. They will be inclined to sexual aggression and violence, be unwilling to compromise, and possibly become more withdrawn and misanthropic.

對於機器人代表性傷害問題的擔憂，經常可以解讀為對它們所帶來的後果的擔憂。如果機器人代表或表達了厭惡女性的態度，需要擔憂的是這種態度在用戶與現實生活中的真人互動時會變得愈發強烈。他們將會更傾向於性攻擊和性暴力、會變得不願妥協、也可能會變得更內向以及更厭世。

Obviously, the consequences of robot lovers would be extremely relevant to any debate about their desirability. If the consequences were clearly and uncontroversially negative, then this would reinforce any negative social meaning they might have, and provide us with strong reasons to discourage their use. If the consequences were clearly and uncontroversially positive (eg, because their use actually discouraged real-world sexual violence), then their negative social meaning could be reformed, and we might have strong reason to encourage their use.

很顯然，機器愛人所帶來的後果會和任何關於它們的慾望的爭論高度相關。如果這些後果既明顯又毫無爭議是負面的，那這將深化所有它們可能代表的負面社會意義，並且會給我們足夠的、拒絕使用它們的理由。如果這些結果明顯且毫無爭議是正面的（比如，由於使用它們而阻止了真實世界的性暴力），那麼它們負面的社會意義可能會被改善，且為我們提供強力的、使用它們的理由。

The problem is that we don』t know which of these two possibilities is more likely right now. We don』t have any empirical studies on the effects of robot-lovers. One possibility follows directly from the claim that meaningful relationships with robots are possible. If this is correct, it means that the goods we currently associate with human relationships are also realisable in robot relationships. This could be a positive consequence because it would enable us to distribute these relationship goods more widely. The philosopher Neil McArthur at the University of Manitoba makes this point specifically in relation to sexual relationships, arguing that there are many people who are excluded from the possibility of entering into valuable sexual relationships with other human beings. If we grant that sexual experiences are part of the well-lived life, and that there might even be a right to sex, this should be seen as a problem. Furthermore, the problem goes beyond sex: people are shut out from other relationship goods too, such as companionship and care. It is not possible to resolve this imbalance in the distribution of relationship goods by trying to find a human partner for everyone, since doing so would probably require mass coercion or compulsion, but it might be possible to do so with robotic relationship partners.

問題是，我們不知道現在的情況更像哪種可能性。對於機器愛人，我們沒有任何實證研究。一種可能性直接源於相信人和機器人之間可能存在有意義的關係。如果這種論調是對的，那這意味著現在在人際關係中產生的的益處在人機關係中也能實現。這可能是一個積極的結果，因為它能使我們更廣地傳播這些關係益處。馬尼托巴大學的哲學教授尼爾·麥克阿瑟把這個觀點和性關係直接聯繫起來。他表示很多人被別人排除在有價值的性關係之外。如果我們認同性經驗是幸福生活的一部分，甚至性生活是每個人應有的權利，那麼這應該被當成一個問題。此外，問題不止是性：人們同樣被排除在如陪伴和關愛這樣的關係益處之外的。通過給每一個人找一個伴侶來解決這種關係益處分配不平衡的問題是不可能的，因為這麼做可能需要大範圍的強制措施。但這可能在機器人伴侶身上實現。

empirical / ?m?p?r?k?l/ adj. based onscientifictesting orpracticalexperience, not on ideas基於經驗的

In addition to this, it is a mistake to always think of robots as replacements for human lovers; we could also view them as complements to existing relationships. The ideal of human intimacy holds that we should relate to one another on terms of equality. But this is often not possible. Robotic partners could help to redress these imbalances by providing third-party outlets that are less destructive of the human-to-human relationship because they might be less likely to be perceived as rivals.

此外，一直認為機器人是人類情人的代替品是錯誤的；我們也可以把它們當成現有關係的補充。理想的人類親密關係包括我們應該平等地對待彼此。但這經常是不可能的。機器伴侶或許可以幫助改變這種不平等：作為第三方的一種宣洩口，它比起人對人的關係的破壞性更小，因為他們不太可能被當成對手。

In the coming decades, people will almost certainly be having relationships with more sophisticated robots, whatever we think about this. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with loving a robot, and some forms of human-robot love could complement and enhance human relationships. At the same time, some could be socially destructive, and it is important that they are anticipated and discouraged. The key question, then, is not whether we can prevent this from happening, but what sort of human-robot relationships we should tolerate and encourage.

未來數十年，無論我們怎麼想，人們幾乎一定會和更多複雜的機器人發展出各種關係。愛上一個機器人本質上並沒錯，一些形式的人機愛戀還可能加強人際關係。但同時，另一些可能對社會造成破壞。而對這些愛戀的預測和阻止是非常重要的。那麼，問題的關鍵就不在於我們是否能夠防止它發生，而在於我們應該忍受和鼓勵何種類型的人機關係。

intrinsic / ?n?tr?ns?k/ adj. being part of thenatureorcharacterof someone or something 固有的、本質的

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