巴菲特答股東問5（銀行業5：富國銀行、所羅門以及華爾街文化）

來自專欄巴菲特Q&A翻譯組

本周繼續發布銀行業的問題。這是1996-2000年間的6道問題，問題主要圍繞著富國銀行（巴菲特的重要持倉）、所羅門兄弟（當時巴菲特正持有優先股）以及華爾街的文化和高額工資：

14. We』ll 「probably」 own M&T Bank stock 10 years from now 【2000】

18. Confident about Salomon but not rest of Wall St. 【1997】

28. No 「secret formulas」 for Wells Fargo 【1996】

19. Why Wall Street businesses are 「tough」 to manage 【1996】

23. Volatile earnings to be expected at Salomon 【1996】

32. 「No magic」 to running a bank — just don』t do 「something foolish」 【1996】

14. We』ll 「probably」 own M&T Bank stock 10 years from now

年份: 2000年

行業: Financials

細分行業: Banking

公司: M&T BANK

翻譯: yT

校對: Tiger虎

14. We』ll 「probably」 own M&T Bank stock 10 years from now

我們「可能」將會持有M&T銀行的股票十年以上

WARREN BUFFETT: We』ll go to 4, please.

巴菲特：下面一個問題來自4號區。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Jerry Zucker, Los Angeles, California. Good morning, boss. (Laughter)

聽眾：我是來自加州洛杉磯的Jerry Zucker。早上好，老闆（笑聲）

Calling your attention to the annual report and major investments, I』d appreciate your

comments on two companies.

關於年度報告和重大投資（應該是從年報中得到的重大投資信息），希望您能評論一下這兩個公司，非常感謝。

Number one, M&T Bank, a new name to that list, but not exactly a household name, at least on the West Coast.

第一個是M&T銀行，一個出現在投資名單里的新名字，這不是一個家喻戶曉的名字，至少在美國西海岸來說。

And company number two, definitely a household name, but missing from the list this year, the Walt Disney Corporation.

而第二家公司，肯定是家喻戶曉的，但是卻在今年的名單當中找不到它了，華特迪士尼公司。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we don』t comment much on our holdings, particularly as to purchases or sales, but we do have the CEO — longtime CEO — of M&T here today, Bob Wilmers. Bob, would you stand up? He should be up here somewhere. There he is. (Applause)

巴菲特：我們通常不會評論我們的持股，特別是購買/售出決策，但今天M&T銀行的CEO Bob Wilmers就在現場，Bob，你可以站起來嗎？他應該在這裡的某個地方，看到他了（鼓掌）。

Bob is a terrific businessman, a terrific banker, and a terrific citizen. I』ve known him a long time. A good friend of Stan Lipsey, our publisher in Buffalo. Bob runs the kind

of a bank that allows Charlie and me to sleep very comfortably.

Bob是一個出色的生意人，一個出色的銀行家，還是一個出色的公民。我認識他很久了，他也是我們在Buffalo的新聞出版人 Stan Lipsey 的好朋友，Bob運作著那種能讓我和查理睡的非常安穩的銀行。

Someone once said there are more banks than bankers, which is something worth thinking about a little bit. But believe me, Bob is a banker and he』s done a lot for

Buffalo.

有人說銀行的數量比銀行家的數量要多，這是值得我們思考的。但相信我，Bob是一個銀行家，他為Buffalo貢獻了良多。

And he runs — he』s got a — he has a very big ownership position, which he achieved, at least in very large part, through purchase with his own money, as opposed to having options. He』s got one of the largest ownership positions, probably, among the hundred largest banks in the United States.

他擁有著非常多數量的M&T銀行股份，其中相當部分是用他自己的錢購買的，而不是持有期權。他在M&T銀行的所有權可能是美國百大銀行里（個人擁有的）最大的。

And it』s just a very attractive business for us to be in, and we』re very comfortable

with it. And 10 years from now, Bob will be here, and I hope I』m here. We will — we』ll probably own M&T.

（M&T銀行）是我們參與的一個非常具有吸引力的生意，我們對此感到非常滿意。十年後Bob會在這，我希望我也在這，我們還將一起持有著M&T銀行。

The Disney Company, our ownership in that fell below the threshold level which we used, although we had ownership. And we think Disney is a terrific business. Michael Eisner』s done a great job there.

至於迪士尼公司，我們的持股量下降到了我們設置的門檻。我們認為迪士尼是一門出色的生意，Michael Eisner(迪士尼公司的CEO)幹得非常出色。

We have — as we put in the annual report — we have mildly reduced equities as prices

began to — generally — began to get more and more full.

就像在年報里提及的，隨著股價開始上漲，我們輕微的減少了持股數量。

We do not think the general ownership of equities is going to be very exciting over the next 10 or 15 years, so we would like to buy businesses.

我們認為股票市場在接下來的10到15年不會令人感到興奮，所以我們更傾向於收購生意。

We bought a few last year. We had this one we announced last week in the insurance field. We got another small acquisition where we』ve got an agreement with somebody. It』s very small.

去年我們完成了一些收購。其中一項在上周公布了，這是一門保險領域的生意。我們跟某人協議得到了一小部分所有權，非常小。

But we would love it if those were 10 times that size or 20 times that size, because — you will see more of that, relative to marketable securities, as we go along.

如果交易的規模比這個大十倍甚至二十倍，我們會更加高興如果。接下來，相比有價證券投資，我們會做更多的收購。

Charlie?

查理你說呢？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, regarding equities generally, I think that Fortune article, which was sent out to the Berkshire shareholders this year, should be absolutely must-reading for everybody. In fact, it would be a good thing to read two or three times.

查理：是的。總體來說關於股票，我認為《財富》的文章，就是已經發送給全體伯克希爾公司股東的那篇，對所有人來說都是必讀的，實際上，讀個兩三遍會更好。

The ideas there sound so simple, that —you know, people have the theory that they must understand it. But I think the world is more complicated than that. I think we are in for reduced expectations eventually, with respect to the kind of returns people have had from investing in stocks.

那些概念聽起來非常簡單，人們覺得自己肯定理解它。但是我認為世界比那遠複雜多了，就人們投資股票獲得的回報而言，我認為大家應該降低預期。

WARREN BUFFETT: You want to offer any thoughts as to what — that might — what the corollary might be?

巴菲特：你能展開說說嗎?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think if you have very unreasonable expectations of life, it makes life much more miserable. Much better to get your expectations within reason.

查理：我認為如果你對人生抱有不合理的期望，那樣只會使你過得更痛苦。而擁有合理的期望值會好得多。

It』s much easier to reduce expectations to some reasonable level than it is to get superhuman achievements.

相對於取得超人的成就，降低期望值到合理的水平上，是容易得多的。

WARREN BUFFETT: That』s why my kids were almost delirious when they heard that announcement I was going to give them $300 each and they — (Laughter) How to be — do you want to be a zillionaire, or whatever it was.

巴菲特：這就是為什麼我的孩子們聽到我會給他們每個人300美元的時候極度興奮（笑聲），而不是讓他們成為一個超級有錢的傢伙或者完成任何其他（困難的事情）。

Incidentally, that was terrific of Regis Philbin to do something like that. I mean, all of those appearances [in the video shown to shareholders] are nonpaid, I can assure you.

(Laughter)

順便說一句，Regis Philbin太棒了，他做得就是這樣的事。我的意思是，我可以向你保證，(在向股東展示的視頻中)所有這些人的出境都是無償的。(笑聲)

[Regis Philbin, 著名主持人，主持的「誰想成為百萬富問」是熱門節目，參與者通過問題搶答的形式有機會獲得一百萬美金]

And those people are good — very, very, good sports. And I thank them.

那些人都是非常非常要好的朋友。我感謝他們的參與。

-END-

18. Confident about Salomon but not rest of Wall St.

對所羅門公司有信心 但並非所有的華爾街公司

年份: 1997年

行業: Financials

細分行業: Banking

公司: SALOMON

翻譯: david

校對: 王子晨

18. Confident about Salomon but not rest of Wall St.

對所羅門公司有信心 但並非所有的華爾街公司

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, gentlemen. My name is Cary Blecker (PH) from Wellington, Florida.

提問：早上好。我是來自佛羅里達惠靈頓的Cary Blecker。

I know in 1987 when you purchased — or invested — in the Salomon Brothers convertible preferred stock, you had the eight-year time frame to convert it into common or take the cash out. I know in 』95 you took cash out, which was not a vote of confidence for Salomon Brothers. Any feelings on that in the future?

我記得你在1987年購買了——或者說投資了——所羅門兄弟的可轉換優先股，在長達8年的時間裡，你可以選擇是將其轉換成普通股或是贖回並獲得現金。而在95年你選擇了獲得現金，顯然你對所羅門兄弟信心不足。未來你會怎麼決定？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We — as the gentleman mentioned, we bought it in 1987, and starting in 1995 we have a — we have, every year for five years, we either have to take cash or convert to common, 20 percent of the original issue of 700 million.

巴菲特：這位先生說的沒錯，我們是在1987年作出的投資。從1995年開始的5年時間，我們每年要做一個決定：選擇將原始投資的7億美金中的20%變現或者轉換成普通股。

We don』t have to make those decisions ahead of time. So we, in 1995, we elected to take cash. In 1996 we elected to take stock.

我們不需要提前作出決定。在1995年，我們選擇了現金贖回；在隨後的1996年，我們選擇了轉股。

And you know, we see no reason ever to swing at the ball while it』s still in the pitcher』s glove. We』d just as soon wait till it gets to the plate to make the decision. So the ball will get to the plate on October 31st of 1997, I believe, for the next 20 percent. And we』ll decide whether to swing at that point. But we don』t need to make that decision today.

在棒球場上，當球還在投手手套里的時候，擊球手並不需要揮棒。等球到本壘板的時候再揮棒不遲。對於我們來說，下一個球（現金贖回或者轉股的機會）會在1997年10月31日到達本壘板，到那時我們再決定是否揮棒，現在還不到做決定的時候。

I would say that, you know, the odds are overwhelming that we』ll convert, but we』ll wait until that time to make the final decision.

我覺得轉股的可能性非常大，不過最終決定要到那個時候才做出。

We have terrific confidence in the people that run Salomon. They helped us through some incredibly dark days in the past, and showed the stuff of which they were made. And so we feel very good about that.

我們對所羅門現在的管理層非常有信心。他們幫我們度過了一段非常黑暗的日子，展現了他們崇高的品德，給我們留下了非常好的印象。

We don』t have the same degree of conviction about the profitability of the investment banking or brokerage business as a whole.

不過我們對公司的投行和經紀業務整體的盈利能力沒那麼有把握。

It』s not the sort of — you don』t develop that kind of conviction about that business versus a Coca-Cola or something. They』re different. They have different economic characteristics.

所羅門的商業模式，決定了它無法像可口可樂那樣具有高度的確定性。它們的經濟特性不同。

So we will see how the businesses — the industry — evolves. But we feel very good about the management, and the odds are extremely high that we will convert. But we will swing at the ball when it gets to the plate.

我們會繼續觀察整個行業的發展。我們相信管理層，轉股的概率極高，到最終時刻我們會作出決定。

Charlie?

查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No more.

查理：沒什麼可說。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK.

巴菲特：好。

-END-

總結：關於所羅門兄弟可轉換優先股的投資，巴菲特相信公司管理層的人品，最差情況是每年投資到期償還現金。至於是否轉股，每年到最後時刻再做決定，要看是否有機可圖（轉股價和現價孰高孰低）。

28. No 「secret formulas」 for Wells Fargo

年份: 1996年

行業: Financials

細分行業: Banking

公司: WFC

翻譯: david

校對: 王子晨

28. No 「secret formulas」 for Wells Fargo

富國銀行沒有「秘密配方」

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4.

巴菲特：第四區提問。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, my name is Hugh Stephenson. I』m a shareholder from Atlanta, Georgia.

聽眾：巴菲特您好，我叫Hugh Stephenson，我是一名來自喬治亞州亞特蘭大的投資者。

My question involves the company』s interest in Wells Fargo. As you know, Wells Fargo, like most banks, has a very expensive branch system for deposit-gathering and servicing their customers.

我的問題是關於富國銀行的。像大多數銀行一樣，富國銀行在吸收存款和服務客戶上所投入的網點建設成本非常高昂。

As I guess you know, they also have moved more into branches in supermarkets and in online banking that seems to have the potential to very significantly reduce their costs, relative to the branch system.

他們已將更多的分支機構開在超市，並很可能拓展網上銀行業務從而大幅削減成本。

Would you comment on how you think that might play out and how significant it might be?

你能否評價下此舉的重要性以及可能帶來的影響嗎？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the question — you』re right. Wells Fargo has been a leader in moving into supermarkets. They』ve got a couple different formats they』ve used. And they』ve been a — they』ve certainly been a leader in the online banking services.

巴菲特：你說的沒錯，富國銀行將網點開在超市這一步很領先。他們削減成本的方式有好幾種。在網上銀行業務這塊，毫無疑問他們也是行業領導者。

Unfortunately, in banking, you know, it』s a little hard to have any secret formulas. Coca-Cola has 7X down there in the vaults of the, what used to be the Trust Company of Georgia, now SunTrust. But in the banking business, anything you do, your competitors can copy.

不幸的是，在銀行業，想要有成功的秘方不太現實。可口可樂把他們的秘密配方保管在喬治亞信託（曾用名），現在叫太陽信託的銀行的保險庫里，別人無法竊取。但是在銀行業，你做出的任何決策，你的競爭對手都能模仿。

Nevertheless, there』s a — there is an advantage. And sometimes it can be a quite — a significant advantage in being first and learning more about different distribution methods. And I think Wells Fargo has done a terrific job in learning that.

話說回來，富國銀行還是有優勢的。有時候處於行業領先並深入了解不同的分銷渠道會創造非常大的優勢。富國銀行就做得不錯。

I think they』ve got some advantages. They — but they aren』t advantages that other people can』t work at copying and chipping away at.

他們的確有一定的優勢，但他們的優勢沒有大到別人無法模仿並學會的地步。

But it』s a good management. They』ve done a very good job of seizing on that particular trend in supermarkets.

他們的管理層很優秀，在超市網點布局上做得很好。

And as such, they are — they have the potential, perhaps, for having a relatively low-cost deposit-gathering operation. And every other bank in the world will be looking, noticing how that works, not only there but at other banks, to figure out whether they can copy it. Charlie? OK.

通過這種方式，他們或許能以相對低成本吸納存款。其它的銀行都會觀望，看這種方式效果如何，然後想辦法模仿。

-END-

總結：對於銀行來說，並沒有哪家能保持絕對的競爭優勢，大家的經營方式都可以互相抄襲。但是富國銀行在發展超市網點和網上銀行方面領先了其它銀行，能夠因此降低成本，創造一定的競爭優勢。

19. Why Wall Street businesses are 「tough」 to manage

年份: 1996年

行業: Financials

細分行業: Banking

公司:

翻譯: Tiger虎

校對: 王子晨

19. Why Wall Street businesses are 「tough」 to manage

為什麼華爾街的企業很難管理

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5?

巴菲特：第五區提問？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I』m Randall Bellows (PH) from Chicago. Thank you for this marathon question-and-answer period.

聽眾：我是來自芝加哥的Randall。謝謝您提供這樣馬拉松式的問答環節。

WARREN BUFFETT: We enjoy it. Thanks.

巴菲特：我們很享受，謝謝。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. My question is on the security business, Wall Street firms, in general, and specifically, what you feel about Salomon at this time. Thank you.

聽眾：謝謝。我的問題是關於證券市場和華爾街的，特別是您對所羅門兄弟公司的看法。再次感謝。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we know more about the security business than we knew 10 years ago. (Laughter) And it, you know, it is a tough business to manage.

巴菲特：我們對證券行業比十年前了解得更多了。(笑聲)這是一個很難管理的行業。

There』s a lot of money made in the business and then — throughout Wall Street, I』m talking about. There』s, you know, there』s very big sums of money made. And then the question is, how does it get divided up between the institution and the people there?

這個行業賺了很多錢——我指的是整個華爾街。人們掙了很多很多錢。問題是，這些錢該如何在機構和個人之間分配呢?

And you get to this question — I』ve often used the analogy of, you know, would you rather — if you』re an investor, and you get a chance to buy the Mayo Clinic, you know, that is one sort of an investment. And if you get a chance to buy the local brain surgeon, that』s another one.

最終還是來到這個問題，我經常用類似的類比，如果你是投資者，有機會購買梅奧診所，那是一種投資。如果你有機會購買一個當地的腦外科醫生，那是另一種投資。

You buy the local brain surgeon and his practice for X millions of dollars. And the next day, you know, what do you own?

你花了幾百萬美元買了當地的腦外科醫生和他的腦外科手術生意。第二天，你擁有什麼呢?

And if you』re buying the local brain surgeon, you would not pay any real multiple of earnings because he』s going to have this revelation, several days later, that it』s really him and not you there, with your little stock certificate, that』s producing the earnings. And it』s his reputation. And he doesn』t care.

如果你要買當地的腦外科醫生，你並不會支付未來收益的多少倍來獲得這個生意，因為幾天後他會發現，真正創造收益的是他自己，而不是你的那點微乎其微的投入。真正創造收益的是他的聲譽，他不在乎你那點小錢。

Can you imagine Berkshire Hathaway advertising brain surgery, you know, how much business we would do?

你能想像如果伯克希爾為腦外科手術做廣告，我們會有多少生意嗎？

So — (laughter) — he owns the business, even though you』ve got the stock certificate.

實際上，還是這個醫生掌控著自己的生意，儘管你有投資他。

Now, if you go to the Mayo Clinic, no one can name the name of anybody at the Mayo Clinic, unless you live within 10 miles of Rochester [Minnesota].

如果你買的是梅奧醫學中心（全美最大最領先的醫療機構），而不是醫學中心裡的某個醫生，除非你住在明尼蘇達州的羅切斯特附近10英里之內【注1】。

And there, the institution has the power. Now, it has to keep quality up and do all the things that an institution has to do. But whoever owns the Mayo Clinic has an asset that is independent of the attitude of any one person in the place the next day.

在那裡，機構有權力。它必須保持質量，做所有機構必須做的事情。但是，不管誰擁有梅奧診所，這個資產都不會在第二天因為任何個人的態度受到不良影響。

Wall Street has a mix of both. And there are some businesses that are more — where the value resides more in the institution. And there are some where the value resides more in the individuals.

華爾街兼而有之。企業的價值更多地存在於機構中。而有些價值則存在於個人身上。

We』ve got a couple of sensational people running Salomon. And they wrestle with this problem as they go along. And they seem to be wrestling considerably more successfully currently than was the case close to a year ago.

我們有幾個非常棒的人在經營所羅門公司。他們在一起的時候，他們會解決這個問題。與一年前相比，他們現在做的要好得多。

But it is not an easy business to run. And it』s not an easy business to predict, unless you have a business that』s very institutional in character, and there aren』t many of those in Wall Street.

但這不是一件容易管理的行業。也不是一個容易預測得行業，除非你有一家非常制度化的公司，而在華爾街這樣的公司並不多。

【注1】梅奧中心

是集醫療、科研、教育為一體的機構，它包括位於羅切斯特市的Mayo 門診部、聖瑪麗醫院、羅切斯特衛理公會醫院以及醫學院和研究生院。它還在亞利桑那州的Scottsdale，和佛羅里達州Jacksonville建有兩個新的校區。其中以羅切斯特為中心，該市的十萬人口中，Mayo醫學中心佔有三萬多人口。

-END-

23. Volatile earnings to be expected at Salomon

年份: 1996年

行業: Financials

細分行業: Banking

公司: SALOMON

翻譯: 富貴兒

校對: 王子晨

23. Volatile earnings to be expected at Salomon

所羅門未來的收益波動性

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2, please?

沃倫·巴菲特：請第二區的提問。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is George Gotti (PH) from Zurich, Switzerland. I』ve got a question with respect to Salomon.

觀眾：我是來自瑞士蘇黎世的George Gotti(PH)。關於所羅門我有一個問題。

Salomon experienced quite a large volatility in profits and even revenues in the past years. What are your views on how this will develop in the future with respect to volatility in profits and revenues?

在過去的年份中，所羅門在利潤和營收上都面臨相當大的波動。未來將會怎麼發展，您是怎麼看的呢？

WARREN BUFFETT: I didn』t get a hundred percent of that, Charlie. Want to —?

沃倫·巴菲特：我沒聽到，查理。他想問啥？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, well —

查理·芒格：嗯，那個--

WARREN BUFFETT: I can see, he can hear. We make a great combination. (Laughter)

沃倫·巴菲特：好的，他聽得到。我們是最佳拍檔。（笑聲）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you can see we aren』t wasting much around the joint. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，你可以看到我們沒怎麼浪費時間。（笑聲）

Salomon』s earnings have always been volatile, at least all the time I』ve been around the place. And I don』t think that that volatility will — is likely to disappear.

所羅門的收入過去總是在波動，至少在我進入之後一直都是這樣。而且，我認為這種波動的狀態在未來並不會消失。

All that said, we very much like the people at Salomon. And they』ve done a ton of business with Berkshire over the years and in a whole lot of different capacities. And they』ve done it very well.

說了這麼多，我們非常喜歡所羅門的夥計們。多年來他們與伯克希爾（Berkshire）做了巨量的業務，表現出了多個不同領域的業務能力。他們做得很好。

So we』re high on the firm, as a customer. And the firms we like, as a customer, we think, maybe, other people will like, as a customer. And generally, we love it, volatile or no.

作為客戶，我們對他們評價很高。從客戶的角度，我認為，我們喜歡，其他人應該也會喜歡。總的來說，我們很喜歡這家公司，無論業績是否波動。

WARREN BUFFETT: If you — at Salomon, as well as other firms of that type, they mark their securities to market. And so the changes in those marks go through earnings daily, actually, but you see them quarterly.

沃倫·巴菲特：如果你 – 在所羅門，以及其他同類公司，他們的證券會按市價調整（這造成了業績波動）。事實上，他們的市價每天都在變化，但是你每個季度才會看一次報告。

Interestingly, if you took Berkshire over the last 30 years, and marked to market, as we do now for balance sheet purposes, but not for income statement purposes, because the rules are different in that case — if you did that, you would see enormous volatility, quarter to quarter, in Berkshire』s figures.

有趣的是，如果你回顧伯克希爾的過去30年的市價，因為我們資產負債表的緣故，但並不是出於收入表的目的，因為這兩種規則不一樣 – 如果你回顧一下，你會看到伯克希爾的數據在各個季度都有相當多的波動。

You would — I don』t think you』d necessarily have seen any down year. But you would』ve seen swings between a few percent and, perhaps, 50 percent or something.

你會看到，當然我不認為你會看到某一年下降了。但是你可以看到存在百分比的波動，可能是50%或者更多。

And if you looked quarterly, you』d have seen a number of quarters of losses. And you would』ve seen some great upsurges, too.

如果你看季報，可以看見季度的虧損。當然，你也會看到一些亮眼的增長。

The volatility would be extreme, if it had all been run through the income account. But accounting convention does not call for running it through the income account, in the case of Berkshire. And it does, in the case of Salomon.

如果所有這些（市場波動）都體現在收入項目中，那麼波動是非常厲害的。但是在伯克希爾，會計慣例並不要求這麼做。這也同樣適用於所羅門。

But the nature of their business is volatile earnings. The nature of most Wall Street businesses is going to be volatile earnings. Some may follow policies that tend to make it look a little less volatile than it might actually be, even. The real thing that counts is two things, really. I mean, it』s running it so that the volatility never kills you in any way, and the second is having a decent return on equity over time. And I think that the people at the top of Salomon are very focused on that.

然而，所羅門的業務性質本身就是具有波動性的。大多數華爾街企業也將具備波動性收益這一性質。有些人可能會遵循一些政策，使之看上去波動小一些。然而實際情況卻是兩碼事。我的意思是，第一，這樣的操作使（短期）波動不會以任何方式擊垮你；第二，在足夠的時間內給你一個可觀的回報。我認為，所羅門公司的管理層很看重這一點。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think it』s illogical for the credit rating agencies to mark down Salomon as much as they do because the earnings are volatile. But they』re in a style business. And it』s their game.

查理·芒格：我認為評級機構這種根據收益波動來將所羅門調低級別的做法不太合理。但這是他們的地盤兒，他們有他們的玩兒法。

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32. 「No magic」 to running a bank — just don』t do 「something foolish」

年份: 1996年

行業: Financials

細分行業: Banking

公司:

翻譯: Tiger虎

校對: 王子晨

32. 「No magic」 to running a bank — just don』t do 「something foolish」

經營銀行沒有魔法- 只是不要干蠢事

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4?

巴菲特：第四區？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Edward Barr, Lexington, Kentucky.

聽眾：我是愛德華，來自肯塔基州的Lexington。

Earlier, you led us through a discussion of the competitive position of Disney. And you also discussed share repurchase.

早些時候，你和我們討論了迪斯尼的競爭地位。你還討論了股份回購。

I wondered if you could also lead us through a discussion of the competitive position of Wells Fargo, since they just effected such a large combination [with First Interstate], in addition with, perhaps, some discussion of their share repurchase, which is probably as large, in percentage terms, as any company I can think of at the present time.

不知道你是否也可以談一下富國銀行的競爭地位, 因為他們剛剛完成了和第一洲際銀行的合併。如果可能的話，再談談關於富國銀行的股票回購,從百分比來看，這可能是目前最大規模的股票回購了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Wells should repurchase their shares, if they feel that they』re repurchasing them below intrinsic business value. And that』s a calculation that they make.

巴菲特：富國應該回購股票——如果他們覺得回購價格低於企業的內在價值。這是他們要考慮的。

And you should — have to ask the question of them what their calculus is of that. But that will determine whether that share repurchase program makes good sense or not. The advantages of an in-market merger are — can be dramatic. Sometimes, it just causes a bank to do what they should』ve done anyway.

你應該問他們的問題是他們隊企業內在價值的估計是否如此。

這將決定股票回購計劃對股東來說是否有意義。銀行間的市場內併購[注1]的好處是——（有時）可以是戲劇性的。有時候，它只是促使銀行去做他們應該做的事情。

I mean, I』m not so — I』m not always as convinced that the economies come about through — totally through scale, as they are just from taking a hard look at how they run their business. We may have in the audience today — he was here earlier — the CEO of the Bank of Granite, which is in Granite, North Carolina. And that bank earned 2.58 percent on assets, I believe, in the most recent quarter, annualized, and had a 33 percent efficiency ratio.

我的意思是，我不那麼相信，我不總是那麼相信效率完全是通過規模實現的，對企業經營管理的深入研究也可以提升效率。位於北卡羅來納州花崗岩市的花崗岩銀行的首席執行官可能就坐在你們中間，他早些時候在這裡的。這家銀行，如果沒記錯得話，最近一個季度的資產年化收益率為2.58%[注2]，效率比為33%。

Now, that bank is 400 million or 500 million of assets. You know, it doesn』t need to be 5 billion in order to get more efficient or anything of the sort.

這個銀行的資產大約是4，5億美金。你看，你不需要有50億美金資產才能變得更有效率或是在其他的方面更好。

It』s got — it』s so much more efficient than any of those larger banks that had to be put together to get those ratios that it makes you kind of wonder about the underlying rationale.

這個銀行運營的如此高效，就算把所有的大銀行都整合在一起都不一定能達到這個程度。這讓你對（行業公認的一些）基本邏輯產生懷疑。

But I』m sure that Mr. [John] Forlines, who runs that bank, just focuses on — and he』s been focusing on it for a lot of years — just doing the right things day after day. And it didn』t take any in-market merger or anything of the sort to cause him to do that.

但我相信，經營這家銀行的弗萊恩斯先生只是專註於——他多年來一直專註於此——日復一日地做正確的事情。而且也不需要任何市場內的合併或類似的事情來促使他這麼做。

I recommend any of you in the banking business to get his report because there is nothing magic about the community of Granite, North Carolina.

我建議你們中在銀行業工作的人拿到他的報告看一看，因為北卡羅來納州的花崗岩銀行並沒有什麼魔法。

Nor does he work under laws that are way different than the rest of bankers or anything of the sort. He just gets a record that — achieves a record — that makes all the rest of the records look silly.

他也不是在一套和其他銀行家所適用的不同的法律體系下運營這個銀行，或是因為什麼其他的不同。他剛剛創造了一個讓其他記錄都相形見絀的紀錄。

We had a fellow over in Rockford, Illinois, in the bank we owned back in the 』70s, Gene Abegg, whose brother is going to be 104. There was a fellow from Rockford here that got me to sign a note to Ed Abegg, who will be 104 soon. I wish Gene had lived to 104.

我們在伊利諾斯州的羅克福德有一個朋友，Gene Abegg，經營我們70年代曾擁有的一家銀行 （Illinois National Bank）。他的哥哥很快就104歲了。有個來自羅克福德的傢伙讓我給即將104歲的Ed Abegg 簽名。我希望Gene也活到104歲。

But Gene ran a bank in Rockford that, when banks — the best banks were earning one percent on assets, he earned two percent on assets. And he did it with way less leverage than anyone else and lower loan losses and big investment portfolio.

Gene在羅克福德經營著一家銀行，當最好的銀行在資產上賺1%時，他在資產上賺2%. 他以比其他人更少的槓桿,更低的貸款損失,和很大的投資組合來做到這個成績。

And there wasn』t any magic about it. He just didn』t do anything that didn』t make sense. And there』s a lot of room for improvement in the banking business with or without mergers.

這裡沒有任何魔法。他只是沒有做任何不明智的事。不管做不做併購，銀行業務都有很大的改進空間。

But I would say that Wells, on the record, has done an exceptionally good job of running their bank compared to other big banks. And I would say that those two operations put together will be run a whole lot more efficiently than if First Interstate had been run by — run on its own.

但我要說的是，與其他大型銀行相比，富國銀行在經營方面做得異常出色。我認為，這兩個銀行合併後一起運營的效率要比第一洲際銀行單獨運營會高得多。

It』s a business that can be a very good business, when run right, as the Bank of Granite or Illinois National Bank in Rockford proved. There』s no magic to it. You just have to stay away from doing something foolish.

如果經營得當，這是一項非常好的業務，就像位於羅克福德的花崗岩銀行或伊利諾斯國家銀行證明的那樣。它沒有魔法。你只要別做傻事就行了

It』s a little like investing. You know, you don』t have to do anything very smart. You just have to avoid doing things that are ungodly dumb when looked at about a year later and — you know, airlines and that sort of thing. (Laughter)

這有點像投資。你不需要做任何非常聰明的事。你只需要避免做一些一年後回頭看覺得非常愚蠢的事就可以，比如投資航空公司之類的事情。(笑聲)

And you know, that』s the trick. It is not some great crystal ball game where you look into the future and see all these things that other people can』t possibly see. I mean, what』s complicated about Coca-Cola or Gillette or Wells Fargo, for that matter?

這就是訣竅。這可不是什麼偉大的水晶球遊戲，你可以展望未來，看到其他人不可能看到的東西。我的意思是，可口可樂，吉列，富國銀行有什麼複雜之處嗎?

And that』s — we like businesses like banking, if we』ve got somebody in charge of them that is going to run them right. We』ve got a — I don』t know whether Bob Wilmers is here. But he runs First Empire, which we have a good-sized investment in. Bob just runs it right, you know?

所以說，我們喜歡銀行這樣的生意，如果有人能負責正確的管理它。我不知道Bob Wilmers是否在這裡。他掌管著第一帝國集團，我們在裡面有大量的投資。Bob正是這樣能夠正確經營管理銀行的人。

I do not worry about surprises from Bob or First Empire. And he』ll do things — if he can grow, and it』s logical, he』ll grow. And if it isn』t logical to do something, he』ll pass. He has no ego compulsions forcing him into some sort of action. And he runs a terrific bank.

我不擔心鮑勃或第一帝國會有什麼意外。他會做一些事情——如果銀行有成長的機會，並且合乎邏輯，他會讓公司壯大。如果做某事不合邏輯，他會避免那麼做。他沒有自我強迫症，非要逼著自己去做某些行動。他經營著一家很棒的銀行。

Charlie?

查理，有補充的嗎？

注1：「in-market merger」通常指兩個在同一地理區域經營的銀行之間的合併。合併後的機構通常會在同一個地區擁有超過一家營業網點，所以很多時候必須關閉其中一家。通常合併後通過削減成本或合併某些產品或服務來提高運營效率。

注2: 中國五大行2017年的資產收益率是1%。2017年Bank of America reported return on asset 0.8%, adjusted return on

asset 0.93%.

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