西方人關注中國第四個現代化

25年前，鄧小平批評中國人民解放軍（PLA）「自滿， 散漫，無戰鬥力。」即使這樣， 三年後，在中國現代化的進程中，他把軍隊建設排在農業、工業和科技之後。當1982年海軍司令拋出要成為海上強國時，鄧小平認為這個目標在2040年之前都無法實現。

Later military modernisation became more of a priority, thanks to two demonstrations of American firepower. First, America』s use of precision weapons in Operation Desert Storm during the first Gulf war convinced China that it could no longer base its defence on the weight of numbers. Second, when the PLA was hectoring Taiwan with missile tests in 1996, President Bill Clinton ordered two aircraft-carrier strike groups into the region, one of them headed by the provocatively named USS Independence. China had to back down.

之後，中國的軍隊現代化佔據了越來越優先的地位，這都是拜兩次美國的軍事演習所賜。首先， 在第一次海灣戰爭沙漠風暴行動中美國運用了精密武器，這使中國堅信，自己不能再依靠人多勢眾了。再有，當中國人民解放軍還在用導彈演習震懾台灣時，當時的美國總統柯林頓派出了兩艘航空母艦，其中一個具有挑釁性的名字——獨立級戰艦。中國當時只好撤退。

The collapse of the Soviet Union had persuaded China』s leaders that an arms race with the world』s only superpower could squander enough money to pose a threat to the party』s grip. To challenge America head on made no sense. Instead China put its efforts into affordable 「asymmetric」 weapons.

蘇聯的解體讓中國的領導人明白，與世界唯一超級大國的軍備競賽會浪費大量的金錢，從而危及政黨的統治。向美國叫板毫無意義。於是，中國開始著力發展可以負擔得起的「不對稱」武器。

This unorthodox strategy has made the PLA』s progress harder to measure. Western opinion is deeply divided. Military analysts are alarmed at what they see as a growing threat to American maritime supremacy in the western Pacific. China security specialists tend to scoff at all the scaremongering. Who is right?

這種非正規的策略使得衡量PLA的進步更加困難。西方看法被極大的分裂了。軍事分析家擔心中國將成為西太平洋上美國軍事霸主地位的日益增長的威脅，而中國安全專家卻對這種散布恐慌的言論嗤之以鼻。到底誰才正確？

Three areas of the PLA』s modernisation stand out. First, China has created what the Pentagon calls 「the most active land-based ballistic- and cruise-missile programme in the world」. The Second Artillery has about 1,100 short-range ballistic missiles facing Taiwan and has been extending their range and improving their accuracy and payload. The Second Artillery is also improving its medium-range ballistic missiles, able to carry either conventional or nuclear warheads. The PLA has deployed several hundred air- and land-launched long-range cruise missiles. And it is developing the world』s first anti-ship ballistic missile, fitted with a manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle for added menace.

PLA的現代化在三個方面非常突出： 第一，中國已經創造了五角大樓所稱的「世界上最活躍的地面彈道和巡航導彈。」第二炮兵擁有1100個面向台灣的短程彈道導彈，並且已經延長了射程，改善了準確度和導彈負荷量。第二炮兵還正在改善它的中等射程彈道導彈，使它能夠發射常規彈頭和核彈頭。PLA已經部署了數百個空中和地面遠程巡航導彈，並且，還研發了世界上第一個反艦艇彈道導彈，配有可調動的再入載體，以應對其他的威脅。

Second, China has transformed and enlarged its submarine fleet, which can now berth in the newly completed base on Hainan Island, just off China』s southern coast. In the eight years to 2002 China bought 12 Russian Kilo-class submarines, a big improvement on its own noisy Ming- and Romeo-class boats. Since then the PLA navy has been introducing longer-range and stealthier Chinese designs, including the nuclear-powered Jin class, which carries ballistic missiles, and the Shang class, a nuclear-powered attack submarine. China has about 66 submarines against America』s 71, though the American boats are superior. By 2030, according to the Kokoda Foundation, an Australian think-tank, China could have 85-100 submarines.

第二，中國已經改造並擴大了它的潛艇艦隊，目前駐紮在海南島的新基地，該基地緊鄰中國的南海岸。到2002年為止的八年時間裡，中國購買了12艘俄羅斯公里級潛艇，這是對其原來明級和羅密歐級艦艇的極大改善。從那以後，PLA海軍就一直在引進長距離並更隱秘的中國設計產品，包括能夠承載彈道導彈的晉型原子力潛水艇，和商級原子力攻擊潛艇。中國目前擁有66艘潛艇，正在逼近美國的71艘。據一個澳大利亞智囊團Kokoda Foundation。到2030年，中國可能擁有85-100艘潛艇。

And third, China has concentrated on what it calls 「informatisation」, a tongue-twister that Jiang Zemin coined in 2002 to describe how the PLA needs to function as one force, using sensors, communications and electronic and cyber-warfare. China now has a good idea of what is going on far into the Pacific, thanks to a combination of satellites, over-the-horizon radar, medium-range surface-wave radars, reconnaissance drones and underwater-sensor arrays.

第三，中國已經開始關注所謂的「信息化建設」，這是江澤民在2002年創造的一個新詞，用以描述PLA怎樣運用探測設備、通信、電子和網路戰進一步武裝自己。藉助衛星、超地平線雷達、中等距離地波雷達、無人駕駛偵察機和水下探測部隊，中國現在對太平洋中發生的事情可以了如指掌。

China has also been working on anti-satellite weapons. American satellites have been 「dazzled」 by lasers fired from the ground. And in 2007 a ballistic missile launched from Xichang space centre in Sichuan blew up a broken weather satellite—no mean feat, though other countries were furious because it produced more than 35,000 new pieces of space debris.

中國同時也在研究反衛星武器。美國的衛星遭遇了地面上發射的激光的破壞。在2007年，四川西昌太空中心發射的一個彈道導彈銷毀了一個損壞的氣象衛星——此舉乏善可陳，儘管很多其他國家也對此衛星產生了35000個新的空間碎片非常不滿。

Chinese hackers have been busy, too. In March last year Canadian researchers discovered a spy network containing more than 1,300 computers, many of them in China, that had got into governments』 systems. Taiwanese and Western targets suffered from severe Chinese cyber-attacks at least 35 times in the decade to 2009, according to Northrop Grumman, an American defence contractor. The Pentagon concedes that it is not sure the PLA was behind such attacks, but argues that 「authoritative」 analysts in the PLA see cyber-warfare as important.

中國的黑客也在忙碌著。去年三月，加拿大的研究者們發現了一個包括1300台計算機的間諜網路，已經進入了政府系統，該網路中很多台計算機在中國。根據一個名為Northrop Grumman的美國防禦機構的數據，本世紀到2009年為止，台灣和西方的目標已經遭到了至少35次來自中國的強烈網路攻擊。五角大樓承認，不能確定PLA與這些攻擊有關，但是它堅稱PLA中的權威分析家非常看中網路武器的重要性。

The new arsenal

新的軍火庫

What does this amount to? Military experts in America, Australia and Japan think China』s new arsenals are a greater threat than its higher-profile plans to launch aircraft-carriers in the next decade or so. Alan Dupont, of the University of Sydney in Australia, says that 「missiles and cyber-equivalents are becoming the weapons of choice for the conventionally outgunned.」

這意味著什麼？美國、澳大利亞和日本的軍事專家認為，中國新的軍火庫比其高調宣稱的今後十年左右的航空母艦計劃更有威脅性。澳大利亞悉尼大學的Alan Dupont說，「對於傳統意義上軍事武器落後的國家來說，導彈和網路武器是最好的選擇。」

According to the Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), an American research institute, Chinese firepower threatens America』s Asian bases, which until now have been safe from all but nuclear attack. The Second Artillery』s missiles could swamp the bases』 defences and destroy runways as well as large numbers of fighters and ships. Japan is already within range of Chinese missiles, many of them currently pointing at Taiwan. Guam soon will be .

根據美國研究機構戰略和預算評估中心（CSBA），中國的火力威脅了美國的亞洲基地，該基地至今為止對於除了核武器之外的其他襲擊都是安全的。第二炮兵的導彈能夠攻克該基地的防禦，摧毀跑到和大量戰鬥機和艦艇。日本已經在中國導彈的射程之內，台灣也已經在目標範圍之內，關島也在不久之後會被納入目標範圍。

China』s submarines, missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles threaten America』s aircraft-carrier strike groups within 1,000 to 1,600 nautical miles of the Chinese coast. According to Ross Babbage, an Australian defence analyst and founder of the Kokoda Foundation, if China had an anti-ship ballistic missile, coming in fast and without much warning, it would be even harder to defend against. And China』s space and cyber-weapons could serve as what Chinese planners label an 「assassin』s mace」 in a surprise attack designed to smash America』s elaborate but fragile electronic networks. That would leave American forces half-blind and mute, and its bases and carriers more vulnerable still.

中國的艦艇、導彈和反艦艇巡航導彈能在距離中國海岸線1000至1600英里的範圍內威脅到美國的航空母艦。 根據澳大利亞防禦分析家和Kokoda基地創始人Ross Babbage，如果中國擁有反艦艇彈道導彈，出其不意地快速襲擊，那麼將更加難以防範。中國的空間和網路武器可以成為中國策劃者標榜的「殺手鐧」，出其不意的襲擊美國複雜卻脆弱的電子網路。這會使美國軍力陷入半失明和緘默狀態，它的基地和武器將更容易被破壞。

In sum, China』s abilities to strike have soared far beyond seeking to deter American intervention in any future mainland dispute with Taiwan. Today China can project power out from its coastline well beyond the 12-mile (19km) limit that the Americans once approached without a second thought. Mr Okamoto, the Japanese security expert, believes China』s strategy is to have 「complete control」 of what planners call the First Island Chain. Ultimately, China seems to want to stop the American fleet from being able to secure its interests in the western Pacific.

總之，中國的攻擊力已經遠遠超過了阻止美國干涉大陸與台灣對峙的能力。如今，中國可以在其海岸線12英里（19公里）以內投射武器，而美國曾經在這個範圍內可以任意往來。日本安全專家Okamoto相信，中國的策略是，完全控制所謂的「第一海島鏈」。最終，中國希望通過保證美國在西太平洋的利益來組織美國的艦隊。

America』s most senior officials have taken note. Last year Robert Gates, the defence secretary, gave warning that 「investments [of countries like China] in cyber- and anti-satellite warfare, anti-air and anti-ship weaponry and ballistic missiles could threaten America』s primary way to project power and help allies in the Pacific—in particular our forward air bases and carrier strike groups.」

美國最高官員已經對此開始關注。去年，國防部長 Robert Gates警告說，中國這樣的國家的任何網路、反衛星武器、防空、防艦艇武器和彈道導彈的投入都會威脅到美國部署軍力和幫助太平洋同盟國，尤其是對於我們未來的空中基地和航母攻擊部隊。

Mr Babbage is blunter: 「Current defence planning is invalid,」 he says. He and the analysts at CSBA argue that America needs to rethink its strategy in the Pacific. It should strengthen its bases and be able to disrupt Chinese attacks with decoys and by spreading aircraft and ships around the region. American forces must have better logistics and be able to fight even when their information networks are impaired. Crucially, they must be in a position to disable China』s electronic reconnaissance, surveillance and battle-damage assessment, some of which is protected by a system of tunnels beyond easy reach of American weapons.

Babbage先生更加直言不諱：「目前的防禦計劃是徒勞的，」他這樣說。他和DSBA的分析專家辯論說，美國需要重新考慮其在太平洋上的戰略。它可以加強它的基地，可以通過誘餌和在此區域部署飛機和艦艇來摧毀中國的攻擊。美國軍隊必須能夠邏輯更加嚴密，能夠在信息網路被損壞的情況下繼續戰鬥。最重要的是，他們必須能夠摧毀中國的電子檢測，監視和戰鬥損傷評估，而這些被一個系統的通道所保護，美國的武器想要破壞絕非易事。

Pacific in name only

太平洋名存實亡

Critics say the cold warriors are suffering from a bad case of 「enemy-deprivation syndrome」. For a start, the impression that China』s defence spending has soared is misleading. The PLA』s budget has broadly kept pace with GDP in the past decade, after two decades in which its share of GDP fell (see chart 2). Experts differ about the size of China』s defence budget, which is only partly disclosed. Sam Perlo-Freeman, of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, puts overall spending in 2009 at $99 billion in 2008 dollars, though some estimates are higher and the official total is only $70 billion. The United States is planning to spend $663 billion. As a share of GDP, China spends less than half the American figure and less than it did at the start of the 1990s. 「There is not much evidence of an arms race,」 says Mr Perlo-Freeman.

批評家們說，冷戰分子都患有一種「敵人缺失綜合症」。首先，中國防禦支出飆升的印象帶來了誤導。在過去的十年中， PLA預算總體是與GDP同步的，而之前的二十年其佔GDP的比例是減少的。專家們對中國防禦預算規模存在爭議。斯德哥爾摩國際和平研究所的 Sam Perlo-Freeman以2008年的美元計算，2009年的總開銷為990億美元，儘管有些估計偏高，官方公布的總數為700億美元。而美國計劃的支出為6630億美元。作為GDP的一部分，中國的花費不及美國的一半，比上世紀90年代以來的任何時期都要少。「軍備競賽的證據是不充分的。」Perlo-Freeman先生說。

Some doubt the quality of China』s equipment. One retired American admiral says that much of the Russian equipment it bought was 「junk」. Despite China』s progress, it lags in guidance and control, turbine engines, machine tools, diagnostic and forensic equipment and computer-aided design and manufacturing. 「China has come a long way fast,」 says Professor Dupont, 「but military modernisation gets harder from here.」

有些人對中國裝備的質量表示懷疑。一位已退休的美國海軍軍官說，很多中國從俄羅斯買來的裝備都是「破爛」。雖然中國在進步，但是它在引導與控制、渦輪發動機、機械工具、診斷和法醫設備、計算機救援設計與生產方面都仍然落後。「中國是在快速地前進，」Dupont教授說，「但是軍事現代化任重而道遠。」

Some have doubts about China』s manpower, too. The PLA is much more professional now than when it was a peasant army, but it lacks experience. Nigel Inkster, of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), recalls one of the founders of the Chinese navy once telling him: 「It』s not that I didn』t know much about sailing, but I hadn』t ever seen the sea.」

有些人同樣質疑中國的人力。與當時一個農民軍隊相比， PLA現在專業多了。但是它仍然缺乏經驗。戰略國際研究所的 (IISS)Nigel Inkster回憶一位中國海軍的創始人曾經告訴他：「並非我不知道怎麼航海，而是我從來沒有見過海。」

Complex subjects like submarine warfare take years to master. 「If you fight, there are holes,」 says the IISS』s Christian Le Mière. 「And until you do, you don』t know where they are.」 The retired admiral thinks Chinese forces suffer from a lack of trust, which could slow them up in battle. 「We give our people responsibility and initiative,」 he says. 「That』s anathema to them.」

像水下戰爭這些複雜的課題還需要很多年去掌握。「當你作戰的時候，總有一些漏洞，」 IISS的Christian Le Mière說，「直到你親身體驗了，你才知道漏洞在哪裡。」那位已退休的海軍軍官認為，中國軍隊目前存在缺乏信任的問題，這一點會使它在戰鬥中減慢節奏。「我們授予我們的戰士更多的責任和能動性，而他們對此深惡痛絕。」

Robert Ross, a professor at Harvard, argues that the pessimists overestimate China』s threat and underestimate America』s powers. The United States is better able to track the other side』s submarines; it is superior in cyber-warfare and less vulnerable than China in space—if only because it has built-in redundancy. China would struggle to penetrate the countermeasures and electronic camouflage that protect American ships. Carlyle Thayer, of the Australian Defence Force Academy, notes that it has already deployed 31 of its 53 fast-attack submarines and three Ohio class nuclear submarines to the Pacific.

哈弗大學教授Robert Ross說，悲觀主義者高估了中國的威脅， 低估了美國的實力。美國更能夠對對方的艦艇進行追蹤；美國與中國相比，在網路武器上更佔優勢，更不易受到攻擊，單單憑藉美國內部冗餘的設計就可以這樣說。中國想要努力滲入保護美國艦艇的程序和電子偽裝。澳大利亞防禦學會的 Carlyle Thayer說，中國已經部署了其53個快速襲擊艦艇中的31艘以及三艘俄亥俄級核潛艇在太平洋上。

For all the uncertainties in this debate, three things are beyond dispute. First, China has already forced American ships to think about how and when they approach the Chinese coast. The closer American vessels come, the more missiles and submarines they face and the less time they would have to react to a strike. Anyone sailing a carrier worth $15 billion-20 billion with a crew of 6,000 would think twice about taking on that extra risk. To deny America possession of seas it has dominated for decades, China does not need to control its own coastal waters; it just has to be able to threaten American ships there. Hugh White, a former Australian security and defence official, foresees the western Pacific becoming a 「naval no-go zone」.

在這場論戰中所有的不確定因素中，有三件事是毋庸爭論的。第一， 中國已經迫使美國艦隊考慮怎樣和何時靠近中國的海岸。美國的艦艇越接近，他們就會面臨更多的導彈和艦艇，他們擁有的反擊時間就會越短。任何一個駕駛一艘價值150-200億美元，裝載6000名船員的航空母艦的人，都會再三考慮是否需要冒這個風險。為了否認美國對已經擁有了幾十年的海域的所有權，中國並不需要控制其自己的附近海域，它只需在哪裡能夠威脅美國的艦艇。澳大利亞前安全與防禦官員Hugh White預測西太平洋將成為一片「無人佔有」

Second, China』s ability to project power is improving. Its submarines, fighter aircraft, missiles, and cyber- and electronic warfare, once poor, now pose a threat. China』s weapons will continue to improve, and its forces will gather experience. Provided that the economy does not fall over, budgets will grow, too, absolutely and possibly as a share of GDP. Other things being equal, China can project power into its backyard more easily than America can project power across the Pacific Ocean. At risk is what Mr Gates has called 「the operational sanctuary our navy has enjoyed in the western Pacific for the better part of six decades」.

第二， 中國軍備建設的能力正在提高。那些一度簡陋的艦艇、戰鬥機、導彈和網路與電子武器，現在已經成為了一種威脅。中國的武器將繼續改善，軍隊將繼續積累經驗。在經濟不衰退的情況下，其預算的絕對數額還會增長，也會以GDP的一部分同比例增長。在其他條件相同的情況下，中國在自己的後院部署軍力比美國跨越太平洋要容易得多。Gates先生所稱的「美國海軍60年來在西太平洋上享受到的庇護」受到了威脅。

Third, although the United States is able to respond to China, it will have to overcome some obstacles first. America』s military spending in Asia is overshadowed by the need to cut overall government spending and by other military priorities, such as Afghanistan. Jonathan Pollack, of the Brookings Institution, points out that some ideas, such as replacing aircraft-carriers with more submarines, would inevitably run into opposition from the navy and from politicians whose constituencies would suffer. 「For many officers the navy』s core institutional identity is indelibly tied to carriers and the power-projection mission they perform,」 he says. 「Reducing their numbers is going to be a very painful process.」 Above all, big shifts in military planning take decades: America needs to think now about China in 2025.

第三，儘管美國可以反擊中國，但是它必須先克服很多障礙。美國在亞洲的軍隊開支並不樂觀，受到縮減政府開支和其他包括阿富汗在內的其他軍事重點問題的影響。Brookings研究所的Jonathan Pollack支出，一些包括用更多的艦艇替代航空母艦的想法一定會遭到海軍的反對，當影響到一些選民的時候，相關的政客也會反對。「對於很多軍官來說，海軍的核心標誌毫無疑問地與航空母艦和它們實施的軍力部署相聯繫。」他說，「減少航空母艦的數量將會是一個痛苦的過程。」總之，軍隊規劃的大變革需要數十年的時間，而美國需要現在就考慮2025年中國的問題。

All this points to an important principle. Military planning is framed differently from diplomacy. Diplomats are interested in what they think states intend to do, but military planners have to work with what they think states can do. Intentions change and states can mislead. If you are charged with defending your country, you need to be able to meet even improbable threats.

所有這些都指向一個重要的原則。軍隊規劃與外交不同。外交官們感興趣的是美國想要做什麼，而軍事策劃者必須考慮美國能做什麼。意向會改變，國家可能起到誤導的作用。如果你被授予保護國家的責任，你就甚至需要能夠應對不可能出現的威脅。

That logic works in China, too. America has not been shy of going to war in recent years. Not long ago a retired Chinese admiral likened the American navy to a man with a criminal record 「wandering just outside the gate of a family home」. American strength in the 1990s made China feel insecure, so it transformed the PLA to shore up its policy on Taiwan and protect its economically vital coastline. Yet by adding to its own security, China has taken away from that of its neighbours and of the United States. Perhaps China does not mean ever to use its weapons aggressively. But American defence planners cannot rely on that, so they must respond.

這種邏輯在中國同樣適用。近些年來，美國從來不排斥戰爭。不久之前，一位退休的中國軍官將美國海軍比作一個在家門口徘徊的人。上世紀90年代美國的強大讓中國感到不安，因此它改造了PLA，讓它的政策在台灣站住腳，並保衛其關乎經濟命脈的海岸線。但是，通過增加自己的安全感，中國損害了其鄰國和美國的利益。也許中國從來沒有想要帶攻擊性地運用武器，但是美國的防禦策劃者不能完全相信，他們必須做出回應。

In this way two states that never intend harm can begin to perceive each other as growing threats. If you do not arm, you leave yourself open to attack. If you do, you threaten the other country. A British historian, Herbert Butterfield, called this the 「absolute predicament and irreducible dilemma」. It is one reason why relations between China and America will probably sour.

這樣以來，兩個從未想要傷害對方的國家將對方都當稱了日益強大的威脅。如果你自己不準備好，那麼就要等著挨打。如果你準備好了，你就可以威脅別人。一個英國歷史學家Herbert Butterfield稱之為，「絕對並不可減少的矛盾」。這就是為什麼中美關係將可能日益緊張的原因之一。