中國之前途：中國想要什麼？CHINAS FUTURE | The Economist

中國想要什麼？（上篇.歷史）原文："China"s Future: What China Wants" -《The Economist》翻譯：海天隨著中國再次成為世界上最大的經濟體，它尋求重新得到在過去千百年里所享有的尊重。但中國不知道該怎樣獲得這種尊重，或者說，它是否值得這樣的尊重。

馬修. 博爾頓，18世紀最偉大的企業家之一, 瓦特開發蒸汽機的合作夥伴, 對英國向清國派出第一個使團的重要性曾經毫不懷疑。在他給東印度公司的秘書詹姆斯?科布的信中，博爾頓寫道，「我相信，這是將我們的產品推向世界最廣大市場的最有利契機。」博爾頓主張馬戛爾尼的1793北京使團應該「廣泛選取我們所生產的各種產品，從觀賞品到實用品。」通過向中國的皇帝，朝廷和百姓展示這些產品，馬戛爾尼的使團就能夠了解到中國想要什麼，這樣博爾頓在伯明翰的工廠和他在各個行業的朋友們，就可以開足馬力生產，滿足那些前所未有的大宗需求，人人獲利。可事情卻不按這樣的腳本發展。乾隆皇帝收下了馬戛爾尼的禮物，有些還很得他的歡心，比如那艘一等君權戰列艦的模型，就似乎很合他的興味。但是所有這些都被當成是進貢，而不是貿易。清廷將喬治三世國王使團的這次來訪，看做跟來自高麗和越南的特使都差不多，由禮部為他們提供一次向天子表達尊重和忠心的機會。如果是來自亞洲內陸其他欠發達地區的「野蠻」外夷, 就該歸理藩院應付了。中國皇帝毫不理睬馬戛爾尼關於天子和國王喬治應該被視為平等的荒唐說法。皇上對英國「遣使恭賚表章」表示滿意，雖然覺得那些貢品司空見慣，「念其奉使遠徙」，也就笑納了。但他並沒有把它當作一個新的貿易關係的開始：「天朝扶有四方，惟勵精圖治，辦理政務，珍奇異寶，並不貴重……然從不貴奇巧，並更無需爾國置辦物件。」馬戛爾尼關於中國開放更多貿易口岸（當時東印度公司僅能在廣州口岸做交易）和在北京設置倉庫以收貯發賣貨物的要求，都被斷然拒絕。跟日本不同，中國那時候並不拒絕對外交往。他們在邊疆各個關口與外族做生意，只是中國人看不出來那些「野蠻人」能提供什麼了不起的東西。回眸歷史，對域外事物抱有更積極的態度可能是明智的。彼時的中國不知道，一場經濟，技術和文化的革命正在歐洲發生，並將影響全球。殖民資本主義的興起，日後被證明是中國有史以來面臨的最大挑戰。馬戛爾尼所造訪的中華帝國，儘管也曾經歷興衰和幾次外侮，卻在此前兩千年的大部分時間裡，一直是地球上人口最多的政治實體和最富有的經濟體。然而在隨後的兩個世紀中，這一切都被翻轉了。中國即將成為一個半殖民地，在戰亂和革命中被侮辱，撕裂，陷於貧弱。今天，這個國家已經變成當年馬戛爾尼所尋找的地方：一個相對開放的市場，非常樂意做生意。借用博爾頓的話，過去的二十年見證了中國產品進入了世界最廣大市場的最有利契機。這給中國帶來引人矚目的繁榮。購買力方面，它有望重新回到世界最大經濟體的地位。它仍是數億貧困人口的家園，同時也是一個二十一世紀的國度，到處有現代化的機場，熠熠閃亮的太陽能農場。它的探月車正在月球表面滾過，還打算派遣航天員登月。這也是一個有著很多訴求的國家。總的來說，中國知道它想要什麼。在國內，人民希望增長能夠持續，領導人也希望增長可以買到穩定。在國際舞台上，人民與共產黨都想獲得新的尊重，以及有助於其國家地位的影響力。因此，中國希望現有的情況保持不變，那些幫助它增長的條件能夠持續下去，但同時又希望自己能變成不同的樣子。在任何情況下，既想保持原狀又要改變模樣，都是一件相當棘手的事情。在當今中國，事情尤其艱難，因為領導中國的列寧主義者們，必須一邊應付國內變革與停滯間存在的巨大矛盾，一邊試圖維護對社會的控制，而這個社會的轉型幾乎與其經濟增長同樣迅猛。事情也更加危險，因為今天的中國正沉浸在好戰的民族主義之中，它的領導者對感知到的每一個威脅做出回應，對每一點輕慢都回以不成比例的自我肯定。蘇聯重組改革後的解體，給中國領導人提供的教訓，不止是政治改革的危險性，還有對美國深刻的不信任：接下來，它會來挖中國的牆角嗎？阿拉伯之春的混亂已經把習近平主席給嚇著了。看起來他要嘗試從內部清理，而拒絕任何政治多元化和司法獨立的理念。這影響著中國的外交政策。中國正在中國南海有爭議島嶼上修建跑道，在有爭議的海域建起石油鑽井平台，並且重新定義其空域，儘管並沒有明確的計劃來使其主張得到公認。這些舉動困擾著它的鄰國，也困擾著美國。中國希望重新崛起，具體意義卻不完全清楚；美國決心不讓這種願望傷害到自己與盟國的利益，如何應對也不清楚。兩者相遇，便構成定義邊緣不清晰的對抗，非常危險。中國最出色的外交政策評論家之一，中國人民大學的時殷弘說，五年前，他確信中國可以和平崛起（中國今天還在這樣講），現在他不那麼肯定了。

公元前221年，當中國實現首次實現統一時，羅馬人正在與迦太基人作戰，爭奪西地中海的統治權。羅馬帝國本可以爬升得更高，卻臭名昭著地轟然崩潰。中國也分崩離析過許多次，但是已經構建好的大一統模型，它總能再凝聚起來。到了公元220漢朝末年，中國的統治者將強調社會等級和個人道德價值的儒家思想制度化，作為統治的基礎。到了公元七世紀的唐代（大概與穆罕默德返回麥加同一時期），中國成為地球上最富有和最燦爛的文明之一。它的經濟和軍事實力使其鄰國相形見絀，豐富的文化和儒家的道德秩序使其出類拔萃的地位顯得順理成章。中國是天下效仿的榜樣。今天日本京都的城市布局就彷彿八世紀的長安（今西安）；韓國和越南吸納了漢字；孔子的教義成為許多亞洲文化的哲學基礎，直至今天。正如皇帝佔據中國社會階層的頂端是天命所歸，中國也合當端坐世界之巔，睥睨天下。馬戛爾尼去中國的節骨眼，正值清代的鼎盛時期。18世紀中葉，通過密集的軍事行動和對準噶爾人的種族殺戮，清朝將西藏和西域納入治下，帝國版圖之雄偉空前絕後。雖然農民的日子過得艱難，帝王的生活卻是窮奢極欲，蔚為壯觀。儘管見識了大清驚人的財富，或許是由於他與清廷打交道時飽受挫折，馬戛爾尼認為這個國家並不會像其統治者指望的那樣永久。他寫道，中國好似一艘「發了瘋的戰船」，「僅憑藉她的體積和外觀」就能嚇倒鄰國，而他感覺到其中的脆弱和將要出現的問題。 「她會像破船般漂浮一段時間，然後被打成碎片衝到岸上。」導致中國後來衰落，帝國滅亡的結構性原因，已經被廣泛討論。有人引用歷史學家馬克?埃爾文的「高度均衡陷阱」學說：國家運行良好，憑藉廉價的勞動力和有效率的管理，供給和需求的矛盾很容易被調和，從而沒有留出什麼動力讓人們更致力於技術進步。另一些人指出，歐洲得益於各國間的競爭和貿易，帶動了武器的進步和對新市場的胃口。美國歷史學家肯尼斯.彭慕蘭認為，從美洲獲得廉價的商品是帶動英國和歐洲工業化的一大因素，而中國沒有享有這樣的機遇。同樣，歐洲運氣也好，煤炭儲藏多靠近其工業中心，而中國的煤礦和工廠往往相隔數千公里，到今天這仍然是個令人頭疼的問題。如此這般，可能再加上其他原因，中國沒有能像西方一樣走上工業化的道路。歐洲在中世紀學到了來自中國的火藥，但是到了19世紀，歐洲人遠遠比中國人更擅長用火藥來達到自己的目的。19世紀30年代，英國試圖用鴉片來打開中國市場，因為這玩意兒能讓人想要，而且不停地要下去，不管他是什麼樣的人。中國人試圖阻止這種貿易，英國便發動戰爭，而且戰勝了。1842年《南京條約》簽訂，英國攫取了香港，並迫使中國打開了國門。中國從此陷入了被否定，被擊敗和半殖民地化的漩渦。最屈辱的，也許是孱弱的中國在1894年被日本戰敗。大和民族文化雖然植根於中華文明，彼時卻已轉型，熱切地採用西方的技術，野心勃勃。中國在亞洲的中心地位已被日本篡奪。那之後發生了很多事情：1911年辛亥革命建立共和，毛主義興起至1949年取得勝利，直到當前的「有中國特色的社會主義」。這其中，很多是中國人對自己國家喪失財富，權力和地位所做出的反應，以及對重拾國家尊嚴的渴望。從領導階層到民間，中國人都認為尊重是他們國家應享有的權利。19世紀後期的改革者和革命者開始相信，中國傳統文化是問題的一部分。為了不被列強瓜分，他們開始拋棄很多中國傳統文化；許多人相信，為了保全民族，他們必須摧毀自己的文化。1905年，兩千年的儒家科舉制度被廢棄；1911年，末代皇帝和整個帝制被推翻。然而由於沒有現代化的體制來支持，新的共和國很快就崩潰，陷入一片混亂。

1949年毛的政權一統天下之後， 共產黨人對中國文化的打擊更進一步。中國的制度，乃至其創造和包容的思維方式，都被從其他地方打包批發來的思想替換掉。這就好比歐洲人拋棄掉羅馬律法，希臘哲學和基督教信仰，寸草不留。在毛時代，孔子成了敵人，然而人民關於中國作為一個偉大文明的信念卻一直堅定地存在，並持續至今。這個國家由此遭受深刻的認同危機，現在還在努力化解。一路走來，中國拋卻了「萬方來朝」的帝國觀，接受了威斯特伐利亞和約推介給歐洲的世界觀，即主權國家基本均等，其間的相互區別僅在於財富數量和實力的不同，而非任何性質的階層等級。中國現在將自己視為世界各國的一員，然而用美國學者盧西恩.派伊的話來說，它同時是「一個文明，假裝成一個國家」。它的歷史，規模，以及由過去的二十年中顯著增長所帶來的潛力感，促使中國想得到更多，收回從前被外國人掠去的種種。中國的人民和領導人感到，自己國家的時代正又一次來臨。

- See more at: http://blog.creaders.net/url169/user_blog_diary.php?did=190075#sthash.9NA1r3Uw.dpuf中國想要什麼？（中篇.疆土）原文："China"s Future: What China Wants" -《The Economist》 翻譯：海天究其野心，中國並不熱衷於爭奪全球霸權。中國對亞洲以外政治的興趣不大，除非是關係到它獲得盡量多的原材料和市場。諸如中國在非洲的「新殖民主義」之類的講座，著實有些誇大其辭。中國的直接投資存量仍遠遠落後於英國和法國，只相當於美國的三分之一。美國約翰·霍普金斯大學的Debra Brautigam認為，儘管中國的影響力無疑越來越大，它的介入卻不是霸權性的，而是交易性的。Brautigam女士說，20世紀80年代，當一家日本公司買下洛克菲勒中心時，「美國人認為他們買的是整個曼哈頓。中國在非洲的情況也是這樣：報道的全是些感覺。」在即將出版的新書中，她研究了關於中國企業在非洲收購土地的20則媒體報道，總額號稱有5百50萬公頃。Brautigam女士查出了確鑿的數字：不過63,400公頃。沒錯，中國工頭虐待非洲工人，中資公司經營非法煤礦，令人惱火的廉價中國貨砸掉本地小業主的飯碗。然而這些，都不過是拙劣的商業行為，而非大政方針。與昔日的歐洲殖民統治不同，中國沒有將其他人排除在大陸之外的戰略眼光，也沒有任何想像中的所謂「文明使命」。當它感到自己的形象可能出了問題，中國的回應非常務實：蓋醫院，修鐵路，斥資援助瘧疾預防。在非洲和拉丁美洲，中國更注重掌握當地公司的股權，而不是只購買土地與資源。中國還嘗試運用軟實力，通過世界各地的孔子學院，說明中國和它的文化是良性的，雖然做法常顯得笨手笨腳。中國「既非傳教士文化，也不是一個價值觀的超級大國，」悉尼大學的克里·布朗說。「它並不企圖讓別人都變成中國。」美國外交政策的說辭內容，總愛把自己塑造成民主和自由的領軍者。共產黨則不愛搞這類普世價值。同盟往往基於共同的價值觀；如果沒有這些，就難以找到朋友。敬畏可以算是友誼的一個替代品。中國已經開始讓世界敬畏，甚至憂心忡忡。關注宗族的儒家思想和共產主義滋育出的恐懼感，教會中國人只管自己的事。俗話說得好：各人自掃門前雪，莫管他人瓦上霜。如果中國對待世界也採取類似的態度，那可能是因為中國在自己的國界內也面臨著全球性的問題：它有比任何其他國家都更多的貧困人口（除了印度）。當你國內有一億六千萬公民，每天的生活費不到1.25美元，很多人開始公開抱怨國家內部的種種問題，那麼非洲的發展需求，對你確實會顯得不那麼緊迫。

(左圖：各國貧困人口所佔全球比例）所以中國的外交政策頗為矛盾。如果不是為了強化自己的大國形象，中國總希望能盡量少參與海外行動。倘若自己的利益受到威脅，中國會採取海外行動，但不是為了獲得更大更高意義上的好處。中國海軍參加了非洲之角的反海盜護航和聯合國在非洲的維和行動。2011年，中國派出一艘大船，協調將36，000名中國工人從利比亞撤離。隨著中資企業更深入地走向世界，中國可能會有更多這樣的行動，但只有當代價低微或絕對必要時它才會這樣做。中國看到了近年來美國外交政策的軍事化造成的損害；對其國內弱點的敏感，也構成中國對自己行為的一種約束。在相當廣泛的問題上，中國反對什麼比它支持什麼要明了許多。中國否決了西方國家干涉敘利亞和達爾富爾的企圖，卻對俄羅斯吞併克里米亞不持立場（儘管它對本國內任何形式的分裂主義都持否定態度）。2009年哥本哈根氣候峰會上，中國確保沒有什麼主張能夠成形，來迫使它延緩工業增長。在哥本哈根和別的地方，中國證明自己已經能夠阻撓，卻還不會打造。正如一位布希政府的前高級官員對中國參與20國集團的評論，「他們很愛來參加，但我們還在等待他們提出第一個主意。」

（左圖：能源消耗與碳排放量所佔比例）這位人士認為，世界需要中國更多的參與和主動性，而不是更少。中國領導人不喜歡現有的各種國家結盟，但是卻沒有提出別的集體安全體系方案。他們談論在要中國東海和南海分享油氣和漁業資源，卻沒有提供任何具體的建議。他們譴責西方干涉發展中國家的內政，卻在那些自己的份額越來越重的國家裡，讓當地的腐敗和施政不善的問題更加惡化。對於一支正在上升的力量，缺乏參與並不罕見。通過一次世界大戰，美國才不可逆轉地被拖上世界舞台。雖然沒有一個精心打造的日程表，但這不妨礙中國想獲得更好的地位。儘管作為第二次世界大戰的戰勝國，中國已經是聯合國安理會五個常任理事國之一，中國還是為缺乏在國際組織中的影響力而沮喪，並正率領其他發展中大國，試圖做出更好的安排。金磚國家-巴西，俄羅斯，印度，中國和南非，佔世界人口的42％和全球經濟的28％（按平價購買力計算），但在國際貨幣基金組織（IMF）中只擁有11％的投票權。今年七月，中國牽頭成立了位於上海的新發展銀行，其中包括所有的金磚國家成員。它看起來像一個初出茅廬的世界銀行的替代者，引發了關於「中國布雷頓森林體系」的爭論。中國還建立了一個亞洲基礎設施投資銀行，與亞洲開發銀行分庭抗禮。

在亞洲內部，中國人的活躍引發了人們的擔憂。這種擔憂是可以理解的。最具挑釁性的也許是，中國祭出了南海「九段線」，筆走龍蛇，洋洋洒洒，讓人摸不著頭腦。中國宣稱對這個圈裡的所有陸地擁有主權，似乎也包括所有的水體和海床。與之相反，如果依照《聯合國海洋法公約》（UNCLOS）的規則，其他國家也可以對其中不少地方提出領土主張。6月，在新加坡舉行的區域安全年度論壇「香格里拉對話」上，中國將軍王關中（解放軍副總參謀長-譯註）明確表示，中國尊重《聯合國海洋法公約》，但是「法不溯及既往」，公約不能追溯適用。「九段線「主張在1940年代中就已經建立了，而且南海諸島兩千多年來一直屬於中國。中國其他一些人則更加直率。位於海南的中國南海研究院院長吳立存最近指出，《聯合國海洋法公約》是在西方國家主導下建立的；著眼於長遠，中國「要通過地區合作等各種方式，重新構建由我主導的更加合理、公平、公正的國際海洋秩序。」這番言論無疑引起了華盛頓的關切。前美國政府高官，現供職於卡內基國際和平基金會的包道格不禁問道：「中國到底想拆掉多少座廟呢？」也許也沒有多少吧，至少現在。但是美國海軍戰爭學院的萊爾·戈爾茨坦認為，「中國已經想明白了，做一個大國肯定麻煩，難免要踐踏一些花花草草。中國人願意付出這個代價。」諸如「九段線」必須得到尊重這類的規矩，對某些小國而言或許可以接受。在2010年河內東盟會議上，中國前外交部長楊潔篪就曾脫口而出：「中國是大國，其他國家是小國，這是事實。」從軍事上講，這的確是事實。中國的武裝力量，即使技術不算一流，規模肯定足夠龐大，且令人印象深刻，不僅僅是因為它還有核彈。但是，楊先生說的某些小國卻有著大朋友。憑藉在日本和韓國的軍事基地，美國擁有西太平洋的支配權已經有70年了。儘管它四分之一個世紀前贏得了冷戰，美國在該區域的存在並沒有減少。2011年亞洲之行期間，奧巴馬總統高調宣布，美國的戰略支點將從中東轉向亞洲。

（左圖：軍隊規模與軍費對比）中國領導人相信，美國決意阻止中國在亞太地區增強戰略與軍事影響力；美國試圖遏制中國，一如它從前遏制並最終瓦解了蘇聯。具有諷刺意味的是，中國是唯一真正相信美國戰略支點轉移的國家。東南亞國家對於美國關注這一地區的說法多表示懷疑；在美國國內，奧巴馬的政壇對手則指責奧巴馬做得太少。 最近一次的香格里拉對話絲毫無助於打消中國的疑慮。日本首相安倍晉三表示願意向中國的鄰國提供軍事裝備援助。安倍一直企圖在日本戰後憲法的許可範圍內，推進一個更強大的亞太地區安保政策。在他上任的第一年內，安倍訪問了東盟的每一個會員國。美國國防部長哈格爾在香格里拉對話中為安倍的想法背書，指責中國的「單方面行動破壞地區穩定」。 幾十年來，中國在南海問題上一貫態度鮮明；習近平上任後，中國的立場明顯更加強硬起來。中國近來試圖控制「第一島鏈」-從沖繩到南沙群島廣大海域的舉動，讓幾乎所有的鄰國開始與它疏遠。美國智囊機構太平洋論壇CSIS的布萊德.格勞澤曼認為，「要破壞中國的長遠利益，很難設計一個比這更好的外交政策了。」

（左圖：全球出口總量市場份額）這些舉措的部分動機，無疑來自對控制海洋資源的渴望。但中國並沒有將其視為赤裸裸的領土擴張。中國領導人相信自己的說法，即東海和南海的島嶼自古以來就是中國的領土--毛澤東去世之後，中國按照它在清代帝國時期擁有的最大疆域來捍衛自己的領土主張，而不是遵照此前較小的版圖。他們的領土主張積極好鬥，表現不亞於（在他們看來好過）那個他們認為唯一可與其比擬的超級大國。中國注意到，美國不能算是全球國際秩序神殿的一個清白的保護者，它只是坐享超級大國的特權和支配權，而中國也想得到這些。美國人討厭國際條約的限制，甚至比中國人有過之而無不及，美國自己甚至還沒有批准《聯合國海洋法公約》；美國與少數盟國聯手，違反國際法，入侵了伊拉克

。 - See more at: http://blog.creaders.net/url169/user_blog_diary.php?did=190132#sthash.YvsQxSmC.dpuf中國想要什麼？（下篇.爭鋒）原文："China"s Future: What China Wants" -《The Economist》 翻譯：海天中國可能也注意到它的野心和美國昔日的相似之處。雖然美國一直到20世紀初才在全球發揮作用，但在此前一百年它就確立了一個雄心勃勃的區域性定位。1823年詹姆斯.門羅總統制定國策，拒絕歐洲國家干涉西半球，任何襲擾都將被視為侵略行為。從概念上講，中國似乎想在東亞仿效門羅主義：外部力量影響力的消減將使它能夠從容支配這個地區。不同的是，在19世紀的美洲，沒有任何本土力量來挑戰新興美國，而且大部分美洲國家都很高興能將歐洲實力從該地區趕走。至少在初期，他們都是門羅主義的受益者，而不是鬥爭對象。中國並非完全不懂得妥協。陸地邊界方面，中國有予有奪，一些爭議已經逐漸解決。然而，這部分是由於南海和東海對於中國具有更重要的戰略意義。其戰略重要性的關鍵在於，說到底，台灣的主權問題遲早要解決，實際上中國是在部署保護其側翼，以備未來與美國在台灣問題上發生軍事衝突。朝鮮不斷動蕩的局勢也有可能使兩個大國間擦槍走火。2013年加州峰會，習近平會晤奧巴馬時說：「寬廣的太平洋有足夠的空間容納中美兩個大國。」這話的意思，與其理解成萬里之隔下兩國和平共處的可能性，不如說是在表示，西太平洋理應屬於中國的勢力範圍。7月間，對來訪的美國國務卿克里，習近平又重複了這番話。如果說這其中暗示了兩個國家之間的對稱性，中國人更清楚，其實它還享有各種非對稱優勢。其中之一，中國作為單邊角色，可以在美國及其在該地區的盟友之間打楔子。澳大利亞學者休·懷特在最近的一篇文章指出，通過強力脅迫其他亞洲國家，「中國逼迫美國在拋棄盟友和與中國作戰之間做出選擇。」

中國的軍隊雖遠不如美軍專業熟練，但是享有本土作戰優勢，而美國只能通過海空作戰控制這些海域。如果中國的反艦導彈能夠構成嚴重威脅，他們就可以大大降低美國的武力投入，而無需花費巨資建立一支勉強能跟美軍相抗衡的海軍。所以雙方軍力上的不平衡，並非如有人想的那樣大，好像簡單數數有幾個航母戰鬥群就行（中國正在建造其首艘航母，而美國有十艘航母，其中四個在太平洋地區）。中國相信還有意願上的不對稱。它認為厭戰的美國不太可能花費鮮血和巨資，去保衛一些根本無人居住，對它也沒有直接戰略意義的礁石。美國可能會瘸子打圍--坐著喊。另一方面，深受民族主義而非僅被官方宣傳左右的中國民眾，則很樂於看到中國在東海南海投入武力，對此熱情高漲。中國的軍工企業渴望國家給他們撥款，讓他們能打造出更大，更好的國之利器。即使執政黨的領導人希望能在遵守國際法的框架內，和平崛起，已經養成的民族情緒或許也不一定允許中國這樣做。一旦問題涉及到日本，尤其如此。19世紀中國衰落的時候，日本取而代之成為亞洲的地區大國；中日關係從前到今後都將最為令人困擾。無需官方授意，中國媒體關於日本的宣傳總是非常尖刻；中國人完全記得被日本殘酷佔領期間，他們所蒙受的苦難。如果需要把人們的注意力從執政黨的不足上轉移開來，就把日本拎出來敲打一番，非常有效。中國領導人對其國家安全的考慮合情合理，也有權尋求讓他們的國家發揮更大的國際作用，然而沉溺於講述自己從前作為受害人如何如何，使他們看不到，自己正在成為亞洲的欺凌者。民眾的情緒高漲，表明中國不斷增長的自信並不純粹是國際關係問題。「每當我看到外交政策上的一項改變，我總會問，『國內是怎麼回事？』」美國波士頓大學的約瑟夫.傅士卓說。習近平正在清除對手，懲治腐敗，並如許多人所望，推進艱難的經濟和金融改革；弄些國外的事來讓人們分神，可能會派上用場。 對內鞏固權力，對外顯示力量，兩者是相互聯繫的，但這不意味著中國要全面回歸到「馬戛爾尼滾回去」那般的帝國式的傲慢。中國人現在知道，國界之外有他們想要的思想，市場，原材料和投資；他們也很好地融入了許多國際組織，儘管有時不無勉強。從當初對威斯特伐利亞的世界觀毫無了解，中國已經成長為一個忠實信徒；它把自己看成一群小國中的大國，天然優越。中國已經接受了外國國王可以與它的領導人平起平坐，雖然還不一定認同應該有法律來約束所有大小邦國。中國的統治者們還不認可，也無法接受，在國內與他們的百姓實現平等。毛澤東時代的中國創造了一個強大的政權和一個虛弱的社會。現在，那個強大的政權必須面對一個前所未有的強大起來的社會，讓個人能夠有新的途徑來表達對各種事物的看法，包括要求政府更負責任。中國的統治者像昔日的帝王們一樣，相信沒有一黨專政，國家就會分崩離析。而越來越多的中國民眾（以及許多外國漢學家）相信，只要一黨專政延續，中國就不能完全現代化。既得利益者們的激情和被壓迫者的怨恨糾纏交織在一起。在西部的穆斯林和西藏地區，不斷發生的騷亂撼動了社會。在經濟繁榮的東部，後天安門時代那種"只要遠離政治，幹什麼都行"的默契漸漸失靈，公眾對於腐敗，污染和其他問題的憤怒變得越來越響亮。可是，中國領導人不是讓公眾有更多正式的參與渠道和走向法治，而是通過打壓自由思想者，減少民眾的參與，因為他們相信，展開真正的，結構性的改革要比不做更危險。事實可能與此恰恰相反。中國國內這些深刻的分歧，將越來越難以靠單純的繁榮來掩蓋。 美國一直洋洋自得，它的經濟無可匹敵，全球影響力無人能比。美國作為世界上最大軍事強國的地位依然牢固，但是隨著中國的持續增長，美國作為世界最大經濟體的地位正變得岌岌可危。 （左圖：《經濟學人》對中美兩國GDP的預測。預計到2021年，中國GDP將超過美國） 中國的GDP何時能超過美國？ 比較經濟有很多種方法。

我們的圖表顯示的是以目前美元市場匯率計算的國內生產總值（GDP）。美國經濟黯然失色的時間表取決於一系列因素：自身的增長率，中國的增長率，各個國家的價格變化，以及相互間的匯率。比如說，倘若中國的物價上漲比美國的快，而它的貨幣(人民幣元)又沒有崩盤，那麼中國的經濟相對於美國將會更值錢，不久就能實現超越。對外夜郎自大，以此安撫國內民眾，不僅更難以為中國爭取到盟友和尊重，還有一個更深層次的問題。世界上有許多國家都羨慕並想效仿中國，依靠不民主的但有效率的方式獲得幾十年的經濟增長。如果中國的國內政治看上去不太穩定，對它的一些欽佩就會渙散。即使事情現在還說得過去，人們對中國的欽佩之情也並沒有轉化為摯愛，或者與之成為利益共同體。在經濟上和軍事上，中國朝著恢復其在亞洲中心地位的目標，已經走出很遠；在智慧和道義上卻還沒能如此。歷史上，中國的「軟實力」是如此強大，如哈佛大學的威廉·柯比所說，「鄰國主動把自己中國化」了。而現在，習近平可能知道如何維護自己，在國內和國外都讓人生畏。但是，如果中國不能發揮出更大的吸引力，這樣的地位總會趨向於不穩定。 如果中國能夠解決自己的身份認同危機，再次成為一個有吸引力的文明，而不僅僅是一個令人羨慕的發展模式，這將大大有助於它獲得尊重和渴望中的影響力。這種事情很難發生，除非執政黨願意向它的人民提供更多的權力，而習近平已經表明，在他任內不會這樣做。危險的是，中國想以在世界範圍內擴張勢力，作為其國內根本變革的替代。如果那些根本變革不能發生，那麼中國的全球影響力就將繼續顯得空洞，缺乏吸引力和富有威脅性，它的鄰國們也將繼續拽住山姆大叔的後衣襟不撒手。中國不再如馬戛爾1793年所描述那樣，是一艘「發了瘋的戰船」。儘管存在很多問題，這終究是一條更時尚，更現代的戰艦。200多年來，歷經多少痛苦和磨難，中國已經改變了其身份的內核，從一個自我封閉和保守的國家變成一個開放的，具有前瞻性的大國。自1978年以來，中國在對財富和國家實力的不懈追求中，表現出靈活性和不屈不撓的決心。現在，這些目標已經伸手可觸，中國正站在實現偉大的邊緣。放眼未來，接下來幾十年，雄關漫道，將最為艱難。

（全文終）- See more at: http://blog.creaders.net/url169/user_blog_diary.php?did=190173#sthash.QmAomvbK.dpufWhat China wants

As China becomes, again, the world"s largest economy, it wants the respect it enjoyed in centuries past. But it does not know how to achieve or deserve it

MATTHEW BOULTON, James Watt』s partner in the development of the steam engine and one of the 18th century』s greatest industrialists, was in no doubt about the importance of Britain』s first embassy to the court of the Chinese emperor. 「I conceive」, he wrote to James Cobb, secretary of the East India Company, 「the present occasion to be the most favourable that ever occurred for the introduction of our manufactures into the most extensive market in the world.」

In light of this great opportunity, he argued, George Macartney』s 1793 mission to Beijing should take a 「very extensive selection of specimens of all the articles we make both for ornament and use.」 By displaying such a selection to the emperor, court and people, Macartney』s embassy would learn what the Chinese wanted. Boulton』s Birmingham factories, along with those of his friends in other industries, would then set about producing those desiderata in unheard-of bulk, to everybody』s benefit.

That is not how things turned out. The emperor accepted Macartney』s gifts, and quite liked some of them—a model of the Royal Sovereign, a first-rate man o』 war, seemed particularly to catch his fancy—but understood the whole transaction as one of tribute, not trade. The court saw a visit from the representatives of King George as something similar in kind to the opportunities the emperor』s Ministry of Rituals provided for envoys from Korea and Vietnam to express their respect and devotion to the Ruler of All Under Heaven. (Dealings with the less sophisticated foreigners from inner Asia were the responsibility of the Office of Barbarian Affairs.)

The emperor was thus having none of Macartney』s scandalous suggestion that the Son of Heaven and King George should be perceived as equals. He professed himself happy that Britain』s tribute, though admittedly commonplace, should have come from supplicants so far away. But he did not see it as the beginning of a new trading relationship: 「We have never valued ingenious articles, nor do we have the slightest need of your country』s manufactures…Curios and the boasted ingenuity of their devices I prize not.」 Macartney』s request that more ports in China be opened to trade (the East India Company was limited to Guangzhou, then known as Canton) and that a warehouse be set up in Beijing itself was flatly refused. China at that time did not reject the outside world, as Japan did. It was engaged with barbarians on all fronts. It just failed to see that they had very much to offer.

In retrospect, a more active interest in extramural matters might have been advisable. China was unaware that an economic, technological and cultural revolution was taking place in Europe and being felt throughout the rest of the world. The subsequent rise of colonialist capitalism would prove the greatest challenge it would ever face. The Chinese empire Macartney visited had been (a few periods of collapse and invasion notwithstanding) the planet』s most populous political entity and richest economy for most of two millennia. In the following two centuries all of that would be reversed. China would be semi-colonised, humiliated, pauperised and torn by civil war and revolution.

Now, though, the country has become what Macartney was looking for: a relatively open market that very much wants to trade. To appropriate Boulton, the past two decades have seen the most favourable conditions that have ever occurred for the introduction of China』s manufactures into the most extensive markets in the world. That has brought China remarkable prosperity. In terms of purchasing power it is poised to retake its place as the biggest economy in the world. Still home to hundreds of millions mired in poverty, it is also a 21st-century nation of Norman Foster airports and shining solar farms. It has rolled a rover across the face of the moon, and it hopes to send people to follow it.

Video

An embassy to China

And now it is a nation that wants some things very much. In general, it knows what these things are. At home its people want continued growth, its leaders the stability that growth can buy. On the international stage people and Communist Party want a new deference and the influence that befits their nation』s stature. Thus China wants the current dispensation to stay the same—it wants the conditions that have helped it grow to endure—but at the same time it wants it turned into something else.

Finessing this need for things to change yet stay the same would be a tricky task in any circumstances. It is made harder by the fact that China』s Leninist leadership is already managing a huge contradiction between change and stasis at home as it tries to keep its grip on a society which has transformed itself socially almost as fast as it has grown economically. And it is made more dangerous by the fact that China is steeped in a belligerent form of nationalism and ruled over by men who respond to every perceived threat and slight with disproportionate self-assertion.

The post-perestroika collapse of the Soviet Union taught China』s leaders not just the dangers of political reform but also a profound distrust of America: would it undermine them next? Xi Jinping, the president, has since been spooked by the chaos unleashed in the Arab spring. It seems he wants to try to cleanse the party from within so it can continue to rule while refusing any notions of political plurality or an independent judiciary. That consolidation is influencing China』s foreign policy.

China is building airstrips on disputed islands in the South China Sea, moving oil rigs into disputed waters and redefining its airspace without any clear programme for turning such assertion into the acknowledged status it sees as its due. This troubles its neighbours, and it troubles America. Put together China』s desire to re-establish itself (without being fully clear about what that might entail) and America』s determination not to let that desire disrupt its interests and those of its allies (without being clear about how to respond) and you have the sort of ill-defined rivalry that can be very dangerous indeed. Shi Yinhong, of Renmin University in Beijing, one of China』s most eminent foreign-policy commentators, says that, five years ago, he was sure that China could rise peacefully, as it says it wants to. Now, he says, he is not so sure.

The long fall

WHEN China was first unified in 221BC, Rome was fighting Carthage for dominion over the western Mediterranean. Rome would go on to rise further and, famously, fall. China collapsed, too, many times, but the model had been set that it must always reunite. By the end of the Han dynasty in 220AD its rulers had institutionalised the teachings of Confucius, which emphasised the value of social hierarchy and personal morality, as the basis for government. By the Tang dynasty in the 7th century—at about the time Muhammad returned to Mecca—China was one of the wealthiest and most illustrious civilisations on Earth. Its economic and military power dwarfed that of neighbouring peoples. Its cultural riches and Confucian moral order made that pre-eminence seem natural to all concerned. China was the model to emulate. Kyoto in Japan is laid out like 8th-century Chang』an (modern day Xi』an). The Koreans and Vietnamese adopted Chinese script. Confucian teaching became, and remains, the philosophical foundation of many Asian cultures. Just as it was right for the emperor to occupy the apex of China』s hierarchy, so it was meet for China to sit atop the world』s.

Macartney came to this paragon at the height of its Qing dynasty. In the middle of the 18th century the emperor had brought Tibet and Turkestan into the empire by means of intensive military campaigns and the genocidal elimination of the Dzungars, taking it to its greatest historical extent. Though everyday life for the peasants was grim, imperial life was magnificent. But for all the wealth and despite—or perhaps because of—his imperious dismissal, Macartney felt the state was not as sempiternal as its rulers would have it. It was, he wrote, a 「crazy, first rate man o』 war」, able to overawe her neighbours 「merely by her bulk and appearance」. He sensed something of its fragility and the problems to come. 「She may drift sometime as a wreck and then be dashed to pieces on the shore.」

The structural reasons for China』s subsequent decline and the empire』s demise have been much discussed. Some point to what Mark Elvin, a historian, calls 「the high-level equilibrium trap」; the country ran well enough, with cheap labour and efficient administration, that supply and demand could be easily matched in a way that left no incentive to invest in technological improvement. Others note that Europe benefited from competition and trade between states, which drove its capacity for weaponry and its appetites for new markets. As Kenneth Pomeranz, an American historian, has argued, access to cheap commodities from the Americas was a factor in driving industrialisation in Britain and Europe that China did not enjoy. So was the good luck of having coal deposits close to Europe』s centres of industry; China』s coal and its factories were separated by thousands of kilometres, a problem that remains trying today.

For some or all of these reasons, and probably others too, China did not industrialise in the way that the West did. Europe had learned of gunpowder from China in the Middle Ages, but by the 19th century Europeans were far better at using it to get their way. In the 1830s the British tried to prise open the China market with opium—something people could be made to want, and keep wanting, whatever their previous inclinations. The Chinese tried to stop the trade; the British forced a war upon them and won it. In the subsequent Treaty of Nanjing, concluded in 1842, Britain grabbed Hong Kong and forced China to open its doors. China descended into a spiral of denial, defeat and semi-colonisation. Perhaps most humiliating, in the 1890s enfeebled China was defeated in battle by the Japanese—a people whose culture had been founded on Chinese civilisation, but which was now transformed by eagerly adopted Western technology and ambition. China』s centrality in Asia had been usurped.

Much of what has taken place since—republican revolution in 1911, the rise and victory of Maoism in 1949 and now 「socialism with Chinese characteristics」—has been a reaction to the loss of wealth, power and status, and a desire to regain the respect China』s leaders and people feel to be their country』s due.

The reformers and revolutionaries of the late 19th century came to believe that traditional Chinese culture was part of the problem. In an attempt not to be carved up by the colonial powers, they began to ditch much of China』s cultural heritage; to save themselves as a nation, many believed they had to destroy themselves as a culture. In 1905 the Confucian examination system that had been the focus of governmental training for two millennia was abandoned. The last emperor and the entire imperial system were overthrown in 1911. With no modern institutions to support it, the new republic soon collapsed into chaos.

After Mao reunited China in 1949, the Communists stepped up the assault on Chinese culture yet further. China』s institutions, and the mindsets they created and embodied, were replaced wholesale by ideas from elsewhere. This was the equivalent of Europeans throwing out any vestiges of Roman law, Greek philosophy or Christian belief. Under Mao, Confucius became the enemy. And yet the sense of China as a great civilisation persisted, and persists to this day—leaving the country with a deep identity crisis that it is still struggling to resolve.

Along the way, China cast off the imperial view of the world as a source of tribute and embraced the one that in Europe had been introduced by the Peace of Westphalia: one of essentially equivalent sovereign states distinguished from each other by the quantities of wealth and power they disposed of, not by any qualitative hierarchy. China now has to see itself as a state among others. Yet it is at the same time, in the words of Lucian Pye, an American academic, 「a civilisation pretending to be a state」. Its history, its size and the feeling of potency brought on by the remarkable growth of the past two decades push it to want to be something more, and to take back the place that foreigners stole from it. China』s people and leaders feel their nation』s time has come once again.

Expanding the bounds

FOR all this ambition, China is not bent on global domination. It has little interest in polities beyond Asia, except in as much as they provide it with raw material and markets. Talk of China』s 「neo-colonialism」 in Africa, for instance, is much exaggerated. The country』s stock of direct investment there still lags far behind Britain』s and France』s and amounts to only a third of America』s. Though China』s influence is undoubtedly growing, its engagement is not imperial but transactional, says Deborah Brautigam, of Johns Hopkins University. When a Japanese company bought the Rockefeller Centre in the 1980s, 「Americans thought they were buying all of Manhattan,」 says Ms Brautigam. 「The same is true of China in Africa. It』s all about perception.」 In a forthcoming book, she investigates 20 media reports of land acquisitions by Chinese firms in Africa, claimed to total 5.5m hectares. She found the real figure to be just 63,400 hectares.

Chinese foremen have abused African workers, Chinese companies have run illegal mines and annoyingly undercut local traders with cheap Chinese goods. But these are the problems of bad business, not of grand strategy. Unlike Europe』s colonial powers of yesteryear, China has no strategic vision of keeping all others out of its bit of the continent, nor any hypocritical 「civilising mission」. When it perceives it could have a problem with its image, it responds pragmatically: building hospitals, paying for malaria-prevention programmes, laying down railways. In Africa and Latin America it is focusing more on taking stakes in local companies, not just buying up land and resources. It is also making forays into the use of soft power through a number of Confucius Institutes all over the world that try—in frequently ham-fisted ways—to show that China and its culture are benign.

China is 「neither a missionary culture nor a values superpower,」 says Kerry Brown of the University of Sydney. 「It is not trying to make other people into China.」 The rhetoric of American foreign policy—and frequently its content, too—is shaped by claims to be the champion of democracy and liberty. The Communist Party is less committed to universal values. Alliances often grow out of shared values; if you don』t have them, friends are harder to find. Awe can be a respectable alternative to friendship, and China has begun to awe the world—but also to worry it.

Clan-focused Confucianism and the fear bred by communism have persuaded the Chinese to mind their own business: sweep the snow from in front of your own house, goes the old saying, don』t worry about the frost on your neighbour』s roof. If it adopts similar attitudes to the world at large, that may be because China faces problems on a global scale within its own borders: it has more poor people than any other country save India. When 160m of your own citizens are living on less than $1.25 a day, and many people are beginning to complain more openly about your nation』s domestic problems, the development needs of Africans can seem less pressing.

Accordingly, there is a tension in Chinese foreign policy. The country wants to have as little involvement abroad as it can get away with, except for engagements that enhance its image as a great power. It will act abroad when its own interests are at stake, but not for the greater or general good. Its navy has started to take part in anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa and in UN peacekeeping in Africa. In 2011 it sent a ship to co-ordinate the evacuation of 36,000 Chinese workers from Libya. More such actions may follow as its companies get more deeply involved in the world, but only if they are seen as either low-cost or absolutely necessary. Acute awareness of its domestic weaknesses acts as a restraint, as does the damage China sees done by the militarisation of America』s foreign policy in recent years.

In a wide range of fields, what China is against is a lot clearer than what it is for. It vetoed the interventions Western powers sought in Syria and Darfur and has taken no position on the Russian annexation of Crimea (despite having a dim view of any sort of centrifugalism at home). At the 2009 climate summit in Copenhagen China made sure no deal emerged that would even suggest it might have to slow its industrial growth. There and elsewhere it showed itself ready to block but not ready to build. As a former senior official in the Bush administration says of Chinese engagement at the G20, 「They love to show up, but we』re still waiting for their first idea.」

The former official argues that the world needs more Chinese engagement and initiative, not less. Chinese leaders dislike the existing system of alliances, he says, but offer no alternative system of collective security. They talk about sharing hydrocarbon and fishery resources in the South and East China Seas, but have offered no concrete proposals. They condemn Western interference in the internal affairs of developing nations, but exacerbate corruption and poor governance in countries where they have a growing stake of their own.

A lack of engagement is not unusual in a rising power. It took a world war to draw America irrevocably onto the world stage. And the absence of an articulated agenda does not stop China wanting more standing. Despite being one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—a position it achieved as one of the victorious powers in the second world war—it is frustrated by what it sees as its lack of influence in international organisations and is leading the other large developing nations in pushing for a better deal.

The BRICS countries—Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa—make up 42% of the world』s population and 28% of the global economy (at PPP), but they have only 11% of the votes at the International Monetary Fund. In July China led the establishment of the Shanghai-based New Development Bank, of which all the BRICS countries are members and which looks like a fledgling alternative to the World Bank, leading to talk of a 「Chinese Bretton Woods」. China has also set up an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to rival the Asian Development Bank.

Leviathan and its hooks

WITHIN Asia, it is Chinese activity, not Chinese inactivity, that has people worried, and their concern is understandable. Perhaps most provocative is China』s devotion to the 「nine-dash line」, an ill-defined swish of the pen around the South China Sea. Within this perimeter, China claims all the dry land and, it appears, all the water and seabed too; by way of contrast, the rules of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) would tend to see quite a lot of those things as subject to claims from other countries. Speaking in June at the Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual regional-security shindig in Singapore, Wang Guanzhong, a Chinese general, made it clear that although China respected UNCLOS, the convention could not apply retroactively: the nine-dash line was instituted in the 1940s and the islands of the South China Sea have been Chinese for 2,000 years.

Others in China have been blunter. Wu Shicun, head of the National Institute for South China Seas Studies, based on the southern Chinese island of Hainan, recently pointed out that UNCLOS was developed under Western guidance and that, looking to the long term, 「we should rebuild through various methods of regional co-operation a more reasonable, fairer and more just international maritime order that is guided by us.」 Not surprisingly, this has caused concern in Washington. 「How much of the temple do they actually want to tear down?」 asks Douglas Paal, a former American official now at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Probably not all that much, for now. But 「China gets it that being a great power is messy, and involves trampling on a few flowers,」 says Lyle Goldstein of America』s Naval War College. 「It is a price the Chinese are willing to pay.」 Rules such as those which say the nine-dash line must be respected might be acceptable for the small fry. But as China』s then foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, vocally pointed out at a meeting of regional powers in Hanoi in 2010, 「China is a big country and other countries are small countries and that is a fact.」

Militarily, this is indeed the case. China』s armed forces are, if not technologically first-rate, certainly large and impressive, not least because they include a nuclear-missile force. But some of Mr Yang』s small countries have a big friend. With troops and bases in Japan and South Korea, America has been the dominant power of the western Pacific for 70 years. Its regional presence has not declined much since it won the cold war a quarter of a century ago. On a trip to Asia in 2011 Barack Obama announced a 「pivot」 of his country』s policy away from the Middle East and towards Asia.

China』s leaders are convinced that America is determined to prevent their country from increasing its strategic and military influence in Asia—that it is trying to contain China as it once sought to contain and eventually crush the Soviet Union. The irony is that China is the only country that really believes the pivot is happening. South-East Asian nations express a fair amount of scepticism at the idea that America』s attention has been newly fixed on their region, and his opponents in America claim Mr Obama has done far too little to follow through on what he said in 2011.

That said, the recent Shangri-La Dialogue did nothing to dispel China』s fears. Japan』s prime minister, Shinzo Abe, offered to assist China』s neighbours with military hardware, and has been pushing, within the constraints of Japan』s pacifist post-war constitution, for a more robust defence policy in the region. In his first year in office Mr Abe visited every member of the Association of South-East Asian Nations. America』s secretary of defence, Chuck Hagel, endorsed Mr Abe』s ideas at Shangri-La, accusing China of 「destabilising unilateral actions」.

China has been assertive in the South China Sea for decades, but there has been a distinct hardening of its position since Mr Xi came to power. Recent moves to dominate the seas within the 「first island chain」 that runs from Okinawa through Taiwan to the Spratlys (see map) have alienated almost all the country』s neighbours. 「It would be hard to construct a foreign policy better designed to undermine China』s long-term interests,」 argues Brad Glosserman of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a think-tank.

The moves are undoubtedly motivated in part by a desire to control the resources of the sea bed. But China itself does not see them as straightforward territorial expansionism. Chinese leaders believe their own rhetoric about the islands of the East and South China Seas having always been part of their territory–a territory that, since the death of Mao, they have chosen to define as almost the empire』s maximum extent under the Qing dynasty, rather than its more modest earlier size. And if they are expressing this territorial interest aggressively, they are behaving no worse—in their eyes, better—than the only other power they see as their match. The Chinese note that America is hardly an unsullied protector of that temple of the global international order; it enjoys the great-power prerogatives and dispensations they seek for their own nation. Disliking the restraints of international treaties perhaps even more than China does, America has not itself ratified UNCLOS. With a handful of allies it rode roughshod over the international legal system to invade Iraq.

Video

Videographic: China』s territorial disputes

China might also note parallels between its ambitions and those of America』s in days gone by. Although America waited until the early 20th century to take on a global role, it defined an ambitious regional role a hundred years earlier. In 1823 James Monroe laid out as policy a refusal to countenance any interference in the Western hemisphere by European nations; all incursions would be treated as acts of aggression. Conceptually, what China wants in East Asia seems akin to a Monroe Doctrine: a decrease in the influence of external powers that would allow it untroubled regional dominance. The difference is that the 19th-century Americas did not have any home-grown powers to challenge the United States, and most of its nations were quite content with the idea of keeping European great powers out of the area. At least in its early years, they were the doctrine』s beneficiaries, not its subjects.

China is not completely uncompromising. Along its land borders it has let some disputes fade away and offered a bit of give and take. But this is in part because the South and East China Seas are seen as more strategically important. A key part of this strategic importance is the possibility that, eventually, the question of Taiwan』s sovereignty will come to a head; it is in effect protecting its flanks in case of a future clash with America on the matter. The ever-volatile situation in North Korea could also create a flashpoint between the two states.

When Mr Xi said, at his 2013 California summit with Mr Obama, that 「the vast Pacific has enough space for two large countries like the United States and China,」 it was an expression not so much of the possibility of peaceful coexistence that must surely come from being separated by 10,000km of water, as of the idea that the western Pacific was a legitimate Chinese sphere of influence.

And if Mr Xi』s words, repeated to America』s secretary of state, John Kerry, in Beijing in July, seemed to imply a symmetry between the countries, China knows that, in fact, it enjoys various asymmetric advantages. For one, it is a unitary actor. It can drive wedges between America and its allies in the region. Hugh White, an Australian academic, argued in a recent article that, by threatening other Asian countries with force, 「China confronts America with the choice between deserting its friends and fighting China.」

China』s armed forces are much less proficient than America』s. But China enjoys the advantage of playing at home. America can dominate these seas only through naval and air operations. If Chinese anti-ship missiles present a serious threat to such operations they can greatly reduce America』s ability to project power, without putting China to the expense of developing a navy of its own remotely so capable. Thus the military forces of the two sides are not as unbalanced as one might think by simply counting carrier groups (of which China is building its first, whereas America has ten, four of them in the Pacific).

China also thinks there is an asymmetry of will. It sees a war-weary America as unlikely to spend blood and treasure defending uninhabited rocks of no direct strategic importance. America may speak loudly, but its big stick will remain unwielded. China』s people, on the other hand, their views shaped not just by propaganda but also by a nationalism that needs scant encouragement, look on the projection of power in the China seas very favourably. And its military-industrial complex yearns to be paid to build bigger, better sticks of its own. Even if party leaders wanted to succeed in their stated desire for a peaceful rise and to remain within international law, the way they have shaped the spirit of their country would not necessarily let them.

This is especially true when it comes to Japan, the country which took on the role of regional power in Asia when China was laid low in the 19th century, and with which relations would always be most vexed. The vitriolic propaganda against the Japanese in Chinese media scarcely needs official prompting; Chinese suffering under Japan』s cruel occupation is well remembered. Japan is a useful whipping boy to distract attention from the party』s inadequacies. China』s leaders have legitimate security concerns and a right to seek a larger international role for their nation but, obsessed with their own narrative of victimhood, they do not see that they themselves are becoming Asia』s bullies.

The challenge of change

PUBLIC enthusiasm underlines the fact that China』s growing assertiveness is not purely a matter of relationships outside its borders. 「Whenever I see a change in foreign policy, I always ask, 『what』s going on domestically?』 」 says Joseph Fewsmith of Boston University. Mr Xi is purging rivals, clamping down on corruption and, many hope, pushing through tough economic and financial reforms; some foreign distraction might come in handy.

Consolidating power at home and throwing its weight around abroad are linked, but they do not mark a return to full-blown, go-home-Macartney imperial arrogance. The Chinese know that there are now things they want from beyond their borders—ideas as well as markets, raw materials and investment—and they have integrated remarkably well, if sometimes grudgingly, into many international organisations. From not understanding the Westphalian world view, China has grown into a devotee, seeing a way of looking at the world in which it thinks, as a big state among small states, that it enjoys natural advantages. It has accepted the equality of its rulers with foreign kings, though not necessarily the idea that there should be laws to bind all such princes.

However, those rulers have not accepted, and cannot accept, equality with those they rule at home. Maoist China created a strong state and a weak society. Now that strong state has to deal with an ever stronger society, too, in which individuals have new ways of expressing themselves about all sorts of things, including the need for more accountable government. China』s rulers believe the country cannot hold together without one-party rule as firm as an emperor』s (and they may be right); an increasing number of its people (and many foreign sinologists) believe it cannot become fully modern as long as one-party rule endures.

Both the aspirations of the enriched and the resentments of the oppressed are in play. In western regions, Muslim and Tibetan areas are constantly rocked by unrest. In the more prosperous east of the country, the post-Tiananmen deal—stay out of politics and you can do anything you want—is fraying, and public outrage at corruption, pollution and other problems grows more vociferous. Yet rather than allow more formal popular participation and move towards the rule of law, China』s leaders are allowing less participation as they crack down on free-thinkers, believing that carrying out real, structural reform is more dangerous than not doing so. In fact the opposite may be true. The deep fissures in the country will be increasingly hard to paper over with mere prosperity.

It is not just that seeking to placate the public at home with braggadocio overseas will make it harder still for China to garner allies and respect. There is a deeper problem. Many countries around the world admire, and would like to emulate, the undemocratic but effective way that China has managed its decades of growth. If China』s domestic politics look less stable, some of that admiration will wane. And even if things can be held together, for the time being, admiration for China does not translate into affection for it, or into a sense of common cause. Economically and militarily, China has come a long way towards regaining the centrality in Asia it enjoyed through much of history. Intellectually and morally, it has not. In the old days it held a 「soft power」 so strong, according to William Kirby of Harvard University, that 「neighbours converted themselves」 to it. Now, Mr Xi may know how to assert himself and how to be feared, at home and abroad. But without the ability to exert a greater power of attraction, too, such strength will always tend to destabilise.

If China could resolve its identity crisis and once again become an attractive civilisation rather than just an enviable development model, it would be much better placed to get the respect and influence it craves. But it is hard to see that happening unless the party gives more power to its people, and Mr Xi has made it clear that will not happen on his watch. The danger is that China will seek greater power in the world as a substitute for fundamental changes at home. If it fails to make those changes, its global power will continue to look hollow, unattractive and threatening, and its neighbours will continue to cling to the coat-tails of Uncle Sam.

China is no longer the 「crazy, first-rate man o』 war」 described by Macartney in 1793. In spite of its many problems, it is a sleeker, more modern ship. Over 200 years, through much pain and suffering, it has transformed the very core of its identity, changing itself from an inward- and backward-looking power to an outward- and forward-looking one. Since 1978, it has shown both flexibility and unwielding resolve in its continued pursuit of wealth and power. Now those goals are within reach and China stands on the verge of greatness. The next few decades may prove to be the most difficult of all.

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