【What China Wants】6 Page Essay譯文 （3）

接上文。。。

LEVIATHAN AND ITS HOOKS

利維但及其觸角

WITHIN Asia, it is Chinese activity, notChinese inactivity, that has people worried, and their concern is understandable.Perhaps most provocative is China"s devotion to the 「nine-dash line」, anill-defined swish of the pen around the South China Sea. Within this perimeter,China claims all the dry land and, it appears, all the water and seabed too; byway of contrast, the rules of the United Nations Convention on the Law of theSea (UNCLOS) would tend to see quite a lot of those things as subject to claimsfrom other countries. Speaking in June at the Shangri-La Dialogue, an annualregional-security shindig in Singapore, Wang Guanzhong, a Chinese general, madeit clear that although China respected UNCLOS, the convention could not applyretroactively: the nine-dash line was instituted in the 1940s and the islandsof the South China Sea have been Chinese for 2,000 years.

在亞洲，是中國的「有所為」，而不是中國的「無所為」，引發了人們的擔憂。這種擔憂是可以理解的。其中最具刺激性的可能是中國對「九段線」——一條圍繞著南中國海劃定的模糊的線——的堅守。中國宣稱，她對在這條線周邊以內的所有的陸地，似乎還包括所有的海域和海床，都擁有主權。與之相反的是，聯合國海洋法會議(UNCLOS)的法律會傾向於把這其中的很多東西，看作是其他國家也可以宣稱擁有主權的對象。今年7月，中國將軍王冠中在新加坡舉行的大型地區安全論壇「香格里拉對話」中曾明確表示，儘管中國尊重UNCLOS，但是，UNCLOS不具有追溯力，不適用於「九段線」。因為，九段線早在上世紀40年代就被劃定了。南中國海中的島嶼，在過去的2000多年中，一直是中國的。

Others in China have been blunter. WuShicun, head of the National Institute for South China Seas Studies, based onthe southern Chinese island of Hainan, recently pointed out that UNCLOS wasdeveloped under Western guidance and that, looking to the long term, 「we shouldrebuild through various methods of regional co-operation a more reasonable,fairer and more just international maritime order that is guided by us.」 Notsurprisingly, this has caused concern in Washington. 「How much of the temple dothey actually want to tear down?」 asks Douglas Paal, a former American officialnow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

中國的其他一些人就更加直接了當了。位於中國海南島的中國南海研究院院長吳士存最近指出，UNCLOS是在西方的指導下形成的。因而，從長期來看，「我們應當通過多樣的地區合作方式，重建一個由我們來主導的，更合理、更公平，更公正的國際海洋秩序」。不出所料，這種觀點已經在華盛頓引起了關注。「他們到底想推倒這座廟的多大一部分呢？」卡內基國際和平基金會的美國政府前官員包道格問道。

Probably not all that much, for now. But「China gets it that being a great power is messy, and involves trampling on afew flowers,」 says Lyle Goldstein of America"s Naval War College. 「It is aprice the Chinese are willing to pay.」 Rules such as those which say thenine-dash line must be respected might be acceptable for the small fry. But asChina"s then foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, vocally pointed out at a meeting ofregional powers in Hanoi in 2010, 「China is a big country and other countriesare small countries and that is a fact.」

從當前來看，可能不會太大。但是，「中國知道，做大國就要幹些臟活，比如說辣手摧花這樣的事，」美國海軍戰爭學院的萊爾·戈爾茨坦說。「這是一個中國願意付出的代價。」像規定九段線必須得到尊重這一類的規則可能會被勢單力孤的小國接受。但是，正如時任中國外長楊潔篪2010年在河內舉行的一次地區強國會議上所說的那樣，「中國是一個大國，其他國家是小國。這就是事實。」

Militarily, this is indeed the case.China"s armed forces are, if not technologically first-rate, certainly largeand impressive, not least because they include a nuclear-missile force. Butsome of Mr Yang"s small countries have a big friend. With troops and bases inJapan and South Korea, America has been the dominant power of the westernPacific for 70 years. Its regional presence has not declined much since it wonthe cold war a quarter of a century ago. On a trip to Asia in 2011 Barack Obamaannounced a 「pivot」 of his country"s policy away from the Middle East andtowards Asia.

在軍事方面，實際情況確實如此。中國的軍事力量，雖說在技術方面還不是第一流的，確實是龐大的和令人印象深刻的，而且這還不僅僅是因為他們擁有一支核武器部隊。但是，楊所說的那些小國家擁有一個大朋友。在過去的70年間，美國一直是西太平洋的主導力量，在日本和南朝鮮駐有部隊，擁有基地。美國在該地區的存在，自其在25年前贏得了冷戰後，一直沒有太多的衰落。2011年，奧巴馬在其亞洲之行中，宣布了美國國家政策從中東向亞洲的一個「轉向」。

China"s leaders are convinced that Americais determined to prevent their country from increasing its strategic andmilitary influence in Asia—that it is trying to contain China as it once soughtto contain and eventually crush the Soviet Union. The irony is that China isthe only country that really believes the pivot is happening. South-East Asiannations express a fair amount of scepticism at the idea that America"sattention has been newly fixed on their region, and his opponents in Americaclaim Mr Obama has done far too little to follow through on what he said in2011.

受此影響，中國領導層相信，美國決意要防止他們的國家增強在亞洲的戰略影響力和軍事影響力。換言之，中國領導層相信，美國正在試圖像曾經遏制並最終打敗了蘇聯那樣來遏制中國。具有諷刺意味的是，中國是唯一一個真得相信這種「轉向」正在發生的國家。東南亞國家對美國的注意力最近已經被固定在這塊地區的看法非常懷疑，奧巴馬在國內的對手稱，這位美國總統幾乎沒有去兌現他在2011年所說的那些話。

That said, the recent Shangri-La Dialoguedid nothing to dispel China"s fears. Japan"s prime minister, Shinzo Abe,offered to assist China"s neighbours with military hardware, and has beenpushing, within the constraints of Japan"s pacifist post-war constitution, fora more robust defence policy in the region. In his first year in office Mr Abevisited every member of the Association of South-East Asian Nations. America"ssecretary of defence, Chuck Hagel, endorsed Mr Abe"s ideas at Shangri-La,accusing China of 「destabilising unilateral actions」.

這就是說，在消除中國的擔憂方面，近年來的香格里拉對話可謂是一無所成。日本首相安倍晉三已經建議用軍事硬體來援助中國的鄰國，並且還在日本戰後和平憲法所允許的範圍內，為該地區力爭一種更加強勢的防禦政策。安倍在其任內的第一年遍訪了東盟成員國。美國國防部長查克·哈格爾在香格里拉對話上對安倍的想法給予了背書，對中國「破壞穩定的單邊行為」提出了指責。

China has been assertive in the South ChinaSea for decades. Alastair Iain Johnston of Harvard University argues thatrecent changes have not always been in the degree of this assertiveness but inthe level of interest Western media take in it and the narratives they create.Others, though, see a distinct hardening of the position since Mr Xi came topower. Recent moves to dominate the seas within the 「first island chain」 that runsfrom Okinawa through Taiwan to the Spratlys have alienated almost all the country"s neighbours. 「It would be hard toconstruct a foreign policy better designed to undermine China"s long-terminterests,」 argues Brad Glosserman of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a think-tank.

幾十年來，中國在南中國海問題上，始終是堅定而自信。哈佛大學的江憶恩指出，最近的種種變化，並非總是在於這種自信的程度，而是在於西方媒體對這種自信的興趣的大小，以及他么所創造的報道的力度。不過，在其他人看來，自習上台以來，這種立場呈現出一種明顯的強化態勢。最近發生在從關島經台灣到斯普拉特利群島這條被稱之為「第一島鏈」海域內的主宰舉動，已經使他們同幾乎所有的鄰國的關係都疏遠了。美國智庫戰略與國際研究中心"太平洋論壇"的羅瑟曼說：「難就難在，不容易構建一種有著較好設計的外交政策，以削弱中國的長期利益。」

The moves are undoubtedly motivated in partby a desire to control the resources of the sea bed. But China itself does notsee them as straightforward territorial expansionism. Chinese leaders believetheir own rhetoric about the islands of the East and South China Seas havingalways been part of their territory–a territory that, since the death of Mao,they have chosen to define as almost the empire"s maximum extent under the Qingdynasty, rather than its more modest earlier size. And if they are expressingthis territorial interest aggressively, they are behaving no worse—in theireyes, better—than the only other power they see as their match. The Chinesenote that America is hardly an unsullied protector of that temple of the globalinternational order; it enjoys the great-power prerogatives and dispensationsthey seek for their own nation. Disliking the restraints of internationaltreaties perhaps even more than China does, America has not itself ratifiedUNCLOS. With a handful of allies it rode roughshod over the international legalsystem to invade Iraq.

這些舉動背後的動機，無疑可以部分地歸之於一種想要掌控這塊海域的海底資源的渴望。但是，中國自己並不把這些舉動看作是赤裸裸的領土擴張主義。自毛去世之後，中國的領導層一直就把幾乎同清朝統治下的帝國的最大疆域相同的而不是早先較小的疆域界定為自己的領土。因而，當他們說東中國海和南中國海中的那些島嶼始終是他們領土的一部分時，他們是相信這種表述的。如果他們正在攻擊性地表達領土方面的利益，那麼，這種表現之惡劣同被他們視為唯一對手的另一個大國的表現不相上下。不過，在他們眼中，這種表現要好於那個國家。中國人指出，美國幾乎不能稱之為一個沒有污點的國際秩序之廟的保護者。他們所享受的超級大國的特權和豁免權是他們為自己的國家所尋求的。不喜歡國際條約之約束可能甚於中國的美國一直沒有批准UNCLOS。鑒於盟友眾多，美國曾肆意地踐踏了國際法體系以入侵伊拉克。

China might also note parallels between itsambitions and those of America"s in days gone by. Although America waited untilthe early 20th century to take on a global role, it defined an ambitiousregional role a hundred years earlier. In 1823 James Monroe laid out as policya refusal to countenance any interference in the Western hemisphere by Europeannations; all incursions would be treated as acts of aggression.

中國可能還會指出，她的野心同美國以前的野心是一樣的。儘管美國一直等到20世紀初才去承擔全球性角色，但是，早在那之前100年，她就已經為自己界定了一個野心勃勃的地區角色。詹姆斯·門羅早在1823年就把拒絕支持歐洲國家對西半球的任何介入確立為一項國策。所有的不請自來都會被當作侵略行為來對待。

Conceptually, what China wants in East Asiaseems akin to a Monroe Doctrine: a decrease in the influence of external powersthat would allow it untroubled regional dominance. The difference is that the19th-century Americas did not have any home-grown powers to challenge the UnitedStates, and most of its nations were quite content with the idea of keepingEuropean great powers out of the area. At least in its early years, they werethe doctrine"s beneficiaries, not its subjects.

從本質上來說，中國在東亞想要的似乎是門羅主義的一個翻版：外部勢力影響力的削弱會承認她不受干擾的地區影響力。不同之處在於，19世紀的美洲沒有任何同地區強國挑戰美國，大多數國家都非常滿足於將歐洲的超級大國排除在地區之外的想法。至少在其初期，他們都是門羅主義的受益者，而不是門羅主義所針對的對象。

China is not completely uncompromising.Along its land borders it has let some disputes fade away and offered a bit ofgive and take. But this is in part because the South and East China Seas areseen as more strategically important. A key part of this strategic importanceis the possibility that, eventually, the question of Taiwan"s sovereignty willcome to a head; it is in effect protecting its flanks in case of a future clashwith America on the matter. The ever-volatile situation in North Korea couldalso create a flashpoint between the two states.

中國不是完全不讓步。她已經讓一些陸地邊界的爭端慢慢地消失了，做出過一些妥協。但是，這部分是因為南中國海和東中國海被視為是更為重要的戰略之所在。這種戰略重要性的一個關鍵部分是台灣主權問題最終會面臨攤牌的可能性。實際上，中國正在保護她的側翼，以防將來在這個問題上同美國發生衝突。向來脆弱的北朝鮮局勢也可能在兩國之間製造一個引爆點。

When Mr Xi said, at his 2013 Californiasummit with Mr Obama, that 「the vast Pacific has enough space for two largecountries like the United States and China,」 it was an expression not so muchof the possibility of peaceful coexistence that must surely come from beingseparated by 10,000km of water, as of the idea that the western Pacific was alegitimate Chinese sphere of influence.

當習近平2013年在加州峰會上對奧巴馬說「對於像美中這樣的兩個大國來說，廣闊的太平洋有著足夠的空間」時，與其說這是對於兩國和平共處可能性的一種表述，倒不如說這是有關西太平洋是中國合法的勢力範圍的一種想法。

And if Mr Xi"s words, repeated to America"ssecretary of state, John Kerry, in Beijing in July, seemed to imply a symmetrybetween the countries, China knows that, in fact, it enjoys various asymmetricadvantages. For one, it is a unitary actor. It can drive wedges between Americaand its allies in the region. Hugh White, an Australian academic, argued in arecent article that, by threatening other Asian countries with force, 「Chinaconfronts America with the choice between deserting its friends and fightingChina.」

如果說在今年7月被重複給美國國務卿約翰·克里的習的這句話，似乎是在暗示存在於兩國之間的一種對等。實際上，中國知道，她享有多種不對等的優勢。比如說，她是一個統一行動體。她能夠玩轉美國和美國在該地區的盟友之間的不和。澳大利亞學者休·懷特在最近的一篇文章中指出，通過用武力來威脅其他亞洲國家，「中國是在利用利用『要麼拋棄朋友，要麼與中國為敵』的辦法來對抗美國。」

China"s armed forces are much lessproficient than America"s. But China enjoys the advantage of playing at home.America can dominate these seas only through naval and air operations. IfChinese anti-ship missiles present a serious threat to such operations they cangreatly reduce America"s ability to project power, without putting China to theexpense of developing a navy of its own remotely so capable. Thus the militaryforces of the two sides are not as unbalanced as one might think by simplycounting carrier groups (of which China is building its first, whereas Americahas ten, four of them in the Pacific).

中國的軍隊遠不如美軍訓練有素。但是，中國享有在地利的優勢。美國只能依靠海軍和空軍的行動來主宰這些海域。如果中國反艦導彈對此類行動形成嚴重的威脅，這些導彈就能大大地降低美國投放軍力的能力，而中國也不必再為發展一支自己的有遠洋能力的海軍而投入大筆的資金。因此，雙方的軍事實力並不像簡單地計算航母艦隊數量那樣不平衡。（中國正在建造她的第一艘航母，而美國有十艘航母，其中四艘在太平洋）。

China also thinks there is an asymmetry ofwill. It sees a war-weary America as unlikely to spend blood and treasuredefending uninhabited rocks of no direct strategic importance. America mayspeak loudly, but its big stick will remain unwielded. China"s people, on theother hand, their views shaped not just by propaganda but also by a nationalismthat needs scant encouragement, look on the projection of power in the Chinaseas very favourably. And its military-industrial complex yearns to be paid tobuild bigger, better sticks of its own. Even if party leaders wanted to succeedin their stated desire for a peaceful rise and to remain within internationallaw, the way they have shaped the spirit of their country would not necessarilylet them.

中國認為，雙方還存在著一種意願上的不對等。在她看來，厭戰的美國不可能為了保護沒有直接戰略重要性的無人居住的島嶼，去流血，去耗費錢財。美國或許只是喊得響，但是她的大棒還會。相比之下，觀點不僅被宣傳而且被需要空洞鼓勵的民族主義所形成的中國民眾，對在中國海域投放實力是非常看重的。同時，其軍工企業渴望得到資金，去建造更大更好的自己的大棒。就算是黨的領導層想在他們所宣稱的對於和平崛起的渴望這個方面獲得成功，並且仍然留在國際法之內，但是他們形成其國家精神的方式必然不會允許他們這樣做。

This is especially true when it comes toJapan, the country which took on the role of regional power in Asia when Chinawas laid low in the 19th century, and with which relations would always be mostvexed. The vitriolic propaganda against the Japanese in Chinese media scarcelyneeds official prompting; Chinese suffering under Japan"s cruel occupation iswell remembered. Japan is a useful whipping boy to distract attention from theparty"s inadequacies. China"s leaders have legitimate security concerns and aright to seek a larger international role for their nation but, obsessed withtheir own narrative of victimhood, they do not see that they themselves arebecoming Asia"s bullies.

這在涉及到日本時尤其如此。日本在19世紀接過亞洲地區強國角色之時，正值中國戰敗之際，中國同它的關係是最棘手的。中國媒體上針對日本人的刻薄宣傳幾乎不需要官方的督促；中國在日本殘暴佔領下的遭遇被銘記在心。日本是一個有用的替罪羊，可悲用來分散對黨的不足的注意力。中國領導層有著合法的安全關切，有權利為他們的國家尋求一個更大的國際角色。但是，由於沉迷於他們自己的受害者的敘述，他們沒有看到自己正在成為亞洲的恃強凌弱者。

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