冷戰陰霾從未散盡，美國的勝利只是幻象 | 時報專欄

1991年，喬治·H·W·布希總統（左）和前蘇聯總統米哈伊爾·戈爾巴喬夫在莫斯科。Rick Wilking/Reuters

（本文發表於時報觀點與評論版面，是「紅色世紀」系列專欄中的一篇。）

This is an essay in the series Red Century, about the history and legacy of Communism 100 years after the Russian Revolution.

紅色世紀：十月革命100年後，探索共產主義的歷史與後世影響。

The Cold War as a system of states ended on a cold and gray December day in Moscow in 1991, when Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Soviet Union out of existence. Communism itself, in its Marxist-Leninist form, had ceased to exist as a practical ideal for how to organize society.

1991年12月，在莫斯科寒冷陰沉的一天，米哈伊爾·戈爾巴喬夫(Mikhail Gorbachev)簽署條約宣告蘇聯不復存在，作為一種國家體系的冷戰結束了。馬克思列寧主義形式的共產主義本身，也不再是一種切實的社會組織理想。

「If I had to do it over again, I would not even be a Communist,」 Bulgaria』s deposed Communist leader, Todor Zhivkov, had said the year before. 「And if Lenin were alive today, he would say the same thing. I must now admit that we started from the wrong basis, from the wrong premise. The foundation of socialism was wrong. I believe that at its very conception the idea of socialism was stillborn.」

「如果非要我再來一次，我甚至不會當共產黨員，」在之前的一年，被罷黜的保加利亞共產黨領袖托多爾·日夫科夫(Todor Zhivkov)表示。「如果列寧今天還活著，他也會說同樣的話。現在我必須承認，我們的出發點，我們的基礎和前提是錯誤的。社會主義的根基是錯誤的。我認為，社會主義這個概念在孕育過程中就已經死了。」

But the Cold War as an ideological struggle disappeared only in part, despite Communism』s implosion. On the American side, not so much changed on that day. The Cold War was over, and the United States had won it. But most Americans still believed that they could only be safe if the world looked more like their own country and if the world』s governments abided by the will of the United States.

共產主義崩潰了，但冷戰作為一種意識形態鬥爭只消失了一部分。在美國方面，那一天並沒有很大變化。冷戰結束了，美國贏了。但大部分美國人依然認為，只有當全世界看起來更像自己的國家，只有當世界各國的政府服從美國的意願，他們才會安全。

Ideas and assumptions that had built up over generations persisted, despite the disappearance of the Soviet threat. Instead of a more limited and achievable American foreign policy, most policy makers from both parties believed that the United States could then, at minimal cost or risk, act on its own imperatives.

儘管蘇聯的威脅消失了，但幾代人建立起來的那些觀念依然存在。兩黨的大部分政策制定者沒有採取更有限、更可行的外交政策，而是認為，美國終於能以最小的代價或風險肆意妄為了。

America』s post-Cold War triumphalism came in two versions. First was the Clinton version, which promoted a prosperity agenda of market values on a global scale. Its lack of purpose in international affairs was striking, but its domestic political instincts were probably right: Americans were tired of foreign entanglements and wanted to enjoy 「the peace dividend.」

冷戰後美國的洋洋得意有兩種表現形式。第一種是柯林頓版，在全球範圍內宣揚市場價值的繁榮願景。它在國際事務中的意志欠缺是十分明顯的，但它的國內政治直覺很可能是對的：美國人厭倦了外交糾葛，想享受「和平紅利」。

As a result, the 1990s was a lost opportunity for international cooperation, particularly to combat disease, poverty and inequality. The most glaring examples of these omissions were former Cold War battlefields like Afghanistan, Congo and Nicaragua, where the United States could not have cared less about what happened — once the Cold War was over.

結果，美國喪失了二十世紀九十年代這個國際合作的機會，尤其是在對抗疾病、貧窮和不公正方面。這些疏漏最明顯的例子是在阿富汗、剛果和尼加拉瓜等前冷戰戰場——冷戰一結束，美國完全不再關心它們的情況。

The second was the Bush version. Where President Bill Clinton emphasized prosperity, President George W. Bush emphasized predominance. In between, of course, stood Sept. 11. It is possible that the Bush version would never have come into being had it not been for the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington carried out by Islamist fanatics (a renegade faction, in fact, of an American Cold War alliance).

第二個是布希版。在比爾·柯林頓總統強調繁榮的同時，喬治·W·布希總統強調主導地位。當然，在這之間發生了9·11事件。如果不是因為伊斯蘭狂熱分子（他們是一個叛變派別，事實上，是美國在冷戰中的聯盟）對紐約和華盛頓發動恐怖主義襲擊，可能也就沒有布希版了。

The Cold War experience clearly conditioned the United States response to these atrocities. Instead of targeted military strikes and global police cooperation, which would have been the most sensible reaction, the Bush administration chose this moment of unchallenged global hegemony to lash out and occupy Afghanistan and Iraq. These actions had no meaning in a strategic sense, creating 21st-century colonies under the rule of a Great Power with no appetite for colonial rule.

冷戰的經驗清晰地影響了美國對這些暴行的反應。布希政府沒有做出本可能是最明智的反應：進行針對性軍事打擊和全球警察合作；而是選擇了在當時，在那個沒有任何國家對美國全球霸主地位構成挑戰的時刻，打擊並佔領阿富汗和伊拉克。這些行動毫無戰略意義，只是創造了一些二十一世紀殖民地，由一個沒有殖民統治胃口的超級大國統治。

But the United States did not act out of strategic purpose. It acted because its people were understandably angry and fearful. And it acted because it could. The Bush version was directed by foreign policy advisers who thought of the world predominantly in Cold War terms; they stressed power projection, territorial control and regime change.

但美國並不是依據戰略目的行事。它的行動是基於其人民所懷有的那些可以理解的憤怒與恐懼。它這樣行動是因為它可以這樣行動。指導布希版的外交政策顧問主要是以冷戰的方式去思考這個世界；他們強調權力投射、領土控制和政權更替。

The post-Cold War era was therefore not an aberration but a continuity and confirmation of an absolute historical purpose for the United States. Gradually, however, over the course of the generation that has passed since the Cold War, the United States has become less and less able to afford global predominance.

因此，後冷戰時代並沒有偏離美國的專制歷史意志，而是它的延續和鞏固。然而，漸漸地，隨著冷戰結束後一代人離去，美國越來越無法負擔全球主導地位。

As America entered a new century, its main aim should have been to bring other nations into the fold of international norms and the rule of law, especially as its own power diminishes. Instead, the United States did what declining superpowers often do: engage in futile, needless wars far from its borders, in which short-term security is mistaken for long-term strategic goals. The consequence is an America less prepared than it could have been to deal with the big challenges of the future: the rise of China and India, the transfer of economic power from West to East, and systemic challenges like climate change and disease epidemics.

進入新世紀後，美國的主要目標本應該是將其他國家納入國際規範和法治，特別是由於美國自身的力量正在減弱。相反，美國做了衰退中的超級大國經常做的事情：將短期的安全誤認為長期的戰略目標，因此介入遠離自身邊界、徒勞無用的戰爭之中。其結果是，面對未來的巨大挑戰，諸如中國和印度的崛起，經濟強國從西方轉向東方，以及氣候變化和疾病流行等系統性挑戰，美國沒有做好充分準備。

If the United States won the Cold War but failed to capitalize on it, then the Soviet Union, or rather Russia, lost it, and lost it big. The collapse left Russians feeling déclassé and usurped. One day they had been the elite nation in a superpower union of republics. The next, they had neither purpose nor position. Materially, things were bad, too. Old people did not get their pensions. Some starved to death. Malnutrition and alcoholism shortened the average life span for a Russian man from nearly 65 in 1987 to less than 58 in 1994.

如果說美國贏得了冷戰，但沒有善加利用，那麼蘇聯或者說俄羅斯則是輸了，輸得很慘。蘇聯的崩潰讓俄羅斯人感到失去了原有社會地位，感到自己的權力被篡奪了。他們曾經是一個精英國家，屬於一個共和國聯盟構成的超級大國。可一轉眼，他們沒了目標也沒了地位。物質方面也很糟糕。老人得不到養老金。有些人餓死了。營養不良和酒精中毒使俄羅斯男子的平均壽命從1987年的近65歲縮短至1994年的不到58歲。

If many Russians felt robbed of a future, they were not wrong. Russia』s future was indeed stolen — by the privatization of Russian industry and of its natural resources. As the socialist state with its moribund economy was dismantled, a new oligarchy emerged from party institutions, planning bureaus and centers of science and technology and assumed ownership of Russia』s riches. Often, the new owners stripped these assets and closed down production. In a state in which unemployment had, officially at least, been nonexistent, the rate of joblessness rose through the 1990s to peak at 13 percent. All this happened while the West applauded Boris Yeltsin』s economic reforms.

如果許多俄羅斯人覺得自己的未來被搶走了，他們並沒有錯。俄羅斯的未來的確是被偷走了——被俄羅斯工業與自然資源的私有化偷走。隨著經濟缺乏活力的社會主義國家解體，從黨的機構、規劃局和科技中心湧現出了新的寡頭，並且得到了俄羅斯財富的所有權。這些新的所有者通常會將其資產剝離並停產。在一個一度不存在失業率（至少是在官方數據中）的國家裡，1990年代，失業率最高達到了13％。所有這一切都發生在備受西方讚揚的鮑里斯·葉利欽(Boris Yeltsin)的經濟改革時期。

In retrospect, the economic transition to capitalism was a catastrophe for most Russians. It is also clear that the West should have dealt with post-Cold War Russia better than it did. Both the West and Russia would have been considerably more secure today if the chance for Russia to join the European Union, and possibly even NATO, had at least been kept open in the 1990s.

回想起來，向資本主義的經濟轉型是大多數俄羅斯人的災難。同樣明顯的是，西方本應更好地處理冷戰後俄羅斯的問題。在1990年代，如果俄羅斯加入歐盟甚至北約的機會至少能有討論的餘地，西方和俄羅斯今天都會安全得多。

Instead, their exclusion has given Russians the sense of being outcasts and victims — which, in turn, has given credence to embittered jingoists like President Vladimir Putin, who see all the disasters that have befallen the country over the past generation as an American plot to reduce and isolate it. Mr. Putin』s authoritarianism and bellicosity have been sustained by genuine popular support.

相反，西方的排斥使得俄羅斯人感到成了棄兒和受害者——這種情緒反過來令弗拉基米爾·普京(Vladimir Putin)總統這種心懷怨恨的強硬主義者獲得信任，在過去一代人的心中，降臨在這個國家的所有災難都被視為美國削弱與隔離俄羅斯的陰謀。普京的威權和好鬥是靠著民眾的真心擁護維持下去的。

The shocks of the 1990s have given way to an uninhibited cynicism among Russians, which not only encompasses a deep distrust of their fellow citizens but also sees conspiracies against themselves everywhere, often contrary to fact and reason. Over half of all Russians now believe Leonid Brezhnev was their best leader in the 20th century, followed by Lenin and Stalin. Gorbachev is at the bottom of the list.

1990年代所受的衝擊令俄羅斯人變得懷疑一切，不僅包括對同胞深切的不信任，而且感到到處都是針對他們的陰謀，這些想法往往違背事實和理性。現在，有超過一半的俄羅斯人認為列昂尼德·勃列日涅夫(Leonid Brezhnev)是他們在二十世紀最偉大的領袖，其次是列寧和斯大林。戈爾巴喬夫位於名單最末。

For others around the world, the end of the Cold War undoubtedly came as a relief. China is often seen as a major beneficiary of the Cold War. This is not entirely true, of course. For decades, the country was under a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship that was out of tune with its needs. A result, during the Maoist era, was some of the most terrible crimes of the Cold War, in which millions died. But during the 1970s and 』80s, Deng Xiaoping』s China benefited hugely from its de facto alliance with the United States, both in security and development.

對於世界上的其他國家來說，冷戰的結束無疑令人鬆了一口氣。中國經常被視為冷戰的主要受益者。這當然不完全正確。幾十年來，中國處在不符合其需要的馬列主義獨裁統治之下。結果，在毛澤東時代出現了冷戰期間一些最可怕的罪行，死亡人數以百萬計。但在二十世紀七八十年代，鄧小平統治下的中國與美國結成了事實上的聯盟，從而在安全與發展這兩方面都獲益匪淺。

In the multipolar world now establishing itself, the United States and China have emerged as the strongest powers. Their competition for influence in Asia will define the outlook for the world. China, like Russia, is well integrated into the capitalist world system, and many of the interests of these two countries』 leaders are linked to further integration.

在當今正在形成的多極世界中，美國和中國已經成為最強大的力量。他們對亞洲影響力的競爭將會決定世界的前景。中國像俄羅斯一樣，很好地融入了資本主義世界體系，兩國領導人的許多利益都與進一步融合有關。

Russia and China, unlike the Soviet Union, are not likely to seek isolation or global confrontation. They will attempt to nibble away at American interests and dominate their regions. But neither China nor Russia is willing or able to mount a global ideological challenge backed by military power. Rivalries may lead to conflicts, or even local wars, but not of the systemic Cold War kind.

俄羅斯與中國不同於蘇聯，不可能尋求孤立或全球對抗。它們將會試圖蠶食美國的利益，主宰自己所在的區域。然而，中國和俄羅斯都不願意、或者沒有能力發起一場由軍事力量支撐的全球意識形態挑戰。競爭可能導致衝突，甚至局部戰爭，但不會是全面冷戰那樣的情況。

The ease with which many former Marxists have adapted themselves to post-Cold War market economics raises the question of whether this had been an avoidable conflict in the first place. With hindsight, the outcome was not worth the sacrifice — not in Angola, not in Vietnam, Nicaragua or Russia, for that matter. But was it avoidable back in the 1940s, when the Cold War went from an ideological conflict to a permanent military confrontation?

許多前馬克思主義國家都輕鬆適應了冷戰後的市場經濟，這不禁令人思考：這樣的衝突是不是本可以避免。事後看來，衝突的結果是極為得不償失的——不論是在安哥拉、越南、尼加拉瓜或俄羅斯都是如此。但是，回到1940年代，當冷戰從意識形態衝突變成長期軍事對抗的時候，它真的可以避免嗎？

While post-World War II clashes and rivalries were certainly unavoidable — Stalin』s policies alone were enough to produce those — it is hard to argue that a global Cold War that was to last for almost 50 years and threaten the obliteration of the world could not have been avoided. There were points along the way when leaders could have held back, especially on military rivalry and the arms race. But the ideological conflict at the root of the tension made such sensible thinking very difficult to achieve.

雖然二戰後的碰撞和競爭當然是不可避免的——斯大林的政策本身就足以產生這些衝突——但是，很難說一場持續近五十年，有可能造成世界毀滅的全球性冷戰是不可避免的。整個過程中一直都存在各方領袖本可以退讓的時刻，尤其是在軍事競爭和軍備競賽方面。但是，存在於緊張局勢根源之中的意識形態衝突令這種明智的想法很難實現。

People of good will on both sides believed that they were representing an idea whose very existence was threatened. It led them to take otherwise avoidable risks with their own lives and the lives of others.

雙方都有心懷善意的人認為，自己所代表的理念面臨著滅亡威脅。這導致他們將自己和他人的生命置於本可避免的風險之中。

The Cold War affected everyone in the world because of the threat of nuclear destruction it implied. In this sense, nobody was safe from the Cold War. The greatest victory of Gorbachev』s generation was that nuclear war was avoided. Historically, most Great Power rivalries end in a cataclysm. The Cold War did not, but on a couple of occasions, we were much closer to nuclear devastation than any but a few realized.

冷戰暗示著核毀滅的威脅，因此影響到世界上的每一個人。在這個意義上，冷戰中沒有人是安全的。戈爾巴喬夫那一代人最大的勝利就是避免了核戰爭。從歷史上看，大多數超級大國的競爭都以極大的災難而告終。冷戰雖然並非如此，但多數人不知道，我們曾經有幾次十分接近核災難。

Why were leaders willing to take such unconscionable risks with the fate of the earth? Why did so many people believe in ideologies that they, at other times, would have realized could not possibly hold all the solutions they were looking for? My answer is that the Cold War world, like the world today, had a lot of obvious ills. As injustice and oppression became more visible in the 20th century through mass communications, people — especially young people — felt the need to remedy these ills. Cold War ideologies offered immediate solutions to complex problems.

為什麼領導人願意拿地球的命運冒這種不合情理的風險？為什麼有這麼多人相信意識形態，換了其他時候，他們其實本可以意識到，意識形態不可能擁有他們尋找的所有解決方案？我的答案是：正如今天的世界一樣，冷戰的世界中也有很多明顯的弊端。隨著不平等和壓迫現象在二十世紀通過大眾傳播變得更加明顯，人們——尤其是年輕人——覺得需要醫治這些弊病。冷戰意識形態提供了解決方案，承諾立即解決這些複雜的問題。

What did not change with the end of the Cold War were the conflicts between the haves and the have-nots in international affairs. In some parts of the world today, such conflicts have become more intense because of the upsurge of religious and ethnic movements, which threaten to destroy whole communities. Unrestrained by Cold War universalisms, which at least pretended that all people could enter their promised paradise, these groups are manifestly exclusionist or racist, their supporters convinced that great injustices have been done to them in the past, which somehow justify their present outrages.

冷戰結束之後，不變的是國際事務中富國與窮國之間的衝突。如今，在世界上的一些地方，由於宗教和種族運動的激增，這樣的衝突變得更加激烈，有摧毀整個社區的危險。冷戰中的各種普世主義至少假裝所有人都可以進入應許的天堂，如今的這些團體不再受這些束縛，他們顯然是排他主義者或種族主義者，他們的支持者相信，他們過去曾經遭遇極大的不公正，這在某種程度上令他們現在的憤慨有了合理性。

Often people, especially young people, need to be part of something bigger than themselves or even their families, some immense idea to devote one』s life to. The Cold War shows what can happen when such notions get perverted for the sake of power, influence and control.

人們，特別是年輕人，通常需要參與到某種比自己甚至家庭更大的事業中去，投身某種可以為之獻出生命的理想。冷戰表明，如果為了權力、影響和控制的目的去腐蝕這種觀念，將會有怎樣的下場。

That does not mean that these very human urges are in themselves worthless. But it is a warning that we should consider carefully the risks we are willing to take to achieve our ideals, in order not to replicate the terrible toll that the 20th century took in its quest for perfection.

這並不意味著這些人的衝動本身毫無價值。但這是一種警告，我們應該仔細考慮我們願意為實現理想甘冒什麼樣的風險，以免複製二十世紀為追求完美而付出的可怕代價。

本文作者Odd Arne Westad是哈佛大學肯尼迪政治學院(John F. Kennedy School of Government)的美國-亞洲關係研究教授。本文改編自他的近期著作《冷戰：一部世界史》(The Cold War: A World History)。

翻譯：紐約時報中文網

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