巴菲特答股東問1（銀行業1）

來自專欄巴菲特Q&A翻譯組

周一，我把翻譯組簡單介紹給了大家，參考文章：巴菲特翻譯組成立（附試譯段落——高盛問題），每周三我們會發布一些成果。那本周三，第一期如約而至。我們先從銀行業開始，由於篇幅關係，單個行業也會分成多篇發布。

由於組員大多數並非專業翻譯，大家平時也有自己的工作和生活。我們能保證某個問答一人翻譯，一人校對，整合的時候再做最終修改。其中難免會有錯誤，希望各位朋友可以見諒並指出。

第一期來源於http://buffettfaq.com，是2010年之前的部分問題，其中一些問題涉及金融危機。而眾所周知巴菲特在金融危機後通過購買高盛和美國銀行的優先股而大賺特賺。所以觀察巴菲特對金融危機的看法，應該會有一些收穫。

本期翻譯的問題如下：

Are investment banks so complex that the head is not aware of the risks? (2008)

What do you think of the banking business model? (2002-2008)

You』ve recently invested in Goldman Sachs and GE. Is the financial sector a good buy right now? (2009)

How did you decide to invest in Salomon? (1998)

Is it true that Salomon almost caused a global financial crisis? (2006)

General Electric and Goldman Sachs: GE has a history of trying to manage earnings. Do you regard GE and Goldman as attractive businesses or attractive securities? (2009)

Are investment banks so complex that the head is not aware of the risks? (2008)

投資銀行的複雜程度如此之高，以至於管理層也無法意識到風險？（2008）

翻譯: 王志寬

校對: Zzz8zzz

WB: Exceptionally good question. The answer is probably yes in most places, though there are a few CEOs I respect a lot. Gen Re had 23,000 derivative contracts. I could have worked full time on that, and I probably still couldn』t have gotten my head around it all. And we had exposures that I thought were possible and heads of business units didn』t — I don』t want slim, I want none. I am Chief Risk Officer at Berkshire. If something goes wrong, I cannot assign it to a committee.

巴菲特：非常好的問題。雖然我非常尊敬一些CEO，但在大部分情況下，答案是肯定的（他們無法意識到風險）。通用再保險（巴菲特旗下的大型再保險公司）有23000份衍生品合同。就算我把全部時間都花在這上面，還是無法完全弄清楚。我們的某些風險敞口，我認為是存在的，但業務部門負責人不這麼認為——（這個時候我會說）我不要（所謂的）低風險，我要風險為零。我是伯克希爾首席風控官。如果出了問題，我不能把責任推給委員會。

I think big investment banks and big commercial banks are almost too big to manage effectively in the way they have elected to run their business. It will work most of the time. You may not see the risk. A 1-in-50-year risk - it won』t be in the interest of a 62-year-old executive who is retiring at 65 to worry about it. I worry about everything. Many CEOs say they didn』t know about what was going on. It』s easier to admit he doesn』t know what』s going on than to admit that he knew what was going on and let it go on.

我認為大型投資銀行和大型商業銀行的規模太大，以至於無法按照預期的方式進行管理。（這些機構）大部分時間可以正常運營，但可能會忽視一些（可能性小但後果嚴重）風險。一個62歲還有3年就要退休的高官不太會操心50年一遇的風險。而我操心所有的事。許多CEO聲稱他們不知道發生了什麼。承認不知道發生了什麼，比承認知道發生了什麼並讓它繼續下去更容易。

I』ve been asked for advice on regulation. Somehow, the press hasn』t picked up on this too much. OFHEO [Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight] supervised Fannie [Mae] and Freddie [Mac]—their activities had a public element, and were semi-regulated. For 200 people [at OFHEO] it was their sole job to examine the books. They were two-for-two with two of the biggest accounting scams in the history of the world. The person at the top must have it in their DNA to see risks. In many ways, there are firms that in terms of risk are too big to manage. If too big to fail, there are interesting policy implications.

有人向我徵求關於監管條例的意見。不知何故，媒體對此並不關心。OFHEO [聯邦住房企業監督辦公室]監督房利美和房地美——他們屬於公共事業，並被半監管。對於OFHEO的200多號人來說，監管兩房幾乎是他們唯一的工作。然而，史上最大的會計醜聞卻在發生在兩房。高管必須把風險管理意識刻在骨子裡。某種程度上，一些公司因為規模太大而難以管理風險。所謂的「大到不能倒」，確實是個有趣的政策議題。

CM: It is crazy to allow things, which are run with knavery, to get too big to fail. As an industry, there is a crazy culture of greed and overreaching and overconfidence, trading algorithms. It is demented to allow derivative trading such that clearance risks are embedded in the system. Assets are all 「good until reached for」 on balance sheets. We had $400 million of that at General Re, 「good until reached for」. In the drug business, you must prove it is good. It is a crazy culture, and to some extent, an evil culture. Accounting people really failed us. Accounting standards ought to be dealt with like engineering standards.

芒格：如果任由某項帶有欺詐性質的業務變得「大到不能倒」，那麼這個世界真是太荒唐了。這個行業（投資銀行業）有著貪婪、過度自信、過度依賴演算法交易的文化。讓內含清算風險（清算時的交易對手風險）的衍生品交易市場過度發展是不理智的。（投資銀行的）資產負債表上到處都是「金玉其外、敗絮其中」的問題資產。我們的通用再保險有4億美元的問題資產。在製藥業，你必須證明某種葯是有效的才可以上市（而在金融行業，一些金融創新產品只在理論層面經過檢驗就被廣泛推廣，之後也造成了嚴重的後果）。某種程度上說，這是一種瘋狂且邪惡的文化。此外，會計師讓我們失望了，他們對待會計準則本應該像（工程師）對待工程標準一樣。

WB: Salomon [Salomon Brothers during the 1991 scandal] was trading with Marc Rich who had fled the country. They said they wanted to keep trading with him. Only by total directive could we stop it. I think the Fed did the right thing with Bear [Stearns]. They would have failed on Sunday night, and walked to a bankruptcy judge. They had $14.5 trillion of derivative contracts — not as bad as it sounds, but the parties that had those contracts would have been required to undo the contracts to establish the liability from the estate. With the $400 million at Gen Re, we had 4-5 years. At Bear, it would have been 4-5 hours. It would have been a spectacle.

巴菲特：所羅門在1991的醜聞中，曾經和逃亡他國的Marc Rich（嘉可能公司創始人，擅長商品交易，經歷複雜）一直保持著交易關係。我們用命令的方式才制止了相關的交易。我認為美聯儲在貝爾斯登事件上做了正確的事情，貝爾斯登本可能會在星期日晚上破產（美聯儲兜底300億，幫助摩根大通公司收購了貝爾斯登）。他們有14.5萬億美元的衍生品合同——雖然聽起來不那麼糟糕，但一旦破產，（貝爾斯登）的對手方會撤銷那些合同並建立新的債務關係。我們有4-5年的時間去處理通用再保險的問題資產。而在貝爾斯登，只有4-5小時。如果真的能處理完，這會是一場奇觀（暗示不可能）。

Two of the witnesses at the testimony said, 『we understood we couldn』t borrow unsecured, but we didn』t understand we couldn』t borrow secured.』 The world does not have to lend you money. If they don』t want to lend you money, an extra 10 basis points won』t make a difference. It depends on people』s willingness to lend you money, which comes down to how other people feel about you. If you are dependent on borrowed money, you have to wake up every day worried about what the world thinks of you.

兩位（貝爾斯登的）證人在證詞中說：「我們明白自己無法獲得無擔保貸款，但我們不知道即使我們提供抵押品，也借不到錢。」這個世界沒有借錢給你的義務。如果他們不想借錢給你，你額外支付10個基點（0.1%）的利息也不起作用。這取決於人們借錢給你的意願，即是別人對你的看法。如果你依賴借貸度日，你每天醒來都要擔心世界對你的看法。

Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2008 Boodell Notes

來源: 2008年伯克希爾股東大會Boodell筆記

What do you think of the banking business model? (2002-2008)

您對銀行的業務模式怎麼看？

翻譯: 虹坤宇

校對: david

Banking is a good business - many banks earn high returns on tangible equity

巴菲特：銀行業是門好生意——許多銀行獲得了不菲的有形權益回報（有形權益是指股東權益減去商譽和無形資產）。

「Charlie and I have been surprised at how much profitability banks have, given that it seems like a commodity business.」

考慮到銀行業類似於大宗商品行業（同質化程度高），查理和我一直都很驚訝它竟有著如此的盈利能力。

Underestimated how sticky customers are and how unaware they are of fees banks charge them

（我們）低估了客戶粘性，以及客戶對銀行收費的渾然不覺的程度。

WFC - $4.00 per share after full taxes on $15 of tangible equity

富國銀行以15美元的每股有形權益產生了4美元的每股稅後利潤（暗示富國銀行的有形權益回報率很高，達到26.7%）。

If you have a well run bank, you don』t need to be the #1 bank in an area

如果你的銀行運營良好，你不必成為本區的頭號銀行（就能賺取不錯的利潤）。

Bank ROA is not highly correlated to size

銀行的資產回報率（ROA）與規模並非高度相關。（通常來講，ROA會隨著規模擴大而減少）

You may have to pay 3x tangible equity to buy a bank

你需要花掉三倍於其有形股本的錢來買下一家銀行。

Only problem with banks is that sometimes they get crazy and do dumb things...』91 was a good example

銀行業唯一的問題是他們會時不時變得瘋狂，做一些蠢事。1991年就是一個很好的例子 。

If a bank doesn』t do dumb things on the asset side, it will make good money

如果銀行在資產端不做蠢事，它就會獲得可觀的利潤。

Source: Buffett Vanderbilt Notes

Time: Jan 2005

來源：巴菲特與范德堡大學學生問答實錄

時間：2005年1月

（註：每年有幾次，巴菲特會邀請美國商學院的學生來奧馬哈座談，名額有限，通常20人上下。這次是范德堡大學（又譯范德比爾特大學）歐文商學院被抽中）

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Weve been somewhat surprised at how well banks have done. Some have generated 20% or greater returns on tangible equity over many years, though this is in part due to increasing leverage.

對於銀行業優異的表現，我們有點驚訝。雖然部分原因是由於槓桿的加大，但是有些銀行有形資產收益率還是達到或者超過了20%

[CM: "We misdiagnosed it and, even worse than that, we havent changed."

芒格：我們對銀行的判讀有誤。但是更糟糕的是，我們還沒有改變（暗示還會繼續犯錯）。

Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2002 Tilson Notes

Time: 2002

來源：2002年伯克希爾股東大會Tilson筆記

時間：2002年

Banking, if you can just stay away from following the fads and making bad loans, has been a remarkably good business. Since WW II, ROE for banks that have stayed out of trouble has been good. Some large well-run banks earn 20% ROE. Ive been surprised that margins in banking havent been competed away.

巴菲特：如果銀行業能夠不追逐所謂的熱點、遠離不良貸款，那這可以說是一門非常好的生意了。二戰以來，沒陷入困境的銀行，其凈資產收益率（ROE）都非常高。一些經營狀況良好的大銀行，凈資產收益率可以達到20%。令我驚訝的是，銀行業的利潤率沒有因為競爭而下降。

[CM: What youre saying is that we screwed up, because banking has turned out to be better than we thought. We made a few billion [dollars] from Amex while we misappraised it. My only prediction is that we will continue to make mistakes like that.]

芒格：你所說的正是令我們困擾的事情，因為銀行的表現比我們預想的好。我們誤判了美國運通，卻掙了幾十億（美元）的利潤。我唯一可以預測是：類似的錯誤還會繼續。

Its pretty extraordinary that institutions competing against each other without real competitive advantages can all make high returns. Part of it is higher loan to value ratios than in past years. Some banks get into trouble making bad loans, but you dont have to.

巴菲特：奇特之處在於：在一個高度競爭的行業內，每家公司都沒有真正的比較優勢，但是所有人都可以獲得高收益。部分原因可能是因為貸款/價值比率持續提高。有些銀行會因為壞賬陷入困境，但這是可以避免的。

Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2003 Tilson Notes

Time: 2003

來源：2003年伯克希爾股東大會Tilson筆記

時間：2003

Financial companies are more difficult to analyze than other companies. They can report whatever earnings they want – it』s an easy game to play. For banks, earnings depend on loans and the reserves set aside. It』s easy to change and manipulate the reserves.

巴菲特：與其它類型的公司相比，金融公司分析起來更困難。金融公司可以披露任何他們想要披露的利潤數字——這不過是一個簡單的把戲而已。對於銀行，利潤取決於貸款金額和相應的貸款減值準備金額，而貸款減值準備較容易被更改和操控。

With a company like WD-40 or a brick company, the financials are easy to analyze. But with financial [companies] it』s tough, especially when you throw in derivatives.

對WD-40公司或制磚公司一類的企業（製造業公司），財務分析較為簡單。但是，對於金融公司，尤其是涉及金融衍生品的公司，財務分析則困難得多。

There were very high grade, financially sophisticated people who were on the boards of the GSEs [Government-Sponsored Enterprises, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac] and they were not negligent, but it』s very tough [to detect the shenanigans that went on].

有一些經驗老道、精通財務知識的人在政府資助企業（如房地美和房利美）的董事會擔任要職。他們並沒有疏於職守，但是也很難發現假賬。

Charlie and I were on the board of Salomon and Charlie was on the audit committee, and [it』s just impossible to evaluate thousands of transactions]. You』ll just have to accept that with insurance companies, banks and other financial companies – it』s just a more dangerous field to analyze.

查理和我都是所羅門兄弟的董事會成員，查理還是其審計委員會成員，但是評估成千上萬筆交易基本是不可能的。你必須接受這個現實：對保險公司、銀行以及其它金融公司進行財務分析的難度葯大得多。

With GEICO it』s easier because the statistics are quite accurate – it』s short-tailed insurance. It』s not like asbestos.

對蓋可的分析相對簡單，因為相關的統計數據較為準確（車禍發生概率）——汽車保險屬於短尾保險（短尾保險，指可藉助數理模型進行較為準確度量的保險業務類別），不像石棉致病類保險 （石棉致病的潛伏期可以達到20年以上，所以石棉致病類保險難以估算潛在賠付額，且賠付周期長，屬於長尾保險）。

I wouldn』t fault the ratings agencies. Even the big-name auditors didn』t catch it.

這個事情也不能歸咎於評級機構。有些假賬，即使是知名審計師也無法發現。

[CM: Where you have complexity, by nature you can have fraud and mistakes. You』ll have more of that than in a company that shovels sand from a river and sells it. This will always be true of financial companies, including ones run by governments. If you want accurate numbers from financial companies, you』re in the wrong world.]

芒格：複雜性伴隨著欺騙和錯誤。銀行的情況比一些從河裡撈砂子銷售的公司複雜多了。這種現象在金融業非常普遍，包括由政府經營的金融公司。如果你想從金融公司得到準確可信的數據，恐怕不太可能。

Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2005 Tilson Notes

Time: 2005

來源：2005年伯克希爾股東大會Tilson筆記

時間：2005

[Q - Small regional banks - what would you look at before you buy?]

問題：對於區域性小銀行—在買入前，你會關注哪些方面？

WB: It is hard to make a categorical decision about regional banks. So much depends on the character of the institution. It will be a reflection of the CEO you have. A bank can mean anything. It can be an institution that is doing all sorts of crazy things. The Bank of Commonwealth was an example. We owned a bank in Rockford, Illinois, run by Dean Aback—he would always run a super, sound bank. You should know the culture of the management and the institution before making the decision to buy a bank. We own Wells Fargo and M&T, but it doesn』t mean they are immune. But likely they are immune from institutional stupidity. There was a wise man that said there are more banks than bankers. If you think about that a while, you will get my point.

巴菲特：想要對區域性銀行作出明確的投資決策很困難，很大程度上取決於各家銀行的特性。這種特性可以反映在其CEO上。各個銀行可能會大不相同。銀行可能會做各種瘋狂的事，比如澳洲聯邦銀行。（另外有一些銀行則與之相反）我們擁有位於伊利諾伊斯州羅克福德的一家銀行，由Dean Aback管理。Dean是一位優秀的、穩健的管理者。在買入一家銀行前，你應該了解其管理層和企業文化。我們持有富國銀行和M&T的股票。並不是說這些銀行不會犯錯，但是它們存在制度性風險的可能性較小。有位智者曾說：銀行比銀行家多。如果你仔細想想這句話，就明白我的意思了。

CM: The questioner is on to something. So many large banks have cast a pall over the entire industry. You are prospecting in a likely territory.

芒格：提問者可能嗅到了一些商機。很多大銀行使行業蒙羞。但是你可能正在關注一個有前途的領域（區域性銀行）。

WB: If you took the 20 largest and the 20 smallest banks in Florida, I don』t know if you could tell the difference.

巴菲特：在佛羅里達州的區域銀行中，選最大的20間銀行和最小的20間銀行，我不確定你是否能看出它們的差別。

CM: It is a territory that has some promise.

芒格：（區域性銀行）這是一個有前途的領域。

WB: That is a wildly bullish statement from Charlie. I may need to go start buying! [laughter]

巴菲特：這句話說明查理非常看好這一領域。看來我需要開始買入了！[笑]

Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2008 Boodell Notes

Time: 2008

來源：2008年伯克希爾股東大會Boodell筆記

時間：2008

You』ve recently invested in Goldman Sachs and GE. Is the financial sector a good buy right now? (2009)

你最近投資了高盛和通用電氣（2008年下半年，巴菲特先後買入了50億美元的高盛優先股和30億美元的通用電氣優先股）。現在（2009年初），金融行業存在好的投資機會嗎？（2009）

翻譯: 富貴兒

校對: 減法君

No sector is a good buy unless you understand the business. However, I do believe that there is good value and great opportunity now in the financial sector because it is extremely unpopular. Sector』s themselves don』t make good buys, companies that are undervalued make good buys. You know how to value a business, you project the future cash flows discounted to present and buy with a margin of safety. The earnings prospects need to be greater than the current value. Anything that is unpopular is always great to look at. If I was getting out of school right now, I would take a look.

巴菲特：如果你不了解這門生意，任何公司都沒有投資機會。然而，我確實認為，目前金融行業有很好的投資機會，因為它相當不被看好。金融行業本身並不構成投資機會，只有被低估的公司才算是投資機會。你（需要）知道如何為一家公司估值：測算未來的現金流並且將其折現，然後在有安全邊際的前提下買入。盈利前景需要大於當前價值。任何在當下不被看好的行業/公司都值得一看。如果我現在是一名畢業生（不知道從哪下手），我會去研究不被看好的行業/公司。

Source: Q&A with 6 Business Schools

Time: Feb 2009

來源：六校訪問聯合問答

時間：2009年2月

How did you decide to invest in Salomon? (1998)

你是如何決定投資所羅門兄弟公司（Salomon Brothers）（巴菲特於1987年9月購買了7億美元的所羅門兄弟公司的優先股）的?（1998）

翻譯: 富貴兒

校對: 減法君

Salomon like I said, I went into that because it was a 9% security in 1987 in September 1987 and the Dow was up 35% and we sold a lot of stuff. And I had a lot of money around and it looked to me like we would never get to do anything, so I took an attractive security form in a business I would never buy the common stock of. I went in because of that and I think generally it is a mistake. It worked out OK finally on that. But it is not what I should have been doing. I either should have waited in which case I could have bought more Coca-Cola a year later or thereabouts or I should have even bought Coke at the prices it was selling at even though it was selling at a pretty good price at the time. So that was a mistake.

巴菲特：正如我所說的，1987年9月，所羅門兄弟公司給出的優先股股息率是9%。與此同時，道瓊斯指數在這一年漲了35%，我們賣掉了很多股票並得到了很多無處可去的現金。我通常不會考慮購買投資銀行公司的普通股，（但考慮到現金充裕並且優先股這種形式比普通股更為安全）我買入了所羅門兄弟公司的優先股。事後看來，我認為這是一個錯誤。儘管最後的結果還不錯，但我不應該這麼做。我本來有更好的選擇：比如等一年後增持可口可樂；或者當時就增持可口可樂，即便可口可樂那時的價格並不便宜。總的來說，投資所羅門兄弟是一個錯誤的決定。

On Long-Term Capital that is—we have owned other businesses associated with securities over the years-–One of them is arbitrage. I』ve done arbitrage for 45 years and Graham did it for 30 years before that. That is a business unfortunately I have to be near a phone for. I have to really run it (arbitrage operations) out of the office myself, because it requires being more market-attuned because I don』t want to do that anymore. So unless a really big arbitrage situation came along that I understood, I won』t be doing much of that. But I』ve probably participated in about 300 arbitrage situations at least in my life maybe more. It was a good business, a perfectly good business.

（巴菲特此次訪問學校的時間是1998年10月，當時正值長期資本管理公司（LTCM）破產。巴菲特曾經出價收購瀕臨破產的LTCM，雖然最終未能達成協議。他在此解釋了為什麼他會考慮投資LTCM）對於長期資本管理公司LTCM，（我們之所以會考慮投資），是因為多年以來，我們在證券相關業務上積累了很多經驗，其中之一就是套利。我做了45年的套利，而格雷厄姆做了30年。但是這項業務有個缺點，就是必須不停的打電話。我必須親自出馬，因為它需要根據市場情況迅速調整策略。現在我不想再這樣做了。除非出現我自己看得懂，又有很大利潤空間的套利機會，我才會下手。我這輩子大概做了300樁套利交易。這是一門很賺錢的生意。

LTCM has a bunch of positions, they have tons of positions, but the top ten are probably 90% of the money that is at risk, and I know something about those ten positions. I don』t know everything about them by a long shot, but I know enough that I would feel OK at a big discount going in and we had the staying power to hold it out.

長期資本管理公司LTCM持有很多套利的頭寸，前10名的頭寸可能佔據了90%的資金和風險。我對前10名的頭寸是有一些了解。我雖然不曉得其中所有的細節，但是我確信我掌握的信息已經足夠讓我在收購價格足夠低的情況下立於不敗之地。

We might lose money on something on that, but the odds are with us. That is a game that I understand. There are few other positions we have that are not that big because they can』t get that big. But they could involve yield curve relationships or on the run/off the run governments that are just things you learn over time being around securities markets. They are not the base of our business. Probably on average, they have accounted for 1?2 - 3?4 a percentage point of our return a year. They are little pluses you get for actually having been around a long time.

（在套利交易中）我們的部分交易可能會賠錢，但在可控範圍內。這是我懂得的遊戲。我們還有一些規模不大的套利交易頭寸，是因為套利交易本身的規模限制。那些頭寸或涉及到收益曲線的關係，或跟不同時期發行的政府債券有關等等，如果你在證券業足夠久，你就和會清楚其中的原理。套利交易不是我們的核心業務，平均大概佔到我們年收益的0.5%到0.75%，算是長期投資中一點額外的驚喜吧。

One of the first arbitrages I did involved a company that offered cocoa beans in exchange for their stock. That was in 1955. I bought the stock, turned in the stock, got warehouse certificates for cocoa beans and they happen to be a different type but there was a basis differential and I sold them. That was something I was around at the time, so I learned about it. There hasn』t been a cocoa deal since. 40 odd years, I have been waiting for a cocoa deal. I haven』t seen it. It is there in my memory if it ever comes along. LTCM is that on a big scale.

我所做的第一個套利交易，是用一家公司的股票換取可可豆合約【附註1】。那是在1955年，我買入股票，並換取了可可豆合約，而股票和可可豆合約存在一些價差，所以我賣出可可豆合約後就完成了（我人生的第一筆）套利。我從這件事情中學會了套利。但從那以後，就沒有出現類似的套利機會。40多年來，我一直在等待下一次的這樣機會，但之後就再沒發生過。長期資本管理公司(LTCM)本質上就是大規模的參與這樣的可可豆套利交易。

Source: Lecture at the University of Florida Business School

Time: October 15th 1998

來源:：1998年佛羅里達大學商學院講座

時間：1998年10月15日

【附註1】可可豆套利交易

1955年，可可豆價格飆升。而Rockwood公司持有了大量的可可豆合約，如果Rockwood直接賣出合約，需要繳納大量的利得稅，所以就提出一個股票換可可豆合約的方案：投資者可以用市場價值34美元的股票換取價值36美元的可可豆合約。公司由此可以合理避稅，而投資者又獲得了2元的套利利潤。

巴菲特不僅參與了此次套利，又進一步買入了公司股票（考慮到Rockwood公司的利潤因為可可豆漲價而提升），最終回報豐厚。