巴菲特翻譯組成立（附試譯段落——高盛問題）

06-06

來自專欄巴菲特Q&A翻譯組

1個月前，我發布了翻譯巴菲特股東大會Q&A的招募文章，之後陸續收到了50多份申請。經過試譯段落的篩選後，翻譯組目前成員為25人。組員背景多元化，其中包括賣方分析師、投行人士、審計師、市場總監、專業翻譯和在校學生等。

我們的成員包括（之後每個問題會附上翻譯者和校對者）：aierer, david, Eric/xin CHN, John, Lorant Chiu, Ocdw, prince晨, Sean, yT, zzz8zzz, 哎喲！不錯哦！, 剁手專員, 法西, 風之精靈, 富貴兒, 虹坤宇, 減法君, 飄逸的風之子, 缺憾美, 太帥了, 我很好運, 小和尚, 有黃蓋選黃蓋, 志寬, 卓逸康~

我簡單說下翻譯組成立的初衷。我很早就整理完巴菲特在股東大會上的問答，自己也寫過一些短評。但是發現一個問題，很多地方我無法完全消化，很迫切的想找些朋友討論一下，同時我一個人的效率是完全是不夠的。幾個月前我在雪球上簡單提出了一個翻譯組的構想，希望能夠集思廣益，但是當時並沒有得到什麼回應。而有翻譯組經驗的aierer，看到我的構想後，和我討論了一些翻譯組成立的細節，最終促成了這件事情。所以在此要特別感謝她。我也希望這個團隊可以一直做下去，為價值投資在中國的傳播作出一些貢獻。

目前的資料來源包括：buffettfaq.com、幾名參會人員的速記（Professors David Kass, INGRID R. HENDERSHOT, CFA等）以及CNBC提供的transcript，同時也參考了新浪財經2015年之後的翻譯文稿。

從本周開始，我們每周三會發布翻譯內容，並且按照行業/專題進行分類。我們第一個開展翻譯的行業是金融業（細分為銀行、保險、其他金融）。

以下是作為考核的試譯段落，這道問題在伯克希爾2010年股東大會上提出的，是關於SEC對高盛的指控，這道問題難度頗大，並且需要對事件進行背景調查，故選為試譯段落。金融危機後，SEC對高盛提出了欺詐交易的指控，而巴菲特在高盛擁有大量的優先股投資。這個問題能反映出部分股東當時對巴菲特投資高盛的質疑。我們來看看巴菲特是如何回應。

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翻譯：減法君

校對：zzz8zzz

Goldman Sachs –

Every year you use clip from Solomon Crisis where you warned Solomon』s employees that you will be ruthless if reputation if the firm stained. Clearly GS has lost reputation. What is your reaction to the lawsuit, its affect on your GS investment, and what advice you have now for GS based on your experience at Solomon?

Clearly GS has lost reputation. What is your reaction to the lawsuit, its affect on your GS investment, and what advice you have now for GS based on your experience at Solomon?

關於高盛的問題：

每年伯克希爾股東大會開場前，都會播放一段關於所羅門危機事件【注釋1】的視頻，在視頻中您警告所有所羅門的員工，任何影響公司聲譽的行為都是絕對不可容忍的（以此說明巴菲特對公司聲譽非常重視）。

目前（2010年），高盛公司（被證監會指控欺詐交易）顯然已經丟掉了聲譽，您（作為高盛的投資者）是如何看待該項指控，以及該指控對您在高盛的投資是否會有（負面）影響？此外，根據您之前成功化解所羅門危機事件的經驗，對高盛有何建議？

WB:

Abacus was made subject of SEC complaint (22pages) and I think there has been misreporting on the nature of the transaction. I would like to clarify this transaction, as it is important and frequently mischaracterized.

巴菲特：美國證監會此次對高盛的指控（指控材料共22頁）是關於其參與的Abacus交易【注釋2】（產品性質是債務擔保證券CDO，ABACUS 2007-AC1是營銷材料名），我認為外界曲解了該筆交易的性質。鑒於此次事件非常重要並且經常被錯誤解讀，我在此澄清一些事實。

In the Abacus transaction, there were four losers. GS didn』t intend to lose but did, they couldn』t sell their piece. The main loser was a very large bank in Europe named ABN Amro. Why did they lose money? They guaranteed the credit of another company ACA.

在Abacus交易中，存在四個輸家（高盛、荷蘭銀行、ACA和德國銀行IKB）。高盛沒有預料到他們會成為輸家之一（無法賣出他們持有的部分頭寸）。而最大的輸家是歐洲大型銀行ABN Amro（荷蘭銀行）。荷蘭銀行為什麼賠錢？他們為一家名為ACA的公司提供了信用擔保。

ABN was in the business of judging credits, deciding credit. They fronted the transaction, guaranteed it. We do it frequently here at Berkshire. Many in business will take a policy if we guarantee the policy. We』ve made a lot of money doing this over the years. We lost a fair amount doing this with some dishonest people in early 1970s. They were syndicates at Lloyds.

在信用擔保業務中，荷蘭銀行的角色是判斷其他公司的信用狀況並進行擔保，同時收取一定的擔保費（如果擔保對象破產，荷蘭銀行需要進行賠付）。我們伯克希爾也經常做此類生意，很多貸款合約也（因為我們的擔保）可以順利簽訂。不過，我們在70年代早期由於和一些不誠信的人（勞埃德銀行的財團）做交易而賠了些錢。

In Abacus, ABN guaranteed $900m and was paid 17bps of insurance. They got $1.6m for $900m of insurance coverage. The company went broke, so they had to pay the $900m. The bank made a dumb credit deal. It is hard for me to be sympathetic for a bank that made a bad credit trade.

（回到Abacus的討論上）荷蘭銀行在Abacus交易中為ACA擔保了9億美元，並收取了17個基點（0.17%，160萬美元）的擔保費。如果ACA公司破產，荷蘭銀行需要賠付9億美元。事情的本質就是荷蘭銀行做了一筆愚蠢的交易。我很難對做這種愚蠢交易的銀行產生同情。

ACA, and you wouldn』t know this from the reporting, but they were a bond insurer. They started in municipal bonds, like AMBAC, FSA, etc. Many of those companies started insuring municipal bonds some 30 yrs ago, and it was a big business. But the profits were squeezed. They found new places to insure – and got into insuring structured credits. I described it a few years ago in the annual report like Mae West, 「I was Snow White but I drifted」. Almost all of them did it – they didn』t understand it well, but made more money.

（再討論ACA這件公司）從媒體報道中你無法得知，ACA其實是一間債券承保商。他們是做政府債券保險業務起家的，與AMBAC（美國市政債券保險集團，於1971年成立，2010年倒閉）、FSA（英國金融服務管理局）這類公司類似。很多政府債券承保商在30年前開始經營，並且不斷壯大。然而，當前的利潤空間已經被嚴重擠壓（所以他們不得不多想辦法）。然後，他們發現了「新大陸」，開始為結構性信貸產品提供保險。幾年前，我曾在年報中提及了這一現象。用Mae West（美國著名舞台劇明星與影星，以美麗性感和題材爭議著稱）的話來描述就是「我曾經也是白雪公主，但現在已誤入歧途。」他們幾乎都參與其中（結構性信貸產品保險），卻並不理解這些複雜的產品，只想從中賺了更多的錢。最終這些公司都紛紛陷入麻煩。

Then they all got into trouble. Is there anything wrong with insuring structured credits? No, but you better know what you are doing. We went into municipal bond business when others got into trouble, we got paid more, and we stayed away from CDOs or RMBS. These deals were too hard.

為結構性信貸產品提供保險有錯嗎？沒有錯。但前提是你得知道你正在做什麼。在這些公司（以政府債券保險業務起家）遭遇麻煩的時候，伯克希爾則會進一步拓展政府債券保險業務，（競爭對手陷入困境的時候）我們收取的保費會更多。當然我們會避免那些難以理解的CDOs或者RMBS（CDOs：債務擔保證券；RMBS：住房抵押貸款擔保證券）

WB: We did insure something. It will help you understand Abacus. This deal [slide up on screen of portfolio of US state bonds] we did insure.

我闡述一下伯克希爾的債券承保業務，來幫助你更好的理解Abacus交易的性質。我們為這些債券提供保險（屏幕上顯示了一個組合，包括一些美國州政府債券）。

A large investment bank came to us. We insure a local power generation company, and the Nebraska Methodist hospital. We have $100m with the hospital. An investment bank came to us, with this list of names of states -- $1.1b for Florida, $200m for California. Will you insure the bonds of these States that they will pay for the next ten years. I looked at list, and we had to decide a) do we know enough and b) what premium to charge. We insured $160m for 10yrs. On other side, someone is insured that we will pay if they don』t pay.

一家大型投行找到我們，希望我們為當地的電力公司以及內達華州衛理公會醫院提供保險。醫院的保額是1億美元。另一家投行（從後文看應該是雷曼）找到我們，給我們提供了一份州政府債券的清單：佛羅里達州11億美元，加州2億美元。並且詢問我們是否要為這些10年期的州政府債券提供保險。我看著這份清單，需要問自己兩個問題：

1）我們是否掌握了足夠的信息

2）我們應該收取多少保費

最終我們承保了1.6億，承保期10年。換句話說，如果這些債券違約，將由我們負責賠付。

We didn』t come up with list. There are four reasons we were showed this trade. Lehman might own it and simply want insurance, Lehman might be negative on it – and this is a method to short, they might have a customer wanting protection, or they might have a customer negative on it wanting to short. We don』t care why they wanted the insurance, it was our job to insure the bonds. If they told me Ben Bernanke was on other side of trade, it wouldn』t matter. If it matters to me, I shouldn』t take it.

這份債券清單不是我們列出來的（是投行找上門來的），雷曼希望和我做交易（尋求債券擔保），可能出於以下四種動機：

1）雷曼持有這些債券，希望購買保險降低風險；

2）雷曼希望做空這些債券；

3）雷曼的客戶持有這些債券，希望購買保險降低風險；

4）雷曼的客戶希望做空這些債券。

我們並不在意他的動機，我們的角色就是（合理評估債券的風險）為這些債券提供保險。即使他們告訴我伯南克（時任美聯儲主席）是我的交易對手，對我也沒有任何影響。如果我在意交易對手的話，我就不應該做這筆生意。

We did with the bonds what ACA did. With list of 120, ACA only accepted 50, then negotiated for 30 more. In Abacus it was a mutual negotiation. Unfortunately, all the bonds went south very quickly – it wasn』t clear this would happen in early 2007. If you look at how the ABX was trading, it wasn』t obvious. Now there can be trouble in these States bonds we have insured. Maybe the guy on other side knows more than me. But I see nothing, I won』t complain if I lose money. I can』t claim other side had superior knowledge. Central part of the SEC argument is that Paulson knew more about the transaction. In retrospect, it was just a dumb insurance decision. Charlie?

對於債券，我們所做的和ACA並沒有什麼不同。ACA一開始只接受了120個債券中的50個，然後在協商之下又接受了另外30個。在Abacus交易中，這是個共同協商的過程。不幸的是，這些債券的價格很快就一瀉千里了。這種情況是你在2007年上半年都無法預知的。通過觀察ABX指數（次貸衍生債券綜合指數）的走勢，也無法預知（ABX指數從2007年下半年到2009年間，下跌超過50%，而在2007年上半年還處於上漲趨勢）。現在我們承保的一些州政府債券也有可能會出現問題。也許我們的交易對手知道的信息更多，而我不知道。那我們也不會抱怨。我們不能控告我們的交易對手有信息優勢。然而，證監會指控材料的核心觀點是保爾森的對沖基金對這些交易的了解程度更多。事後看來，這只是一個愚蠢的承保決策罷了。查理，你的意見呢？

CM: My attitude is simple. This was a 3:2 decision by SEC commissioners where they usually decide unanimously. I would have voted with the minority.

芒格：我的態度很簡單。證監會委員會的投票結果是3:2（決定對高盛提出指控），通常他們都會一致通過某項決議（某種程度上說明該項指控在他們內部的意見也不統一）。我會投給票少的一方（不指控高盛）。

WB: ACA was a bond insurer, not an investor, pure and simple. Well... simple as it turns out. The press seems to be misrepresenting the situation by calling ACA a manager. ACA lost money because they were a bond insurer.

巴菲特：ACA只是債券承保商，而不是投資者。情況就是這麼簡單。外界錯誤的將ACA定位為資產管理公司（因為ACA公司的全稱是ACA Management LLC）。ACA是作為債券承保商而虧錢（而證監會對高盛的指控是對「投資者」進行欺詐）。

Ironically, this whole situation has helped BRK』s investment in GS. BRK got $5B in preferred stock (that pays $500M per year) that GS has the right to call at 110% of par and get rid of the preferred that costs them so much each year. BRK would have to put that money in ST securities if they got it back and every day that GS does not call the stock is money in the bank for BRK. In fact, it amounts to $15 per second. Tick, tick, tick. Don』t want those ticks to go away. He likes that they go on at night when he sleeps. GS would love to get rid of the preferred. They only decided to do it because it was the height of the crisis. The Fed has likely been telling GS that they can』t call the preferred and that has helped BRK. Buffett was hoping that the Fed would be quite tough when it came to allowing the preferred to be repaid. In effect, the recent developments have delayed the calling of the preferred. Now BRK will get $500M a year rather than $20M a year they would get from ST Treasuries. So Buffett loves the investment in GS.

諷刺的是，目前這種情況反而對伯克希爾在高盛的投資有利。伯克希爾持有50億美元的高盛優先股（每年的股息收益是5億美元），且高盛有權利按照票麵價格的110%贖回這些優先股，從而擺脫每年巨額的股息。如果高盛贖回的話，我們只能將這些錢放在短期債券上（原文為ST securities，此處應指低風險低收益的短期國債產品）；如果高盛沒有贖回，伯克希爾的收益將很可觀（每秒能賺15美元）。高盛做夢都想甩掉這些優先股，他們當時是處於金融危機最恐慌的時刻而不得不達成這筆優先股交易。美聯儲可能已經向高盛進行施壓，不允許他們贖回這些優先股（與資本充足率有關），這對伯克希爾是有利的。我一直希望美聯儲在不允許高盛贖回優先股這件事情上態度強硬一些。最近的事態發展，推遲了高盛贖回優先股的計劃。這樣，伯克希爾才可以每年獲得5億美元的優先股股息，而不是從短期債券上獲得僅僅2000萬美元的利息。我非常喜歡在高盛的這筆優先股投資。

There is no question that the allegation alone caused the company to lose some reputation and all the negative press has hurt the company and morale. But this is not remotely fatal or anything like that. GS had a situation with Penn Central 30 years ago and one with Ivan Boesky that hurt. But the allegation of something does not fall into the category of losing reputation.

毫無疑問，證監會的指控會使得高盛失去一些聲譽，媒體的負面報道也會打擊員工士氣。但我不認為這是一次致命的危機。30年前的賓州鐵路事件【注釋3】和伊凡博斯基事件【注釋4】對高盛的負面影響更為嚴重。

When a transgression is found out about or alleged (His motto in such situations is: get it right, get it out, get it fast, get it over) it can take a while to figure out what went wrong. He does not hold the allegation against GS. If it leads to something more serious then he will re-look at it. But, when he looks at Abacus he sees it as a legitimate transaction.

當危機發生時，我的格言是：搞清事實，面對真相，迅速應對，解決問題。此次事件可能需要一段時間才會水落石出，但我目前不贊同對高盛的指控。如果高盛存在更嚴重的問題，我可能會考慮重新審視它。如果單就Abacus交易而言，我認為這是一筆正當的交易。

【注釋1】所羅門危機事件視頻

每年伯克希爾股東大會開場時會播放一些混合剪輯的視頻，，其中一段就是巴菲特參與所羅門兄弟公開調查時的證詞（1991年，巴菲特投資的所羅門兄弟公司涉嫌違反監管，遭到公開調查，巴菲特不得不臨危受命擔任該公司的董事長與美國財政部交涉，最終解除了危機）。以下是視頻原文：

I also have asked every Salomon employee to be his or her own compliance officer. After they first obey all rules, I then want employees to ask themselves whether they are willing to have any contemplated act appear the next day on the front page of their local paper to be read by their spouses, children and friends, with the reporting done by an informed an critical reporter. If they follow this test, they need not fear my other message to them. Loose money for the firm and I will be understanding, loose a shred of reputation for the firm and I will be ruthless.

【注釋2】Abacus交易

全稱是ABACUS 2007-AC1，是一筆債務擔保證券CDO（把所有的抵押打包在一起，並且進行重新的包裝，再以產品的形式推放到市場），背後的抵押品是次級住房抵押貸款證券RMBS。簡而言之，就是把很多個次級房屋貸款打包成一項擔保債務。如果美國房地產市場崩潰，Abacus交易的擔保方（ACA）會進行賠付，而高盛虧損的原因是無法將所有CDO賣出去。證監會對高盛的指控在於其隱瞞交易信息，對投資者有欺詐行為。

https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp-pr2010-59.pdf

【注釋3】賓州鐵路事件

上世紀70年代，高盛主動隱瞞了賓州鐵路信用評級下調的事實並繼續向客戶銷售錯誤評級的商業票據。

【注釋4】伊凡博斯基事件

上世紀80年代，高盛員工將內幕消息賣給投機大亨伊凡博斯基進行套利交易，伊凡博斯基是電影《華爾街》中金融大佬戈登·蓋柯的原型。