被綁架的留學行業 (2)：【中】三大市場失靈現象

如果你是一位學生、一位家長、一位留學顧問，都希望你們花時間來讀完我們「被綁架的留學行業」整個系列。在這裡，或者會找到你的影子、某些公司的模子、你希望此為的樣子，在這裡，希望這個系列更好地幫你們定位自己的留學未來與職業規劃，把留學行業引導成為一個學生、顧問、公司共贏的局面。

TAURUS ( 著），H ( 譯），更多信息請關注KK LIBRARY 公眾號，DIY 留學自習室

原文：被綁架的留學行業 (2)：【中】三大市場失靈現象

Rigged to Fail: Three Failures

As promised, here』s the next part of my unvarnished look at three education market failures. Before I continue though, I want to note that my critique isn』t meant to serve as a general, all-out attack on the education industry. My goal is to show that the unscrupulous practices detailed below are enabled by market failures and are without a doubt conducted by certain members of the industry whom I have kept nameless. My goal is NOT to level accusations that these practices are standard industry procedures. Don』t misunderstand my intention.

接下來的這一部分我將會直接地向大家介紹留學行業當中的三大市場失靈現象。不過在這之前，我想澄清一下，我接下來的言論並非是為了攻擊或者指責現在的留學行業。我的目的是讓大家清楚地了解到目前留學行業存在的（由市場失靈現象引起的）一些不公正的操作，以及讓大家意識到很多留學機構仍在進行這些操作。發表這篇文章也不是為了引發大家對留學行業這些現象的爭論，所以大家不要誤解我的意思。

Misinformation

Misinformation is a simple concept: education companies intentionally present facts to lead potential clients to make suboptimal decisions. The claims made by the investment banker, physician, and education consultant in my thought exercise are examples of misinformation. The first two claims are admittedly far-fetched and unlikely to convince prospective clients, but the third has real potential to mislead. See, it presents admission at a top thirty university as a virtual guarantee, which flies in the face of admissions statistics but may just be enticing enough to convince you to sign up for service. Let』s say you do. If you wouldn』t have signed up had you not heard this (untrue) claim, then you, my friend, have become a victim of misinformation.

信息誤導

錯誤信息是一個非常簡單的概念：留學機構有意識地向潛在客戶展示有誤導性的信息，讓他們做出欠佳的決定。之前我提到的投資銀行家、內科醫生和留學顧問就是提供錯誤信息的很好例子。前兩個例子在給出錯誤信息方面非常明顯，因為他們說的話比較牽強，很難真正說服潛在客戶。但是第三個例子，也就是留學顧問，他們所提供的信息可信度看似更高。所以更有可能誤導客戶。很多留學顧問在接觸潛在客戶的時候首先會向他們承諾有較好的錄取結果，如「進入前30名校」，然後再向他們展示一系列出眾的錄取結果，從而吸引潛在客戶完成簽約。如果你因為聽取這樣的信息而選擇該留學服務，那麼你，很不幸，可能將成為了信息誤導的受害者。

Let me offer a concrete illustration: I used to work in an office that literally had 「X Education Today, Top 30 Tomorrow!」 emblazoned on the wall, as if it were a universal, incontrovertible truth. Now, this lofty promise didn』t prove true for most students. Far from it. Although the slogan doesn』t qualify as false advertising in the strictest sense, it comes very close as a heavy-handed suggestion that acceptance into a top thirty university came hand-in-hand with registering for Company X』s college application service.

提供誤導信息的形式有很多種。我曾經在一個留學機構工作過，辦公室的牆上赫然印著「今天選擇了X機構，明天你就能進入美國前30大學」。這給我的感覺就是這家留學機構一定會把你送進前30名校。這個聽起來非常崇高的承諾其實對學生來說是很難實現，對一些學生來說甚至就是遙不可及。儘管嚴格來說這樣的口號不會為潛在客戶造成非常嚴重的消極影響，但是它足以誤導潛在客戶，很多人對它的解讀就是：X機構有能力也有把握把學生送進前30的學校。

Besides inscribing what are pretty much patent falsehoods on their walls, education companies can also misrepresent their success rates by omitting relevant information. For instance, a company may accurately report that its students received twenty-four offers from top thirty universities, which seems like a respectable figure. However, it』s leaving out quite a few critical details, the most obvious of which is the percentage of students who received such offers. After all, students aren』t restricted to only one offer apiece; it』s conceivable that one student received twenty offers, accounting for the bulk of the company』s reported statistic. Moreover, the firm doesn』t tell us anything about its students who received offers—maybe some of them registered for services completely unrelated to college application. Maybe some of them had already gotten offers prior to enlisting the company』s help.

除了把一些有誤導性的口號或者信息印在牆上以外，很多留學機構還通過展示錄取結果以強調已取得成就這種方式吸引客戶。例如，有的機構可能會對外宣稱他們的學生錄取情況非常出色，該機構的學生一共接收到了24個來自前30大學的錄取。但是這樣的數據似乎忽略了一個非常重要的信息，那就是到底有百分之多少的學生獲得這些錄取呢？由於學生收到錄取的數量是不受限制的，因此其中的20個錄取可能全部來自同一個學生。另外，這些學生接收到的錄取很有可能跟他們已經簽訂的留學服務一點關係都沒有，或者他們在接受這些機構的幫助之前已經收到了學校的錄取（學生僅僅選擇該機構的考培服務，在留學申請方面並沒有接受該機構的指導）。

Underinformed clients make themselves especially easy targets for education companies』 misinformation campaigns. Spurred on by hearsay (「my daughter got into such-and-such top school, what about yours?」), many clients readily pull out their checkbooks for firms whose exaggerated claims ring out the loudest. The fault, then, lies not entirely with service providers. Let me draw an analogy: consider a patient who』s being tested for a serious disease. He wishes he doesn』t have the illness and desperately begs the doctor to tell him good news. But if he really has it, his doctor is of course obligated to inform him, even though you can imagine how an overly sympathetic (perhaps morally flexible) doctor may hide the truth. Similarly, service providers may shy away from warning enthusiastic but unqualified clients that their chances of admission at a top thirty university are next to zero. Even the most well-meaning service providers would find it difficult to resist telling potential clients exactly what they want to hear in order to close out the sale.

一些對留學信息了解得不夠充分的家長經常是這些機構的主要目標，而且家長間相互比較孩子們的情況（譬如，我小孩被某某學校錄取了，你的孩子呢？）也可能會加速他們選擇這些機構。因此，把自己鼓吹得越厲害的留學機構就越有可能得到這些家長的「青睞」。當然我們不能把所有的責任都推卸給留學機構，因為客戶本身也是存在問題的。讓我來做個比較：如果一個人進行了某種嚴重疾病的測試，他個人當然會希望自己沒有得到這種病，他同時也希望醫生能夠給他帶來好消息。但是當他真的被確診患有這種病的時候，他的醫生是有義務正式通知他的。不過你可以想像一些同情心極強的醫生可能會隱瞞真相。同樣的，留學顧問會避免直接告知一些非常有熱情但是不具備條件的客戶他們進入前30的名校的幾率幾乎為零，因為像病人一樣，這些客戶也希望聽到他們還留有希望而去為目標奮鬥。即便是極為負責的留學顧問也不得不說出這些客戶想聽的從而達成簽約。

Furthermore, clients uneducated about the reality of college application are susceptible to education firms』 manipulation of other variables in their favor—particularly price. With few benchmarks to assess service quality, underinformed clients may unwisely turn to price as an indicator of quality. But just because quality is often correlated with price doesn』t mean that the former is cause for the latter. Well aware of the signaling power of price, companies can engage in a practice closely related to misinformation but more accurately labeled adverse selection. Knowing that their services really aren』t much different from other services in the market, firms can nevertheless set their prices way above market price to take advantage of those prey to the fallacy of causation.

另外，對留學信息的不熟悉還給留學機構創造了可以暗中操作的機會-特別是在價格上。由於留學服務的質量無法由一個標準測量，因此客戶衡量留學服務的唯一標準可能只有價格。雖然產品或者服務的質量經常與價格聯繫在一起，但這不代表後者可以直接決定前者。了解到價格所能代表的意義之後，很多機構就會把它們與錯誤信息捆綁在一起，然後引導客戶做出欠佳的選擇。由於清楚地了解到自身的服務與市場中其他服務相差無幾，這些留學機構會把他們的留學服務價格設置得比其他競爭對手更高，從而獲取巨大的利益。

Moral Hazard

Every sale is an agreement between company and client. In exchange for compensation, the firm bears the responsibility of applying its expertise in its client』s best interests at all times. However, in the education industry, this tacit expectation is often confined to an unrealized ideal. That』s because information asymmetry insulates education companies from the risk of their clients holding them accountable for service worse than promised.

道德風險

每一單買賣其實都是在買賣雙方達成一致之後完成的。其實買賣本質不外乎是消費者用金錢換取專業技能或知識，進而把它們運用在感興趣的領域。但是在留學行業當中，這種本該被默認的本質卻經常被忽略，消費者得到的很多時候都不是他們理想的服務或結果。這是由於信息不對稱，留學機構可以擁有更多的空間向消費者提供質量較差的服務，而且他們被發現和譴責的幾率也會被降低。

A big part of the reason is simply due to the nature of the job: college application is different from, say, grapes. If I buy grapes and they turn out to be rotten, I』ll find out very easily. I can then take measures to hurt my grape supplier』s business by purchasing grapes from his competitor next time or even telling my friends not to buy his grapes. The grape supplier, therefore, has a vested interest in ensuring his product』s quality. By contrast, college application is different because education companies don』t have full control over clients』 admissions results. A service provider can do everything right but still fail to get her unqualified client into a top thirty school; alternatively, she can do everything wrong and her client can gain acceptance on his own. The point is that clients face immense barriers to checking their service providers』 performance, which opens the door to moral hazard.

還有一大部分的原因是出至他們工作的本質，因為大學申請和購買葡萄還是有很大區別的。當我買的葡萄出現變質的時候，我可以輕易地發現。因此我可以不再購買該店的葡萄或者告訴其他顧客這一家的葡萄質量很差。葡萄供應商會為此會意識到他們的問題從而在接下來保證葡萄的質量。但是相比之下，留學申請則非常不同，因為留學公司並不能控制最終的申請結果。留學機構可能用盡洪荒之力都沒辦法把那些根本不符合條件的學生送進前30的學校，他們也可能在操作上出現問題的情況下仍把學生送進名校，因為學生本身就具備很好的條件。客戶在檢驗留學服務質量的時候會遇到很多阻礙，因此這也是為什麼道德風險這個市場失靈現象會在留學行業出現。

Moral hazard is the condition in which education companies change their behavior after the sale has been finalized (i.e. after they』re insulated from risk), selectively engaging in transactions that benefit themselves at their clients』 expense. The clearest manifestation of moral hazard in the education industry is consulting』s worst-kept secret: recommending clients to universities based not on best fit, but on commission. For the sake of clarity, this practice violates market efficiency because clients who have fallen victim to moral hazard wouldn』t have selected the same schools had their service providers faithfully executed their duties.

在這裡，道德風險指的是留學機構在簽下客戶之後(取得客戶信任之後)改變他們的服務行為，最終從客戶支付的服務費當中獲取利益。留學行業中的秘密，也是道德風險的一個現象就是，留學顧問沒有根據客戶的實際情況向他們推薦最合適的學校，而是向客戶推薦為留學顧問提供更多提成的學校。這樣的行為極大地影響了市場效率，而如果留學顧問履行他們的職責，很多學生則能夠申請其它更符合要求的學校，那麼市場的資源也會得到更合理的分配。

Make no mistake: colleges are big, fat culprits of exploiting market failures as well. After all, they』re not your friends. They』re businesses—businesses with a noble mission statement perhaps, but nevertheless businesses whose ultimate objective is to maximize profit. As they』ve discovered, one especially lucrative way to do so is to cultivate cozy relations with education firms. Seeking to boost application rates, many schools, especially those whose inadequate academic qualities fail to attract students, offer higher commissions to service providers. These incentives aren』t only monetary—many universities offer school memorabilia and even fully-paid week-long vacations in the US.

毫無疑問，學校是造成這個現象的罪魁禍首。其實各國大學並不是你們的「朋友」，說白了他們也是做生意的，只是多了一個聽起來比較偉大的口號罷了。這些大學的終極目標，跟其他生意一樣，都是實現利益最大化。因此實現這個目標的重要方法之一就是與留學機構建立良好的合作關係，通過留學機構吸引更多的學生申請進入他們的學校。為了提高他們的申請率，一些在學術實力上難以吸引學生的學校，會向留學機構提供更高的申請提成。申請提成並不是這些大學提供的唯一獎勵。很多學校還會向留學機構派送獎品甚至是提供長達一周在美國的帶薪假期。

So, in essence, information asymmetry enables colleges to put in place opportunities for moral hazard in the form of higher commissions. And colleges, I maintain, are absolutely at fault here. But those service providers who seize these chances to help themselves to their clients』 detriment are equally blameworthy.

大學為留學顧問提供豐厚提成，而導致道德風險現象的行為是非常值得譴責的。但是一些藉此機會誤導學生做出欠佳選擇從而獲利的留學顧問也應該反思自己的行為。

I』m making an important distinction here when I refer to 「those service providers」 rather than 「every service provider.」 Some service providers genuinely turn a blind eye towards commission and help their clients identify universities whose competitiveness, academic caliber and other qualities are aligned with the students』 profiles. These service providers are the responsible ones who steer clear of colleges』 gift-wrapped moral hazard opportunities. Yet, whether they represent the norm is debatable. It』s more than a little disconcerting that the opaque commission system gives rise to a conflict of interest fundamentally at odds with service providers』 obligation to their clients.

澄清一下，剛才提到的留學顧問指的是某些而不是所有的留學顧問，很多留學顧問還是十分負責的。他們的服務宗旨並不會被自己能夠獲得利潤的多少所影響，他們會盡自己全力，根據學生的情況為他們選定在實力、學術水平以及其他方面都相對符合的學校。他們也非常清楚這些大學所提供的獎勵背後的道德風險，但能否代表所有的留學顧問是非常值得探討的。因為留學行業當中不透明的提成獎勵機制還是會直接影響留學顧問履行義務的程度。

If you think that』s bad, there』s worse. Exceptionally close ties between education companies and universities have bred some truly nefarious practices. Let』s return to Company X. The firm inevitably fell short of meeting its grandiose claims—in some cases, spectacularly. For those students who failed to gain acceptance into not only top thirty but all schools, the company had a singular solution that it kept hush-hush. It literally arranged for those students to be accepted retrospectively and automatically into University Y (albeit not a top thirty school). This was the most blatant pay-to-play assault on the supposedly meritocratic education system I』ve ever seen!

如果你認為上述的情況已經很不可理喻了，那讓我來告訴你，我還見過更糟的。美國部分大學與教育機構之間極其「親密」的關係其實還會催生其他不道德的操作。讓我們回到之前我提到的X公司。由於錄取結果的不穩定性，這家機構在履行他們「本質」工作（幫助學生申請進入前30名校）時遇到了非常多的困難。一部分學生不僅被排名前30學校的學校回拒，而且連其他排名較後的學校的錄取也沒有收到。面對如此困境，這家機構用了一個令人詫異的方法試圖平息即將被激起的爭端，那就是讓這些被拒絕的學生直接進入與該機構合作的學校，而這所學校的排名與事先承諾的「前30」相差甚遠。在現今已經十分發達的教育環境下，如此的行為實在是荒唐至極。

But further consider the moral hazard implications—think about all the room for abuse that the company bought itself with this failsafe in its back pocket. Think about how the firm can continue to sell its services way beyond its means, even past the point at which it can reasonably support its client caseload. Because now, it really can guarantee results—just not the results it advertised, and not in the way it promised.通過一系列道德風險現象的展示我們可以發現，留學機構之所以「敢於」保證結果以及在超出工作承載量的情況下繼續接受學生，是因為，由於信息不對稱，他們真的能夠做到。只是最終的結果以及操作的方式跟簽約時所承諾的大相徑庭罷了。

When Company X』s practice came up during a conversation with my brother, he was justifiably outraged. Already a vocal critic of higher education institutions, even he hadn』t fathomed the full extent to which education companies and universities engaged in morally questionable collusion. 「How come people in the US don』t know about this? How can people just accept this?」 he demanded to know. I had no answer for him.

我曾向從小在美國接受教育的親弟弟分享X機構上述的做法，他聽完之後覺得非常震驚，而且問了我許多問題：「為什麼美國這邊完全不知道有這樣的事情發生？」，「為什麼這些學生和家庭只是默默地接受這樣的結果？」。我給不了他答案，因為這對我來說也非常困惑。。

Perverse Incentive

Finally, we come to perverse incentive. This one』s a real stunner, so I want to delve right into an example featuring the unsung heroes and villains of Guangzhou transportation: taxi drivers. Riding in a taxi is the most hit-or-miss experience since biting into a half-baked egg tart. Good taxi drivers are the perfect chauffeurs, suave enough to make pleasant small talk and tactful enough not to intrude on your private ruminations. Bad taxi drivers somehow manage to do the four most annoying things in the world at the same time: smoke, pick his nose, honk the car horn relentlessly, and shout obscenities to his friends on WeChat.

反常激勵

我們現在來到了最後一個市場失靈現象，那就是乖張利誘。這又是一個令人驚訝的現象了。我首先想舉一個例子，這個例子的主人公是我們廣州城的無名英雄也是「大反派」，那就是的士司機。個人認為在廣州乘搭的士是一個非常撲朔迷離的事情，就像你吃沒有烤熟的蛋撻一樣。好的的士司機可以給你賓至如歸的感覺，他們會在適當的時候跟你進行和諧的對話，而且並不會觸及你的隱私。不稱職的司機我也遇到過，他們會在開車的時候做以下四件事情：吸煙/摳鼻/按喇叭還有跟朋友聊微信。

And some taxi drivers are just plain weird. One time, a driver stopped the car in the middle of our journey to take a leisurely two-minute piss… leaving the meter running, of course. Another time, a driver delivered a stirring sermon on the error of my ways: my woefully negligent failure to bring exact change to pay my 16 RMB fare. I had given him a twenty and he had no ones, only a five. I』m not kidding. This stuff actually happened.

有些司機更是讓你覺得不可理喻。有一次，一個的士司機竟然在開到一半把車停了，然後花了兩分鐘...小便，而且車上的計時器還走。還有一次，我在乘坐的士到達目的地之後發現身上只有一張20元，而乘車的費用是16元。按理說的士司機找回4元給也就完事兒了。但是這位司機大哥發現我身上只剩下20之後就開始喋喋不休了，他堅持讓我找出1元，這樣他就能找回5元給我，因為他身上也只剩下5元散錢。我真的無法想像，就因為這一塊錢，讓我成無辜地為了司機的「眼中釘」。

Man, I could write a whole book about my peculiar taxi experiences, and it wouldn』t even be half bad. But that』s not why I』m bringing up taxi drivers now. It』s the system by which they』re paid that is of interest to us. Think about it: the meter runs as long as time passes, whether the car is moving (faster ticks) or not (slower ticks). Good taxi drivers deftly maneuver past roadblocks and speed through hidden shortcuts, delivering you to your destination in the shortest time possible. Bad ones, on the other hand, take circuitous routes and get caught in agonizing gridlocks; the worst get lost or even intentionally lengthen your journey. And in the end, they get paid more than good drivers do. The taxi payment system literally rewards poor performance—the perfect specimen of a perverse incentive.

講真，如果讓我根據自己的經歷吐槽的士司機，我真的能寫一本書，而且內容會非！常！精！彩！…但這不是我提到的士司機的原因，我想向大家展示的是他們的計費系統。不管的士是否正在行駛，它的路程數都會隨著時間的推移而遞增。好司機會找到最合適的路線並在最短的時間內把你送到目的地。一些奸詐的老司機會帶你走迂迴曲折的路線或者有意繞路以增加路程數。但是最後，老司機收取的費用往往比好司機收取的更多。由此可見，的士行業的計費系統讓老司機的不良行為得到獎勵（收取更多的費用），這是個反常激勵的好例子。

An incentive is perverse if its receipt is contingent on behavior contrary to clients』 interests. The perverse incentive』s obvious and unequivocal violation of market efficiency makes it the most dangerous market failure in our litany. And it spells terrible news for clients in the education industry: in certain situations, education companies gain more from their clients』 failure than from success.

反常激勵指的的產品或服務提供者通過完成一些違反消費者意願的操作而獲得收益。反常激勵是一個性質最惡劣的市場失靈現象，它會極大地影響市場效率。這種現象在留學行業也經常出現，那就是留學機構可以從客戶的失敗中獲得更多的利益。

Consider a gifted student with high expectations but lacking in test-taking ability. With only six months to raise her ACT score by ten points, she feels the time pressure and signs up for as many hours of test preparation as she can muster. Now, the company knows that the student will terminate her service as soon as she attains her target score. So the best-case scenario for the firm is that the student keeps failing to make the progress she seeks until the last available test date. That way, the company receives ongoing payment for the student』s prolonged service and can still claim that it has delivered the promised score increase.

舉個例子。有一個非常有天賦的學生申請美國留學，他被許多人寄予厚望，只不過在考試成績上他還是需要在做一些提升。他接下來的任務是僅僅在6個月之內把他的ACT成績提升至少10分。由於感受到了強大的時間壓迫，她購買了儘可能多的備考課程。由於知道學生在達到目標之後就會不再參加課程，因此留學機構如果想繼續獲得收益，學生就需要一直考取不理想的成績，從而繼續簽約該機構的課程。

So how can the firm make sure that its perverse incentive is seized? Well, it can deliberately assign a less qualified tutor to teach the student. Just like bad taxi drivers try to keep you in the car for as long as possible, education companies succumbing to perverse incentives try to latch on to their clients for as long as possible.

那麼這些公司要怎麼確保他們能夠獲得更多利益呢？部分機構會通過為學生安排資歷較淺或者教學能力相對較弱的老師給學生上課。就如的士司機用盡方法延長整段路程，這些機構會通過以上方法讓學生進行更多的課程。

At this time, a somewhat valid counterpoint can be raised: education firms may have reputational concerns that dissuade them from engaging in the detestable practice above. There』s no doubt that many clients care about how much time their service providers take to help them achieve their goals. However, I think that this very concern for time is also a serious liability, rendering the education industry particularly ripe for exploitation.

可能很多持反對意見的人會說：「這些機構這麼做不怕影響他們自己的聲譽么？」是的，客戶當然會在意服務提供者花了多少時間去幫助和服務他們。但是，時間同樣也給了服務提供者更多空間去進行某種操作從而提升他們的獲益。

See, college application is time-sensitive, and many clients sign up for service when time is running out. These clients also happen to be those who don』t have the luxury of evaluating different education companies, so they usually just pick one and stick with it. In this sense, clients in the education industry tend to be 「sticky,」 especially when firms institute a no-refund policy. That』s why short-term gains from time-constrained, sticky clients are often more worthwhile than difficult-to-quantify, long-term gains. And even if companies eschew perverse incentives for the sake of reputation once in a while, isn』t there just something so fundamentally wrong about rewarding people for doing a worse job?

時間對大學申請來說是非常重要的，而且很多客戶是在時間已經非常緊迫的情況下選擇這些服務服務的。這樣的客戶不會有充足的時間挑選和比較不同的機構，因此在選定一個之後他們會非常依賴這個機構。在這種情況下，客戶對於留學機構的依賴性是非常強的，特別是對一些不提供退款的機構。因此，這些時間緊迫並極具依賴性的客戶所能提供給留學機構的收益比具備充分時間的客戶更多。這就是留學行業的反常激勵行為，留學機構通過有意製造或者利用客戶的窘境從而獲取更多利益。我認為這種行為是非常不正確的。

This article will be concluded in the next and final post.

「被綁架的留學行業」系列文章會在下一篇微信進行最後的總結，給行內外的人有些建議。希望大家繼續密切留意。

若想收聽音頻，請上「喜馬拉雅」搜索 KK_LIBRARY ，或直接入KK_LIBRARY 公眾號收聽全文。

原文鏈接 被綁架的留學行業 (2)：【中】三大市場失靈現象

推薦閱讀：