「綠色貝雷帽」尼日遇襲事件調查報告全文翻譯及點評

這一份「避重就輕」的調查報告

首先劃重點：

1、參與行動的陸軍特種部隊事先並沒有進行針對性的集訓；

2、本次任務是基層連排級指揮員的擅自行動，並沒有報批上級指揮部；

3、戰鬥開始後分隊指揮官試圖迂迴包抄敵軍；

4、發現敵人眾多後倉促撤離，撤離中各小組失去聯繫，一組美軍被射殺；

5、撤離至700米外駐守，指揮官發現人員失聯，4名美軍返回搜尋；

6、再次被敵人逼近，又一次倉促撤離，又一個美軍與尼軍混編小組被追殺；

7、戰鬥打響後的53分鐘內，分隊指揮官沒有發出任何求援通訊，最後車輛陷入沼澤地，陷入絕境後才告訴總部要全軍覆沒；

8、法軍和尼軍沒有任何掉鏈子行為，這次不是豬隊友；

9、法軍幻影戰機跟地面美軍無法通訊聯絡，是多次高速低空通場嚇退了敵人；

10、沒有任何人被俘，死者全部力戰而死；

11、報告把主要原因歸於擅自行動與訓練不足。

總體點評：

這是一份避重就輕的報告，調查本身比較細緻，對涉及行動的100多位相關人進行了訪問，赴尼日進行了實地考察，並對整個戰鬥過程進行了復盤。對人員、訓練不足，違規行動等問題進行了批評。對戰死的美軍與尼日軍士兵的英勇事迹進行了詳細的描述，對法軍、尼日友軍的關鍵性作用予以說明，對他們戰鬥中「掉鏈子」的傳聞予以澄清……然而，對戰鬥失利的原因卻含糊其辭幾乎沒有給出結論（所謂「多方面原因」），對經過調查後了解的流程中的指揮混亂——指揮員從擅自行動、節外生枝，到輕敵大意、臨陣脫逃，以及瞞情不報等一系列問題，除客觀敘述外，沒有給出任何結論，似乎是要讓讀者自己去歸納總結。非常明顯的迴避核心問題。不排除執筆人迫於上級壓力等而做出此種「心裡明白嘴上糊塗」的報告。靜觀此事的後續進展，如果就此不了了之，則恐怕以後還會出現此類問題。

下面是調查報告原文、翻譯及點評

OCT 2017 NIGER AMBUSH SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION 10 May 2018

2017年10月尼日遇襲事件調查報告——2018年3月10日

1.The findings and recommendations with regard to the tragic events of 4 October2017, that resulted in the deaths of four American and four Nigerien Soldiers, are based on all available evidence concerning the actions and decisions by the members of a U.S. Special Operations Forces team (USSOF Team), partner Nigerien forces, and higher headquarters personnel during active combat near Tongo Tongo, Niger. The investigation report, prepared by U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), explains how Sergeant First Class (SFC) Jeremiah Johnson1, Staff Sergeant (SSG) Bryan Black, SSG Dustin Wright, and Sergeant (SGT) La David Johnson gave their last full measure of devotion to our country and died with honor while actively engaging the enemy. The investigation report also shows how Nigerien and French units assisted without hesitation to support the troops in contact and very likely saved the lives of U.S. and Nigerien Soldiers, several of whom were wounded in the attack. The investigation team examined documentary, photographic, audio, video, and testimonial evidence to make findings of fact. It interviewed 143 witnesses, including survivors of the attack, one of whom accompanied the team back to the battlefield to explain what happened during the 4 October 2017 incident.

1.關於2014年10月4日戰鬥的調查結果和建議，基於所有美國特種作戰部隊成員、尼日友軍，以及更高級別的總部人員在本次尼日Tongo Tongo地區戰鬥中的作戰記錄。美國非洲司令部（AFRICOM）編寫的調查報告解釋了一等士官（SFC）Jeremiah Johnson ，士官長（SSG）Bryan Black，士官長Dustin Wright和士官（SGT）La David Johnson如何盡職盡責獻身國家，血戰到底榮譽而死。調查報告還顯示，尼日友軍和法國空軍在戰鬥中並沒有退縮與延誤，其中幾人在襲擊中受傷，其支援有效減少了美尼兩軍傷亡。調查小組先後採訪了143名證人，其中包括襲擊的倖存者，其中一名倖存者還陪同調查員回到戰場，現場復盤了10月4日的戰鬥細節。小組先後審查了文件、照片、音頻、視頻和證詞證據並最終得出調查結果。

2.This investigation identifies individual, organizational, and institutional failures and deficiencies that contributed to the tragic events of 4 October 2017. Although the report details the compounding impact of tactical and operational decisions, no single failure or deficiency was the sole reason for the events of 4 October 2017. To the extent this report highlights tactical decisions made by Soldiers in the heat of battle, it should not be overlooked that American and Nigerien forces fought courageously on 4 October 2017 despite being significantly outnumbered by the enemy.

這項調查闡述了本次戰鬥失利的個人、組織與機構原因及問題。

報告認為，這次失利存在著戰術與指揮決策等多方面的原因，問題是多方面的，而非某一方面。報告重點關注了部隊官兵在戰鬥中的戰術決定。同時，我們注意到美軍與尼軍官兵在寡不敵眾的惡劣條件下的英勇作戰。

3.Based on extensive review and analysis of all relevant information, the investigating officer made the following findings:

調查人員在對所有相關信息進行廣泛審查和分析的基礎上得出以下結論：

a. At the request of the Government of Niger, U.S. Special Operations Forces(USSOF) in Niger conduct a variety of counterterrorism and security force assistance activities with the Nigerien military to build the capacity of those forces to conduct operations to counter Boko Haram, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria – Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS).

應尼日政府的請求，駐尼日的美國特種作戰部隊（USSOF）支持尼日軍隊開展各種反恐和戰鬥支援任務，以幫助這些部隊提高作戰水平，使其可以有效反擊「博科聖地」（Boko Haram）、馬格里布基地組織、以及伊斯蘭國的北非分支「大撒哈拉」組織（ISIS-GS）。

b. Prior to 4 October 2017, USSOF in Ouallam, Niger were concentrated on two primary lines of effort: training and equipping a new Nigerien Counter Terrorism (CT) Company; and conducting operations with a separate Nigerien unit, until the new CT Company reached full operational capacity.

2017年10月4日前，駐紮尼日Ouallam的美國特種部隊主要有兩方面任務：組建並培訓一支尼日反恐部隊; 並與一支尼日部隊聯合作戰行動，直到新訓反恐部隊出師。

c. The USSOF Team involved in the attack on 4 October 2017 previously deployed to Maradi, Niger in 2016. Team members knew when they returned from that deployment they would go back to Niger one year later. From November 2016 to August 2017, the USSOF Team focused their training plan and deployment preparation on the anticipated return to Niger in the fall of 2017. Personnel turnover during that year, however, prevented the USSOF Team from conducting key pre-deployment collective training as a complete team. When they arrived in Ouallam, only half of the team had conducted any collective training together.

2017年10月4日，戰鬥中遇襲的美國特種部隊曾於2016年部署到尼日馬拉迪（Maradi）地區。他們結束該次部署的1年後即2017年秋再重返尼日（Ouallam）。從2016年11月至2017年8月，這支特種部隊集中籌備即將開始的培訓與部署工作。然而，2017年的人員流失影響了這支特種部隊整體進行的部署前集訓。當他們抵達Ouallam時，全隊只有一半的人員一起進行了集體訓練。

d. In the first three weeks they were in Ouallam, the USSOF Team (hereafter referred to as Team OUALLAM) concentrated primarily on training the new CT Company. Prior to 3 October 2017, Team OUALLAM conducted two partnered operations with other Nigerien forces.

到達前三周他們部署在Ouallam，這支特種部隊（以下簡稱OUALLAM部隊）主要工作是培訓新組建的尼日反恐部隊。10月3日前，OUALLAM部隊與其他尼日部隊進行了兩次聯合行動任務。

e. On 3 October 2017, Team OUALLAM left Camp Ouallam with Nigerien forces on a CT operation in the vicinity of Tiloa, Niger targeting a key member of ISIS-GS. Before departing, Team OUALLAM did not conduct pre-mission rehearsals or battle drills with their partner force. Once in Tiloa, the element was unable to locate the target, so Team OUALLAM and their partner Nigeriens continued to a military camp near Tiloa and conducted a key leader engagement (KLE) with a partner force commander. Although USSOF have the authority to conduct CT operations with partner Nigerien forces, the initial concept of operations (CONOPS) submitted for this mission was not approved at the proper level of command. Rather, the USSOF Team commander and the next higher level commander at the Advanced Operations Base (AOB), the company-level command, inaccurately characterized the nature of the mission in the CONOPS. The AOB commander then approved the CONOPS based upon an incorrect belief that he had the authority to do so. At the time of Team OUALLAM』s departure on the initial mission, no command higher than the AOB was aware that the mission sought to find/fix and, if possible, capture a key member of ISIS-GS. The acting AOB commander (a captain) was the most senior officer aware of the true nature of the mission. Proper characterization of the mission would have required approval by the Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE) commander, the battalion-level command, in N』Djamena, Chad.

2017年10月3日，OUALLAM分隊離開了營地赴Tiloa附近執行反恐行動，並與尼日部隊一起鎖定了伊斯蘭國武裝（ISIS-GS）的要犯。出發前，OUALLAM分隊並未與其友軍進行任務前演練或戰鬥演習。但到了Tiloa，分隊卻無法找到目標，所以OUALLAM分隊和尼日友軍繼續前出至Tiloa附近的一個營地，與另一支友軍部隊的指揮官進行了一次官方會談（KLE）。儘管美國特種部隊有權與尼日友軍進行反恐行動，但這次任務的「作戰規劃」 （CONOPS）卻並沒有報上級指揮部門批准——行動基地的連級指揮官以為自己有權決策。而分隊指揮官與行動基地（AOB）的連級指揮官制定的任務規劃並不完善。這導致在OUALLAM分隊出發執行任務時，行動基地以上的各級甚至都不知道這支特戰分隊是去搜尋、定位甚至抓捕ISIS-GS的要犯。行動基地的連級指揮官（一位隊長）算是掌握這項任務真正情況的最高首長了。而制定與決策這樣的任務，按規定是要駐查德的特種作戰指揮與司令部（SOCCE，以下簡稱「查德司令部」）的營級指揮官批准的。

f. Though the SOCCE commander was unaware of the true nature of Team OUALLAM』s original mission, the AOB briefed the SOCCE commander on the new intelligence. The SOCCE commander then directed a multi-team raid including a second USSOF Team and their partner Nigerien force out of Arlit, Niger as the main effort, and Team OUALLAM and their partner Nigerien force as the supporting effort. Weather forced the second USSOF Team to abort the air assault and the SOCCE commander subsequently ordered Team OUALLAM to execute the mission. The mission was unsuccessful in capturing the target. Some media reports alleged Team OUALLAM crossed the border into Mali in pursuit of terrorists. Those reports are false. The SOCCE commander』s approval of this mission was within his authority and he remained in communication with his higher headquarters. Following the raid, Team OUALLAM began their movement back to their home base.

儘管查德司令部指揮官不了解OUALLAM分隊此次任務的真實目的，但前進基地的連級指揮官向他們介紹情況變化。查德司令部指揮官就直接指揮了接下來的突襲行動，參與行動的部隊包括另一支來自Arlit地區的美軍特種部隊及其尼日友軍，他們作為主力，而OUALLAM分隊及其友軍作為支援力量。惡劣的天氣迫使Arlit的美軍特種部隊分隊放棄機降突襲，查德司令部指揮官隨後命令OUALLAM分隊獨自執行任務。分隊並沒有發現目標。一些媒體錯誤地報道稱OUALLAM分隊為了追捕恐怖分子而越境進入馬里。查德司令部指揮官有權批准這項任務，且他與上級總部保持著持續溝通。突襲之後，OUALLAM分隊開始返程回駐地。

g. While returning to base, Team OUALLAM』s partner Nigerien forces needed water so the convoy stopped near the village of Tongo Tongo to resupply. While there, the Team OUALLAM commander conducted an impromptu KLE with village leaders. At the completion of the KLE, they departed the village and, at 1140 on 4 October 2017, Team OUALLAM and their partner Nigeriens were ambushed immediately south of Tongo Tongo by a large enemy force. The American and Nigerien Soldiers dismounted and returned fire. The Team OUALLAM commander, the Nigerien force commander, and several Nigerien Soldiers attempted to counter attack the enemy in a flanking maneuver, killing approximately four enemy personnel. Soon after, the enemy massed and began to envelop Team OUALLAM. Realizing then that the team was significantly outnumbered by a well-trained force, the Team OUALLAM commander returned to the vehicles and ordered everyone to break contact and withdraw to the south. Team members yelled to SSG J. Johnson, who acknowledged the order to withdraw by giving a thumbs up. Team members threw canisters of smoke to mask their movement and, under increasing enemy fire, the convoy began to withdraw. Two Nigerien vehicles and one U.S. vehicle, including three U.S. Soldiers (SSG Black, SSG Wright, and SSG J. Johnson) did not withdraw from the initial ambush site. They were last seen by team members actively engaging the enemy from defensive positions near their vehicle and preparing to withdraw with the rest of the team.

在返回基地途中，OUALLAM分隊的尼日友軍需要補充水源，車隊就在Tongo Tongo村附近停下來進行補給。在那裡，OUALLAM分隊隊長與村長進行了一次臨時「官方會談」（KLE），會談後他們離開村莊。10月4日11時40分，OUALLAM分隊和尼日友軍在Tongo Tongo以南被敵大部隊伏擊。美軍與尼軍下車還擊。OUALLAM分隊隊長、尼軍指揮官和幾名尼軍士兵企圖迂迴側翼反擊，擊斃約4名敵人。然而很快，敵人集結並開始包圍OUALLAM分隊。意識到敵人數量遠超預計後，OUALLAM分隊的指揮官返回車輛，並命令所有人脫離接觸向南撤退。分隊隊員向士官長J.Johnson喊話，他豎起大拇指確認收到撤退命令。隊員們使用煙霧彈掩護撤退行動，車隊冒著敵人越來越猛烈的火力開始撤退。兩輛尼軍車輛和一輛美軍車輛，包括三名美軍士兵（士官長 Black、Wright和J. Johnson）未能從最初的伏擊地點撤離。在隊友最後的目擊中，他們正在與車輛不遠處的敵人交火，並準備與其他隊員一起撤出。

h. After the lead two vehicles began moving they lost visual contact with the third vehicle. SSG Wright entered the third vehicle and began driving it slowly south while SSG J. Johnson and SSG Black moved next to the vehicle using it as cover while providing suppressive fire. During the movement, enemy small arms fire hit SSG Black killing him instantly. SSG Wright halted the vehicle and dismounted. Despite increasing enemy fire, both SSG Wright and SSG J. Johnson remained with SSG Black and attempted to provide cover and assess his wounds. Overrun by enemy fighters, SSG Wright and SSG J. Johnson were forced to evade on foot. Approximately 85 meters from the vehicle, enemy small arms fire hit SSG J. Johnson, severely wounding him. SSG Wright stopped, returned to SSG J. Johnson, and continued to engage the enemy until each was shot and killed by small arms fire. SSG Black, SSG Wright, and SSG J. Johnson were never captured alive by the enemy. As enemy fighters advanced through the ambush site, they fired several additional bursts into the bodies of the three Soldiers.

在為首兩輛車開始撤離後，第三輛車離開了他們的視線。士官長Wright進入第3輛車，並開始緩慢向南行駛，而士官長J. Johnson和Black跟隨車輛移動，並將車身作為射擊的掩體，同時提供壓制火力。在移動過程中，敵方的步槍火力當場擊斃了士官長Black。 士官長Wright停下車子並下車。儘管敵方火力越來越猛烈，士官長Wright和J. Johnson仍然沒有放棄Black，試圖提供掩護並評估傷情。大量敵人迫近，兩人被迫步行撤離。離開車輛大約85米處，敵步槍火力擊中了J. Johnson，身受重傷。Wright轉身回到J. Johnson身邊，繼續與敵人交戰，直到兩人都被步槍擊斃。三位士官長寧死不當俘虜。當敵人通過埋伏地點繼續前進時，他們又向三名士兵遺體補槍。

i. The front two U.S. vehicles and three partner vehicles moved approximately 700 meters south and consolidated at what the investigating team calls 「Position Two.」 Realizing that the third vehicle and their associated personnel were not present, and after repeated attempts to contact them, four U.S. Soldiers moved on foot back to the ambush site to find them. Four other members of Team OUALLAM and approximately 25 partner Nigeriens remaining at Position Two continued to engage advancing enemy forces. The enemy pressed their attack with mounted and dismounted forces and began to envelop the remaining Soldiers from the east and from the south. The remaining Team OUALLAM members at Position Two were forced to evade under enemy fire. Prior to leaving Position Two, all team members acknowledged the order to break contact. U.S. and Nigerien Soldiers observed SGT L. Johnson running to his vehicle. One vehicle carrying three members of Team OUALLAM and four additional partner Nigeriens accelerated away from Position Two under heavy fire. Two U.S. Soldiers and three partner Nigeriens were wounded as the vehicle evaded enemy fighters. One partner Nigerien was killed. The Soldiers in this vehicle were unaware that the team had become separated as they broke contact with the enemy.

前2輛美軍車輛和3輛友軍車輛向南移動大約700米，並在調查小組所稱的「位置二」進行駐守。意識到第3輛美軍車輛及人員掉隊，並多次嘗試與他們通訊聯絡無果，4名美軍士兵步行返回伏擊點去尋找他們。分隊的另外4名隊員和大約25名友軍留在「位置二」繼續阻擊敵軍。敵軍車上與下車的步兵火力點同時向美軍密集射擊，並開始從東部和南部包圍剩餘的隊員。在「位置二」的其餘隊員不得不逃避敵人的射擊。在離開「位置二」前，所有團隊成員都確認收到脫離接觸的命令。美軍與友軍均觀察到士官L. Johnson向他的車輛跑去。 一輛載有3名美軍4名尼軍的車輛在「位置二」附近的重火力攻擊下加速撤離。 由於該車輛躲過了敵軍，車內有2名美軍士兵和3名尼日人受傷，1名尼軍遇難。這輛車上的士兵並沒有意識到，他們在敵人的追趕下分散開了。

j. SGT L. Johnson was in a prone position to the rear of his vehicle when the order to break contact was given. SGT L. Johnson acknowledged the order and, as the driver of his vehicle, he and two partner Nigeriens attempted to get into his vehicle and follow. SGT L. Johnson and the two Nigerien Soldiers were unable to get into the vehicle and were driven back to their prone positions by heavy enemy fire. Unable to reach the vehicle and with enemy forces rapidly closing on their position, they were forced to evade on foot. Running in a westerly direction, the first Nigerien Soldier was shot and killed approximately 460 meters from Position Two. The second Nigerien Soldier was shot and killed approximately 110 meters further to the west. SGT L. Johnson continued to evade, running west for an additional 450 meters before eventually seeking cover under a thorny tree approximately 960 meters from Position Two. There, SGT L. Johnson continued to return fire against the pursuing enemy. The enemy suppressed SGT L. Johnson with a vehicle-mounted heavy machine gun. Dismounted enemy then maneuvered on SGT L. Johnson killing him with small arms fire. The enemy did not capture SGT L. Johnson alive. SGT L. Johnsons hands were not bound and he was not executed but was killed in action while actively engaging the enemy.

當接到撤退命令時，士官L. Johnson處於卧姿射擊狀態。接到命令後，作為車輛駕駛員，他和兩名友軍試圖進入車輛並跟隨主車。然而，由於敵人的火力壓制，L. Johnson和2名尼日士兵被死死壓制在原地，無法上車。由於無法上車，且敵軍迅速逼近，他們被迫徒步撤離。在向西撤離過程中，第一位尼日士兵在離開「位置二」約460米處中彈身亡。第二名尼日士兵在約570米處被槍殺。L. Johnson繼續後撤，他向西跑了450米，最終他依託距「位置二」約960米的一棵荊棘樹作為掩護。在那裡，L. Johnson繼續對追擊的敵人開火。敵人用車載重機槍進行火力壓制。步行的敵人繼續抵近，並用步槍擊斃了他。L. Johnson同樣沒有被俘，他的手並沒有被綁住，沒有被處決，他抵抗到死。

k. Under heavy fire from pursuing enemy vehicles and dismounted personnel, the first vehicle continued north at a high rate of speed becoming stuck in a swampy area southwest of the original ambush site. With enemy fire increasing and becoming more effective, all personnel dismounted from the vehicle. The driver called over the radio indicating they were about to be overrun. The radio call occurred 53 minutes after first contact and was Team OUALLAM』s first request for assistance since first reporting "Troops in Contact." The remaining U.S. and Nigerien personnel dismounted and began moving west.

在敵方車隊持續的火力壓制與追趕下，頭車以極高的速度向北行駛，卻在初始伏擊點西南的沼澤地中陷車。 隨著敵人火力增強，所有人員不得不下車。駕駛員通過電台告訴基地，他們即將全軍覆沒。在這次電台呼叫前，分隊沒有發出任何求援信息，只有在剛剛遭遇伏擊時分隊曾通報「遭遇敵人」，這中間整整間隔53分鐘。此後，美軍與友軍下車並開始向西移動。

l. The four U.S. Soldiers who had returned to the ambush site killed several enemy soldiers near the original ambush site but were unable to locate the vehicle or SSG Black, SSG Wright, and SSG J. Johnson. Under heavy fire, they rejoined the rest of the group dismounting from the vehicle stuck in the swamp. It was at this point they realized SGT L. Johnson was not present. The enemy forces began engaging them 4 with heavy fire forcing them to withdraw. The team members provided critical medical care to the wounded, and evaded to a wooded area west of the ambush site. The combined group established a final defensive position, where they prepared to make their last stand.

此前4名返回的美軍士兵在最初的伏擊點附近擊斃了幾名敵軍士兵，但未能找到車輛及士官Black、Wright和J. Johnson。在猛烈火力下，他們與剛才沼澤中陷車的其餘組員會合。這時，他們才發現士官L. Johnson也失蹤了。敵軍繼續火力壓制，他們繼續撤退。隊員為傷員提供了戰術急救，並且躲進了伏擊點西面的一片密林中。所有隊員在這裡建立了最後的防守陣地，他們準備在那裡固守。

m. Upon receipt of the initial report of troops in contact, the AOB alerted Nigerien forces while the SOCCE alerted the French through their liaison officer. Both partners responded immediately. Nigerien ground forces departed 8 minutes after notification and arrived in Tongo Tongo approximately 4 hours and 25 minutes later due to distance, lack of roads, and rough terrain. French Mirage aircraft conducted the first show of force approximately 47 minutes after receiving notification. A single Nigerien helicopter took off approximately 40 minutes after receiving the request. The helicopter diverted prior to arrival in Tongo Tongo in order to de-conflict airspace for French jets. Despite being armed, the French aircraft were unable to engage because they could not identify U.S. troop locations and did not have communications with the team on the ground. Instead, they flew at low altitude in four separate shows of force that caused the enemy to retreat for cover, likely saving the lives of the surviving members of the USSOF Team. At approximately 1715, French forces from Task Force (TF) BARKHANE arrived in two helicopters and evacuated the surviving Soldiers.

在收到分隊遲來的求救信號後，前進基地聯繫了當地尼日部隊，同時查德司令部也通過聯絡官聯繫了法軍。兩方面友軍積極響應。尼日友軍在接到消息的8分鐘後即出發，但由於距離遠且道路不通、地形崎嶇，約4小時25分鐘後才抵達戰場。法軍幻影戰機在收到訊息約47分鐘後起飛。另有一架尼日直升機在接到請求後約40分鐘起飛。但這架直升機在抵達出事地點前即轉向離開附近空域，以便為法國飛機空出航道。然而，儘管攜帶實彈，法國戰鬥機卻無法識別美軍位置，也無法與分隊建立通訊聯絡。為避免誤傷，而無法投彈。然而，戰鬥機4次低空高速通場，這嚇退了敵軍，並挽救了倖存美軍特種部隊的性命。一直到大約17時15分，來自BARKHANE特遣部隊的法軍兩架直升機抵達並撤離了倖存士兵。

n. A Nigerien ground quick reaction force located the remains of SSG Wright, SSG Black, SSG J. Johnson, and one Nigerien Soldier as they swept through the ambush site. At approximately 1900 on 4 October 2017, the Nigeriens transferred the remains of the three American Soldiers to U.S. custody. Additional U.S. and Nigerien ground forces remained in the Tongo Tongo area searching for SGT L. Johnson until approximately 0540 hours on the morning of the 5th before returning to base to refit and continue search and recovery operations.

一名尼日地面快速反應部隊士兵發現了士官長Wright、Black、J. Johnson和尼日士兵的遺體。4日晚19點，尼日部隊將3名美軍士兵遺體轉交美軍。更多的美國和尼日部隊留在當地搜尋士官L. Johnson，直到5日凌晨約5時40分才返回基地補給後繼續搜救行動。

o. At 0320 on 5 October 2017, the Commander, AFRICOM deployed his theater Crisis Response Force and called for the mobilization of nationally-controlled assets trained and dedicated for personnel recovery (PR) missions. U.S. and partnered Nigerien forces continued to search for SGT L. Johnson using various surveillance platforms throughout periods of darkness and then using ground forces again beginning at first light.

5日3時20分，非洲司令部的指揮官部署了戰區應急戰鬥部隊，並尋求調動聯邦專業救援人員。凌晨的黑暗中，美軍與尼日部隊繼續使用各種搜救平台搜尋L. Johnson，天一亮，就再次投入地面部隊。

p. On the morning of 6 October 2017, Nigerien forces recovered SGT L. Johnsons remains approximately 960 meters from Position Two and approximately 1.6 km from the original ambush site. The Tongo Tongo village elder first notified and then led Nigerien forces to the location of SGT L. Johnsons remains. When found, SGT L. Johnsons hands were not bound and he was laying on his back with his arms to his sides. At 1522 on 6 October 2017, the Nigeriens transferred the remains of SGT L. Johnson to U.S. custody.

6日上午，尼日部隊在「位置二」960米遠處、距離最初伏擊點約1.6公里處發現了他的遺體。Tongo Tongo村的老人首先發現並帶領尼日部隊找到了L. Johnson的遺體。發現時，Johnson的手沒有被束縛，他平躺在地上，雙臂在側。6日15點22分，尼日軍人將L. Johnson的遺體轉交給美軍。

q. The investigation determined SSG Jeremiah Johnson, SSG Bryan Black, SSG Dustin Wright, and SGT La David Johnson were killed by small arms fire while actively engaging the enemy. At no point were U.S. forces captured alive.

調查確定士官長Jeremiah Johnson、Bryan Black、Dustin Wright和La David Johnson在激烈交火中被步槍射殺。美軍從未被俘。

r. During the recovery efforts there were many initial reports that U.S. systems detected signals from equipment assigned to Team OUALLAM. Those reports proved false. U.S. systems did not detect any signals from any devices or Personnel Recovery equipment assigned to Team OUALLAM during the Troops in Contact event near Tongo Tongo.

在搜救期間，許多媒體報道稱OUALLAM分隊曾發出求救信號。這些報告是錯誤的，在這場戰鬥中，各部未曾收到任何電台求救信號。

s. All four Soldiers killed in action sustained wounds that were either immediately fatal or rapidly fatal, and were deceased by the time the initial site was accessible to personnel recovery assets. All four Soldiers were killed in action before French and Nigerien responding forces arrived in Tongo Tongo. Both Soldiers wounded in action sustained injuries that were managed expeditiously by Team members.

在行動中遇難的4名士兵都是致命傷，並在可得到戰術急救前就已經死亡。在法國和尼日快反部隊抵達當地前，所有4名士兵都在行動中遇難。行動中受傷的2名士兵，當時已由隊員迅速處理。

t. SGT L. Johnson evaded on foot to a location outside the immediate search area of responding forces resulting in a 48-hour delay in finding his remains. Efforts to locate SGT L. Johnson were initially delayed by errant reporting that SGT L. Johnson was being held in a village north of Tongo Tongo near the Mali border. U.S. forces focused recovery efforts locating SGT L. Johnson, while simultaneously mobilizing additional assets to conduct a specialized personnel recovery operation.

L. Johnson犧牲的地點是在直接搜索區域外，這導致他的遺體搜尋耗費了48小時。 最初的錯誤報道稱L. Johnson被關押在馬裡邊界附近Tongo Tongo以北的一個村莊，這誤導延誤了搜尋L. Johnson的工作。美國軍隊調動了專業的搜救人員來幫助進行搜救工作。

u. While there is evidence to indicate that the enemy enjoys freedom of movement in Tongo Tongo, there is not enough evidence to conclude that the villagers of Tongo Tongo willingly (without duress) aid and support them. Additionally, there is insufficient evidence to determine if villagers aided the enemy or participated in the attack.

雖然有證據表明敵人在Tongo Tongo地區享有行動自由，但沒有證據表明Tongo Tongo村民自願援助和支持他們。此外，沒有足夠證據證明村民幫助了敵人或參與了襲擊。

v. Contradictory and ambiguous CONOPS approval matrices between Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA), Special Operations Command Forward-North and West Africa, SOCCE, and the AOB resulted in confusion regarding the proper approval level for certain types of CONOPS. A reliance on templated CONOPS (cut and paste from previous CONOPS), a lack of attention to detail in quality control and quality assurance, and inadequate notification of CONOPS to SOCAFRICA all contributed to a general lack of situational awareness and command oversight at every echelon. The CONOPS development, review, approval, and notification processes were pro-forma and did not reflect the detailed, deliberate planning and oversight tools they are intended to be.

非洲特種作戰司令部（SOCAFRICA），西北非特種作戰司令部以及前進基地之間互相矛盾的作戰規劃報批程序導致了對作戰行動審批流程的混淆。刻板的模板化作戰規劃（從以前的CONOPS中複製粘貼），對行動流程細節缺乏關注，以及行動規劃未上報非洲特種作戰司令部，這些造成了各級指揮官對行動態勢均缺乏感知和指揮監督。作戰規劃的設立、審查、批准和下發過程都是在走形式。

w. The immediate response by French and Nigerien partner forces saved American lives. Shows of force by French aircraft prevented surviving members of the team from being overrun, and caused the enemy to break off their pursuit and flee the area. Nigerien ground forces played a crucial role in securing the area and assisting in the recovery efforts.

法軍與尼日友軍的快速反應直接挽救了美軍生命。法國戰鬥機的低空通場阻止了敵人的繼續圍剿並逃離該地區。尼日地面部隊在地區安保與搜救工作方面發揮了至關重要的作用。

x. Individual members of the USSOF Team performed numerous acts of bravery while under fire on 4 October 2017 and their actions should be reviewed for appropriate recognition.

2017年10月4日，部分戰士在遭受攻擊時進行了多次英勇反擊，其英勇事迹應當受到表彰。

4.Based on the findings summarized above, the Commander, AFRICOM made recommendations for adjustments in various areas. Broadly, these recommendations include establishing clear and unambiguous guidance for the planning and approval of military operations, conducting a holistic review of certain equipment requirements ,ensuring appropriate turnover procedures within the theater, and certain acts with respect to coordinating support from partner nation forces.

根據上述調查結果，非洲司令部司令提出了在各個領域進行整改的意見。廣義而言，這些整改意見包括為軍事行動的規劃和批准建立明確的程序，對裝備需求進行全面審核，確保戰區更適當的運作程序，以及更好的與盟國友軍之間的協調。

5.The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred with the findings of the investigation and the recommendations of the AFRICOM Commander as outline above. The Secretary has directed the AFRICOM Commander to take immediate steps to implement his recommendations.

國防部長和參謀長聯席會議主席贊同上述調查結果及非洲戰區司令的建議。國防部長已指示非洲戰區司令立即採取步驟執行他的建議。

The Secretary also has directed actions at the Department, Service, and Combatant Command levels to address systemic issues brought to light by this investigation.

防長還指示各兵種部、後勤與作戰司令部級別採取行動，以解決這次調查發現的系統性問題。

Accordingly, the Secretary of the Army and the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command are directed, inter alia, to: review the training and policies pertinent to Special Forces soldiers that may impact their ability to effectively train foreign partners; reinforce the role of U.S. forces as foreign partner advisors during counter-terrorism operations; review personnel policies that affect units prior to deployment so that units are able to train together throughout the pre-deployment period; and review and minimize administrative requirements that detract from war-fighting readiness.

特別是，要求陸軍部長和美國特種作戰司令部司令審查與「特種部隊訓練盟國友軍」相關的培訓和政策；在反恐行動中加強美軍作為軍事顧問的作用；審查人事政策，避免影響部隊戰鬥部署準備工作，使部隊能夠在戰鬥部署前一起訓練; 審查並最大限度地減少影響戰備狀態的行政事物。

The Secretary of Defense directed the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to review and update, as necessary, all Department of Defense instructions and policies that may impact the ability of operational units to prepare for and deploy as a cohesive, ready, combat force.

國防部長指示負責人事與戰備的副部長，根據需要審查和調整所有可能影響作戰部隊凝聚力、戰鬥力、整備狀態的政策與指示。

The Secretary has given the leaders 120 days to review these matters, identify other issues as appropriate, and provide a plan of action to successfully address them.

國防部長要求各部門在120天內完成審查事項，酌情確定其他問題，並形成行動計劃，以解決這些問題。

The Secretary also sent his memorandum and the investigation report to civilian and military leaders in the Departments of the Air Force and Navy, so they may also take steps, as appropriate, to maintain the expected levels of tactical discipline and operational competence to ensure this type of incident does not happen again.

國防部長還將他的備忘錄和調查報告發給空軍和海軍部的文職和軍事領導，引以為戒，並酌情採取措施保持戰術紀律和作戰能力，確保這類事件不會發生。

Personnel actions relevant to this incident, including recognition for acts of valor and appropriate administrative or disciplinary action, if warranted, will be addressed by the military commands with administrative authority over personnel at issue.

相關的表彰、處罰等人事決策將由具有行政管理權的部門負責人處理。