Sanctions against Russia 對俄制裁－國會即將通過的制裁法律是對總統的羞辱

05-14

Sanctions against Russia

對俄制裁

They don』t trust him

他們不信任他

The sanctions legislation to be passed by Congress is humiliating for the president

國會即將通過的制裁法律是對總統的羞辱

It』s out of my hands, Vlad

老普，我管不住了！

Jul 29th 2017/ United States

MEMBERS of Congress do not agree on much, but on July 25th, after a bipartisan deal, the

House of Representatives voted by 419 votes to three for a bill that toughens sanctions on Russia. This is punishment both for Russia』s meddling in the election that brought President Donald Trump to power, and for its continuing aggression in Ukraine. (The bill also includes new sanctions against Iran and North Korea.) As The Economist went to press, the Senate was expected to follow suit: senators endorsed a similar bill 98-2 in June. The aim is to get the legislation passed before the summer recess and sent to the president for his signature.

美國國會成員能想到一起的時候不多，但在7月25日，兩黨協議之後，眾議院以419票贊成3票反對的結果通過了一份加強對俄制裁的法案。這是為了懲罰俄國干預那場讓唐納德.特朗普總統執掌大權的大選，也是為了處分其在烏克蘭的持續侵略。（這份法案也包含對伊朗和朝鮮的新制裁。）本報（《經濟學人》）付印的同時，預計參議院也會步其後塵：6月份參議員們背書了一份類似法案98-2。目的是為了讓這次立法在國會夏季休會之前通過，並送至總統處簽字。

The implications are momentous. Mr Trump had hoped to lift the existing package of sanctions on Russia at some point. Now he has been stripped of his presidential authority to do so. Since the vote was almost unanimous, he may have no option but to accept it with as much good grace as he can muster. He could veto it, but presidential vetoes can be overridden by a two-thirds majority in both chambers, which in this instance could be achieved.

這暗指含意是深刻的。之前特朗普一直希望在某個時間點解除現行的對俄制裁。現在他連這麼做的總統權力都已經被剝奪了。因為這次投票幾乎是全體一致通過，特朗普除了盡量有風度地接受，可能沒有其它選擇餘地。他可以否決，但是參眾兩院的三分之二多數可以推翻總統否決，比如這種情況。

The bill both locks in and extends previous sanctions aimed at Russia』s energy firms and banks. It also now targets any entity that does business with Russia』s defence or intelligence sectors—a measure that could threaten buyers of Russian weapons with secondary sanctions. This is a blow to Mr Trump, who made it clear during his campaign that he wanted improved ties with Moscow. It now appears that many of the undeclared meetings that have subsequently come to light between Mr Trump』s inner circle of advisers—Michael Flynn, Jared Kushner and Donald Trump junior—and an assortment of Russians with links of various directness to the Kremlin, most notably Sergey Kislyak, the ubiquitous and gregarious former Washington ambassador, were aimed at thawing relations.

這項法案不僅鎖定而且擴大了之前針對俄國能源公司和銀行的制裁，現在還針對任何和俄國防衛或情報部門有交易的實體－即可用二次制裁對採購俄國武器的買家構成威脅。這對特朗普來說可謂當頭一棒，他曾在競選中清楚表明希望改善美俄關係。現在看來很多之前尚未公開、隨之暴露的見面會議都是為了緩和兩國關係，即特朗普核心顧問圈子（邁克爾.弗林Michael Flynn、賈里德.庫什納Jared Kushner、小唐納德.特朗普）和一幫俄國人的見面會，這些俄國人與克里姆林宮有著千絲萬縷的聯繫，其中最有名的就是前俄國駐美大使－哪裡都見得到的社交達人謝爾蓋· 基斯利亞克（Sergey Kislyak）。

Vladimir Putin—who, beyond the reasonable doubt of America』s intelligence agencies (if not its president), authorised the election-hacking operation—may have had reason to

believe that Mr Trump, once in the White House, would find a way to relax sanctions. American and European Union sanctions have dragged down Russia』s economy, which, already reeling from low energy prices, contracted sharply in 2015 and has stagnated

since.

而排除美國情報機構（若不包括美總統）合理懷疑[1]、允許大選黑客行動的弗拉基米爾.普京，他也許一直有理由相信：一旦特朗普入主白宮，就能找到一條放鬆制裁的出路。美國和歐盟的制裁已經拖垮了俄國經濟，讓俄國深陷於能源低價，2015年里經濟嚴重萎縮並一蹶不振。

By overreaching, Mr Trump and Mr Putin have made the relaxation of sanctions politically toxic. That is bad enough for Mr Trump, but his humiliation does not end there. The Republican majority in Congress has, in essence, declared that it does not trust a president from its own party to serve the national interest when it comes to dealing with Russia. There is no other way to interpret the provision in the legislation to prevent the president from suspending sanctions by executive order, in the absence of congressional approval, as Barack Obama did in order to secure the nuclear deal with Iran.

特朗普和普京因為做過了頭，讓放鬆制裁成了政治毒藥。這對特朗普來說夠糟了，但是他的臉丟到這還沒丟完。實質上，國會中的大多數共和黨人都表明：在對俄問題上，他們不信任自己本黨總統會服務於國家利益。國會不批准，無論怎麼解讀制裁立法規定，都不能阻止總統用行政命令中止制裁，就像巴拉克.奧巴馬為了達成伊朗核協議時的做法。

To lift Ukraine-related sanctions, Mr Trump would have to certify by letter that the conditions which had led to them no longer applied—in other words, that Russia』s annexation of Crimea and its support for separatists in the east had ceased. Similarly, the new sanctions brought in to punish Russia for its cyber-attacks could be eased only if Mr Trump could show solid proof that Russia was actively and successfully clamping down on such activities. After receiving such a letter, Congress would then have 30 days to decide whether the president had made his case convincingly. Tellingly, the same conditions do not apply to the sanctions on North Korea and Iran.

為解除烏克蘭相關制裁，特朗普必須用信函確認導致制裁的條件已不再適用－換句話說，即證明俄羅斯對克里米亞的侵吞和對（烏）東部分裂分子的支持業已停止。同樣地，如果特朗普能夠拿出確鑿證據證明俄羅斯積極並成功地打壓了其網路攻擊行為，那麼出於懲罰該行為的新制裁也會減輕。國會收到這樣的信函後，有30天的時間來決定總統是否有足夠的說服力。需要注意的是，對俄制裁條件並不適用於對北韓和伊朗的制裁。

Foreign-policy practitioners, including Mr Trump』s secretary of state, Rex Tillerson, have warned that this creates a potentially damaging precedent. By deliberately tying this president』s hands over Russia, albeit with good reason, Congress risks undermining the ability of future administrations to conduct diplomacy, which often requires flexibility in light of changing circumstances. The bar for eventually removing sanctions will be so high that, in effect, they become permanent.

（美國）外交政策的實踐者，包括特朗普的國務卿雷克斯.蒂勒森都警告這會導致一個具有潛在危害性的先例。國會故意讓美總統和俄羅斯「牽手」，即使是出於好心，也冒著破壞未來內閣外交執行力的風險，外交工作需要靈活應對不斷變化的情況。而最終移除制裁的高牆也會變得十分之高，乃至事實上永久存在。

America』s European allies are worried too, both about the longer-term effects of this bill and the immediate impact of some of the new measures contained in it. The penalties that could be levied on European firms taking part in the controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, which on present plans will start pumping gas from Russia to Germany in 2019, have already raised concerns in Berlin and Brussels. Those qualms are not shared by all EU countries, especially former members of the Soviet bloc, such as Poland and the Baltic states, who want to reduce their dependence on Russian energy.

美國的歐洲盟友也是憂心忡忡，憂慮的是這份制裁法案的更長遠影響和其中一些新手段的直接後果。其中可能對參與北溪2號（Nord Stream 2）管道項目的歐洲公司施加的懲罰已經開始讓德國和比利時兩國感到不安了，這個備受爭議的項目按現有計劃將於2019年開始從俄羅斯向德國輸入天然氣。但並非所有歐盟國家都疑慮重重，尤其是前蘇聯集團的成員國，比如波蘭和波羅的海諸國，他們反倒希望能減少自身對俄羅斯能源的依賴。

How might Mr Trump respond to such a setback to his ability to conduct foreign policy on his own terms? One possibility is that it will increase his determination to find a way out of the Iran nuclear deal, which, like Obamacare, he once pledged to scrap. For America』s nuclear-related sanctions on Iran to remain suspended—a key condition of the 2015 agreement—the State Department must inform Congress whether it believes Iran to be in full compliance every 90 days. So far, Mr Trump has twice reluctantly agreed to certify and thus renew the presidential sanctions waiver. But when he did so on July 17th, it was only after kicking back hard against the recommendation of most of his senior foreign- policyand national-security team.

特朗普會怎麼應對自己在外交政策執行力上的這個跟頭呢？可能性之一就是他會更加堅決地想方設法脫手伊朗核協議，他曾保證將之廢棄，就像保證廢棄奧巴馬醫改一樣。要想美國對伊核相關制裁保持中止狀態的話－2015協議涉及一個關鍵條件－即美國國務院必須每隔90天就向國會報告，稱相信伊朗完全遵守核協議。截至目前，特朗普已經有兩次不願意同意了，才得以繼續總統制裁豁免。但在7月17日他這麼做的時候，是在激烈駁回他的最高級外交和國安團隊的建議之後才行。

The White House now seems to be looking for a way to get out of certifying the Iran deal when it comes up for renewal in October. To that end, the president has ordered White House staffers to bypass Mr Tillerson and to come up with the evidence and arguments he needs to undo the deal that the State Department has failed to provide. Mr Tillerson is reported to be fed up with his lot.

現在白宮似乎希望到10月份伊朗協議再確認時再想方法擺脫該協議。到那個時候，特朗普已經命令白宮官員繞過蒂勒森，拿出他需要的證據和論據撤銷這份國務院拿不出的協議。據稱蒂勒森已經受夠了。

It is still not clear whether Mr Trump wants to kill the Iran deal or try and renegotiate it—something that the other parties to it (Britain, France, Germany, Russia, China and the EU) have already ruled out. But on Iran, unlike Russia, Mr Trump can almost certainly rely on the support of Republicans in Congress for whatever he decides to do. After the ignominy of losing control over sanctions against Russia, the urge to appear decisive and in control may

be hard for Mr Trump to resist.

目前還不清楚特朗普究竟想不想抹殺伊朗協議，或者想不想嘗試重新談判－涉及到的其他國家（英、法、德、俄、中以及歐盟）都已經排除了這麼做的可能性。但不同於俄羅斯的是，在伊朗問題上特朗普幾乎可以完全仰仗國會共和黨對他任何決定的支持。對特朗普來說，在喪失對俄制裁控制權這麼丟臉的事之後，讓自己看起來很果決、並且大權在握的這個強烈願望是很難抵得住的。

原文鏈接：https://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21725603-vote-republicans-bind-hands-president-their-own-party

譯註：[1]

「beyond a reasonable doubt」排除合理懷疑標準（法律用語），即陪審團只有在檢方提出的證據能夠排除所有合理的懷疑之後，才可以判定被告人有罪。換言之，如果陪審員（作為一名正常的、謹慎的人）對被告人是否犯罪仍存有合乎情理的懷疑，則陪審團會認為檢察機關提供的證據還沒有達到「排除合理懷疑」的標準，就會判定被告人無罪。