中國的地緣政治：被環繞的強權

The Geopolitics of China: A Great Power Enclosed

中國的地緣政治：被環繞的強權

MARCH 25, 2012

2012年3月25日

by George Friedman, Stratfor

Stratfor喬治·弗里德曼

Editors Note: This is the second in a series of Stratfor monographs on the geopolitics of countries influential in world affairs. This was originally published in June 2008.

編者按：本文是Stratfor關於影響世界事務的國家的地緣政治系列文章的第二篇，初次發表於2008年6月。

Analysis分析

Contemporary China is an island. Although it is not surrounded by water (which borders only its eastern flank), China is bordered by terrain that is difficult to traverse in virtually any direction. There are some areas that can be traversed, but to understand China we must begin by visualizing the mountains, jungles and wastelands that enclose it. This outer shell both contains and protects China.

當代中國是一個島。雖然沒有被海洋完全包圍（海洋只在其東面），中國卻被幾乎各個方向都難以通行的地形所環繞。有部分地區可以通行，但是要理解中國，我們必須觀察將其環繞的山脈、叢林和荒漠。這一層外殼既限制著中國，又保護著中國。

Internally, China must be divided into two parts: the Chinese heartland and the non-Chinese buffer regions surrounding it. There is a line in China called the 15-inch isohyet, east of which more than 15 inches of rain fall each year and west of which the annual rainfall is less. The vast majority of Chinese live east and south of this line, in the region known as Han China — the Chinese heartland. The region is home to the ethnic Han, whom the world regards as the Chinese. It is important to understand that more than a billion people live in this area, which is about half the size of the United States.

從內部看，中國必須分為兩個部分：華人腹地，以及圍繞著腹地的非華人緩衝區。中國有條15英寸（400毫升）等降雨量線，該線以東年降雨量高於15英寸，以西年降雨量低於15英寸。絕大多數中國人居住在這條線以東和以南，該區域被稱為中原漢地——華人腹地。這一地區是漢族的故鄉，世界上把他們稱為華人。值得牢記的是10億多人聚居在這片美國一半面積的區域里。

The Chinese heartland is divided into two parts, northern and southern, which in turn is represented by two main dialects, Mandarin in the north and Cantonese in the south. These dialects share a writing system but are almost mutually incomprehensible when spoken. The Chinese heartland is defined by two major rivers — the Yellow River in the north and the Yangtze in the South, along with a third lesser river in the south, the Pearl. The heartland is Chinas agricultural region. However — and this is the single most important fact about China — it has about one-third the arable land per person as the rest of the world. This pressure has defined modern Chinese history — both in terms of living with it and trying to move beyond it.

華人腹地又可以分為兩個部分：北方和南方，兩個部分由兩種主要方言所分隔，北方是普通話，南方是廣東話。兩種方言的書面語一致，但是口語幾乎不能互通。華人腹地由兩條主要河流所界定，北方的黃河和南方的長江，南方還有一條相對次要的河流，即珠江。華人腹地是中國的農業區域，但是其人均耕地面積只有世界其他地區的三分之一——這是中國最重要的國情。不論中國人選擇忍受，還是嘗試突破，這一壓力都界定了中國近代史。

A ring of non-Han regions surround this heartland — Tibet, Xinjiang province (home of the Muslim Uighurs), Inner Mongolia and Manchuria (a historical name given to the region north of North Korea that now consists of the Chinese provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning).

一圈未漢化區域環繞著中國腹地——西藏、新疆（維吾爾族穆斯林的故鄉）、內蒙古和滿洲（朝鮮以北地區的歷史名稱，包括中國的黑龍江、吉林和遼寧三省）。

These are the buffer regions that historically have been under Chinese rule when China was strong and have broken away when China was weak. Today, there is a great deal of Han settlement in these regions, a cause of friction, but today Han China is strong.

這些是中國的緩衝區，歷史上中國強盛的時候，它們臣服於中國的統治，當中國衰弱時，則從中國分離出去。今天，在這些地區有相當數量的漢族聚居地，造成了不少摩擦，不過今天的漢族處於強勢地位。

These are also the regions where the historical threat to China originated. Han China is a region full of rivers and rain. It is therefore a land of farmers and merchants. The surrounding areas are the land of nomads and horsemen. In the 13th century, the Mongols under Ghenghis Khan invaded and occupied parts of Han China until the 15th century, when the Han reasserted their authority. Following this period, Chinese strategy remained constant: the slow and systematic assertion of control over these outer regions in order to protect the Han from incursions by nomadic cavalry. This imperative drove Chinese foreign policy. In spite of the imbalance of population, or perhaps because of it, China saw itself as extremely vulnerable to military forces moving from the north and west. Defending a massed population of farmers against these forces was difficult. The easiest solution, the one the Chinese chose, was to reverse the order and impose themselves on their potential conquerors.

這些也是對中國的傳統威脅興起的地方。漢地是一片河流眾多、降水豐富的土地，所以也是一片農民和商人的土地。周邊地區則是游牧民族和騎手的土地。13世紀，蒙古人在成吉思汗的帶領下侵入並佔領了漢地的部分地區，漢人直到15世紀才奪回統治權。從這一時期開始，中國的策略就是一貫的：緩慢但是系統地控制這些外圍地區，以保護漢地不受游牧騎兵襲擾。這一使命驅動了中國的外交政策。雖然有人口分布不均，或許正是因為這種不均，中國認為自己在來自北方和西方的軍事力量之前是極端脆弱的。保衛大量農民抗衡外來勢力是困難的。最簡單的解決方案是反轉形勢，將自己凌駕於可能的征服者之上，這正是中國所選擇的方案。

There was another reason. Aside from providing buffers, these possessions provided defensible borders. With borderlands under their control, China was strongly anchored. Lets consider the nature of Chinas border sequentially, starting in the east along the southern border with Vietnam and Myanmar. The border with Vietnam is the only border readily traversable by large armies or mass commerce. In fact, as recently as 1979, China and Vietnam fought a short border war, and there have been points in history when China has dominated Vietnam. However, the rest of the southern border where Yunnan province meets Laos and Myanmar is hilly jungle, difficult to traverse, with almost no major roads. Significant movement across this border is almost impossible. During World War II, the United States struggled to build the Burma Road to reach Yunnan and supply Chiang Kai-sheks forces. The effort was so difficult it became legendary. China is secure in this region.

還有一個原因。除了提供緩衝區，佔領這些地區還能提供可防守的邊界。只要控制了邊疆地區，中國就能穩定。下文依次分析中國的國界，從與越南、緬甸的南部國界開始。與越南的國界是唯一能通行大量軍隊和商隊的國界。近至1979年，中國和越南爆發過短暫的邊界戰爭，中國在歷史上也曾統治過越南。但是，南部國界的其餘部分，即雲南省與寮國、緬甸接壤的部分，都是山區叢林，幾乎沒有大路，難以通行。大規模行動在這一地區幾無可能。二戰期間，美國曾費力建造了滇緬公路，通往雲南，以補給蔣介石的軍隊。這一工程難度太高，成就了一段傳奇。在這一地區，中國是安全的。

Hkakabo Razi, almost 19,000 feet high, marks the border between China, Myanmar and India. At this point, Chinas southwestern frontier begins, anchored in the Himalayas. More precisely, it is where Tibet, controlled by China, borders India and the two Himalayan states, Nepal and Bhutan. This border runs in a long arc past Pakistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, ending at Pik Pobedy, a 25,000-foot mountain marking the border with China, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. It is possible to pass through this border region with difficulty; historically, parts of it have been accessible as a merchant route. On the whole, however, the Himalayas are a barrier to substantial trade and certainly to military forces. India and China — and China and much of Central Asia — are sealed off from each other.

海拔近19000英尺（約5581米）的開加博峰，是中國、緬甸和印度的邊界。中國的西南邊界從這裡開始，直至喜馬拉雅山脈。更準確地說，是中國控制下的西藏與印度及喜馬拉雅山區國家尼泊爾和不丹接壤。這一邊界划過長長的一段弧形，經過巴基斯坦、塔吉克和吉爾吉斯斯坦，直到海拔25000英尺（7439米）的托木爾峰，這裡是中國、吉爾吉斯斯坦和哈薩克的分界點。雖然困難，但是經過這一國界是可能的；歷史上，這裡的部分地區曾作為商業通道。但是總體上，喜馬拉雅山脈阻礙了大規模貿易，更別說軍事行動了。印度和中國——還有中國和中亞大部——都是彼此隔離的。

The one exception is the next section of the border, with Kazakhstan. This area is passable but has relatively little transport. As the transport expands, this will be the main route between China and the rest of Eurasia. It is the one land bridge from the Chinese island that can be used. The problem is distance. The border with Kazakhstan is almost a thousand miles from the first tier of Han Chinese provinces, and the route passes through sparsely populated Muslim territory, a region that has posed significant challenges to China. Importantly, the Silk Road from China ran through Xinjiang and Kazakhstan on its way west. It was the only way to go.

唯一的區別是下一段與哈薩克的國界。這一地區可以通過，但是相對來說幾乎沒有交通設施。隨著交通設施的發展，這裡可能成為中國和歐亞大陸其他地區的主要通道。這是唯一可利用的能通往「中國島」的大陸橋。問題在於距離。與哈薩克的國界與中國漢地省份最近也相距將近一千英里，並且該通道穿過人口稀疏的穆斯林地區，這一地區對中國形成了巨大挑戰。非常重要的是，絲綢之路從中國出發，向西穿過新疆和哈薩克。這是唯一的出路。

There is, finally, the long northern border first with Mongolia and then with Russia, running to the Pacific. This border is certainly passable. Indeed, the only successful invasion of China took place when Mongol horsemen attacked from Mongolia, occupying a good deal of Han China. Chinas buffers — Inner Mongolia and Manchuria — have protected Han China from other attacks. The Chinese have not attacked northward for two reasons. First, there has historically not been much there worth taking. Second, north-south access is difficult. Russia has two rail lines running from the west to the Pacific — the famous Trans-Siberian Railroad (TSR) and the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM), which connects those two cities and ties into the TSR. Aside from that, there is no east-west ground transportation linking Russia. There is also no north-south transportation. What appears accessible really is not.

最後是與蒙古和俄羅斯的長長的北方國界，直至太平洋。這段國界顯然是可以通行的。實際上，唯一成功入侵中國的蒙古騎兵就是從蒙古發動攻擊的，佔據了華人腹地的大片土地。中國的緩衝區——內蒙古和滿洲——保護了中國不受其他攻擊。中國沒有向北進攻的原因有兩個。第一，歷史上那裡沒有什麼佔領價值。第二，南北通行是困難的。俄羅斯有兩條從西方通往太平洋的鐵路，即著名的西伯利亞大鐵路（TSR）以及連接貝加爾、阿穆爾兩個城市並與TSR併網的貝阿鐵路（BAM）。除此之外，東西走向沒有任何地面交通與俄羅斯相連。南北走向也沒有交通可言。這段邊界看似可以通行，實質上並非如此。

The area in Russia that is most accessible from China is the region bordering the Pacific, the area from Russias Vladivostok to Blagoveschensk. This region has reasonable transport, population and advantages for both sides. If there were ever a conflict between China and Russia, this is the area that would be at the center of it. It is also the area, as you move southward and away from the Pacific, that borders on the Korean Peninsula, the area of Chinas last major military conflict.

從中國最容易通往的俄羅斯地區是太平洋沿岸，即從俄羅斯的海參崴到布拉戈維申斯克一帶。這一地區有可觀的交通和人口，中俄雙方在此各有優勢。如果中國和俄羅斯之間發生衝突的話，該地區將會是衝突的中心。從此向南並離開太平洋，這一地區還與朝鮮半島接壤，而朝鮮半島正是中國上一次爆發大規模軍事衝突的地區。

Then there is the Pacific coast, which has numerous harbors and has historically had substantial coastal trade. It is interesting to note that, apart from the attempt by the Mongols to invade Japan, and a single major maritime thrust by China into the Indian Ocean — primarily for trade and abandoned fairly quickly — China has never been a maritime power. Prior to the 19th century, it had not faced enemies capable of posing a naval threat and, as a result, it had little interest in spending large sums of money on building a navy.

然後就是中國的太平洋沿岸，沿海港口眾多，並且在歷史上就有大量的沿海貿易。值得注意的是，除了蒙古人曾經試圖入侵日本，以及中國歷史上唯一一次軍事挺進印度洋——主要為了貿易而且很快宣告放棄——中國從來就不是一個海洋強國。在19世紀以前，中國從未遇到有能力對其構成海洋威脅的敵人，結果就是中國不願意斥巨資打造海軍。

China, when it controls Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Manchuria, is an insulated state. Han China has only one point of potential friction, in the southeast with Vietnam. Other than that it is surrounded by non-Han buffer regions that it has politically integrated into China. There is a second friction point in eastern Manchuria, touching on Siberia and Korea. There is, finally, a single opening into the rest of Eurasia on the Xinjiang-Kazakh border.

只要控制了西藏、新疆、內蒙古和滿洲，中國便是一個與世隔絕的國家。中原漢地只有一個潛在的摩擦點，即與越南接壤的東南部【應為西南部——譯者注】。除此以外，中原漢地由非漢族的緩衝區所包圍，這些緩衝區在政治上已融入中國。還有第二個摩擦點位於滿洲東部，與西伯利亞和韓國接壤。最後，中國通往歐亞大陸其他地區的唯一通道只剩下新疆與哈薩克的邊境。

Chinas most vulnerable point, since the arrival of Europeans in the western Pacific in the mid-19th century, has been its coast. Apart from European encroachments in which commercial interests were backed up by limited force, China suffered its most significant military encounter — and long and miserable war — after the Japanese invaded and occupied large parts of eastern China along with Manchuria in the 1930s. Despite the mismatch in military power and more than a dozen years of war, Japan still could not force the Chinese government to capitulate. The simple fact was that Han China, given its size and population density, could not be subdued. No matter how many victories the Japanese won, they could not decisively defeat the Chinese.

自19世紀中期歐洲人抵達西太平洋以來，中國最脆弱的地帶就是海岸線。除了歐洲為牟取商業利益而動用有限武力侵犯中國外，中國遭遇的有史以來最嚴重的軍事衝突與漫長而痛苦的戰爭是日本在20世紀30年代侵佔了滿洲和華東大部分地區。儘管軍事實力相差懸殊，戰火持續十幾年，日本仍然沒能迫使中國政府投降。一言以蔽之，中原漢地由於幅員遼闊、人口稠密，是無法被征服的。無論贏得了多少戰役，日本始終無法決定性地戰勝中國。

China is hard to invade; given its size and population, it is even harder to occupy. This also makes it hard for the Chinese to invade others — not utterly impossible, but quite difficult. Containing a fifth of the worlds population, China can wall itself off from the world, as it did prior to the United Kingdoms forced entry in the 19th century and as it did under Mao Zedong. All of this means China is a great power, but one that has to behave very differently from other great powers.

入侵中國絕非易事；由於其幅員遼闊、人口稠密，佔領則更加困難。這也使得中國很難入侵他國——並非完全不可能，但是相當困難。坐擁五分之一的世界人口，中國可以閉關鎖國與世隔絕，就像19世紀英國強行打開中國大門之前以及在毛澤東時代那樣。所有這一切都意味著中國是一個大國，但卻不能其他大國一樣行事。

Chinas Geopolitical Imperatives中國的地緣政治使命

China has three overriding geopolitical imperatives:

中國有三大首要地緣政治使命：

Maintain internal unity in the Han Chinese regions.

在漢族地區維護內部團結。

Maintain control of the buffer regions.?

維持對緩衝區的控制。

Protect the coast from foreign encroachment.

保護海岸線不受外國侵略。

Maintaining Internal Unity 維護內部團結

China is more enclosed than any other great power. The size of its population, coupled with its secure frontiers and relative abundance of resources, allows it to develop with minimal intercourse with the rest of the world, if it chooses. During the Maoist period, for example, China became an insular nation, driven primarily by internal interests and considerations, indifferent or hostile to the rest of the world. It was secure and, except for its involvement in the Korean War and its efforts to pacify restless buffer regions, was relatively peaceful. Internally, however, China underwent periodic, self-generated chaos.

中國比任何其他大國都更加封閉。龐大的人口、安全的邊境以及相對豐富的資源，使得中國只要願意就能只與外部世界保持最低限度的交往。比如在毛澤東時代，中國成為了一個與世隔絕的國家，其主要推動力來自於內部的利害關係和自身考慮，漠視或敵視外面的世界。中國是安全的，並且除了參與朝鮮戰爭，以及力圖平定緩衝區之外，也是相對平靜的。然而在國內，中國則經歷了周期性的和自發性的混亂。

The weakness of insularity for China is poverty. Given the ratio of arable land to population, a self- enclosed China is a poor China. Its population is so poor that economic development?driven by domestic demand, no matter how limited it might be, is impossible. However, an isolated China is easier to manage by a central government. The great danger in China is a rupture within the Han Chinese nation. If that happens, if the central government weakens, the peripheral regions will spin off, and China will then be vulnerable to foreigners taking advantage of Chinese weakness.

閉關鎖國的弊端就是貧窮。鑒於耕地與人口的比例，一個自我封閉的中國就是一個貧窮的中國。國民過於貧窮，所以依靠國內需求帶動哪怕是極其有限的經濟發展都是不可能的。然而，一個孤立的中國更便於中央政府的管理。中國最大的危機就是漢民族內部的分裂。假設出現這種情況，同時中央政府衰弱的話，周邊的緩衝區就會脫離掌控，這時如果外國勢力趁虛而入，中國就會猝不及防。

For China to prosper, it has to engage in trade, exporting silk, silver and industrial products. Historically, land trade has not posed a problem for China. The Silk Road allowed foreign influences to come into China and the resulting wealth created a degree of instability. On the whole, however, it could be managed.

中國要發展，就必須從事貿易，出口絲綢、銀器和工業產品。從歷史上看，陸路貿易並沒有為中國帶來麻煩。絲綢之路允許國外影響進入中國，帶來的財富也造成了一定程度的不穩定。但是總體上，形勢還是可控的。

The dynamic of industrialism changed both the geography of Chinese trade and its consequences. In the mid-19th century, when Europe — led by the British —compelled the Chinese government to give trading concessions to the British, it opened a new chapter in Chinese history. For the first time, the Pacific coast was the interface with the world, not Central Asia. This in turn massively destabilized China.

工業化的力量改變了中國貿易的布局及其結果。19世紀中葉，以英國為首的歐洲迫使中國政府給予貿易優惠，由此打開了中國歷史的新篇章。太平洋沿岸而不是中亞，有史以來第一次成了與世界的介面 。這反過來極大地破壞了中國的穩定。

As trade between China and the world intensified, the Chinese who were engaged in trading increased their wealth dramatically. Those in the coastal provinces of China, the region most deeply involved in trading, became relatively wealthy while the Chinese in the interior (not the buffer regions, which were always poor, but the non-coastal provinces of Han China) remained poor, subsistence farmers.

隨著中國與世界的貿易增長，那些從事貿易的中國人迅速積累了財富。沿海省份由於外貿行業蓬勃發展而變得相對富裕，而內陸地區的人民（這裡不是指一向貧窮的緩衝區，而是指非沿海地區的漢族）卻仍然是貧窮的自耕農。

The central government was balanced between the divergent interests of coastal China and the interior. The coastal region, particularly its newly enriched leadership, had an interest in maintaining and intensifying relations with European powers and with the United States and Japan. The more intense the trade, the wealthier the coastal leadership and the greater the disparity between the regions. In due course, foreigners allied with Chinese coastal merchants and politicians became more powerful in the coastal regions than the central government. The worst geopolitical nightmare of China came true. China fragmented, breaking into regions, some increasingly under the control of foreigners, particularly foreign commercial interests. Beijing lost control over the country. It should be noted that this was the context in which Japan invaded China, which made Japans failure to defeat China all the more extraordinary.

過去，中央政府在沿海地區和內陸地區之間的不同利益間尋求平衡。沿海地區，特別是新富起來的地方領導集團，希望保持並加強與歐洲列強、美國及日本的關係。貿易越是增長， 沿海地區的領導集團就越富有，區域之間的貧富差距就越大。到了一定程度，外國勢力與中國沿海商人及官員結成同盟，從而使得外國勢力在沿海地區的影響力超過中央政府。於是中國最糟糕的地緣政治噩夢成為了現實。中國支離破碎，形成地方割據，有些地方日益受到外國勢力尤其是外國商業利益的控制。北京【應為南京，即民國首都——譯者注】失去了對國家的掌控。應當指出，這正是日本侵略中國時的歷史背景，這也使得日本最終戰敗顯得更加不可思議。

Maos goal was threefold, Marxism aside. First, he wanted to recentralize China — re-establishing Beijing as Chinas capital and political center. Second, he wanted to end the massive inequality between the coastal region and the rest of China. Third, he wanted to expel the foreigners from China. In short, he wanted to recreate a united Han China.

除了馬克思主義，毛澤東有三大目標。第一，恢復中央集權制——將北京重新確立為中國的首都和政治中心。第二，消除沿海地區和其他地區之間巨大的不平衡。第三，把外國勢力從中國驅逐出去。簡而言之，他想要重新建立一個統一的漢族中國。

Mao first attempted to trigger an uprising in the cities in 1927 but failed because the coalition of Chinese interests and foreign powers was impossible to break. Instead he took the Long March to the interior of China, where he raised a massive peasant army that was both nationalist and egalitarian and, in 1948, returned to the coastal region and expelled the foreigners. Mao re-enclosed China, recentralized it, and accepted the inevitable result. China became equal but extraordinarily poor.

1927年，毛澤東首先試圖在城市發動起義，但由於國內利益集團與外國勢力的聯盟牢不可破而失敗了。隨後，他率領長征深入內陸，並且在那裡發展了一支龐大的崇尚民族主義和平等主義的農民軍隊。1948年，他回到沿海地區並將外國列強驅逐出境。毛澤東重新封閉了中國，恢復了中央集權，同時也接受了其必然結果：中國變得了平等但非常貧窮。

Chinas primary geopolitical issue is this: For it to develop it must engage in international trade. If it does that, it must use its coastal cities as an interface with the world. When that happens, the coastal cities and the surrounding region become increasingly wealthy. The influence of foreigners over this region increases and the interests of foreigners and the coastal Chinese converge and begin competing with the interests of the central government. China is constantly challenged by the problem of how to avoid this outcome while engaging in international trade.

中國的首要地緣政治問題是：要發展就必須參與國際貿易。這樣就必須要將沿海城市作為與世界對接的窗口。在這種情況下，沿海城市及其周邊地區會日益富裕起來。外國勢力在這些地區的影響力將隨之增強，與沿海地區的利益趨於一致，進而同中央政府的利益相抗衡。如何參與國際貿易，同時避免這一結果，是中國面臨的一大挑戰。

Controlling the Buffer Regions 控制緩衝區

Prior to Maos rise, with the central government weakened and Han China engaged simultaneously in war with Japan, civil war and regionalism, the center was not holding. While Manchuria was under Chinese control, Outer Mongolia was under Soviet control and extending its influence (Soviet power more than Marxist ideology) into Inner Mongolia, and Tibet and Xinjiang were drifting away.

在毛澤東崛起之前，由於中央政府軟弱，中原漢地需要同時應付中日戰爭、內戰和軍閥割據，中央名存實亡。雖然中國控制著滿洲，但蘇聯卻控制了外蒙古並且繼續向內蒙古擴展影響力（這裡指蘇聯的勢力而非馬克思主義的意識形態），西藏和新疆也正在脫離中國。

At the same time that Mao was fighting the civil war, he was also laying the groundwork for taking control of the buffer regions. Interestingly, his first moves were designed to block Soviet interests in these regions. Mao moved to consolidate Chinese communist control over Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, effectively leveraging the Soviets out. Xinjiang had been under the control of a regional warlord, Yang Zengxin. Shortly after the end of the civil war, Mao moved to force him out and take over Xinjiang. Finally, in 1950 Mao moved against Tibet, which he secured in 1951.

毛澤東在進行內戰的同時，也為控制緩衝區奠定了基礎。有趣的是，他的第一個舉措是阻止蘇聯在這些地區的利益。毛澤東通過鞏固中共對滿洲和內蒙古的控制，有效地把蘇聯趕了出去。新疆當時受到軍閥楊增新（此處有誤，楊增新於1928年死於暗殺——譯者注）的控制。內戰結束後不久，毛澤東逼走了楊增新並接管了新疆。最後，毛澤東在1950年進軍西藏，並於1951年成功控制了西藏。

The rapid-fire consolidation of the buffer regions gave Mao what all Chinese emperors sought, a China secure from invasion. Controlling Tibet meant that India could not move across the Himalayas and establish a secure base of operations on the Tibetan Plateau. There could be skirmishes in the Himalayas, but no one could push a multidivisional force across those mountains and keep it supplied. So long as Tibet was in Chinese hands, the Indians could live on the other side of the moon. Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Manchuria buffered China from the Soviet Union. Mao was more of a geopolitician than an ideologue. He did not trust the Soviets. With the buffer states in hand, they would not invade China. The distances, the poor transportation and the lack of resources meant that any Soviet invasion would run into massive logistical problems well before it reached Han Chinas populated regions, and become bogged down — just as the Japanese had.

迅速收復並控制緩衝區使得毛澤東能夠保護中國不受侵略，這也是中國歷代君王所追求的目標。控制西藏就意味著印度不能翻越喜馬拉雅山，在青藏高原上建立軍事基地。喜馬拉雅山區可能會發生小規模衝突，但沒人能讓一支大部隊翻越這些山脈並為其提供補給。只要西藏在中國人手裡，印度人就只能望山興嘆。新疆、內蒙古和滿洲在中國和蘇聯之間發揮了緩衝作用。毛澤東更像是一位地緣政治家而不是意識形態理論家。他不信任蘇聯。只要中國控制了緩衝區，蘇聯就不會侵略中國。遙遠的距離、不便的交通以及匱乏的資源，意味著蘇聯的入侵在遠未到達漢族人口稠密地區之前就會遇到大量的後勤問題並陷入困境——重蹈日本人的覆轍。

China had geopolitical issues with Vietnam, Pakistan and Afghanistan, neighboring states with which it shared a border, but the real problem for China would come in Manchuria or, more precisely, Korea. The Soviets, more than the Chinese, had encouraged a North Korean invasion of South Korea. It is difficult to speculate on Joseph Stalins thinking, but it worked out superbly for him. The United States intervened, defeated the North Korean Army and drove to the Yalu, the river border with China. The Chinese, seeing the well-armed and well-trained American force surge to its borders, decided that it had to block its advance and attacked south. What resulted was three years of brutal warfare in which the Chinese lost about a million men. From the Soviet point of view, fighting between China and the United States was the best thing imaginable. But from Stratfors point of view, what it demonstrated was the sensitivity of the Chinese to any encroachment on their borderlands, their buffers, which represent the foundation of their national security.

中國與接壤的周邊國家如越南、巴基斯坦和阿富汗都曾有過地緣政治糾紛，但對中國來說，真正的問題可能來自於滿洲，或更確切地說是朝鮮半島。蘇聯，而非中國，曾慫恿朝鮮入侵韓國。我們很難猜測約瑟夫·斯大林的想法，但事實卻對他非常有利。隨後美國介入朝鮮戰爭並一舉擊潰了朝鮮軍隊，直逼中朝邊境的鴨綠江。眼看裝備精良且訓練有素的美國大軍壓境，中國決定阻止美軍向前推進，於是向南發起了攻擊。其結果是長達三年的殘酷戰爭，中國約有一百萬士兵犧牲。從蘇聯的角度來看，中國和美國開戰是最理想的局面。但在Stratfor看來，這一事件說明中國對任何侵犯其邊境和緩衝區的行為極其敏感，因為邊境和緩衝區構成了中國國家安全的基礎。

Protecting the Coast 保衛海岸線

With the buffer regions under control, the coast is Chinas most vulnerable point, but its vulnerability is not to invasion. Given the Japanese example, no one has the interest or forces to try to invade mainland China, supply an army there and hope to win. Invasion is not a meaningful threat.

控制了緩衝區之後，沿海就成了中國最薄弱的環節，但其弱點並非在於容易遭受入侵。由於有日本人的前車之鑒，沒有國家會有興趣或實力從海上入侵中國大陸，補給軍隊並希望取得勝利。入侵的威脅在此毫無意義。

The coastal threat to China is economic, though most would not call it a threat. As we saw, the British intrusion into China culminated in the destabilization of the country, the virtual collapse of the central government and civil war. It was all caused by prosperity. Mao had solved the problem by sealing the coast of China off to any real development and liquidating the class that had collaborated with foreign business. For Mao, xenophobia was integral to national policy. He saw foreign presence as undermining the stability of China. He preferred impoverished unity to chaos. He also understood that, given Chinas population and geography, it could defend itself against potential attackers without an advanced military-industrial complex.

中國沿海地區所面臨的威脅是經濟上的，儘管大多數人不會稱之為威脅。如我們所見，英國入侵中國最終破壞了中國的穩定，導致了中央政府的倒台以及內戰的爆發。這都是經濟繁榮所造成的。毛澤東解決這一問題的辦法是封鎖沿海地區，阻斷真正意義上的經濟發展，以及對那些與外商勾結的階級團體進行清洗。對毛澤東來說，排外主義是國家政策的不可或缺的一部分。他認為外國勢力的存在破壞了中國的穩定。他寧願選擇貧困的統一也不要混亂。同時他也知道，由於有人口和地理優勢，中國即使沒有先進的軍事工業，也能夠抵禦潛在的攻擊。

His successor, Deng Xiaoping, was heir to a powerful state in control of China and the buffer regions. He also felt under tremendous pressure politically to improve living standards, and he undoubtedly understood that technological gaps would eventually threaten Chinese national security. He took a historic gamble. He knew that Chinas economy could not develop on its own. Chinas internal demand for goods was too weak because the Chinese were too poor.

毛的接班人鄧小平繼承了一個控制著中國及其緩衝地區的強勢政權。他也承受著要求改善人民生活的巨大政治壓力，但是毫無疑問的是，他認識到技術上的差距最終將危及中國國家安全。於是他歷史性地賭了一把。他知道中國的經濟不能單獨發展。國內的商品需求太貧瘠，因為中國人太窮了。

Deng gambled that he could open China to foreign investment and reorient the Chinese economy away from agriculture and heavy industry and toward export-oriented industries. By doing so he would increase living standards, import technology and train Chinas workforce. He was betting that the effort this time would not destabilize China, create massive tensions between the prosperous coastal provinces and the interior, foster regionalism, or put the coastal regions under foreign control. Deng believed he could avoid all that by maintaining a strong central government, based on a loyal army and Communist Party apparatus. His successors have struggled to maintain that loyalty to the state and not to foreign investors, who can make individuals wealthy. That is the bet that is currently being played out.

鄧小平斷定他能夠開放中國，吸引外資，調整經濟，將發展重心從農業和重工業轉向出口產業。這樣就能夠改善國人的生活水平，引進技術並培訓勞動力。他認定這一次開放不會動搖中國，不會造成繁榮的沿海省份與內陸之間的劇烈矛盾，也不會催生地方主義或任由沿海地區為外國所控制。鄧小平相信，只要能維持一個強勢的中央政府，依靠忠誠的軍隊和共產黨組織，就能夠避免上述問題。他的繼任者一直在努力維護對國家的忠誠，而不是效忠於那些可以帶來個人財富的外國投資者。這場賭局仍在繼續。

Chinas Geopolitics and its Current Position 中國的地緣政治和當前局勢

From a political and military standpoint, China has achieved its strategic goals. The buffer regions are intact and China faces no threat in Eurasia. It sees a Western attempt to force China out of Tibet as an attempt to undermine Chinese national security. For China, however, Tibet is a minor irritant; China has no possible intention of leaving Tibet, the Tibetans cannot rise up and win, and no one is about to invade the region. Similarly, the Uighur Muslims represent an irritant in Xinjiang and not a direct threat. The Russians have no interest in or capability of invading China, and the Korean Peninsula does not represent a direct threat to the Chinese, certainly not one they could not handle.

從政治和軍事的角度看，中國已經達成了戰略目標。緩衝區完整無缺，歐亞大陸對中國沒有威脅。中國認為，西方勢力試圖迫使它撤出西藏是企圖破壞中國國家安全。但是對中國來說，西藏只是個小難題；中國不可能離開西藏，而西藏人也不可能反抗並獲勝，也沒有國家會試圖入侵西藏。同樣，新疆的維吾爾族穆斯林也只能稱為問題，而非直接威脅。俄羅斯既沒有興趣也沒有能力入侵中國，而朝鮮半島並不對中國構成直接威脅，即使有中國也肯定可以應對。

The greatest military threat to China comes from the United States Navy. The Chinese have become highly dependent on seaborne trade and the United States Navy is in a position to blockade Chinas ports if it wished. Should the United States do that, it would cripple China. Therefore, Chinas primary military interest is to make such a blockade impossible.

中國最大的軍事威脅來自美國海軍。中國高度依賴于海運貿易，只要美國願意，其海軍有能力封鎖中國的港口。美國如果這樣做，將使中國陷入癱瘓。因此，中國的首要軍事利益就是反封鎖。

It would take several generations for China to build a surface navy able to compete with the U.S. Navy. Simply training naval aviators to conduct carrier-based operations effectively would take decades — at least until these trainees became admirals and captains. And this does not take into account the time it would take to build an aircraft carrier and carrier-capable aircraft and master the intricacies of carrier operations.

中國需要花費幾代人的時間才能建造出一支在海面上能與美軍抗衡的海軍。光是訓練海軍飛行員熟練進行艦載操作就需要幾十年——至少要等到這些學員成為海軍上將和艦長。這還未考慮建造航空母艦、艦載飛機以及熟練掌握航空母艦作戰精髓的時間。

For China, the primary mission is to raise the price of a blockade so high that the Americans would not attempt it. The means for that would be land- and submarine-based anti-ship missiles. The strategic solution is for China to construct a missile force sufficiently dispersed that it cannot be suppressed by the United States and with sufficient range to engage the United States at substantial distance, as far as the central Pacific.

對中國來說，首要任務是要提高封鎖中國的代價，以使美國不敢輕舉妄動。手段就是陸基和潛基反艦導彈。中國的戰略方案是打造一支導彈部隊，布署足夠分散使得美國無法對進行壓制，攻擊範圍足以從遠距離對抗美國，射程至少應能到達太平洋中部。

This missile force would have to be able to identify and track potential targets to be effective. Therefore, if the Chinese are to pursue this strategy, they must also develop a space-based maritime reconnaissance system. These are the technologies the Chinese are focusing on. Anti-ship missiles and space-based systems, including anti-satellite systems designed to blind the Americans, represent Chinas military counter to its only significant military threat.

導彈要發揮威力，就必須能夠識別和跟蹤潛在目標。因此，中國想要實施這一戰略，就必須開發一套天基海事偵察系統。這些就是中國正集中全力研發的技術。反艦導彈和太空系統，包括用以干擾美國衛星的反衛星系統，都是中國對於它唯一的重大軍事威脅所做出的軍事反擊手段。

China could also use those missiles to blockade Taiwan by interdicting ships going to and from the island. But the Chinese do not have the naval ability to land a sufficient amphibious force and sustain it in ground combat. Nor do they have the ability to establish air superiority over the Taiwan Strait. China might be able to harass Taiwan but it will not invade it. Missiles, satellites and submarines constitute Chinas naval strategy.

中國同樣可以利用這些導彈來阻止船隻往返台灣，從而封鎖台灣。但是中國海軍的實力不足以讓足夠的兩棲作戰部隊登陸並進行長期的陸地作戰。中國也沒有能力在台灣海峽建立空中優勢。中國也許能騷擾台灣，但不會發動侵略。導彈，衛星和潛艇構成了中國的海軍戰略。

For China, the primary problem posed by Taiwan is naval. Taiwan is positioned in such a way that it can readily serve as an air and naval base that could isolate maritime movement between the South China Sea and the East China Sea, effectively leaving the northern Chinese coast and Shanghai isolated. When you consider the Ryukyu Islands that stretch from Taiwan to Japan and add them to this mix, a non-naval power could blockade the northern Chinese coast if it held Taiwan.

對中國而言，台灣造成的主要問題是海事方面的。台灣憑藉其地理優勢可以作為阻斷南海與東海間海上交通的空軍和海軍基地，有效地把中國北部沿海以及上海孤立開來。如果將從台灣延伸到日本的琉球群島也考慮進來，就會發現，只要掌握台灣，一個沒有海軍實力的國家也可以封鎖中國北部海岸線。

Taiwan would not be important to China unless it became actively hostile or allied with or occupied by a hostile power such as the United States. If that happened, its geographical position would pose an extremely serious problem for China. Taiwan is also an important symbolic issue to China and a way to rally nationalism. Although Taiwan presents no immediate threat, it does pose potential dangers that China cannot ignore.

台灣對中國來說並不重要，除非台灣敵視中國，或者與美國這樣的敵對勢力結盟或被其佔領。假設發生這種情況，台灣的戰略地理位置將對中國構成極為嚴重的威脅。對中國來說，台灣也是一個具有象徵意義和能夠激發民族精神的重要問題。雖然台灣不構成任何直接威脅，但是構成中國不能忽視的潛在危險。

There is one area in which China is being modestly expansionist — Central Asia and particularly Kazakhstan. Traditionally a route for trading silk, Kazakhstan is now an area that can produce energy, badly needed by Chinas industry. The Chinese have been active in developing commercial relations with Kazakhstan and in developing roads into Kazakhstan. These roads are opening a trading route that allows oil to flow in one direction and industrial goods in another.

中國正在中亞尤其是哈薩克進行適度的擴張。作為傳統絲綢之路的必經之道，哈薩克如今是一個能源生產國，而中國的工業急需能源。中方一邊積極發展同哈薩克的商業關係，一邊積極修築通往哈薩克的公路。這些道路打開了一條貿易渠道，使中國能夠進口石油、出口工業品。

In doing this, the Chinese are challenging Russias sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union. The Russians have been prepared to tolerate increased Chinese economic activity in the region while being wary of Chinas turning into a political power. Kazakhstan has been European Russias historical buffer state against Chinese expansion and it has been under Russian domination. This region must be watched carefully. If Russia begins to feel that China is becoming too assertive in this region, it could respond militarily to Chinese economic power.

中國這麼做等同於在前蘇聯地區向俄羅斯的勢力範圍挑戰。俄羅斯打算容忍中國在該地區加強經濟活動，但是卻擔心中國成為一股政治力量。哈薩克歷史上一直是歐洲的俄羅斯防止中國擴張的緩衝區，並一直處於俄羅斯統治之下。必須密切關注該地區。一旦俄羅斯覺得中國在該地區變得過於積極主動，很可能會對中國的經濟力量作出軍事反應。

Chinese-Russian relations have historically been complex. Before World War II, the Soviets attempted to manipulate Chinese politics. After World War II, relations between the Soviet Union and China were never as good as some thought, and sometimes these relations became directly hostile, as in 1968, when Russian and Chinese troops fought a battle along the Ussuri River. The Russians have historically feared a Chinese move into their Pacific maritime provinces. The Chinese have feared a Russian move into Manchuria and beyond.

從歷史上看，中俄關係十分複雜。二戰前，蘇聯曾試圖操縱中國政局。二戰後，中蘇關係從未像有些人認為的那樣友好，有時候兩國關係甚至會惡化為直接對抗，例如1968年，中俄兩軍曾在烏蘇里江一帶爆發衝突。俄國人一直擔心中國進軍其太平洋沿海省份，中國則擔心俄羅斯進入滿洲而後長驅直下。

Neither of these things happened because the logistical challenges involved were enormous and neither had an appetite for the risk of fighting the other. We would think that this caution will prevail under current circumstances. However, growing Chinese influence in Kazakhstan is not a minor matter for the Russians, who may choose to contest China there. If they do, and it becomes a serious matter, the secondary pressure point for both sides would be in the Pacific region, complicated by proximity to Korea.

這些情況之所以沒有發生，是因為涉及到後勤方面的巨大挑戰，而且雙方都不願冒險與對方一戰。我們認為，在目前情況下雙方將繼續保持這種謹慎。然而，中國在哈薩克日益增長的影響力對俄國人來說並非小事，俄羅斯可能選擇在哈薩克與中國展開競爭。假設俄羅斯這麼做且問題激化，那麼可能造成雙方緊張關係升級的第二個壓力點就在太平洋地區，而雙方與朝鮮半島的毗鄰關係可能會使問題複雜化。

But these are only theoretical possibilities. The threat of an American blockade on Chinas coast, of using Taiwan to isolate northern China, of conflict over Kazakhstan — all are possibilities that the Chinese must take into account as they plan for the worst. In fact, the United States does not have an interest in blockading China and the Chinese and Russians are not going to escalate competition over Kazakhstan.

但這些只是理論上的可能性。美國封鎖中國沿海，或利用台灣孤立中國北部，以及中俄在哈薩克的衝突，所有這些可能性，都是中國為做好最壞的打算而必須考慮到的。事實上，美國並沒有興趣封鎖中國，而中國和俄羅斯在哈薩克的競爭也不會升級。

China does not have a military-based geopolitical problem. It is in its traditional strong position, physically secure as it holds its buffer regions. It has achieved its three strategic imperatives. What is most vulnerable at this point is its first imperative: the unity of Han China. That is not threatened militarily. Rather, the threat to it is economic.

中國沒有軍事上的地緣政治問題。中國目前正處於其傳統的強勢地位，其對緩衝地區的控制保證了國土安全。中國已經完成了三大戰略使命。現在最脆弱的一環還是第一條使命，即維護中原漢地的團結。威脅不是軍事上的，而是經濟上的。

Economic Dimensions of Chinese Geopolitics 中國地緣政治的經濟特徵

The problem of China, rooted in geopolitics, is economic and it presents itself in two ways. The first is simple. China has an export-oriented economy. It is in a position of dependency. No matter how large its currency reserves or how advanced its technology or how cheap its labor force, China depends on the willingness and ability of other countries to import its goods — as well as the ability to physically ship them. Any disruption of this flow has a direct effect on the Chinese economy.

中國的地緣政治問題是經濟問題，表現在兩個方面。第一個方面相當簡單，中國經濟以出口導向型經濟為主，因此具有依賴性。不論中國的外匯儲備有多大，技術有多先進，也不論勞動力多麼廉價，最終出口仍取決於其他國家進口中國商品的意願和能力，以及中國的船舶運輸能力。其中任何一個環節出了問題，都會直接影響中國經濟。

The primary reason other countries buy Chinese goods is price. They are cheaper because of wage differentials. Should China lose that advantage to other nations or for other reasons, its ability to export would decline. Today, for example, as energy prices rise, the cost of production rises and the relative importance of the wage differential decreases. At a certain point, as Chinas trading partners see it, the value of Chinese imports relative to the political cost of closing down their factories will shift.

價格是其他國家購買中國商品的主要因素。中國商品價格便宜是由於工資差距。如果中國失去這種優勢或由於某些其他原因，其出口能力將會下降。例如，當今由於能源價格上漲，生產成本上漲，工資差距的重要性相對下降。正如中國的貿易夥伴所見，達到一定程度後，中國商品的價值與關閉本國工廠的政治代價相比也許將不再划算。

And all of this is outside of Chinas control. China cannot control the world price of oil. It can cut into its cash reserves to subsidize those prices for manufacturers but that would essentially be transferring money back to consuming nations. It can control rising wages by imposing price controls, but that would cause internal instability. The center of gravity of China is that it has become the industrial workshop of the world and, as such, it is totally dependent on the world to keep buying its goods rather than someone elses goods.

而這一切都在中國的控制範圍之外。中國無法控制國際原油價格。雖然可以利用國內現金儲備對製造商發放價格補貼，但此種做法基本上等同於將資金重新轉移至消費國。雖然可以實施價格管制來控制工資上漲，但這樣做又會造成內部不穩定。中國經濟的重心是成為世界工廠，因此中國完全依賴於世界繼續購買中國貨而不是購買其他國家的商品。

There are other issues for China, ranging from a dysfunctional financial system to farmland being taken out of production for factories. These are all significant and add to the story. But in geopolitics we look for the center of gravity, and for China the center of gravity is that the more effective it becomes at exporting, the more of a hostage it becomes to its customers. Some observers have warned that China might take its money out of American banks. Unlikely, but assume it did. What would China do without the United States as a customer?

中國還面臨其它問題，包括金融體系功能失調以及工業建設侵佔耕地等。這些問題都非常重要，並且對全局有一定影響。但我們要尋找地緣政治的重心，而中國的重心在於，出口業越是蓬勃發展就越是容易受制於進口國。一些觀察家曾警告說，中國可能會把錢從美國銀行取走。這不太可能，但假設中國這麼做了，那麼沒有了美國這個大客戶，中國還能做些什麼呢？

China has placed itself in a position where it has to keep its customers happy. It struggles against this reality daily, but the fact is that the rest of the world is far less dependent on Chinas exports than China is dependent on the rest of the world.

中國已經將自已置身於一個必須讓客戶滿意的位置。中國每天都在與這一事實抗爭，但事實是，其它國家對中國出口的依賴程度遠遠小於中國對其它國家的依賴程度。

Which brings us to the second, even more serious part of Chinas economic problem. The first geopolitical imperative of China is to ensure the unity of Han China. The third is to protect the coast. Dengs bet was that he could open the coast without disrupting the unity of Han China. As in the 19th century, the coastal region has become wealthy. The interior has remained extraordinarily poor. The coastal region is deeply enmeshed in the global economy. The interior is not. Beijing is once again balancing between the coast and the interior.

這又引出了第二個方面，同時也是中國經濟更加嚴重的問題。中國的第一大地緣政治使命是維繫中原漢地的團結，而第三大使命是保衛海岸線。鄧小平的賭注是開放沿海地區不會破壞中原漢地的團結。然而正如19世紀一樣，沿海地區富裕起來，但內陸仍然非常貧困。沿海區域已深深融入全球經濟，但內地卻沒有。北京有一次必須平衡沿海和內陸之間的利益。

The interests of the coastal region and the interests of importers and investors are closely tied to each other. Beijings interest is in maintaining internal stability. As pressures grow, it will seek to increase its control of the political and economic life of the coast. The interest of the interior is to have money transferred to it from the coast. The interest of the coast is to hold on to its money. Beijing will try to satisfy both, without letting China break apart and without resorting to Maos draconian measures. But the worse the international economic situation becomes the less demand there will be for Chinese products and the less room there will be for China to maneuver.

沿海地區的利益，與進口商和投資者的利益是緊密聯繫在一起的。北京的利益在於維護國內穩定。隨著壓力增大，中央政府將設法加強對沿海地區政治經濟生活的控制。內陸地區希望沿海資金轉移到內地，而沿海地區則希望留住資金。北京會盡量讓雙方都滿意，以免中國分裂，同時避免使用毛澤東的強硬措施。然而，國際經濟形勢越是惡化，對中國產品的需求就越少，因此中國的迴旋餘地也就越小。

The second part of the problem derives from the first. Assuming that the global economy does not decline now, it will at some point. When it does, and Chinese exports fall dramatically, Beijing will have to balance between an interior hungry for money and a coastal region that is hurting badly. It is important to remember that something like 900 million Chinese live in the interior while only about 400 million live in the coastal region. When it comes to balancing power, the interior is the physical threat to the regime while the coast destabilizes the distribution of wealth. The interior has mass on its side. The coast has the international trading system on its. Emperors have stumbled over less.

第二個方面的問題是由第一個方面所產生的。全球經濟即使現在沒有衰退，也總有一天會衰退。衰退一旦發生，中國的出口將急劇下降，那麼北京當局必須在資金匱乏的內陸和損失慘重的沿海之間權衡利弊。非常重要的一點是，內陸地區居住著大概9億人，而沿海地區人口只有大約4億。當涉及到權力平衡時，內陸是對政權的實際威脅，而沿海地區則會破壞財富的分配。內陸有龐大的人口，而沿海則有國際貿易體系。北京將難以取捨。

Conclusion 結論

Geopolitics is based on geography and politics. Politics is built on two foundations: military and economic. The two interact and support each other but are ultimately distinct. For China, securing its buffer regions generally eliminates military problems. What problems are left for China are long-term issues concerning northeastern Manchuria and the balance of power in the Pacific.

地緣政治基於地理和政治。政治的基礎是軍事和經濟，兩者相互影響，相互支持，卻又截然不同。對中國來說，控制了緩衝區就基本上解決了軍事問題。有待解決的軍事問題是滿洲東北部以及在太平洋地區保持均勢的長期問題。

Chinas geopolitical problem is economic. Its first geopolitical imperative, maintain the unity of Han China, and its third, protect the coast, are both more deeply affected by economic considerations than military ones. Its internal and external political problems flow from economics. The dramatic economic development of the last generation has been ruthlessly geographic. This development has benefited the coast and left the interior — the vast majority of Chinese — behind. It has also left China vulnerable to global economic forces that it cannot control and cannot accommodate. This is not new in Chinese history, but its usual resolution is in regionalism and the weakening of the central government. Dengs gamble is being played out by his successors. He dealt the hand. They have to play it.

中國的地緣政治問題是經濟問題。中國的第一大地緣政治使命是維護中原漢地的團結，而第三大使命是保衛海岸線，這兩方面受經濟因素的影響大于軍事因素。中國內外面臨的政治問題都因經濟而生。上一代中國經濟的飛速發展具有地域局限性。這種發展使得沿海地區得益，沒有惠及內陸地區和絕大多數中國人。這也使得中國在其無法控制或適應的全球經濟力量面前顯得尤為脆弱。這在中國歷史上已有先例，但中國通常的解決辦法是實行地方割據和削弱中央政府。鄧小平的賭局正由其接班人來完成。鄧小平已經發了牌，接班人就必須賭下去。

The question on the table is whether the economic basis of China is a foundation or a balancing act. If the former, it can last a long time. If the latter, everyone falls down eventually. There appears to be little evidence that it is a foundation. It excludes most of the Chinese from the game, people who are making less than $100 a month. That is a balancing act and it threatens the first geopolitical imperative of China: protecting the unity of the Han Chinese.

現實問題是，中國的經濟基礎究竟是一個基礎還是一個平衡遊戲。如果是前者，中國的經濟發展可以持續很長時間。如果是後者，一切終將倒塌。然而似乎很少有證據表明是前者。大多數中國人被排除在遊戲之外，每個月的人均收入還不到100美元。因此說，這是一個平衡遊戲，而且正威脅著中國第一大地緣政治使命：維護中原漢地的團結。

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