Hegels Sense-Certainty

Hegel』s sense-certainty

個人梳理的黑格爾的sense certainty (chapter 1).

What is sense-certainty (SC)? It』s the simplest form of knowledge of the objects through senses, and the basic form of consciousness. It』s direct and immediate knowledge of objects. First stage of natural consciousness. Apprehension rather than comprehension. SC is not mediated by the generalisation of concepts. It』s immediate, unique and is able to give us knowledge of concrete singular entities. SC thinks itself as the richest form of knowledge, directly relating to objects. SC regards particulars to be prior to general properties. The object of SC is

『actual, absolutely singular, wholly personal, individual』 and 『absolutely unlike anything else』 (Phenomenology of Spirit, 110).

The question is, can SC obtain knowledge that corresponds to such an object?

What is SC aware of, then? The 『this-here before-me-now』,

e.g.

『The now is the night. But if now, this midday, we look at this truth which has been written down, we will have to say that it has become rather stale』 (95).

SC has an immediate object, the 『this-here-now』. however it is completely indifferent to whether it is this or that. It』s a universal. But should not SC provide us with the truth that can be held on? The first problem for SC is either 1. We stick with what it is aware of immediately – this-here-now – but this turns out in fact to be an indeterminate universality, something that can belong to anything. Or 2. SC can』t be thought except as mediate by other entities. But this brings in relations with other individuals.

Both are incompatible with the object-to-be-known, which is 『actual, absolutely singular, wholly personal, individual』.

Micro-transition: from the object to the I (subject)

In order to preserve the 『immediacy』 of SC, SC shifts from the object as individual and immediate to its own experience of the object as individual and immediate (what I experience, rather than what is being there).

The object that I mean is the object by my holding fast to it: now is daytime because I see it; here is a tree because I see it.

『However, SC experiences in these relationships the same dialectic within the relationships themselves which was in there in the preceding relationships. I, this, see the tree and assert the tree to be here. However, another 「I」 sees the house and asserts that there』s no tree but rather a house. Both truths have the same warrant, namely, the immediacy of seeing and the trustworthiness and assurance which both have about their knowledge. However, one vanishes into the other.』 (101)

It』s different to single out a particular 『I』. We can』t really transmit one thing to the next. The 『I』 turns out also to be an indeterminate universality. SC can no more pick out the states of an 『I』 as the states of a specific 『I』 require resources that SC does not possess.

Micro-transition 2: Pointing – the Unity of Subject and Object

Previously, we focused on the object and subject separately. Now we focus on the whole relation.

I, this I, assert therefore that here is a tree, and it is not the case that I turn around so that the 『here』 would become for me not a tree, or that I myself at another time take the 『here』 not to be a tree, the 『now』 not to be the daytime, etc… Rather, I』m pure intuiting activity, and I stick by what I said in that intuiting activity, namely, that 『Now is daytime』, or else I also stick by what I said in 『Here is a tree』. I also don』t compare the 『here』 and the 『now』 themselves with each other; rather I cling tenaciously to an immediate relation: 『Now it is daytime.』 (104)

The problem is, in the very process of pointing out the 『now』, the 『now』 recedes into the past. In this very process, it ceases to be simple and immediate:

The now is pointed out, this now. Now. It has already ceased to be since it was pointed out; the now that it is an other than that pointed out to us, it is what has been. This is its truth; it doesn』t have the truth of being. It is nonetheless truth that it has been. However, what has been is in fact no essence; it is not, and the issue at stake had to do with what is, with being. (106)

SC becomes aware of a new project, an object that we are aware of now, though not in simple immediacy, but rather as an object that has a past. It is an object that is and has been, that is, that combines being and not-being. The new object is a 『now which is an absolute plurality of nows』 (107). (what is pointed out is not a single individual, but rather an entity that continues and combines being and not-being)

The truth of the object of SC is that it is a simple entity 『which, in its otherness, remains what it is』 (107).

Conclusion: SC has now run out of options. Focusing on either the object or the subject alone leads to indeterminate universality. Focusing on the subject-object relation leads to a new kind of object. A 『simple togetherness of a plurality』 (113).

This leads us to the next stage, perception.