美國通過什麼來判定操縱價格行為？

02-11

美國司法部起訴蘋果等6家企業操縱電子書價格

自由定價是做生意的基本條件，甚至總的來說有自由要求對方給第三方什麼樣的價格。美國《反托拉斯法》禁止的是，幾方說好聯合起來限制競爭的行為（即 collusion），包括聯合定價，也就是這裡的「操縱價格」。

關於 collusion, 美國《反托拉斯法》的條文，也就是判定是否違法的依據，很簡單：「Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.」（「對跨州或跨境商貿進行限制的合同或共謀，即屬非法。」）見：http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sherman_Antitrust_Act

【更正加補充：過去我把美國法律錯翻成了「反壟斷法」。應該直譯為「反托拉斯法」，因為壟斷本身是不被禁止的，知識產權、人才、甚至就是運氣，都能導致市場上的壟斷地位。法律禁止的是，幾家串通起來排斥市場競爭，或者某一家已經有壟斷地位，並對該地位加以濫用（微軟的IE案子就是政府和Nescape抓住後一種情況）。】

發現聯合定價，主要通過看以下幾點跡象：

- 統一價格；

- 針對打折行為的懲罰；

- 關於價格變動需要提前通知的義務；

- 關於價格的信息交換的義務。

聯邦政府或者個人、公司均可以對違法行為進行起訴。印象比較深的案件有：

- 幾年前，韓國的Hynix、德國的Infineon、還有三星這三家DRAM生產商，因為控制價格被美國政府重罰，每家都被罰了1-3億美元。

- 80年代中期，美國棒球大聯盟（MLB）的球隊因為聯合控制球員工資而被政府調查。

- 最後，美國有個幫法學院畢業生（每年有超過10萬人報考美國的法學院）準備律師資格考試的機構，叫做 BARBRI，其在這個細分市場有很大份額。它和主要競爭對手Kaplan 協議限制雙方在這個市場的競爭，最後受到集團訴訟。訴訟在2007年和解，很多過去用過 BARBRI 服務的學生（包括筆者在內）都收到100多美元的退款。案件詳情：http://www.barbri-classaction.com/barbri/default.htm

關於司法部訴蘋果案補充一下案情。

根據起訴書，美國司法部認為蘋果和五大出版商就電子書定價構成「共謀」（conspiracy），違反了《謝爾曼法》（The Sherman Antitrust Act）第一條：「任何旨在限制州際或與外國間貿易或商業的合同、以托拉斯或其他形式的聯合或共謀，都是非法的。」即@裘伯純律師援引的條文。

共謀分為「明示共謀」和「默示共謀」，前者比較容易識別，有信息交換和談判、簽訂協議等行為；而後者不涉及明示的、可以察覺的協議行為，巨頭間依靠心照不宣的默契，就能夠在市場上做出協調一致的行為，非常難以證明。事實上，「默示共謀」和正常的競爭行為很難區分。有時候，一致的定價可能只是產品成本相似、競爭激烈或者是其他因素的結果。

「明示共謀」被比作「反托拉斯法中的一級謀殺」，證據都是比較直接的，包括通過電郵、電話、會談討論價格信息形成的記錄和簽署的協議。比如從司法部的起訴書中關於串謀列出的證據包括http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/applebooks.html：

Practices facilitating a horizontal conspiracy. The Publisher Defendants regularly communicated with each other in private conversations, both in person and on the telephone, and in e-mails to each other to exchange sensitive information and assurances of solidarity to advance the ends of the conspiracy.

Direct evidence of a conspiracy. The Publisher Defendants directly discussed, agreed to, and encouraged each other to collective action to force Amazon to raise its retail e-book prices.

Motive to enter the conspiracy, including knowledge or assurances that competitors also will enter. The Publisher Defendants were motivated by a desire to maintain both the perceived value of their books and their own position in the industry. They received assurances from both each other and Apple that they all would move together to raise retail e-book prices. Apple was motivated to ensure that it would not face competition from Amazon s low-price retail strategy.

Recognition of illicit nature of communications. Publisher Defendants took steps to conceal their communications with one another, including instructions to "double delete" e-mail and taking other measures to avoid leaving a paper trail.

Acts contrary to economic interests. It would have be en contrary to the economic interests of any Publisher Defendant acting alone to attempt to impose agency on all of its retailers and then raise its retail e-book prices. For example, Penguin Group CEO John Makinson reported to his parent company board of directors that "the industry needs to develop a common strategy" to address the threat "from digital companies whose objective may be to disintermediate traditional publishers altogether" because it "will not be possible for any individual publisher to mount an effective response," and Penguin later admitted that it would have been economically disadvantaged if it "was the only publisher dealing with Apple under the new business model.

Abrupt, contemporaneous shift from past behavior. Prior to January 23, 2010, all Publisher Defendants sold their e-books under the traditional wholesale model; by January 25, 2010, all Publisher Defendants had irrevocably committed to transition all of their retailers to the agency model (and Apple had committed to sell e-books on a model inconsistent with the way it sells the vast bulk of the digital media it offers in its iTunes store). On April 3, 2010, as soon as the Apple Agency Agreements simultaneously became effective, all Publisher Defendants immediately used their new retail pricing authority to raise the retail prices of their newly released and bestselling e-books to the common ostensible maximum prices contained in their Apple Agency Agreements.

可見，司法部認為蘋果公司和五大出版商先是就如何迫使亞馬遜提高電子書的售價通過各種手段交換信息，並達成系列協議（「Apple Agency Agreements」），之後電子書價格有明顯提高，損害了消費者的利益。如果這些證據都被法庭接受，蘋果公司和其他出版商的行為確實可能構成「共謀」：錯不在於壟斷地位，而是不能通過聯合定價限制競爭。但蘋果一方也可以反駁關於共謀的書面證據，並指出Amazon「統一定價」的模式才是壟斷，傷害了出版商的利益，所謂「共謀」只是為了打破這種壟斷，是符合市場規律的。

目前，6個被告中，Simon Schuster、HarperColins、Hachette表示不希望陷入訴訟的麻煩中，願意同司法部達成和解，蘋果和企鵝公司、麥克米倫公司則不願意和解，且否認司法部的指控。反托拉斯訴訟一般耗時持久，也許等官司打完了，電子出版業的生態已經變了。