中國的薩拉菲主義以及與沙烏地阿拉伯的聯繫

作者：穆罕穆德·蘇得里（Mohammed Al-Sudairi），譯者：洪漫，譯文來源：《參考資料》。

Salafism, or Salafiyya, is a doctrinal-intellectual current within Islam that espouses a return to the ways of the Salaf As-Salih (the Pious Ancestors), the first three generations of Muslims who lived during and after the death of the Prophet Mohammed. Often described as being rooted in the works of the medieval scholars Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyyah, Salafism seeks to establish a more 「authentic」 religious experience predicated on a presumably correct reading of the Quran and the sunnah (the sayings and practices of the Prophet) and away from the supposedbid』ah (innovations) and heretical practices that have 「polluted」 it.

薩拉菲主義是伊斯蘭教的一個教義—學術思潮，擁護回歸到虔誠先輩（在先知穆罕默德去世前後生活的頭3代穆斯林）的方式。薩拉菲主義經常被描述為植根於中世紀學者伊本罕百里和伊本泰米葉的作品之中，它尋求建立更「正宗」的宗教經驗，而其前提是正確閱讀《古蘭經》和聖訓（先知的說法和做法），遠離假想的異端（創新）和「污染」宗教的異端做法。

This current moreover embraces to a certain extent a rejection of the madhhab (legal school) Sunni traditions that had emerged in Islam』s early centuries. As a relatively modern phenomenon building on the Sunni orthodox revivals of the 18th century, the failures of traditional Muslim authorities to contend with mounting internal and external challenges, as well as the spread of new modernistic discourses, Salafism found a popular following across many Muslim societies in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Its growth was facilitated by Saudi Arabia – which embraced its own idiosyncratic brand of Salafism rooted in the mid-18th century religious revivalism that swept central Arabia (usually denoted by its detractors as Wahhabism after its 「founder」 Mohammed bin Abdul Wahhab) – especially after its annexation of Mecca and Medina in 1924-25, and the subsequent influx of oil wealth, which endowed the country with the religious authority and means (universities, charities, organizations, preachers, and communicative mediums) to promote this current globally.

這一思潮在一定程度上接受抵制在伊斯蘭教早期世紀出現的（法律學派）遜尼派傳統。在19世紀末20世紀初，由於傳統的穆斯林當局未能抗衡內外部出現的挑戰，再加上新的現代性話語的傳播，薩拉菲主義在許多穆斯林社會受到歡迎。沙烏地阿拉伯為其發展提供了便利。沙特接受自己特質品牌的薩拉菲主義，它植根於18世紀中葉席捲阿拉伯半島中部的宗教復興運動（通常被其批評者稱為瓦哈比主義，以其「締造者」穆罕默德本阿卜杜勒瓦哈比命名），尤其是在沙特在1924年至1925年吞併麥加和麥地那，以及隨後坐擁石油財富之後。石油賦予這個國家宗教權威和手段（大學、慈善機構、組織、宣講員和交際媒介），從而將這一思潮推向全球。

Among China』s Hui ethnic group, Saudi-influenced Salafism has been present for nearly a century. Aside from the intellectual residue influencing other sects and currents, its most obvious manifestation is to be found in the Salafi sect, which constitutes a small minority within the community of the faithful in China. Concentrated in small clusters across the Northwest and Yunnan, and identified by their 「Saudi」 clothes, Salafis have elicited fear and opposition from their ideological opponents within the wider Chinese Muslim community, leading at times to outright sectarian conflict.

沙特薩拉菲主義在中國回族中的影響已經存在了近一個世紀。薩拉菲派在中國的伊斯蘭教派中佔據少數，他們主要集中在西北和雲南，人數很少，可以從他們的「沙特」服飾中看得出來。薩拉菲派已經在更廣泛的中國穆斯林社區中的意識形態對手中引發了恐懼和反對，時常導致徹底的教派衝突。

Since the 1990s, and particularly following 9/11, the Chinese state has placed the Salafi community under close surveillance, fearing that its close connections with Saudi Arabia as well as presumed Uighur Salafi networks, not to mention the sect』s considerable growth over the past few years (attracting not only other Hui, but increasingly Han as well), might herald political and religious violence in the future. These security concerns have only abounded with the rising specter of the Islamic State and the appearance of a few Chinese fighters in the ranks of the contending Islamist groups in Syria and Iraq.

自上個世紀90年代以來，特別是在「911」恐怖襲擊之後，中國一直擔心本國薩拉菲社區與沙特以及據推測維吾爾族薩拉菲網路有著緊密聯繫，更何況該教派在過去5年間人數大幅增長（不僅吸引其他回族，而且還越來越吸引漢族），這可能預示著未來的政治和宗教暴力事件。隨著「伊斯蘭國」組織幽靈的崛起，再加上幾名中國武裝人員出現在敘利亞和伊拉克的伊斯蘭集團隊伍中，這些安全關切與日俱增。

Historical Roots of Chinese Salafism

中國薩拉菲主義的歷史根源

Although relatively isolated since the 14th century with the disintegration of the Yuan dynasty, the Hui Muslim communities, and especially those in the Northwest of China, remained open to the religious and intellectual influences emanating from other parts of the Muslim world. The spread of the various Sufi tariqas (orders),such as the Naqshibandis, Kubrawis, and Qadiris, during the late Ming and early Qing in China in the 17th century, as well as the consolidation of Sufi tariqas with their own distinct lineages, tombs and practices (such as the Khuffiyya and Jahriyya), is indicative of this permeability, which endured primarily through the Hajj and overland trade networks via Central Asia and Yunnan. Unsurprisingly, the transmission of Salafism – or initially Wahhabi ideas – amongst the Hui follows this template in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

自14世紀元朝解體以來，回族穆斯林社區，尤其是中國西北部的回族穆斯林社區雖然相對孤立，但仍然對源自伊斯蘭世界其他地方的宗教和思想影響保持開放的態度。在17世紀的明末清初，各種蘇菲派（伊斯蘭各種神秘主義派別的總稱——本刊注）「道乘」（泛指伊斯蘭尋道者在導師指引下修鍊過程——本刊注），如納黑希班底教派等，得以傳播，再加上蘇菲派「道乘」鞏固了自己不同的譜系、墓葬和慣例（如虎非耶派的「隱沒」以及「哲合忍耶」等），都表明了這種滲透性，這主要是通過朝覲，並通過中亞和雲南的陸路貿易網路來傳播。不出所料，在19世紀末20世紀初，薩拉菲主義——或者最初的瓦哈比理念——在回族中的傳播遵循的就是這個模式。

Wahhabism gained converts in China throughout the Republican era, primarily as a byproduct of the growing traffic of Muslim pilgrims going to the Hejaz, facilitated by the proliferation of new means of transportation such as the steamship. Between 1923 and 1934, hundreds of Hui Muslims made the Hajj. In 1937 – prior to the full-fledged Japanese invasion of the country – well over 170 Hui reportedly boarded a steamer in Shanghai bound for Mecca. The effects of this were palpable, ranging from a noticeable increase in the availability of Wahhabi literature across China in the 1930s, as observed by the scholar Ma Tong, to high-profile conversions of detractors of the movement, including Sufi Sheiks.

在共和時代，瓦哈比主義在中國贏得了信徒，這主要是穆斯林去沙特漢志地區朝覲的交通發展的副產品，而這要歸功於輪船等交通手段的大闊步發展。在1923年至1934年，數百名回族穆斯林進行了朝覲。1937年，也就是在日本全面入侵中國之前，據報道超過170名回族在上海登上了駛往麥加的輪船。這樣做的效果是顯而易見的。正如回族學者馬通所說，在上個世紀30年代，中國的瓦哈比文學顯著增加。再加上，反對這一運動的人中也有人高調皈依。

It is from within this context that the first pronounced Salafiyya sect emerged within China and mostly, interestingly enough, in reaction to the perceived 「departure」 of the Yihewani movement from its puritan and proto-Wahhabi ethos. The founding propagator of an explicit Salafism is usually identified as Ma Debao (1867-1977), originally a Yihewani adherent who officiated in various mosques across the Northwest. His earliest encounters with Salafism came through a visiting – presumably Arab – scholar who settled in Xining, Qinghai in 1934 to teach the Wahhabi doctrine. This exposure led him to reassess some of his views, although his major intellectual transformation would only come when he departed for the Hajj in 1936, a period during which he spent considerable time at the Salafi Dar Al-Hadith school.

在這一背景下，賽萊菲耶派（受沙特瓦哈比運動影響形成的中國伊斯蘭教派別——本刊注），在中國首次明顯出現，這基本上是對伊赫瓦尼派（中國伊斯蘭教派別——本刊注）「脫離」其原瓦哈比精神而做出的反應。人們通常認為，薩拉菲主義的創始傳播者是馬德寶（1867—1977年）。他原本是伊赫瓦尼派信徒，在整個西北地區的各清真寺都當過阿訇。他最早接觸薩拉菲主義是通過一次拜訪。1934年，馬德寶拜訪了在青海省西寧傳授瓦哈比教義的一位到訪學者（大概是阿拉伯人）。這一接觸使馬德寶重新評估了自己的一些看法。不過，他的重大認識轉變發生在1936年。當時他去朝覲，在此期間，他在薩拉菲哈迪塞學校花了大量時間學習。

On returning to China in 1937, Ma Debao became an enthusiastic promoter of the teachings, quickly gathering a following of his own centered in the Xinwang mosque in Linxia, Gansu and breaking away in turn from the Yihewani movement, whom he perceived to have compromised their beliefs. His Salafi group encountered strong opposition from the established Yihewani clergy and their warlord backers, forcing the movement to assume a more cautious and quietest attitude towards politics for the sake of its survival.

在1937年返回中國之後，馬德寶成為這些教義的狂熱信徒，迅速以甘肅臨夏的一座清真寺為核心聚集了自己的追隨者，隨後脫離了伊赫瓦尼運動。他認為該運動已經損害了他們的信仰。他的薩拉菲集團遭到根深蒂固的伊赫瓦尼派神職人員及其軍閥支持者的強烈反對，迫使該運動為了生存而對政治抱有更謹慎的態度。

After the founding of the People』s Republic in 1949, the Salafis – now unfettered by the Muslim warlords – experienced a brief period of religious growth, with its leadership actively participating in a number of state organs as well as the newly created Islamic Association of China (IAC). This soon came to an end as the 1958 「Religious Reform Campaign,」 followed by the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), forced the movement underground as many of its leaders and adherents were killed off or sent to concentration camps. It survived as remnants from the leadership settled in Xinjiang and Tibet during these difficult years.

在中華人民共和國於1949年成立之後，薩拉菲派（現在不再受到穆斯林軍閥的束縛）經歷了短暫的宗教發展期，其領導層積极參与多個國家機構以及新成立的中國伊斯蘭教協會（IAC）。

Channels of Saudi Influence

沙特影響力的渠道

The start of the 「Reform and Opening Up」 in 1978 signaled the end of a dark period of sustained persecution against China』s Muslim communities, including the Salafis. The dismantlement of restrictions on religious worship, the restoration of mosques, and the reformation of the IAC served to reconsolidate state control over these communities but more significantly, served to showcase (in a resurrection of Chinese foreign policy patterns in the 1950s) Beijing』s tolerance of Islam, a policy principally aimed at courting the support of various Muslim states. The direct outcome of this new 「opening」 allowed the re-introduction, and even amplification of, Saudi Salafi influences across the country, with implications for both the Salafi and wider Muslim community as a whole. This occurred through various channels, the most important of which was the restoration of the Hajj missions in 1979 (after nearly a decade-long suspension dating from 1964) followed by new regulations allowing private individuals to make the pilgrimage in 1984, that allowed considerable numbers of Hui Muslims – jumping from nearly 2000 in 1985 to nearly 10,000 annually in 1990 – to travel to the Kingdom. There, some of these pilgrims opted to stay for further study or came in touch with relatives from the well-established Chinese Saudi diaspora (which had settled in the Hedjaz following the end of the Chinese civil war and received citizenship there). These interactions exposed Chinese Muslims to new discourses and religious experiences that challenged their own traditional understandings of Islam. They returned to China carrying Wahhabi books, leaflets, fatwas (religious rulings), and sermon tapes that broadly disseminated Salafi ideas.

1978年「改革開放」的啟動標誌著對中國穆斯林社區（包括薩拉菲派）的宗教崇拜限制取消了，清真寺恢復了，IAC的改革重新鞏固了國家對這些社區的控制，但更顯著的是，有助於展示北京對伊斯蘭教的包容，而該政策的主要目的是團結各伊斯蘭國家。開放政策的直接後果是，允許重新引入，甚至是擴大沙特薩拉菲主義在中國整個國家的影響，對薩拉菲派乃至更廣泛的穆斯林社區整體都產生了影響。這一切是通過各種渠道產生的，其中最重要的是政府出台了新規定允許個人去沙特朝覲，朝覲在1979年得以恢復。有相當多的回族穆斯林每年去沙特，1985年近2000人，到了1999年達到近萬人。還有，一些朝覲者選擇留下來繼續學習，或者與親戚建立聯繫。這些親戚來自已經在沙特安家落戶的中國流散人口（他們在中國內戰結束後在赫加齊定居下來，並獲得公民身份）。這些互動讓中國穆斯林接觸到新的話語和宗教體驗，從而挑戰了他們自己對伊斯蘭教的傳統理解。他們回到中國時帶著瓦哈比教派的書籍、傳單、法特瓦（宗教裁決），以及廣為傳播薩拉菲理念的講經錄像帶。

Other significant channels included the arrival of Saudi organizations and preachers in China during the 1980s. Initially, religious activities were limited to influential groups like the Organization for Islamic Cooperation, the Muslim World League, and the Islamic Development Bank, which operated under the auspices of the IAC and in turn re-directed their efforts in a non-sectarian fashion. Their activities, beyond providing alternative channels of communication between Saudi and Chinese officials, encompassed the construction of various Islamic Institutes, the renovation of major mosques, the initiation of a Quranic printing and distribution project (in 1987, more than a million copies were disbursed across China as a 「royal gift」 from the Saudi King), and the provision of training workshops for clerics and scholarships for students (initially in China and Pakistan,) amongst others. By the mid-1980s, religious policies were relaxed considerably, allowing for a growing number of Saudi private organizations and individuals (mainly preachers and missionaries bringing in religious literature) to increasingly work outside established IAC channels. In this new environment, these entities began to selectively target their funding towards specific groups – particularly those visibly identified as Salafi in places like Gansu, Qinhai, Ningxia, Shanxi, and Yunnan – and popularize certain discourses that might have been rejected by the IAC for fear of inviting state reprimand.

其他顯著的渠道包括沙特組織和神職人員在上個世紀80年代來到中國。最初，宗教活動僅限於有影響力的集團，如伊斯蘭合作組織、世界穆斯林聯盟和伊斯蘭開發銀行等。這些組織都在IAC的羽翼下運作。除了提供沙特與中國官方之間替代性的溝通渠道，他們的活動還涵蓋建造各種伊斯蘭研究院，裝修大清真寺，啟動一個《古蘭經》印刷和發行項目（在1987年，作為沙特國王的「王室禮物」，一百多萬冊《古蘭經》在中國全國各地免費發放）。他們還為學生提供神職人員的培訓講習班和獎學金（最初是在中國和巴基斯坦），如此等等。到了80年代中期，中國的宗教政策大幅放寬，允許越來越多的沙特私人組織和個人（主要是帶來宗教文獻的神職人員）越來越多地在IAC渠道之外活動。在這種新的環境下，這些實體開始選擇性地將其經費面向特定群體，特別是甘肅、青海、寧夏、陝西和雲南地區那些明顯被標識為薩拉菲派的群體，普及了IAC由於擔心會招致國家譴責而拒絕的某些宗教話語。

The activities of these groups were greatly facilitated by a network of Chinese Salafi activists who had graduated from Saudi or Saudi-affiliated institutions like Imam Saudi University, Umm Al-Qura, and Medina University. While numbers are hard to come by, one study from Medina University shows that between 1961 and 2000/2001, over 652 scholarships were granted to mainland Chinese. Nearly 76 percent of these were offered in the 1980s and 90s alone. While significant numbers of the graduates (who ofter never actually completed their studies) gravitated towards middlemen jobs in Guangzhou or Yiwu where they could utilize their Arabic proficiency, a few joined privately run religious academies in Yunnan or Gansu, and some began officiating in mosques after the longstanding official barriers on the hiring of foreign-trained Imams eased in the 2000s. A smaller but far more influential group fostered close ties with Saudi organizations and preachers – a relationship that was beneficial to both sides.

中國薩拉菲派活動人士組成的網路為這些團體的活動提供了極大的便利。這些活動人士畢業於沙特或者沙特的附屬機構，如伊瑪目沙特大學和麥地那大學等。雖然數字很難得到，但麥地那大學的一項研究結果表明，在1961年至2000/2001年間，沙特向中國大陸652人提供了獎學金。這些人中近76％是在20世紀80年代和90年代拿到獎學金的。不過，相當數量的畢業生（從來沒有真正完成學業）被廣州和義烏的中間商的工作所吸引，因為他們可以利用自己的阿拉伯語水平。少數人加入了雲南和甘肅省由私人經營的宗教院校。在21世紀頭十年，中國放鬆了對僱用受外國培訓的伊瑪目的長期官方障礙之後，有的人開始主理清真寺。一個較小但更有影響力的組織與沙特組織和神職人員建立了密切的聯繫——這一關係對雙方都有利。

The Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, which came under a U.S.-backed UN ban in 2004 due to its presumed affiliations with Al-Qaeda, is illustrative. Throughout the 1990s, the organization expended considerable funds on the construction of Salafi mosques across China, the maintenance of Salafi-aligned schools (typically 「Arabic language」 schools that double as Islamic institutions), and the provision of scholarships for interested students – an array of activities that were largely overseen by various (at times competing) circles of Medina University graduates who leveraged their influence within the wider community.

哈拉曼伊斯蘭基金會就很能說明問題。由於據推測與「基地」組織有關係，聯合國在美國的支持下在2004年取締了它。在整個20世紀90年代，該組織花費大量資金在中國各地建造薩拉菲派清真寺，贊助與薩拉菲派結盟的學校（通常是兼作伊斯蘭機構的「阿拉伯語」學校），以及向感興趣的學生提供獎學金。一連串的活動基本上受到各種（有時候是相互競爭的）麥地那大學畢業生圈的監督，這些畢業生在更廣泛的社區範圍內發揮自己的影響力。

In conjunction with these developments, Beijing had assumed a more cautious attitude by the 1990s, typified by the barring of entry of suspected preachers, continued refusal to offer scholarships for students heading to Saudi Arabia, and the introduction of new laws that restricted foreign religious activities, including one in 1994 that banned donations made outside the auspices of the IAC. Unsurprisingly, these restrictions have grown more stringent over the last decade, but they have not severed the Saudi ties altogether.

在這些發展的同時，北京也在上個世紀90年代採取了更審慎的態度。不出所料，這些限制在過去10年間變得更加嚴格，但是它們並沒有完全切斷與沙特的關係。

The Saudi Impact

沙特的影響

Saudi influences have had a somewhat contradictory impact on Hui Salafis and the wider Muslim community in China. On one level, these influences have contributed – to a degree – to the salafisation (namely, a cultural and religious approximation of an 「idealized」 Saudi orthodoxy) of Hui Muslim society. This salafisation subsumes the adoption of presumably Salafi doctrines, prayers rituals, attitudes, and even culturally authentic attire (the Saudi headgear worn in a manner usually associated with the religiously conservative in the Kingdom) and mosque architecture under what can be described as an Arabization process, although the appearance of these trends is not always indicative of a Salafi influence. The salafisation of Hui Muslims has affected nearly all sects, albeit in different ways. Amongst Salafis, the re-introduction of orthodox sources after a significant period of isolation, and amplified now by globalizing forces, led to the breakdown of the old Salafi community as a new generation of Salafis (the early graduates and pilgrims) in the 1980s sought to 「correct」 the errors of their elders. This was reflected in the schism that emerged over the interpretation of certain Quranic verses, the appearance of a more activist opposition to Sufism leading to the demolishment of some Sufi tombs in the Northwest, and the enunciation of a takfeeri (excommunicatory) stance towards 「deviant」 Salafis and non-Salafi Muslims that led to bouts of sectarian infighting. Beyond the Salafis, salafisation is also observable amongst Yihewani and Gedimu (「old」 traditional) Muslims who, in many cases, while not describing themselves necessarily as Salafis (due to fears of ostracization or out of a fidelity towards the Hanafi madhab), embraced aspects of this intellectual tradition. In the Yihewani case, it is marked by a revived interest in the Wahhabi origins of the movement.

沙特對中國的回族薩拉菲派和較廣泛的穆斯林社區產生了有點矛盾的影響。在一個層面上，這些影響在一定程度上促成了回族穆斯林社會的「薩拉菲化」（即，在文化上和宗教上接受「理想化的」沙特正統）。這種薩拉菲化包括採納薩拉菲主義、禱告禮儀、態度，甚至是文化上而言真正的裝束（戴沙特頭巾通常與這個王國的宗教保守有關），清真寺的建造也可以被描述成阿拉伯化進程，儘管這些趨勢的出現並不總是表明薩拉菲派的影響。回族穆斯林的薩拉菲化已經影響到幾乎所有的派別，雖然方式不同。在薩拉菲派當中，在相當長的隔離期之後重新引進正統源，現在又由於全球化的力量而放大，導致了舊薩拉菲社區的解體，因為20世紀80年代的新一代薩拉菲派（早期的畢業生和朝覲者）謀求「糾正」長輩的錯誤。這主要表現在對《古蘭經》某些經文的解釋出現了分裂，蘇菲派遭到激進人士的反對，對「離經叛道的」薩拉菲派和非薩拉菲派穆斯林的驅逐導致教派明爭暗鬥。除了薩拉菲派，在伊赫瓦尼派和「古老」的傳統穆斯林當中也可以觀察到薩拉菲化。在很多情況下，這些人不一定將自己描述成薩拉菲派（因為擔心會遭到驅逐或者出於對哈乃斐教法學派的忠誠），但他們接受這種思想傳統的各個方面。在伊赫瓦尼派，他們對這一運動的瓦哈比起源重新點燃了興趣。

On another level, Saudi influences have, counterintuitively, encouraged a fragmentation of the Salafi community within China. This has been driven of two factors: First, the introduction of new sources of funding and ideas brought by Saudi organizations, preachers, and affiliated graduates led to the proliferation of new 「mosque communities」 or jama』at amongst Salafis, a development that was principally shaped by the leadership struggles that assumed an intergenerational character. Second, Salafis – like other sects – were not exposed to homogenous discourses on Islam or Salafism, mainly because of existing cultural and linguistic barriers, and the multiplicity of doctrines and agendas pursued by various organizations and preachers, which have induced a splintering effect along doctrinal and ritualistic lines within the Salafi community, even if less pronounced than elsewhere in the Islamic World.

在另一個層面上，沙特的影響反而促進了中國境內薩拉菲社區的分裂。這是由兩個因素驅動的：首先，沙特組織、神職人員和相關畢業生帶來了新的經費和思想，造成新的「清真寺社區」或者薩拉菲派寺坊的激增，這種發展主要是由領導權的爭鬥所塑造的。其次，薩拉菲派像其他派別一樣，沒有接觸到對伊斯蘭教或者薩拉菲主義的本土闡釋，這主要是因為現有的文化和語言障礙，以及各種組織和神職人員追求多樣化的理論和議程。

Indeed, the most significant outcome of these two simultaneous developments is that it has helped give way to the formation of what can be called a 「Salafism with Chinese characteristics.」 Its proponents – mainly from the 1990s generation, are charting new discourses about Salafism that deviate from that which exists in the Saudi mainstream. Most notably, there is a strong rejection of sectarianism (although there is a troubling growth in anti-Shia sentiment) and an emphasis on ecumenical approaches – a shift that stems principally from what many view as the takfeeri legacy of the 1980s that led to unnecessary confrontations with the wider Muslim community. Indeed, the Salafis today encounter severe challenges in proselytize and even practicing in places like Xining, Qinghai.

事實上，這兩個同時發展的局勢的最顯著結果是，它有助於「中國特色薩拉菲主義」的構成。其支持者——主要來自20世紀90年代的一代人——正在繪製關於偏離沙特主流薩拉菲主義的新話語。最值得注意的是，他們強烈反對宗派主義（雖然反什葉派情緒令人不安地在增大），並強調合一做法——這一轉變主要源於來自許多人所認為的20世紀80年代的驅逐出教的做法。這種做法導致與更廣泛的穆斯林社區發生不必要的衝突。事實上，薩拉菲派如今在勸誘改宗方面遇到了嚴峻的挑戰，甚至是在西寧和青海等地。

The post-90s generation is also far more internationalist and, to a large extent, far more cognizant of the realities facing Hui Muslims within the Chinese state (as a minority of a minority contending with the attention of the state security apparatus). While courting Saudi funding and literature, it is selective in what discourses it seeks to reproduce. This explains why some Saudi-oriented Salafis are increasingly discouraging visits by Saudi preachers, who are unable to appreciate the specificities of Chinese Islam there. More importantly, this new generation is more willing to cooperate with the authorities, and is displaying signs of seeking to participate more actively within the political channels that have been traditionally dominated by Sufi and Yihewani groups.

90後一代人也更加國際主義。在很大程度上，他們更加認識到中國境內回族穆斯林面臨的現狀——作為少數民族中的少數引起國家的注意。雖然想求得沙特的資金和知識，他們在話語方面還是具有選擇性。正因如此，一些有沙特傾向的薩拉菲派日益拒絕沙特神職人員的到訪，因為這些人不能夠理解中國伊斯蘭教的特殊性。更重要的是，新一代更願意與政府合作。他們顯示的跡象表明，他們正謀求更加積極地參與歷來由蘇菲派和伊赫瓦尼派群體佔主導地位的政治渠道。

In all, the Hui Salafi scene and its connections to Saudi Arabia are complex. The community is fragmenting intellectually and generating new discourses that reflect the tensions that confront new religious authorities and groups seeking to navigate the difficult waters between perceived orthodoxy and the realities of their situation. Hui Salafis want to carve out a space of their own within China. Their concerns are not political per se: Across the spectrum, they appear to have embraced the apolitical quietism one expects to see within the Saudi clerical establishment. Even with regards to the Uighur Salafis – if we speak in terms of an Islamic political project – there is little evidence to suggest a burgeoning solidarity between the two groups. Historical hatreds notwithstanding, the evolution of Uighur Salafism has taken a completely different trajectory than that of the Hui and its political/religious dynamics are therefore different. Rather, for the majority of Hui Salafis, their concerns remain solely those of identity and religious legitimization.

總之，回族薩拉菲派及其與沙特的聯繫十分複雜。該社區在知識方面四分五裂，創造的新話語反映出新宗教機構和團體在謀求所謂的正統和現狀之間艱難導航時面臨著緊張局勢。回族薩拉菲派想在中國境內開拓出自己的空間。他們的擔憂不是政治本身：在整個頻譜，他們似乎已經接受了人們預計在沙特神職層面看到的非政治性清靜無為。即使在維吾爾族的薩拉菲派方面，也幾乎沒有證據表明，這兩個群體之間新出現了團結。儘管有宿仇，維吾爾族薩拉菲主義的發展採取了跟回族完全不同的軌跡，其政治/宗教動態因此也是不同的。相反，對於絕大多數回族薩拉菲派，他們的擔憂依然僅存在於認同和宗教合法性的問題上。

Mohammed Al-Sudairi is a graduate of Georgetown University』s School of Foreign Service in Qatar (International Politics). He spent two years in Beijing studying Chinese and undertaking freelance research.

穆罕穆德 ?蘇得里畢業於美國喬治敦大學外交學院卡達分校（國際政治專業），曾在北京學習中文並從事自由研究工作，為期兩年。