移動出行：寡頭壟斷 vs. 多頭壟斷

原文來自Tiller Partner的合伙人Tory Green。

Tory認為：Uber不可能成為像Facebook等互聯網公司一樣的壟斷公司，原因在於：1)Uber的網路效應是供給端的，靠規模可以被打破； 2)Uber缺乏互聯網公司的零邊際成本效應

當市場前三的 Sidecar 今年早些時候關閉並出售其資產給通用汽車以後，很多人認為共享出行市場的戰爭似乎結束了，普遍的看法是 Uber 註定要成為一個市場壟斷者。

但是最近， Lyft 和滴滴獲得了數十億美元的投資， 很多人已經質疑這種看法，並開始思考：這個市場是否可以有多個玩家?

矽谷的觀點

紐約客今年早些時候有一篇文章認為技術驅動的行業無法支持多個玩家，矽谷競爭趨勢都是指向一個壟斷的贏家。

造成這種情況的主要原因來自網路效應經濟 — 即一個產品或服務的價值隨使用人數的增加而增加。網路效應在 Facebook 、 eBay 和 Skype 等公司隨處可見，每一個都是他們自己領域的壟斷者。

互聯網壟斷企業存在的第二個原因是零邊際成本分布 —- 提供單位額外的商品或服務不會增加總的成本。除了增加帶寬有一點點可忽略不計的成本外， Google 和 Snapchat 服務一個新用戶的成本基本為零。

這兩種力量在一起，形成良性循環。一旦服務流行起來，它創造更多的消費需求。由於提供服務的成本在很大程度上是零，很容易吸引新的用戶使用服務。這些新增的用戶使產品更有價值，反過來，吸引更多的用戶。如此循環，使互聯網成為不公平競爭的滋生地。

提及科技公司，法學教授Tim解釋說： 「 從長遠來看，競爭是異常，壟斷才是常態 」 。這就是為什麼我們看到互聯網領域這麼多近乎壟斷的公司，如 Facebook ，谷歌，維基百科， LinkedIn ， Craigslist ，亞馬遜和 Twitter 。事實上，乍一看，技術行業真的是 「 贏家通吃 」 的市場。

這種觀點很大程度上支持了為什麼Uber的估值是其競爭對手Lyft的12倍，而其收入只有Lyft的4倍。

新的反駁觀點

隨著近期 Lyft 和滴滴融資總額超過 20 億美金，似乎投資者並不准備認輸，這或許是明智的，上面討論的支持 「 贏者通吃 」 理論的兩個關鍵點上Uber都有缺陷。

如同Quartz網站的文章指出的， 第一個錯誤在於不理解有兩種不同的網路效應。

第一種網路效應被稱為「需求端網路效應」。在需求端網路效應中，每新增加一個用戶，產品或服務的價值會因為這個用戶的增加而直接增加。 Facebook 就是一個完美的例子—你加入 Facebook ，因為你所有的朋友都在那裡。從經濟角度來看，需求方的網路效應是遊戲改變者，因為即使一個小小的競爭優勢也能迅速滾雪球成一個根深蒂固的競爭優勢。

另一種類型的網路效應被稱為「供給側網路效應」。在供給側的網路效應里，產品或服務的使用增加，對用戶的直接效用沒有影響，但它產生有價值的免費產品和服務。這方面的一個很好的例子是手機運營商。一個運營商的用戶越多，他們越可以負擔得起基礎設施的投資。基礎設施越好，服務質量就越好。在這種情況下，用戶的數量是間接地影響客戶的選擇：人們加入一個運營商不是因為他們的朋友都在那裡，而是因為哪個運營商的服務最好。

Uber的例子也是同樣。公司的競爭優勢主要來自於路上的司機數目和經營城市的數量。這兩者都是供給側的好處。

不過，雖然供給側的網路效應有自己的優勢，這不是一個無法戰勝的競爭優勢。在這種特殊情況下，挑戰它的方法是採購規模 — 吸引更多的司機，開到更多的城市，等等 ...

競爭對手如Lyft，正在做這樣的事情，而且已經融了20億美金。

事實上，Lyft的總裁 John 認為，「在運輸行業，尤其是我們的業務，有很強的網路效應，但只是一定的程度上。 」具體來說，John發現，「一旦你能達到3分鐘內接客，網路上有更多的人並沒有什麼額外的好處。」

「贏者通吃」理論的第二個錯誤是，與許多科技公司不同，Uber並沒有零邊際成本的效應。雖然公司的商業模式已經消除了很多傳統的計程車業務相關的成本，比如車輛和車輛維修、牌照、保險、汽油和司機的薪酬福利，邊際成本仍然存在。

看一看 Uber 泄露的財務數據，我們發現，在 2014 年第二季度他們 「 銷售成本 」 和 「 運營和支持 」 合計 4900 萬美金，而對應收入只有5800萬美金。傳統的會計準則會把這些作為可變成本，這和額外計為固定成本的的 1.15 億美金的營銷成本、研發和一般開銷是分開的。

雖然文件沒有逐行列出費用的明細，但是很容易推測，這些費用的很大一部分都直接關係到他們的服務產品的拓展。例如，Uber在每一個新的城市啟動時，它必須創建一個本地的團隊來處理特定的政治、法規和消費者的喜好。Uber也有可能花很多錢獲取新的司機，包括市場營銷、獎勵和獎金、篩選和背景調查。最後，Uber要為司機提供保險，這也是直接的邊際成本。

而如果像加利福尼亞州一樣的裁決 — 法官認定Uber的司機實際上就是員工—在全國範圍內被採納，那麼邊際成本可能會飆升。據一些分析人士，如果提供醫療、失業、工傷，工資稅、 401K 、休假和報銷行使的里程、汽油和過路費，邊際成本會提高一個數量級，公司為每個司機要額外支付1.3萬美金(即 41 億美金一年)。

所以，雖然零邊際成本是技術公司獲得壟斷地位的主要要素之一，它在共享出行行業里並不存在。

綜上所述，投資者開始意識到矽谷所認為的共享出行市場是一個 「 贏家通吃 」 的市場這個觀點有兩個缺陷： 1 )沒有需求端的網路效應 ; 2 )實際邊際成本不低

但Uber遠不是一個計程車服務公司， Uber可以做更多!

一些矽谷的專家會說，盯著出行共享市場是近視的，Uber將演變成一個通用的 「 技術工具 」 ，將重新點燃網路效應的良性循環，一直達到全球壟斷。

例如，許多業內人士認為，Uber可以創建一個全方位服務的 「 城市物流網路 」 ，完全擁有配送服務令人垂涎的 「 最後一英里 」 。隨著如 UberRUSH (快遞)， UberEATS (送外賣)和 UberCargo 服務(搬運)服務的推出，該公司似乎在向這個方向前進。

但即使是Uber能夠實現其擁有 「 生活方式和物流的交匯 」 的夢想，這是否改變底層的經濟學原理呢?

Uber會立即獲得需求端的網路效應嗎?大多數人並不關心誰提供了服務，只要他們能準時趕到那裡。所以這把我們帶到了我們開始的地方 ...... 有規模優勢，但他們來自供給端。考慮到市場的已有玩家如FedEx和 UPS 在這個市場的經驗和規模，競爭可能不會像很多Uber多頭相信的那樣很快消失。如同FedEx首席執行官弗雷德 · 史密斯說： 「 我認為這只是一個城市神話，說Uber在某種程度上改變了物流行業的基本成本結構。 」

Uber會立刻獲得零邊際成本嗎?不會，它會面臨如上面討論的同樣的成本結構問題。

還有人認為，自動駕駛汽車將會成為獲得壟斷地位關鍵，但即使這也不是什麼萬能葯。如果Uber在這條路上繼續前行，並且擁有這些資產，那麼成本可能反而會增加。如果它採取 Lyft 正在走的路，把汽車的所有權外包給別人，某些成本仍然不可避免的出現在價值鏈的某個地方。用米爾頓 · 弗里德曼(註：諾貝爾經濟學家)的說法來講，天下沒有免費的午餐，不管你用什麼類型的車輛來運輸都和零邊際成本分布這個原理相悖 — 即使是太陽能供電的自動駕駛汽車。

一旦Uber擴大當前的的服務品類，競爭對手將有時間和空間來完事自己的物流框架，並且在Uber錯過的地區建立優勢。是不是FedEx， UPS ， Instacart ， Deliv ，亞馬遜或 Lyf t無關緊要 — 真正的問題是仍有競爭的空間。

總之，技術的成熟和其他的衍生服務反而會為其他更多的玩家進入這個行業提供機會，而不是更少。

矽谷的價值投資?

當Uber的口號從 「 每個人的私人司機 」 改變為 「 生活方式和物流的交匯」，毫無疑問，它這麼做是把自己定位成科技公司，就像 Facebook ， LinkedIn 和 Twitter 一樣，認為自己可以很容易利用網路效應的良性循環來壟斷市場。

但是，讓我們認真的思考一秒鐘：這是 2016 年，任何一家有機會獲得長期成功的公司，這樣或者那樣，都是一家技術公司。如果你不利用技術，你就已經死了。

因此，儘管共享出行市場和物流可能已經進化到不再是嚴格的模擬市場，(比如，它不會經歷歷史上我們在酒店、航空公司和 / 或汽車租賃公司市場看到的競爭程度)，但它也不是嚴格的 「 數字化 」 市場。只要網路效應留在供給側，只要擴展需要邊際成本，只要監管的威脅仍然存在，那麼Uber就不可能成為一個真正的壟斷者，像一些矽谷內部人士希望的那樣。

事實上，正如John指出的， Lyft 「 在所有排名前 20 位的市場正獲得越來越多的份額 」 ，如果一個玩家有完全的壟斷地位，這是不可能發生的。

因此，考慮到所有這些潛在的競爭 — 事實上，共享出行和物流市場都可能可以支持多個競爭對手，這對Uber有什麼影響?是否值得700億美金的價格?

好吧，我現在不會對這個發表意見，但我要說的是，很多投資者，甚至是出了名的保守的紐約大學教授 Damodoran ，似乎也這麼認為。

但是，也許這一切里更重要的問題是：如果你相信Uber估值合理(或至少接近)，那麼為什麼 Lyft ，滴滴和 GrabTaxi 估值比它低很多?

畢竟，這些公司都建立了類似的基礎設施建設， Lyft 在 Uber 的老巢舊金山控制了 40 %以上的市場份額，收入是其1/4而估值是其 1/12; 滴滴號稱(註：因為愉悅資本投資了神州專車，為了保持中立，我只能呵呵一下，「號稱」)在利潤豐厚的中國市場擁有 87 %的市場份額，估值是Uber的1/3 ; ，Ola，在印度市場號稱擁有80%的市場份額，估值才和 Lyft 差不多。

考慮到這些差異，也許是老派的價值投資在矽谷這個地方也有用武之地 …

譯者：戴汨 愉悅資本創始合伙人(midai@joycapital.com.cn)微信公眾號：ThinkingSlow。愉悅資本是新一代的VC基金，由劉二海、李瀟、戴汨創立，我們是創始人也是投資經理;愉悅資本，創始人和創始人對話。

附英文原文：

When top 3 player Sidecar closed earlier this year and sold its assets to GM, many pronounced the ride-sharing wars over and the prevailing wisdom seemed to suggest that Uber was destined to become a monopoly.

But recent multi-billion dollar investments in Lyft and Didi Chuxing have challenged that perception and caused many to wonder whether this market has room for more than one player…

The Silicon Valley Argument

An article written earlier this year in the New Yorker argues that industries driven by technology can』t support multiple players, and that competition in Silicon Valley trends toward one monopolistic winner.

The primary reason for this stems from the economics of network effects – a phenomenon where the value of a product or service increases with the number of people using it. Network effects are seen in companies such as Facebook, eBay and Skype; all virtual monopolies in their field.

A second reason for the existence of internet monopolies can be found in the economics of zero marginal cost distribution – a situation where an additional good or service can be produced without any increase in total cost. With the exception of the minimal cost of increased bandwidth, it』s largely free for Google or Snapchat to host another user.

Together, these two forces create a virtuous cycle. Once a service becomes popular, it creates additional consumer demand. Since the cost of distribution is largely zero, it』s easy to attract and onboard new customers to the service. These additional users make the offering more valuable and, in turn, attract even more users. This cycle continues and makes the internet a breeding ground for unfair competition.

When it comes to technology companies, law professor Tim Wu explains: 「over the long haul, competition has been the exception, monopoly the rule」. That』s why we see so many near monopolies in the space, such as Facebook, Google, Wikipedia, LinkedIn, Craigslist, Amazon and Twitter. Indeed, at first glance, it seems that technology industries may be 「winner-takes-all」 markets.

This view is likely a large part of the reason that Uber is valued at 12x more than its nearest competitor Lyft, despite only having 4x the revenue.

The Emerging Counterpoint

With recent investments in Lyft and Didi Chuxing totaling over $2 billion, it seems like investors aren』t ready to throw in towel yet, and that』s probably wise given that there are two key faults underpinning the 「winner-takes-all」 theory discussed above.

As pointed out in this article on Quartz, the first mistake is not understanding that there are two different types of 「network effects」.

The first is known as a 「demand-side network effect」. In a demand-side network effect, the value of a product or service is directly increased by each additional user solely due to the addition of that user. Facebook is the perfect example of this – you join Facebook because all of your friends are on there. From an economic point of view, demand-side network effects are a game-changer, as even a small competitive lead can rapidly snowball into an entrenched competitive advantage.

The other type of network effect is known as a 「supply-side network effect」. In a supply-side network effect, increased usage of a product or service has no influence on the direct utility for users, but it spawns the production of valuable complimentary goods and services. A great example of this can be seen with cell phone carriers. The more users a carrier has, the more money they can afford to spend on infrastructure. The better the infrastructure, the better the quality of service. In this case, the number of users is indirectly influencing the customer』s choice: although people may not join a carrier because their friends are on there, they are likely to join the carrier with the best service.

And that』s the case with Uber. The company』s competitive advantage largely stems from the number of drivers they have on the road and the number of cities they operate in. Both of these are supply-side benefits.

But while supply-side network effects definitely have their advantages, this is not a competitive edge that can』t be overcome. In this particular case, the way to challenge it is by Purchasing scale – attracting more drivers, opening in more cities, etc...

With $2 billion in funding to date, that』s exactly what competitors such as Lyft are doing.

Indeed, Lyft President John Zimmer agrees that, 「in a transportation business, specifically our business, there are very strong network effects, but only to a point.」 Specifically, Zimmer found that 「once you hit three minute pickup times, theres no benefit to having more people on the network."

The second mistake in the 「winner-takes-all」 theory is that, unlike many technology companies, Uber does not experience zero marginal cost distribution. While it is true that the company』s business model has eliminated a lot of the costs associated with a traditional taxi business, such as vehicles and vehicle maintenance, licenses, insurance, gas and driver compensation and benefits, there are costs to distribution that still exist.

Taking a look at Uber』s leaked financials, we see that in the second quarter of 2014 they listed $49 million in 「cost of revenue」 and 「operations and support」 against $57 million of revenue. Traditional accounting standards would assume that these are variable costs, which are separate from the additional $115 million in 「fixed costs」 of sales and marketing, R&D and general overhead.

While the document doesn』t break out expenses by line item, it』s easy to speculate that a large portion of these costs are directly tied to the expansion of their service offering. For instance, each time Uber launches in a new city, it has to create a local team to deal with the particular politics, regulations and consumer preferences of that environment. Uber also likely experiences substantial costs in the acquisition of new drivers, including marketing, incentives and bonuses, and screening and background checks. Finally, Uber now provides insurance to its drivers, and there』s a cost to that as well.

And if rulings such as the one in California - where a judge determined that an Uber driver was, in fact, an employee – gain national traction, then distribution costs could skyrocket. According to some anaLysts, offering health insurance, unemployment, worker』s compensation, payroll taxes, 401K, vacation time and reimbursement for miles, gas and tolls, could raise distribution costs by an order of magnitude, and cost the company an additional $13K per driver (or $4.1 billion per year).

So while zero marginal cost distribution is a key ingredient in the recipe for making a tech monopoly, it simply doesn』t exist in the ride-sharing industry.

In summary, investors are beginning to realize that the Silicon Valley view that ride-sharing is a 「winner-take-all」 market is flawed for two reasons: 1) the absence of demand-side network effects and 2) tangible marginal costs to distribution.

But Uber Has the Potential to be So Much More Than a Taxi-Service!

Some Silicon Valley pundits will argue that focusing on ride-sharing is myopic, and that Uber will evolve into an all-purpose 「tech utility」 that will re-ignite the virtuous cycle of network effects and pave the way to global domination.

For instance, many insiders believe that Uber can create a full service 「urban logistics fabric」 and completely own the coveted 「last mile」 of distribution. With services such as UberRUSH (courier), UberEATS (food delivery) and UberCargo (moving), the company seems to be heading in this direction.

But even if Uber is able to realize its dream of owning the 「interdiv of lifestyle and logistics」, does this change the underlying economics?

Would Uber instantly gain demand-side network effects? Most people don』t care who delivers their packages, as long as they get there on time. So that leaves us where we started…there are advantages to scale, but they come from the supply side. And given that incumbents such as FedEx and UPS have both experience in this market AND scale, competition might not disappear as quickly as some Uber bulls would have you think. As FedEx CEO Fred Smith says 「I think there』s just an urban mythology that [Uber] somehow changes the basic cost input of the logistics business」.

Would Uber instantly gain zero marginal cost distribution? No, it would face the same costs as discussed above.

Others believe that the emergence autonomous cars will hold the key to monopolistic power, but even that isn』t the panacea that some hold it out to be. If Uber continues on the path it seems to be heading now and takes ownership of these assets, then costs would likely increase. Even if it take the road that Lyft is travelling, and outsources the car ownership to someone else, there are still costs that are going to present themselves somewhere in the value chain. In parlance popularized by Milton Friedman, there』s 「no free lunch」 and delivery via any type of vehicle – even a solar powered self-driving one – is the exact opposite of zero marginal cost distribution.

If anything, as Uber aims to expand beyond its current offerings, competitors will have the time and space to perfect their own logistical framework and establish an advantage in the areas the Uber misses. Whether that』s FedEx, UPS, Instacart, Deliv, Amazon or Lyft is largely irrelevant – what matters is that there』s still room for competition.

In short, the maturation of technology and proliferation of options should serve as an opportunity for more players to enter the industry, not fewer.

Valley Value Investing?

When Uber changed its slogan from 「everyone』s private driver」 to 「where lifestyle meets logistics」 it undoubtedly did so to position itself as a 「technology company」 that, like Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter, could easily dominate its market with the virtuous cycle of network effects.

But let』s get serious for a second: It』s 2016, EVERY company with a chance of long-term success is, in one way or another, a 「technology company」. If you』re not leveraging technology, you』re already dead.

So while the market for ride-sharing and logistics may have evolved to the point where it』s no longer strictly analog (i.e. it probably won』t experience the same level of competition that we』ve historically seen in hotels, airlines and / or rental car companies), it』s not strictly 「DIGital」 either. As long as the network effects remain on the supply-side, as long as there are costs to expansion and as long as the threat of regulation remains, then it』s unlikely that Uber will ever become a true monopoly in the way that some Silicon Valley insiders hope.

Indeed, as John Zimmer points out, Lyft is 「gaining share in all top 20 markets」 and that』s not what happens when one player has a complete monopoly.

So given all of this potential competition – the fact that both the ride-sharing and logistics market can likely support multiple competitors, where does that leave Uber? Is it worth the $70 billion price tag?

Well, I won』t opine on this right now, but what I will say is that a lot of its investors, and even the notoriously conservative NYU professor Aswath Damodoran, seem to think so.

But perhaps the more important question in all of this is the following: if you believe that Uber is fairly valued (or at least close to it), then why are Lyft, Ola, Didi Chuxing and GrabTaxi valued so low?

After all, these companies are all building a similar infrastructure, and Lyft controls over 40% of the market in Uber』s home turf of San Francisco and has a fourth of the revenues of Uber at 1/12th of the valuation; Didi Chuxing claims to control over 87% of the lucrative Chinese market and has 1/3rd of the valuation of Uber; and Ola claims 80% of the Indian market and has a value similar to Lyft.

Given these discrepancies, perhaps old-school value investing has a place in Silicon Valley after all…