如何看待無管理層的神秘區塊鏈項目DAO創造6300萬美元眾籌神話?
新聞鏈接:幣看-無管理層的神秘區塊鏈項目DAO創造6300萬美元眾籌神話
摘要:上月一個沒有任何領導者的分散式組織僅僅依靠互聯網在虛擬世界存在了如此之久,成功解除了很多觀察者和以太坊社區成員的顧慮,獲得他們的信任。
DAO這個名稱來自於一個新的組織概念——分散式自治組織(distributed autonomous organization)。致力於支持以太坊相關項目的DAO眾籌獲得了超過6000萬美元價值的以太幣——以太坊的代幣。
首先拋出我的觀點:這個項目有坑。但是看好DAO概念在討論區塊鏈的時候很容易忘記是在討論Fin-tech,所以說脫離了經濟學範疇都是在耍流氓。經濟學首先是一門關於人的學科,再好的技術也不能解決人性的問題的,去中心化是如此,智能合約更是如此,DAO忽略了投票是一種非常簡化的自治模型,所以是有很大問題的。妄圖用炒技術概念來蒙蔽自己和大家是不現實的。然後我就問一個問題,作為一個公司創始人,你有一個非常好的團隊和一個非常棒的想法,那麼你會用DAO的形式嗎?說好的企業理念,說好的產品呢,難道你的企業理念要靠投票維持?做企業不是做融資,即使融資方式方便又不代表容易搞定融資方。以上,歡迎提出有意義的反對意見。引用Dan 的觀點如下(值得認真讀的article,原文 Is The DAO going to be DOA? a€」 Steemit),Dan提了DAO的「四宗罪」:
The DAO is the latest Decentralized, Autonomous Organization to make major waves as they raised over $100 million worth of ETH tokens (12% of all ETH). The question remains, is it a good idea to invest in The DAO and have they learned anything from those who have gone before?
In this article I will talk about the experience gained from BitShares, not to promote BitShares as superior, but to highlight the hard lessons that can be learned from BitShares』 failures and how they might apply to The DAO.
BackgroundLet me take a moment to share my credentials on the subject of DAOs. The first two words of DAO, Decentralized Autonomous, entered the crypto-currency lexicon after a discussion between my father and I back in 2013. I introduced the concept that a blockchain can be viewed as a DAC. It was because of these articles that Vitalik Buterin, one of the founders of The DAO, started exploring the concepts in a three part series .
The last word of DAC was changed from Company (or Corporation) to Organization in order to avoid unnecessary legal entanglements, but the concept remains the same.
Over the past three years I have worked with the BitShares community to implement the worlds first Decentralized Autonomous Organization based upon many of the same principles as The DAO. Money was raised, tokens were allocated, and token holders were given the ability to vote on how to spend community money and set blockchain parameters.
The latest incarnation of BitShares gave members joint control over a $6 million dollar reserve fund. Advanced consensus and voting systems were implemented to address voter apathy. Powers were divided. Participatory budgeting was adopted. The stakeholders have the ability to vote for hard forks that implement new features. BitShares even adopted fee-backed assets to help fund specific features. Every thing in the blockchain was parameterized and those parameters could be changed by elected committee members. BitShares has been and continues to be one of the most comprehensive examples of a self-governing DAC / DAO.
There is only one major technological difference between The DAO and BitShares, with The DAO, the blockchain smart contracts can change without all of the nodes having to upgrade. This difference is relatively trivial and ultimately irrelevant to the potential success or failure ofThe DAO. The reason this technical difference is irrelevant is because success and failure of a DAO/DAC depends not on the technology used, but entirely on how a community interacts with the technology and each other.
Smart Contracts cannot fix Dumb PeopleBitShares had all of the tools, the talent, and the money to do great things if only the BTS holders could agree on what should be done, who should be paid, and how much should be spent. So what lessons have we learned from BitShares』 experiment and how is The DAO doing anything meaningfully different to address it?
Poor Voter ParticipationOne of the first things we learned from BitShares is that the vast majority (90%+) of stakeholders did not participate in voting. This is due to the fact that voting requires time, energy, and skills that most investors lack. How many people have the economic, technical, and entrepreneurial skills to vote responsibly?
In order to boost participation BitShares 2.0 introduced proxy voting which centralized decision making into about a dozen elected proxies. Even with proxy voting, most people ultimately chose their preferred proxy along party/philosophical lines rather than considering individual proposals.
The DAO currently requires a level of voter participation that is much higher than BitShares has ever seen for a worker proposal. Even with proxies the highest level of consensus stakeholders have achieved is just a tad over (20%). This means The DAO is expecting much higher levels of participation of voters without using proxies. Unless the majority of DAO stake is held in a few active hands, this will be very hard to achieve.
Perhaps even more interesting with The DAO, once you vote for something you are no longer allowed to split your ETH out and form a new DAO. This means that you have much to lose by voting and much to gain by not voting. With an initial quorum of 20% it will be very challenging to get enough agreement, especially with the downsides associated with actually voting.
Anti-Spending MovementIt didn』t take long for the BitShares community to realize that funding projects today would cause a short-term fall in the value of BitShares. Unable to bear the short-term paper-loss and psychological impact of a lower market cap, people started electing proxies that would vote against all spending proposals.
With The DAO the same principles are at work. Every time a project is funded, the amount of ETH backing the DAO tokens falls and is replaced with speculative IOU from a contractor. What is worse, when the ETH is sold to fund the projects the value of all ETH falls. Since The DAOkeeps its savings in ETH, the actual cost of funding a proposal includes any loss value caused by selling ETH.
Considering many of the investors in the DAO also hold ETH there is a conflict of interest in their voting preferences. Most individuals will see the short-term cost (loss of liquidity) of authorizing spending to be much higher than the long-term benefit. After all, authorizing a $1 million dollar project will cause the DAO to lose 1% of its capital today and would likely move the Etheruem price by more than 1% down as everyone attempts to front-run the sell pressure created by the project. In the long-run the project may add value to Etheruem and the DAO, but the long-run is often years away.
Smart speculators know they can make the most money by not tying up their capital during the no-growth phase. They will sell today and buy back in closer to the completion the project.
Not everyone will agree with the value an approved project will bring to The DAO. So while those who vote to approve it see $1 million dollars being invested to create $10 million of value, many more will see that $1 million dollars being wasted with no chance of return. Who is right? Well odds are in favor of it being wasted as 9 in 10 startups fail.
Fortunately The DAO allows non-voters to split and reclaim their ETH by splitting their funds out.
Death by 1000 SplitsThe DAO has tentatively raised $100 million dollars worth of ETH, but so far the investors have taken no real risk. Every single person who has purchased DAO tokens has the ability to reclaim their ETH so long as they never vote. The end result is a massive marketing campaign that totally misrepresents what has been invested and what hasn』t. Considering there is no real risk being taken beyond the risk of holding ETH and that there is the potential for a large gain it is no wonder so many people have participated.
So what happens next? Everyone seeking a zero risk return will abstain from voting. If greater than 80% fall in this category, then nothing will pass. There is a very real possibility that this will happen.
Will there be any proposals in the first place? To prevent proposal spam all new proposals must make a deposit that gets forfeited if a quorum (20%) is not reached. In this case there will be no proposals unless the proposers are already certain they will win. To be certain will require conducting non-binding polls outside The DAO. What happens if people vote in non-binding polls but then refuse to vote for the actual proposal? Free profits for The DAO when the deposit fee is forfeited. This may or may not be an issue depending upon whether the required deposit is small enough to risk losing. Anything less than $100 is probably OK.
Once the first project gets approved a new moral hazard is created. Lets assume it is approved with the minimum 20%. The DAO will receive reward shares in the funded project and those shares will be divided equally among all participants. The non-voters will get the rewards and can then split their funds. The voters on the other hand will be unable to split. They take 100% of the risk and only get 20% of the reward, where as the non-voters get 80% of the reward and minimal risk.
The DAO is complicated and I admit that I am not sure I fully understand how, when, and where ETH can be split relative to payouts and rewards. It may well be that non-voters end up funding 80% of the proposal and can only reclaim a fraction of their original investment after the proposal is funded.
Regardless of which way it is actually implemented, there are more benefits to be gained by not-voting and splitting your ETH out of The DAO than by voting and keeping your ETH in The DAO. Liquidity is valuable.
Ignore the Technology
Fancy technology can obscure our assessment of what is really going on. The DAO solves a single problem: the corrupt trustee or administrator. It replaces voluntary compliance with a corporation』s charter under threat of lawsuit, with automated compliance with software defined rules. This subtle change may be enough to bypass regulatory hurdles facing traditional trustee』s and administrators, but it doesn』t solve most of the problems the regulations were attempting to address.
What The DAO doesn』t solve is all of the other problems inherent with any joint venture. These are people problems, economic problems, and political problems. In some sense, The DAOcreates many new problems caused by its ridged rules and expensive machine-enforced process for change.
The DAO doesn』t solve the 「group trap」 where by losers subsidize winners. It disempowers the individual actor and forces him to submit to group decision making. It doesn』t make raising money cheaper for companies, it just adds blockchain-enforced bureaucratic and political processes.
Ask yourself if you would still invest in The DAO if its rules were written into the charter of a traditional VC firm. Ask yourself it it would not be simpler to keep your ETH and simply vote with your investment dollars for individual blockchain IPO』s where the IPO rules are enforced by the blockchain. Now ask yourself, what value is The DAO providing to your capital in exchange for all of the added restrictions it places on your capital.
A traditional VC firm is run by experts who study potential investments in depth and get paid proportional to their success. People give money to a VC firm because they trust the management of the firm and accept reduced profits because the VC firm is adding value. The DAO is just a committee of non-professional voters who have relatively little ability to do proper due diligence.
ConclusionMy opinion is that The DAO will be DOA (Dead on Arrival). The theory of jointly deciding to fund efforts will face the reality of individual self interest, politics, and economics. There will be rapid defecting (splitting) as people realize there is little to be gained by banding together under the structure of The DAO and much to be lost.
It might not happen at first, but over time the Etheruem community will learn the hard way what the BitShares community has already discovered. Creating social systems to jointly fund development of projects and investments is challenging. Ultimately, technology can only aid in communication, it cannot fix the fundamental incompatibilities between individual self interest and community decision making.
這幾天花時間調查了這平台,看看是不是有賺錢的機會。
對區塊鏈領域認識比較粗淺,只是個人接觸DAO學習階段的一些思考。歡迎前輩多指導,大家多討論。
DAO是什麼?
DAO是一種全新的公司/基金的組織結構。Distributed Autonomous Organization
傳統的公司,無非就是一群人,利用一筆錢和資源,按照管理制度,實現經營目標,分配所得利潤。
DAO和傳統的組織結構不同,它遵循的規則並不是現實世界裡的公司章程和法律條文,而是一套計算機代碼。它作為一種去中心化組織,沒有管理層和決策者,所有的決策都來自於群眾的智慧,並且經過一套規則檢驗後,付諸於實行。
新聞中創下眾籌記錄的項目全名其實是 The DAO,中文意思可以理解為「 DAO的典型代表」,或者「眾DAO之母」, 就像魔戒里的至尊魔戒一樣。
現階段,The DAO所作的事情有點像風險投資基金,它會讓出資人決定資金和資源的投資方向,優先聚焦有潛力的項目。
The DAO的具體操作
The DAO的根基是以太坊Ethereum。以太坊是一個基於區塊鏈技術的支持型平台(在區塊鏈領域非常牛,非常有潛力)。 The DAO通過以太坊籌集到的資金是加密數字貨幣——以太幣 (ETH)形式。這些資金鎖定在智能合約中,沒有哪個人能夠單獨動用這筆錢。
參與 The DAO眾籌的人都可以獲得The DAO的基金份額( Tokens)。這裡要注意:在DAO中,傳統公司的【委託-代理】關係已經不存在了,所以出資給DAO的人即是DAO基金份額的持有人,也是DAO的股東。
與普通的基金份額不同的是,The DAO的出資人有權直接提交投資項目議案。
提出的議案並不會馬上會執行,需要由其他的DAO出資人進行投票,一般需要兩周時間讓社區的群眾有充分時間討論。通過投票與計算後,如果議案得到需要的票數支持,相應的基金份額代表的資金就會劃給該投資項目。
獲得了投資人的授權後,The DAO將以合約的形式,找承包商執行投資計劃、落地生產,並在後期回饋收益。
The DAO並不是只投資一個項目,它可以專註多個領域,投資不同的創新產品。未來,
結合自動化的工廠和新型工業 4.0的生產能力,它有著很大的想像空。
The DAO為何這麼diao
The DAO可能是人類歷史上首次由計算機代碼控制的營利性組織。
The DAO的代碼是開源的,在The DAO白皮書中,用戶可以看到所有的公開代碼,以及每行代碼所起到的作用。整套代碼就的等於是一個完全的公司,包括如何投入資金,如何運用資金等方面的規則已經全部寫明。整個組織的運營規則全部對外開放,絕對透明,傳統的會計核算和外部審計在它面前都顯得是落後時代的老古董。
這家投資公司沒有武斷魯莽的老闆,沒有職業經理人,不需要財務部、行政部、人事部。內部不會有攀比、懶散,官僚和勾心鬥角打內耗。
The DAO不是人,沒有道德風險,也沒有代理人風險。不會因為管理層私心或者短期的眼前利益而犧牲股東長期利益。
歷史上終於出現了一個物理意義上絕對不會跑路的平台。
我們來回想一下金融教材里的歷史故事: 股份制公司創生時,就是為了聚攏具有共同目標的一組人,大家共同出資,共同承擔風險,分享未來的收益。 The DAO的出現,幾乎就是股份制公司的數字升級版。拿大家熟悉的 P2P來對比,P2P 節省了資金中介機構的運營成本,可以說是升級版的【銀行】;而 The DAO節省了企業運營成本,目標是改變【公司制】。
之前我就認為,眾籌的意義在於改變生產經營的過程和結構, The DAO把眾籌又向前推進了一小步。
DAO能不能賺錢
從運營成本角度來說, DAO要比傳統的風險投資類機構有著更低的運營成本。
傳統的風投基金中,投資策略是由經驗豐富(同時也拿高薪)的基金經理、研究員制定的。在 The DAO中,決策來自於「群眾的智慧」。它通過一套詳細的規則,來保證做出對出資人最有利的投資決策。
The DAO不收取基金管理費。The DAO基於數字貨幣的資產,也不需要什麼認購費、贖回費、銀行託管費。
DAO本身的盈利能力有很大不確定性,目前也沒法衡量。但如果用純粹的風險投資基金做參考,聽說這個行業的內部回報率平均水平在15%到40%之間。紅杉這種牛一點的可能會獲得100%的回報率。
DAO的投資人不一定拿財務回報,也可能獲得實體產品或者服務。The DAO如果生產實體產品的話,股東本身就是很好的銷售群體。
另一方面,The DAO的基金份額基於區塊鏈技術,可以隨意拆分,又可以方便地轉讓。有了成熟的交易市場後, The DAO的份額價格也會隨和時間波動,如果說眾籌The DAO的朋友是拿到了「原始股」,那麼今後DAO還存在二級市場的機會(投機)。
DAO的風險
做投資不看風險的都死光了。 The DAO的風險包括但不限於:
1.過度投機
傳統的早期風投機構,孵化一個項目需要的時間是按年計算,5年-7年才能獲得收益是很正常的事情。The DAO雖然通過互聯網化提升了資金運營效率,但是否能在短期內看到真實的回報依然是個謎。
目前階段, The DAO的盈利能力還只是「想像」中有著「很大空間」;但與此同時,投機與炒作卻已經相伴而生。
因為The DAO加入了以太幣作為計價的中間單位,DAO份額的實際價值難以測算。以太幣作為一種虛擬貨幣,在一些虛擬貨幣平台上被交易,價格一天漲跌超過10%是常有的事情。今年以來,以太幣的價格已經飛漲了一輪又一輪。人民幣買入以太幣的價格從今年年初的6、7元漲到了現在的120多元。這種上漲背後的原因是多樣的,其中無疑帶有投機性質。
另一方面,新聞報道中,TheDAO創下眾籌募資紀錄的那個金額,也同樣是根據以太幣的價格折算而來。近兩個月,有關DAO的新聞報道,引起了大眾對以太幣的關注,隨之資金湧入,也抬升了以太幣的價格。
因為有了以太幣的存在,現階段用人民幣買入DAO的基金份額是否存在的過度投機的問題,值得警惕。
未來,The DAO找線下承包商定製產品時,如何把以太幣兌換成實際的購買力?以太幣的匯率會不會明顯承壓?
更糟糕的情況是,投資一個實體項目會導致資金流出以太幣生態,造成以太幣貶值——如果以太幣價格下跌,在高位投資的出資人想要變現就可能蒙受損失。這種短期的貶值壓力可能會損害股東的投資積極性。
2.生態崩潰
目前階段, The DAO的投資提案有很大一部分是這對它本身的改進與提升。
The DAO的規則並非一成不變,代碼是由人寫的,代碼本身也可以通過一種「提案 -投票」的方式升級改進。這就有點像開源軟體和維基百科的成長方式。在知識和工具領域,這種升級方式很有效;在投資領域,它是不是還能有用呢?
由於 The DAO的提案由投票來決定。它本身也設計大量機制保護小股東的利益。但未來這套機制效果如何?是否會造成The DAO執行效率低下?
DAO的獨特運營方式,也可能引出另一個問題:The DAO關注的投資提案包括以太坊平台上的創業項目。由於創業項目和 The DAO都在以太坊生態圈之中,用傳統的眼光來看,它甚至有「自融」之嫌疑。
雖然整個以太坊崩潰的概率極小,但這種極端的風險不可不警惕。
3.投資失誤
在The DAO的出資人中,並非每一個人都有足夠的知識,經驗和智慧來做出明智的投資決策。群眾的決策究竟是理智的投資還是羊群效應?甚至一個大泡沫?這些都是未知數。
整個DAO的股東團隊其實是經過篩選的,它牽涉到虛擬貨幣概念和大量代碼與說明都是門檻。但如果大量短線投機客湧入之後,它的投資決策還能那麼精準嗎?我們把目光放長遠一點,假設DAO成立後進入平穩運營。它的股東結構會是哪些人?
現在可以猜測到的人群包括:對新科技敏感的極客;熟悉互聯網金融的人;投機客;運用DAO放大資金槓桿的職業投資人;跟風的小額散戶。這群人對於投資項目的判斷力將經受考驗。
另一方面,DAO社區的透明性,也會讓其投資策略對外公開,很容易引來競爭者。早期創投出現緊逼的競爭者可不是一件好事。
4.政策風險
The DAO是無國界的,它的一部分資金被註冊在瑞士,因為瑞士的法律對「來源不特定」的資金管理較為寬鬆。但是作為一家無國界的公司,它未來的運營中依然可能面臨一些監管問題。
這種形式的創新面臨何種政策風險呢?
寫在最後
全世界都能看到的一串代碼負責管理著上億美元的錢。這樣的投資機會肯定值得關注。
The DAO本身充滿著不確定性風險,但是DAO所代表的這種概念無疑是先進的。
現在投資 The DAO 的渠道對普通玩家不太友好;但受到 The
DAO的啟發,國內一定也會有類似的項目出現。如果馬化騰推出了一個類似 The DAO的東西,你會有興趣嗎?
其實這個可以回歸到最原始的精英政治和民主政治來看問題,DAO分散式自治組織(distributed autonomous organization)類似是民主政治,是自由公開靠投票的,但正因為於此也是低效的,這個可以看美國的政治體系不難看出來,一個政策從提案到立法最後落實各州,少則幾年多則幾十年,政治體系尚可接受,但是在變化莫測的商業領域這樣做效率幾何就是很值得玩味了,也許又是一場偉大經濟烏托邦的理想試驗。最後我只能說人類的發展就是在一次次試錯中磕碰出來的,祝大家好運吧!
本來是奔著建立互聯網烏托邦的目的,基於ethereum的匿名風險投資系統,無奈沒有0 bug 的代碼,今天就被智能合約的bug艹翻天了,大量ethereum幣流入黑客私人地址,造成dao價格攔腰斬斷,法克!!
這種模式確實不錯,按份額投票。
這種形式一方面籌集資金(代法幣),類似股票發行,從法律來講不用法幣募集資源算不算一種股票發行?或者說有沒有法律法規監管?另一方面,通過募集的資源投入到其他有價值的項目中,在投資項目中,結合當前的法律法規,需要作為自然人還是法人持有被投資項目的股東?當前法律法規是否空白?有待專家解答。火幣區域塊鏈的書上強調,全球化的過程中 資金貨幣流轉應該更加快捷無障礙,所有人都需要一種可信賴的信用貨幣做交易。 雖然說現在的紙幣,在某種程度上也脫離了金屬貨幣的概念 已經是國家政府提供的信用貨幣。 但是現在的紙幣,是有直接實體經濟支撐的,所有的行業認同這個貨幣 這是人類社會從最早的物物交換到原始貨幣、金屬、紙幣一步步過來的。 並不是說你創造一個貨幣能做全球無差異化流通大家就會試用,電子貨幣如何讓所有人接受是一個大問題。 人類社會做到現在的紙幣概念是花了幾千年,支付寶類的電子貨幣在概念上市把紙幣電子化、數字化 它也不算憑空創造出來。 而電子貨幣,恕我暫時沒看出有什麼實際支出點 所有的作用都是衍生出來的概念, 就好像一開始我們是一船以船交換貨物 後來有幾十船我們覺得這樣太麻煩,就你開船來我拿金屬貨幣去, 你拿到金屬貨幣再去找其他人。 金屬貨幣都來也發現太重了換成紙幣,紙幣一車一車隨著交易了的大增又太麻煩,那我要不就簽個協議簽個合同這樣方便,合同協議太繁瑣 那就寫串數字吧 在一個大家都認同的平台上,然後就金錢數字化了。 這中間是有很密切的銜接的, 一步步所有人認同才可以 你直接拿出個憑空而來的電子幣是站不住腳的。
我關心的是區域塊鏈的電子貨幣既然是通過大規模的演算而來的,那這一塊演算能否直接產生對這個世界有用的『』產品『』。 比如說,科幻電影中 全球有一個巨大無比的計算任務,每個個人、組織或者公司能通過自己的終端參與其中,你花人力物力去參與計算應該獲得獎勵 這個獎勵就是『』電子貨幣『』。 只有這樣電子貨幣才能有實際作用才會被認可,個人愚見。
要不然你再獨特也沒用, 現在的電子貨幣像紙幣里的 『』紙『』,合法貨幣是印在紙上的那些符號、文字、 而真正的價值不在紙 而是符號文字所代表的公信力推薦閱讀:
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