冷戰（劍橋）專題--美國大戰略的形成（1）

以下為中文譯文：

美國大戰略的形成，1945-1952

1945年4月12日，美國總統富蘭克林·D·羅斯福去世。副總統哈里·S·杜魯門進而領導美利堅合眾國。杜魯門上任僅僅數月，對前任的外交政策和策略知之甚少。他覺得「好像日月星辰全部壓在了」肩膀上。第二天，他對關係甚好的記者私語到：「為我祈禱吧。」

挑戰與志向

杜魯門領導下的美國有著全球有史以來最繁榮的經濟和最強大的軍事力量。戰時生產將美國從大蕭條的陰影中提振出來，並帶來了前所未有的繁榮時代。戰時美國GNP增長了60%，總盈利額增長了50%。儘管美國仍存在著社會不安、工人騷亂、種族衝突以及青少年破壞公共財產等問題，美國人的可自由支配收入仍然是前所未有的多。

與此同時，美國政府打造了人類歷史上最為強大的戰爭機器。1942年末，美國所生產的武器數量比所有軸心國國家生產的武器總數還要多，而在1943年，美國的武器裝備將近是蘇聯武器裝備的3倍。1945年，美國黃金儲量佔全球黃金儲量的2/3，其投資資本為全球的3/4，航運船隻為1/2，生產力也佔1/2。美國GNP是蘇聯GNP的3倍，是英國GNP的5倍多。並且，美國即將完成技術和生產上耗資甚巨、極其重要的傑作--原子彈。

然而杜魯門及其顧問仍然覺得不安全。他們害怕美國會再次進入蕭條，因為他們心知肚明，戰時政府需求大大刺激了生產，但戰爭結束時的情況怎樣，他們並不知道。杜魯門及其顧問相信，美國需要開放的全球貿易環境，保持當前的需求量。20世紀30年代，高關稅、配額及外匯管制，與納粹德國、日本甚至英國政府構建的貿易壁壘一道割裂了全球貿易系統。而現在，戰爭接近尾聲，歐亞大量人口將接受國家計劃、中央集權控制，加上社會福利項目的普及，為全球最重要的自由企業、私有財產和個人權利構成了新的挑戰。

美國政府對開放性全球貿易系統的追求也汲取了間戰（1次世界大戰-2次世界大戰）期間的經濟、意識形態和地緣政治上的經驗教訓。30年代後期-40年代初期，美國政府在軍事上所得到的最大教訓就是，決不能讓潛在敵人通過經濟行為、政治顛覆或軍事侵犯控制歐亞資源。一旦獲得此類資源，美國的潛在敵人將提高自己的鬥爭能力，進而將其影響力擴展到整個西半球，甚至可能發動對美戰爭，曠日持久的戰爭。美國總統羅斯福在1940年因而認為，美國決不能成為「信奉武力的世界中的一個孤島」。

因此，杜魯門及其顧問的任務就是，隨著二次世界大戰接近尾聲，要利用美國國力塑造有利於美國生活方式的國際環境。杜魯門相信，美國乃是上帝之國，是山巔之城，在個人自由、私有財產、創業機會、有限政府方面乃是全球值得遵循的優越文明。杜魯門認為，這種生活方式曾被德國納粹和日本軍國主義所威脅過。間戰期間的孤立政策乃是致命的錯誤，白白浪費時間，讓敵對勢力控制了歐亞大陸上的優勢資源。因此，杜魯門要遵循羅斯福政策，想在互不侵犯、民族自決、平等獲得原材料、非歧視性貿易及參與國際組織的基礎上組建一個新的世界秩序。

圖中主要人物左數起：蒙哥馬利、艾森豪威爾、朱可夫、塔厄西

但在1945年春天，杜魯門及其顧問仍然不知如何通過實際戰略完成這一目標，也不明了這一目標對戰時各國達成的聯盟具有怎樣的意義。杜魯門想要和英國和蘇聯領導人保持良好關係，但他卻並不十分尊敬英國戰時領導人丘吉爾，也不特別厭惡蘇聯共產黨領導人約瑟夫斯大林。他所希望的是，兩家都順從美國的領導。杜魯門也知道，他要做出一些妥協，但在他眼裡，美國國力和美國正派，卻將美國提升到了一個特別的位置。他說的讓步，就是本次要達成自己目標的85%。

1945年5月德國甫一投降，杜魯門就面臨著兩大外交難題：如何結束對日戰爭，如何與斯大林和蘇聯打交道？這兩個問題本身就有關聯。斯大林在1945年2月的雅爾塔會議上已向羅斯福表示，德國投降三個月內蘇聯將對日宣戰。如果確實宣戰，蘇軍將與亞洲大陸上大批日軍師團交戰，這將減少美國的傷亡。作為回報，羅斯福承諾斯大林，後者可以控制中國東北的港口和鐵路以及其它遠東領土，如日本在1904-05年日俄戰爭中獲得的南薩哈林島和千島群島。在羅斯福看來，為發展戰後與蘇合作，這一交易確有用處，如果按照斯大林對美承諾，蘇聯承認中國國民黨，不再幫助中共，那麼這一交易可說是非常有用。但杜魯門顧問及其朋友卻對美國處理對斯大林關係這一問題上分歧甚深，而他們的態度將形成對總統的建議意見。美國駐蘇大使W·艾夫里爾·哈里曼、總統軍事上的左膀右臂海軍上將威廉·D·萊希、海軍部長詹姆斯·V·佛利斯托以及副國務卿約瑟夫·C·格魯等顧問希望總統強硬對待蘇聯。他們認為，蘇軍向柏林進軍路上要經過波蘭、捷克斯洛伐克、匈牙利、羅馬尼亞以及東德，深恐蘇聯國力因此增長。並且，斯大林監禁、謀殺西方精心挑選的非共產主義領導人（特別在波蘭），這使得他們深深不滿；最後，他們反對斯大林在東歐建立的臨時政府。而陸軍部長亨利·L·史汀生、羅斯福對斯大林的代表哈里·霍普金斯、前副總統兼商務部長亨利·A·華萊士以及前任美國駐蘇大使約瑟夫·C·戴維斯則支持杜魯門諒解斯大林違反相關協議的行為，諒解斯大林的安全需求，並想方設法作出可接受的妥協。

正當猶疑不定時，原子彈項目有了長足的發展，到1945年7月中旬，新墨西哥州沙漠中原子彈測試獲得了成功。杜魯門因此受到了極大的影響，而在近身顧問中，只有一部分人能夠預見這一新技術奇蹟會對戰後世界中各大國關係調整產生怎樣的巨大影響。但對於那些不甚明了的人（如杜魯門政府新任國務卿詹姆斯·F·拜恩），這意味著，美國可通過原子武器按照自己的意願去塑造世界和平。就原子彈，拜恩表示：「（原子彈）給了我們巨大的能力，根據最新分析，這種能力簡直是控制性的。」杜魯門最初也傾向於發表類似的說法。在波茨坦會議上，他簡單地向斯大林告知了美國最新試驗的核武器，還以為這將成為他的致勝法寶，能讓斯大林在東歐臨時政府組成問題和德國佔領問題作出修改妥協。雖然當時杜魯門總統並沒決定用原子彈轟炸廣島長崎，進而以此塑造戰後美國的外交手段，但他確實認為，原子彈將增強美國國力，使他能夠從蘇聯人那裡訛到更多的妥協。杜魯門甚至覺得，原子彈能讓日本人在蘇聯對日宣戰、獲得雅爾塔會議規定的領土之前就投降。杜魯門在日記中匆匆記下：「俺覺得鬼子在俄國參戰之前就會舉白旗」，「一旦曼哈頓（原子彈）扔在日本本土上，鬼子肯定會投降」。

波茨坦會議

然而，杜魯門及其最信任的拜恩先生，都不希望與斯大林撕破臉皮，也不希望產生冷戰。與斯大林在波茨坦會面之後，杜魯門在寫給妻子的信中說：「俺喜歡斯大林，這個人挺直爽，知道自己能拿到什麼，要是拿不到他就會妥協。」但杜魯門認為，與斯大林打交道就意味著讓這個蘇聯獨裁者聽從美國對建立戰後國際秩序的看法，無論這個看法多麼飄渺、不成熟。杜魯門在1945年10月27日海軍節講話中說明了他對戰後秩序的更廣義的看法。其中，他聲援了民族自決和國家主權，諷刺了不顧人民意願的領土變化；他聲援了開放貿易、海洋自由、非受限使用原材料以及國際經濟合作。他對泛美主義和聯合國持熱情歡迎的態度。他說，美國將為全人類保有原子彈，並將其作為一種「神聖的託管」。在各種講話、聲明中，杜魯門清楚地表示，他並不反對就原子能控制問題進行協商，但他強調，他是不會放棄美國這一優勢力量的。

但在日本於1945年9月投降後，美國很快複員了自己的武裝力量。空軍頑強地堅持了下去，成為了一個獨立實體，而陸軍和海軍彼此之間卻需要為其位置、任務以及不斷縮水的軍事預算苦苦鬥爭。由於國務卿拜恩很快控制了美國的外交政策，因此他可以說無所作為，並未緩解本部門或軍事部門同事的敏感情緒。杜魯門一開始想讓拜恩制定美國的外交政策，但很快卻意識到，拜恩國務卿冒犯了權勢巨大的議員們卻又沒有獲得任何值得稱道的外交成功。美國外交政策似乎左右搖擺，漫無目標，慫恿克里姆林宮的潛在對手，卻又沒有獲得倫敦、巴黎等地潛在友邦的支持和同情。

1945年底，杜魯門對國務卿的表現已經是大為光火，甚為不滿，並且在蘇聯人的行動面前吃盡了苦頭。他要制訂更為強硬的政策。他諷刺到，蘇聯在保加利亞和羅馬尼亞建立了警察國家，並譴責蘇聯拒絕從伊朗撤軍。杜魯門寫道：「毫無疑問，俄國想要入侵土耳其，並且奪取黑海通向地中海的海峽......俺覺得不能再妥協了，俺受夠了！不要再哄著慣著蘇聯人了！」

這一看法在外交和戰略上產生的後果極其清楚。蘇聯的擴張需要遏止，但喬治·F·凱南於1946年2月從美國駐蘇莫斯科大使館的七千字長電也好，溫斯頓·丘吉爾於1946年3月在密蘇里州富爾頓發表的「鐵幕」演講也好，都沒有說明設計具體政策或一攬子事務處理順序的必要性。凱南電報和丘吉爾的演講簡明扼要地說明了無限擴張的集權國家威脅下全球戰後所產生的大量問題。丘吉爾警告說：「從波羅的海的什切青到亞得里亞海邊的的里雅斯特，一幅橫貫歐洲大陸的鐵幕已經降落下來。」蘇聯佔領當局不僅監禁著潛在的敵人，支持著東歐的附庸，蘇軍支援範圍外的西歐和南歐共產黨人也在不斷調整，試圖合法獲得政權，或非法奪取政權。「基督教文明」正在遭受威脅，前任英國首相丘吉爾建議，盎格魯-撒克遜人應當聯合起來，抵抗新集權主義陰影。

華約北約對峙

而凱南長電則符合杜魯門和許多顧問的想法，因此在美國政策制定圈中廣泛流傳。凱南在電報中寫道，斯大林的世界觀是「神經質的」，其基礎來自於「傳統上的俄國非安全感」。克里姆林宮領導人「臆造」了一個敵對、邪惡的世界。他們要撕裂西歐，挑撥資本主義國家的不合，並腐蝕英國、法國、荷蘭、葡萄牙殖民地與母國的聯繫。凱南因而總結道：「我們所面對的蘇聯，乃是堅信不能與美國保持持久和平的政治力量。」但凱南並未對未來悲觀失望。蘇聯的擴張是可遏制的。蘇聯領導人「缺乏理性的邏輯」，但「對武力的邏輯卻非常敏感....如果能夠適當處理，根本不需要拿國家聲望做賭注，與其攤牌。」

以下為英語原版：

The emergence of an American grand strategy, 1945–1952

melvyn p. leffler

On April 12, 1945, President Franklin D. Roosevelt died. His vice president, Harry S. Truman, assumed the leadership of the United States of America. He had been in office only a few months, and knew little about his predecessor』s diplomacy and strategy. He felt 「like the moon, the stars, and all the planetshad fallen」 on him. 「Pray for me now,」 he whispered to friendly reporters the next day.1

Challenges and aspirations

Truman presided over the greatest military and economic power the world had ever known. War production had lifted the United States out of the Great Depression and had inaugurated an era of unimagined prosperity. Gross national product increased by 60 percent during the war, total earnings by 50 percent. Despite social unrest, labor agitation, racial conflict, and teenage vandalism, Americans had more discretionary income than ever before.

Simultaneously, the US government had built up the greatest war machine in human history. By the end of 1942, the United States was producing more arms than all the Axis states combined, and, in 1943, it made almost three times more armaments than did the Soviet Union. In 1945, the United States had two-thirds of the world』s gold reserves, three-fourths of its invested capital, half of its shipping vessels, and half of its manufacturing capacity. Its GNP was three times that of the Soviet Union and more than five times that of Britain. It was also nearing completion of the atomic bomb, a technological and production feat of huge costs and proportions.

Yet Truman and his advisers did not feel secure. They feared that the United States would again sink into depression. They understood that wartime government demand had boosted production, and they wondered what would replace it at the war』s end. They were convinced that they needed an open world trading environment to sustain demand. High tariffs, quotas, and exchange restrictions had sundered the global trading system during the 1930s as had the trading blocs established by the Nazis, the Japanese, and even the British. Now, as the war approached an end, the appeal of national planning and statist controls to many people in Europe and Asia, coupled with the popularity of social-welfare programs, posed new challenges to the world』s foremost champion of free enterprise, private property, and individual rights.

The desire for an open world trading system merged economic, ideological, and geostrategic lessons of the interwar era. The greatest military lesson of the late 1930s and the early 1940s was that potential adversaries must never again be allowed to gain contro of the resources of Europe and Asia through economic practices, political subversion, or military aggression. The acquisition of such resources allowed potential foes to augment their fighting capabilities, encouraged them to spread their influence to the Western hemisphere, tempted them to wage war against the United States, and enabled them to fight a protracted struggle. The United States, said Roosevelt in 1940, must not become 「a lone island in a world dominated by the philosophy of force.」2

Truman』s task, therefore, and that of his advisers, as World War II came to a close, was to use American power to forge an international environment conducive to the American way of life. The new president believed that the United States was God』s country, the city on a hill, the exemplar of a superior civilization based on personal freedoms, private property, entrepreneurial opportunity, and limited government. He grasped that this way of life had been endangered by the rise of German Nazism and Japanese militarism. The isolationist policies of the interwar years had been a grave error, allowing time for hostile adversaries to gain control of the preponderant resources of Europe and Asia. Hence, Truman wanted to follow Roosevelt』s policies. He wanted to forge a new world order based on nonaggression, self-determination, equal access to raw materials, nondiscriminatory trade, and participation in an international organization.3

What this meant in terms of actual strategy, however, was a mystery to Truman and his advisers in the spring of 1945. What this meant in terms of the future of the great wartime coalition was no clearer to them. The new president wanted to get along with the leaders of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. But he had no great reverence for Winston Churchill, Britain』s wartime leader, nor any special antipathy toward Iosif Stalin, the Soviet Union』s Communist dictator. He expected them both to defer to American leadership. Compromises, Truman knew, he would have to make. But American power and American righteousness, in his view, placed the United States in a special position. When he talked about concessions, he meant that he expected to get his way 85 percent of the time.4

大林說了啥？知道的金坷垃都給他！

Once Germany surrendered in May 1945, Truman faced two overriding foreign-policy questions: how to bring about the end of the war with Japan and how to deal with Stalin and the Soviet Union. These questions themselves were interrelated. Stalin had promised Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 that the Soviet Union would declare war on Japan within three months of Germany』s surrender. Should he do so, Soviet troops would engage large numbers of Japanese divisions on the Asian mainland, thereby reducing American casualties. In return, Roosevelt had promised Stalin that he could gain control of Manchurian ports and railroads and other Far East territories, such as Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands that Japan had seized after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05. In his desire to nurture postwar collaboration with the Soviet Union, this deal made sense to Roosevelt, especially if Stalin recognized the Chinese Nationalists and withheld aid from the Chinese Communists, which the Soviet leader promised he would do. But Truman』s advisers and friends were deeply divided about how the United States should deal with Stalin, and their attitudes shaped the recommendations they gave to the new president. Some advisers, such as W. Averell Harriman, the US ambassador to the Soviet Union, Admiral William Leahy, the president』s chief military aide, Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal, and Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew, wanted the president to take a hard line against the Soviet Union. They feared the growth of Soviet power as troops marched toward Berlin through Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and the eastern parts of Germany. They were disgusted by Stalin』s

imprisonment and murder of selective nonCommunist leaders, especially in Poland, and they objected to the provisional governments he was establishing throughout Eastern Europe. Other advisers and friends, such as Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt』s envoy to Stalin, HenryA. Wallace, the secretary of commerce and former vice president, and Joseph C. Davies, the former US ambassador to Moscow, encouraged Truman to tolerate Stalin』s transgressions, understand his security imperatives, and craft acceptable compromises.

As he pondered what to do, Truman was greatly affected by the rapid development and successful secret testing of the atomic bomb in the New Mexico desert in mid-July 1945. Only a few of his closest advisers knew about this new technological wonder that promised to have such a huge impact on the configuration of power in the postwar world. But for some of those who did know about it, such as James F. Byrnes, Truman』s newly selected secretary of state, the atomic weapon offered the leverage to shape the peace according to American desires. The atomic bomb, Byrnes said, 「had given us great power, and … in the last analysis, it would control.」5 Truman was inclined initially to think along similar lines. When he elliptically told Stalin at the Potsdam Conference about the powerful new weapon that the United States had just tested, Truman was thinking that it would serve as his trump card to get Stalin to be more amenable about the composition of the provisional governments in Eastern Europe and the occupation of Germany. The president did not decide to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in order to shape the diplomacy of the postwar world, but he certainly believed that it would enhance US power and augment his ability to elicit concessions from the Soviets. He even dared to hope that the atomic bomb might force the Japanese to surrender before the Soviets declared war on Tokyo and seized the territories promised them at Yalta. 「Believe Japs will fold up before Russia comes in,」 Truman jotted in his diary. 「I am sure they will when Manhattan [the atomic bomb] appears over their homeland.」6

Yet neither Truman nor Byrnes, the man Truman now relied on more than any other person, wanted a showdown or a cold war with Stalin. After meeting him at Potsdam, Truman wrote his wife, 「I like Stalin. He is straightforward. Knows what he wants and will compromise when he can』t get it.」7 But dealing with Stalin, in Truman』s view, meant that the Soviet dictator would need to comply with American thinking about the configuration of the postwar international order, however vague and inchoate that thinking was. In broad terms, Truman laid out his conception in his Navy Day speech of October 27, 1945. The president championed self-determination and national sovereignty. He ridiculed territorial changes that were forced upon peoples against their will. He championed open trade, freedom of the seas, unrestricted access to raw materials, and international economic cooperation. He embraced pan-Americanism and the United Nations. He said the United States would hold the atomic bomb as a 「sacred trust」 for all mankind. He made clear in a variety of speeches and statements that he was not averse to negotiating agreements governing the control of atomic energy, but he emphasized that he would not relinquish the United States』 superior power.8

But after Japan officially surrendered in September 1945, the United States quickly demobilized its armed forces. The air force struggled tenaciously to become an independent entity, and the army and the navy fought one another bitterly over roles, missions, and a shrinking military budget. Secretary of State Byrnes did little to assuage the sensibilities of colleagues either in his own department or the military services as he moved quickly to gain control of the nation』s foreign policy. Truman』s initial instinct was to allow Byrnes to shape the nation』s diplomacy, but the president realized very quickly that his secretary of state was offending powerful legislators without achieving any notable diplomatic successes. American foreign policy seemed to be floundering, engendering the contempt of potential adversaries in the Kremlin without garnering much sympathy from potential friends in London, Paris, and elsewhere.

At the end of 1945, Truman grew frustrated with the performance of his secretary of state and embittered by the actions of the Soviet Union. He wanted a tougher policy. He ridiculed the 「police states」 that the Kremlin was forming in Bulgaria and Romania and condemned the Soviets』 refusal to withdraw their troops from Iran. 「There isn』t any doubt in my mind,」 Truman wrote, 「that Russia intends an invasion of Turkey and the seizure of the Black Sea Straits to the Mediterranean…I do not think we should play compromise any longer … I』m tired of babying the Soviets.」9

What this meant in terms of policy and strategy was far from clear. The expansion of Soviet power needed to be contained, but neither George F. Kennan』s「long telegram」 from the US Embassy in Moscow in February 1946 nor Winston Churchill』s 「iron curtain」 speech in Fulton, Missouri, in March provided the specificity that was needed to design a concrete strategy or a set of priorities. Kennan』s message and Churchill』s address simplified the myriad problems of the postwar world in terms of a threat from another totalitarian power intent on unlimited expansion. 「From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic,」 Churchill warned, 「an iron curtain has descended across the continent.」 Not only were Soviet occupation authorities imprisoning potential foes and supporting their local minions in Eastern Europe, but Communist Parties beyond the reach of Soviet armies in Western and Southern Europe were angling to win power legally or to seize it illegally. With 「Christian civilization」 endangered, the former British prime minister recommended that Anglo-Saxons unite to withstand the new totalitarian specter.10

Kennan』s telegram was widely circulated throughout US policymaking circles because his analysis accorded with Truman』s instincts and the thinking of many of his advisers. Stalin』s view of the world, wrote Kennan, was 「neurotic,」 based as it was on a 「traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity.」 Kremlin leaders conjured up a hostile, evil world. They sought to foment disunity in Western Europe, promote dissension among capitalist nations, and erode links to the colonial dependencies of Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Portugal. 「We have here,」 Kennan concluded, 「a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with [the] United States there can be no permanent modus vivendi.」 Yet Kennan was not pessimistic about the future. Soviet expansion could be contained. Soviet leaders were 「impervious to logic of reason,」 but 「highly sensitive to logic of force … If situations are properly handled there need be no prestige-engaging showdowns.」11

推薦閱讀：