【研究】關於美國總統的「戰爭權力」——川普空襲敘利亞是否合法

01-26

關於美國總統的「戰爭權力」，最有名的一個說法是：美國海軍陸戰隊是唯一一支不經國會批准總統就能自由調動進行海外作戰的部隊。

然而這種說法靠譜么？美國總統可以無需國會批准就調用陸戰隊？他的「戰爭權力」究竟有多大？

我覺得有必要小小深入研究一下。

首先讓我們從最近這次川普下令空襲敘利亞說起吧。

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本文英文原文4月7日發佈於CNN網站；網址：Was Trump"s Syria strike legal? An expert weighs in

Redwolf Luo@知乎對該文做了翻譯；原文/譯文對照如下。

*英語水平有限；對美國法律理解有限；如有任何錯誤，還請友善指出，謝謝！

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Was Trump"s Syria strike legal?

川普空襲敘利亞合法嗎？

(CNN)A Q&A with CNN legal analyst andnational security law professor Steve Vladeck about the legal issuessurrounding President Donald Trump"s authorization of a strike against a Syriangovernment air base.

(CNN)關於川普總統授權空襲敘利亞政府空軍基地的法律問題，CNN法律分析師兼國家安全法教授Steve Vladeck接受了CNN電視台主持人的訪問。

Q: Was Thursday"s strike"legal"?

A: The Trump administration has suggestedthat they are, as an exercise of the President"s inherent power under ArticleII of the US Constitution. At least judged against the constitutional text,historical practice, and contemporary understanding, this argument is a stretch-- but it"s going to take a bit of work to explain why.

Q: 星期四（譯者註：2017年4月6日）對敘利亞的空襲「合法」么?

A: 特朗普政府表示，他們是根據美國憲法第二條行使總統固有的權力。至少從憲法文本、歷史慣例和當代理解來看，這種說法是有道理的，但要解釋為什麼還要做一點工作。

Q: What does the Constitution say?

A: Neither the text of the Constitutionnor historical precedent conclusively settle when the president needs Congressto approve the use of military force. The Constitution divides the war powersbetween Congress and the President, and leaves unresolved exactly when uses ofmilitary force do and do not require Congress"s sign-off. Article I of theConstitution gives Congress the powers to "declare war," "raiseand support armies," "provide and maintain a navy," and "makerules" to govern the military (and, perhaps most importantly, to fund allmilitary operations), but Article II gives the President the "executivepower," and makes him "commander in chief" of the military,powers that virtually all presidents have interpreted to give them at leastsome room to use the military without express permission from Congress.

Q: 憲法具體是怎麼說的？

A: 就「總統在什麼情況下需要國會授權使用武力」這一問題，無論是憲法文本還是歷史先例都沒能給出明確回答。憲法將戰爭權力在國會和總統之間進行了分權，但卻沒能明確界定究竟什麼時候需要由國會授權，總統才能動用武力。憲法第一條規定，國會擁有「宣戰權」、「募兵權」，同時可以「制定規則」治軍（當然，其中最重要的可能就是給各項軍事行動提供財政支持）。但憲法第二條也賦予了總統「行政權」，使總統成為軍隊「總司令」，而這也給了幾乎每一位總統留下些許自由解讀的空間，使得他們可以在沒有國會明確許可的情況下使用武力。

Q: What has happened in practice?

A: There are a number of examples ofmodern uses of US military force without express statutory authorization.President Harry S. Truman ordered US forces into combat in Korea; PresidentRonald Reagan ordered the use of military force in, among other places, Libya,Grenada and Lebanon; President George H.W. Bush directed an invasion of Panamato topple the government of Manual Noriega; and President Barack Obama used airstrikes to support the ouster of Moammar Gadhafi in Libya. At the same time, weshouldn"t read too much into any one example; some of these were based on verydifferent legal theories (for example, the Korean War was justified on theground that it was as part of broader UN operations that Congress hadimplicitly authorized). And some were (and remain) very controversial, likeObama"s use of force in Libya.

Q: 那實際情況究竟是怎樣的？

A: 在沒得到國會明確法定授權的情況下，總統就動用了武力，最近幾十年有一些具體的實例。杜魯門命令部隊登陸韓國參戰；里根下令在利比亞，格瑞那達和黎巴嫩等地使用軍事力量；老布希直接導演了美軍入侵巴拿馬、試圖推翻諾列加政權的行動；奧巴馬則以空襲的方式為推翻利比亞卡扎菲的統治提供支持。但另一方面，我們也不能過度解讀這裡面任何一個案例，因為有些軍事行為是基於另外一些法律理論（比如，美軍參與朝鮮戰爭，是聯合國行動的一部分，而聯合國的決議可以在一定程度上理解為默認獲得國會授權）。但有的時候也會引起爭議，比如奧巴馬對利比亞動武，爭議一直存在。

Q: Didn"t Obama also use militaryforce in Syria? Why is this different?

A: Obama used military force in Syria onvarious occasions, but against terrorist groups including ISIS, not the Assadregime. He justified those actions legally under the Authorization for the Useof Military Force ("AUMF") that Congress passed after the September11, 2001 terrorist attacks. That AUMF allows the President to act against thosegroups the President determined to be responsible for the attacks, and both theObama and Trump administrations have interpreted that statute to include ISIS-- and to use force under its auspices in both Iraq and Syria. That argumentitself is controversial, but there"s just no argument that the 2001 AUMFauthorizes force against the Assad regime.

Q: 奧巴馬不也對敘利亞動武了么？這又有什麼不一樣？

A: 奧巴馬對敘利亞動武是針對包括ISIS在內的恐怖組織，而不是針對阿薩德政權的。基於2001年911事件後、國會通過的以「反恐」為目的的「使用軍力授權法案（AUMF）」，奧巴馬給自己的行為找到了合法性依據。而AUMF法案賦予了總統採取行動制裁那些總統判定跟襲擊相關的恐怖組織的權力，無論是奧巴馬政府還是川普政府，他們都把AUMF解讀為其針對的對象也包括ISIS，所以他們才在伊拉克和敘利亞使用武力。這一論點本身是有爭議的，但這絕不意味著2001年AUMF法案授權總統可以對阿薩德政權動武。

Q: Has the Supreme Court settledthe matter?

A: Not even a little. During the CivilWar, the Supreme Court recognized that the President does have unilateral powerto "repel sudden attacks," what we generally refer to today as a"defensive war power." But the court has otherwise bent over backwardto avoid demarcating the lines between Congress and the president here --perhaps most famously during the Vietnam War, when it ducked dozens of casestrying to prompt a ruling on whether various US military operations insoutheast Asia were lawful. Last night"s strikes did not involve Trump"repel(ling) sudden attacks," so these precedents don"t help. Andperhaps more importantly, the absence of meaningful judicial precedents meansthat debates over whether particular uses of force were or were not lawful areleft to scholars and the political branches.

Q: 那最高法院是否解決了這個問題？

A: 一點也么有。在南北戰爭期間，最高法院肯定了總統有「抵禦突然襲擊」的權力，這一權力如今我們通常稱為「防衛戰爭權」。但另一方面，最高法院實際上也一直在迴避給總統和國會標定出權力的界限——眾所周知，越戰期間，最高法院推掉了數十個意圖裁判美軍行動是否合法的案子。昨晚（譯者註：指2017年4月6日）對敘利亞的空襲，當然跟「抵禦突然襲擊」無關，所以剛才說的這些先例並不能徹底解決這個問題。但也許更為重要的是，正因為以往的先例沒能給出明確判定，這也就意味著某一動武行為到底是否合法這類問題被留給了學者和政府。

Q: What do legal scholars say?

A: Although the Supreme Court hasn"tsettled the matter, there"s actually widespread consensus among scholars fromacross the ideological spectrum about at least some basic principles, includingthat the President does not need Congress"s specific approval before usingforce in (1) self-defense; (2) non-combat roles; or (3) situations in whichCongress has provided more general advance authorization, such as in support ofUN-authorized operations.

Q: 那麼法律學者怎麼說？

A: 雖然最高法院沒能給出明確界定，但有著不同意識形態的眾多法律學者們，就一些基本面還是達成了廣泛共識的，其中就包括「總統在哪些情況下，可以無需國會特別授權就可以動用武力」。這些情況有：(1) 防衛；(2) 將軍隊用於非戰鬥角色；或者(3) 那些國會提供了預授權的情況，比如參與執行聯合國授權的行動時。

Q: Does last night"s strike fallinto any of those categories?

A: It does not appear to -- and the WhiteHouse itself hasn"t so far argued otherwise. It might be different if there wasa broader international consensus -- and the strikes were in support ofmultilateral operations. But that"s not true here. Instead, what little theWhite House has said so far on the legal authority seems to imply that thestrike"s legality comes entirely from it being "in the nationalinterest" to stop the use and proliferation of chemical weapons,presumably for both regional security and humanitarian reasons.

Q: 昨晚的空襲屬於上述哪種情況呢？

A: 似乎哪種情況都不屬於——至少白宮自己到目前為止也沒給出別的說法。如果事先能有一個廣泛的國際共識，並且空襲是多國參與的多邊行動的一部分，那麼性質會有很大不同。然而實際情況並非如此。恰恰相反，到目前為止，白宮就空襲的合法性問題並沒有給出什麼說法，那麼這似乎也就意味著其合法性來自於：出於地區安全和人道主義原因，制止使用和擴散化學武器關乎美國「國家利益」。

Q: Why isn"t that enough for alegal justification to use force?

A: It"s a compelling policy argument, asmost Americans would agree that chemical weapons raise both security andhumanitarian concerns. But unilateral presidential war-making requires morethan just good policy arguments; it requires legal underpinning. If therereally is sufficient consensus on the wisdom of such force as a policy matter,the President can ask Congress to provide specific authorization.

Q: 那仍不足以使得空襲具備合法性么？為什麼？

A: 作為一個政論觀點，那足以令人信服，畢竟大多數美國人都認同化學武器是對和平和人道主義的威脅。但總統單方面做出戰爭決策需要的不僅僅是一個令人信服的政論觀點，它需要法律基礎。單純把這當成一項政治議題，如果確實有著廣泛共識，那總統本可以向國會要求特別授權。

Q: Why does the absence ofprecedent itself suggest that last night"s strike might be illegal?

A: Congress hasn"t expressly forbiddenunilateral uses of force outside of the three contexts mentioned above. But ithas, through a 1973 statute known as the War Powers Resolution, imposed aseries of procedural requirements to ensure that presidents keep Congress inthe loop, and it has imposed a 60-day limit on how long presidents can use suchforce without more express statutory approval. So it"s possible that, if lastnight"s strike was truly a one-off episode, it would be problematic as a matterof precedent, but not in blatant conflict with the War Powers Resolution.That"s why a lot depends on the next steps.

Q: 為什麼以往沒有先例足以指出昨晚的空襲可能是非法的？

A: 國會從未明確禁止總統在上述三種情況之外的條件下單方面動武。但通過1973年所立「戰爭權力決議」法案，國會特別制定了一系列程序性要求，以確保國會始終在決策鏈條中。該法案要求，如果沒有國會的明確授權，總統動用武力的時間不能超過60天。所以，情況可能是：如果昨晚的空襲就是一次性的非常事件，那麼作為先例會是有問題的，但至少肯定不違反「戰爭權力決議」。這就是為什麼說還得再看看事件的後續進展。

Q: The White House apparentlynotified numerous key congressional leaders of the strikes. Why isn"t thatenough?

A: It may be enough politically, but theConstitution requires more than just informal congressional notification andacquiescence; it requires that the use of force be justified either by thepresident"s inherent authority (which, again, usually extends only to thespecific categories identified above), or by a specific statute. During theKorean War, the Supreme Court specifically rejected an argument that Congresshad authorized Truman"s seizure of striking US steel mills simply by beingnotified and not objecting. So too, here.

Q: 關於空襲，白宮顯然提前通報了很多國會領袖。這還不夠么？為什麼？

A: 單純就政治層面來討論的話，那夠了；但在法律層面上，憲法的要求遠不止僅僅是非正式通報下國會、國會給予默許這麼簡單；憲法要求，對武力的使用，要麼基於總統本身的固有權威（再次強調下，只能適用於上述那幾種情況範疇），要麼就基於某項具體法案。朝鮮戰爭期間，杜魯門政府試圖強行接管美國鋼鐵產業，事前也通報了國會、並得到國會的默許，然而這一行為最終仍被最高法院判定違憲。這其實跟眼前的狀況是類似的。

Q: So what happens now?

A: Under the War Powers Resolution, thePresident is supposed to report to Congress within 48 hours on "(A) thecircumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed Forces; (B)the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction tookplace; and (C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities orinvolvement." If Trump complies with that requirement, we should know alot more by the end of the weekend. Then, it will be up to Congress whether topursue some kind of more express authorization, or to push back against the useof force, or, as is most likely, to do nothing. After 60 days, Congress doingnothing should have legal consequences if we"re still using force against theBashar al-Assad regime. But if we"re not, then this matter may fade into thebackground without domestic legal consequences.

Q: 那現在具體是什麼情況呢？

A: 根據「戰爭權力決議」，總統需要在48小時之內通報國會，報告需包含以下內容：(A)動用武裝力量的實際狀態；(B)動用武裝力量合憲、合法的授權情況；(C)對所涉衝突周期和程度的評估。如果川普遵照這個要求，那麼本周末就會有更多的信息被披露出來。屆時，就由國會來決策到底是給予更明確的授權，還是叫停繼續動武，亦或是更可能什麼都不做。60天後，如果我們繼續對阿薩德政權動武，而國會仍然什麼說法都沒給的話，那就會帶來法律問題。但是如果60天後沒有繼續動武了，那麼這事兒也就就此結束了。（譯者註：「戰爭權力決議」規定，美國總統單方面決策對外用兵後，如果60天內沒得到國會進一步授權，那麼必須得撤軍。）

Q: So the strike was legal?

A: Just because it may produce nodomestic consequences doesn"t mean it was legal. And, perhaps most importantly,it will now likely be very difficult as both a practical and legal matter forTrump to use additional military force against the Assad regime without morespecific approval from Congress. Until and unless that happens, though, therelikely will be no formal resolution of the legal question -- and, thus, onemore equivocal precedent in the separation of war powers.

Q: 如此說來，空襲是合法的？

A: 沒引起國內後果並不意味著空襲就是合法的。而且，也許最為重要的是，如果沒有國會的明確授權，無論從實踐還是從法律層面來說，川普要想對阿薩德政權進一步動武將會很難。除非這種情況發生，否則關於這個法律問題就不會有明確的決議，此外，對於戰爭權力的分配，從此就又多了一個模稜兩可的案例。

譯者註：以上討論的合不合法的問題，顯然指的是合不合美國的國內法。

雖然「只是」翻譯，但那顯然也是需要付出時間和精力的。

因此，任何官方/私下的轉載，還請徵詢我本人同意。

謝謝！

另外，嘗試下發圖片文字的效果。