Peter Thiel 2015 年 2 月的中國行，帶來哪些《從 0 到 1》中未提及的有價值信息？

01-22

包括但不限於演講、對話節目、《老友記》視頻節目中，談及了書內容之外的新觀點、案例等信息。

儘管有軟文宣傳等潛在趨向，這哥們來我還是想聽聽的。

對KK的追逐還沒有結束，打著明星企業家、矽谷大鱷、Paypal黑幫老大、斯坦福創業課教授等標籤的PT現在特別火。書看了，這哥們寫的特別實在有概念有落地感覺比KK的雲里霧裡好一些（純個人口味，無任何褒貶之意），本來想寫寫讀後感，看到不錯的，不如直接分享實在。

以下為豆瓣中一位讀者的各章讀書筆記，供各位學習和分享。

第一章《The Challenge of the Future》：全球化是橫向的擴張，只能複製以前就有的成功，而科技創新是縱向的擴張，是創造以前不存在的東西。沒有科技創新，只有全球化，這個世界只能玩完。這是為什麼要科技創新的原因。
　第二章《Party Like It』s 1999》：回顧1999年的科技泡沫的優劣。以及現在世界對待1999年科技泡沫的問題。1999年的互聯網失敗導致了人們的熱情轉向房地產、全球化，也導致了對科技的錯誤四條（一、玩增量安全路線；二、試錯，而不是計劃未來；三、玩競爭遊戲；四、不注重銷售）。1999年的互聯網泡沫的確有問題，但並不能全盤否定。保持創造世界的熱情，是必要的。後面的幾章會論述，如何實現這種熱情，而不是像1999年那樣被這些熱情毀滅。
　　第三章《All Happy Companies Are Alike》：本章說明了創新性壟斷才是一個公司應該有的狀態。完全競爭只能導致完全沒有利潤。而像Goolge這種創新性壟斷公司創造了「壟斷謊言」來讓人們以為Google沒有壟斷，作者告訴我們不要受Google這種公司的宣傳的蒙蔽。要勇於創造創新性壟斷公司。
　　第四章《The Ideology of Competition》：我們常常以為競爭才是商業的本質，甚至為了打敗對手，將所有精力放在競爭上，但是如果無法迅速取得勝利的競爭，只會導致價值的消耗，而不是創造價值。無法打敗對手，就聯合起來，比如當初peter thiel聯合elon musk創造了paypal。
　　第五章《Last Mover Advantage》：高盈利能力的持久性。一家企業的估值是由以後幾年的現金流決定的，這就是為什麼很多互聯網企業現階段雖然虧損或者盈利很少，但是有很高估值的原因。而持久性有幾個特徵，分別是：技術優勢（比第二名好10倍）、網路效應（需要規模、但大市場的規模比較難取得，所以一開始要進入小市場）、經濟規模（很多傳統產品都難以取得規模效應，網路產品的規模效應比較明顯）、品牌（品牌依附產品存在，僅僅有品牌的科技公司是行不通的，比如yahoo的mayer裝酷）。本章詳細論述了這四個特徵。開創創新性壟斷企業的路徑是：先在利基市場取得壟斷地位，再在成功的基礎上擴展到臨近市場，一步一步擴大壟斷，不要找原有產業的麻煩，不要像Napster那樣試圖去毀滅原有產業，因為這樣會帶來麻煩，當擴張到臨近產業的時候也要遵守這個原則。先發優勢並不一定是好的，末發優勢是等別人開創了市場，但是由自己來最後一擊。（末發優勢讓我想起來蘋果是怎樣開創ipod搞死其他mp3，開創iphone搞死諾基亞，開創ipad搞死上網本的過程）
　　第六章《You Are Not a Lottery Ticket》：人生觀的問題。成功來自於能力和計劃，而不是好運。美國的時代舒適性，也就是時代局限性，導致美國人以為成功者主要靠運氣。美國在1970年之前處於「遠見性樂觀」時代，那個時候的人願意樹立計劃來實現他們期望的未來。1970年之後，科技進步大大降低了，美國處於「無遠見樂觀時代」，美國人認定未來是樂觀的、進步的、科技創新的，但是沒有樹立計划去實現這個未來，所以，誰都不知道拿錢怎麼辦。美國的父母以為將孩子送到大學裡面，按照自己在1970年前經歷過的路徑走一遍，就可以像自己一樣得到幸福的人生。但是，孩子們都進入法學院、商學院，畢業了去銀行。銀行家把錢給投資人，投資人將錢投入股市，公司拿到錢之後不能創造新價值，只能抬高股價，最終，錢變成了終極目的。而不是像1970年以前，錢只是實現未來的一個工具。所以，當代美國是「無遠見樂觀時代」。當代中國是「遠見性悲觀時代」：中國人瘋狂儲蓄就是因為他們知道未來一定是悲觀的，中國人以複製西方的方式，註定是無法趕上西方的生活標準的，因為西方使用資源的方式無法滿足中國巨大人口的需求；中國之所以如此炫目，是因為中國的起步非常低，所以靠複製得來的增長在初始階段會非常快。歐洲是「無遠見性悲觀時代」，未來會變壞，但是是迅速變壞，還是緩慢變壞，歐洲人不知道，他們只是隨機應變。蘋果公司最牛逼的地方不是高明的設計，而是為了實現夢想，而設計未來，並實現未來。我們的人生不是一張彩票，我們不應該把我們的一切歸因於運氣，甚至放棄我們對未來的控制。控制未來，是我們應該做的事情。此外，Thiel還在本章吐槽了兩個東西：美國教育和長壽研究。美國教育的問題在於父母對孩子的未來規劃是基於父母自己順利的人生經歷來的，對創造世界缺乏興趣。而長壽研究則是對突破人類的壽命極限缺乏勇氣和計劃。
　　第七章《Follow the Money》：說明價值在哪裡。2/8定律對人生的啟發。只找最好的，因為最好的產生了更多的價值。這個世界是不成比例的。但是，大數定律在日常生活中是如此不顯著，以至於大部分人沒有注意到它。即使是投資家，也沒有。投資家，每年都會投資一堆企業。但是投資家會把自己每年每天的精力用在和初創的企業共同發展上，最後，投資家投資的企業中，一家帶來的收益超過其他所有，而第二名帶來的收益，又超過除了第一名的所有。美國新創企業的不到1%接受風險投資，風險投資金額只佔美國GDP的0.2%，但是風險投資的企業創造的就業崗位占私營部門的11%，這些企業的收益佔美國GDP的22%。最優秀的12家接受風險投資的企業價值2萬億。
　　我們在學校裡面接受相同的教育，但實際上，根據2/8定律，最靠前的企業才能得到超過後面所有人的收益。Google股票的0.01%值3500萬美元。人也是一樣，進入正確的公司，比在一個公司裡面做正確的事情有價值。這就是個人選擇職業時候，應該遵循的原則。
　　第八章《Secrets》：為什麼要創建公司的問題，以及從何處來創建公司。常識、秘密、不可及的知識，三者中，秘密是創建公司的基礎。常識不能帶來優勢，所以不能用於創建公司。不可及的知識無法實現，所以不能用於創建公司。原教旨主義讓人們無法追尋秘密。原教旨主義可能是因為在地球上，大部分地方都已經被人類探索過了。所以人們也覺得，其他領域也是這樣。另一個導致人們不敢追尋秘密的原因是害怕犯錯。第三個原因是自滿，學校的老師和父母讓學生相信只要沿著學校這條路走，人生就一定會圓滿。第四個原因是全球化導致的不自信，全球化的力量將人們的注意力引導向毫無差別的競爭，而讓人們不相信他們可以發現秘密。（這四條最後的總結有點現在這一代趕不上以前的那一代人的感覺）。經濟上的未知論導致了大家無限相信市場經濟，最終誰都不去懷疑市場是否運作正常，從而帶來了經濟泡沫。惠普運營公司上的未知論導致了惠普的董事會不去關注技術創新，而是僅僅保持公司運行正常，「等待創新自己來臨」，這導致了惠普的市值不斷下降。尋找秘密的方法是：去懷疑那些常人從來不懷疑的地方。而找到一個秘密之後，既不要誰也不告訴，也不要告訴任何人。開一個公司，將這個秘密變成一個創意，和公司內部的人分享這個秘密，才是合適的方法。
　　第九章《Foundations》：公司的組織結構的問題。有點難，再讀一遍。

　　看完張亮的《創業的首要問題》創業的首要問題 - 逆旅 - 知乎專欄，我把第九章的內容想清楚了。
　　本章指出大部分出問題的創業公司，問題都是在創業初期的時候就存在的。Thiel定律：A startup messed up at its foundation cannot be fixed。創業初期的決定將是至關重要的。接著，thiel講解了哪幾個問題是創業初期至關重要的，以及應該如何應對。第一個是合伙人。合夥就像結婚，合伙人的分歧就想離婚，嗯，像離婚一樣醜陋不堪。最終，分歧會犧牲公司。第二個是股權、運營者、執行者三者的分離將會導致的問題。尤其是運營者一般是創業者。投資人和創業者之間會出現問題。投資人一般希望越早上市套現越好，但運營者希望能讓公司成長更多再上市。這就得來一個結論：董事會的人越少越好，三個董事是最理想的，若為公開上市，最好不要超過五人。第三個是要公司裡面的每一個人全職工作，除非是律師、會計，遠程工作也應該避免。第四個是工資問題，ceo不應該領取超過15萬美元的年薪，即使最過分，也不能超過30萬年薪，否則ceo會變成一個政客而不是創業者。ceo工資不高也可以為每一個創業公司的員工樹立榜樣。任何形式的現金意味著現在，而不是未來。第五個是既得利益者的問題。用股權分配代替現金分配，是一個好的形式。但是這會帶來既得利益者的問題。即使如此，股權分配仍然是最好的吸引員工的方式。（比如當初給facebook刷牆的油漆工現在暴富了，很多人大概會覺得不公平。）
　　第十章《The Mechanics of Mafia》：公司裡面的人的問題。本章講述的是於什麼人來組成公司，以及招募什麼人，最後建立什麼樣的公司。和朋友、理想氣質相近的人建立公司是最靠譜的。
　　第十一章《If You Build It, Will They Come?》：本章講述了銷售的重要性。首先，闡明了銷售的必要性，打破了「好產品不需要銷售，就能獲得客戶」的謠言。並提出了「最好的銷售技巧是看不見的」理論。同時，論述了技術人員對銷售人員的誤解，甚至全社會對銷售人員的誤解。說明了銷售的核心是潛移默化地改變人的想法（這件事如此之讓人厭惡，所以銷任何銷售都必須是隱藏的，即使達到了目的，也不能說出來），而不是對客戶忠誠。接著，闡述了幾種一般性的銷售技巧：1、1百萬美元-1億美元之間的產品，以ceo來銷售，這種銷售需要前期精心的準備、高超的個人技巧、ceo這樣的人員檔次；2、1萬-10萬美元之間的產品，需要招募銷售人員來銷售，這種銷售方式也要遵循「從最緊急的微小市場開始先取得壟斷地位，再進一步擴大戰果」；3、1000美元左右的產品，比較難於銷售，因此其銷售成本大於銷售利益。而小企業軟體一般處於這個範圍，這也是為什麼小企業軟體發展非常慢的原因。4、大眾產品的銷售。靠電視廣告、各種大眾廣告。5、病毒銷售。一個用戶使用產品之後會帶來另一個用戶的過程就是病毒銷售。————銷售不僅遵循冪次定律，也遵循冪次定律：以上提到的某一種銷售方式帶來的收益，也許大於其他所有方式。銷售要針對合適的群體，針對這些群體正在使用的產品的痛點，實現徹底代替現有產品的壟斷目的，然後再擴大戰果，進入非痛點群體。最後，不僅僅產品銷售是銷售。媒體公關也是銷售，優秀的媒體公關會為公司帶來優秀的投資人、優秀的潛在員工、優秀的潛在客戶。實際上，任何人在任何時候，都是銷售人員。
　　第十二章《Man and Machine》：本章說明了兩個觀點：全球化是替代效應，因為人會替代人；電腦是補充效應，因為電腦的作用是協助人做更多工作。電腦在200年內不會取代人，近100年內，用電腦來協助人做更多工作才是創業的方向。第二個觀點是，大數據實際上是大量的愚蠢數據。因為電腦善於處理重複工作，而人善於做價值判斷和邏輯判斷。結合電腦和人的優點，才是開創未來的合適路勁。而不是試圖用電腦完全取代人，或者禁止電腦的發展。比如palantir就是因為當初paypal初創的時候有很多詐騙，paypal無法僅僅用電腦來識別詐騙，因為詐騙分子會隨時變化，而電腦軟體卻不能。所以，用軟體來標示出可疑分子，再用人來判斷是否真的是詐騙分子，就解決了paypal的詐騙問題。皮特泰爾根據此創意，開創了palantir公司，幫助政府部門、公司識別恐怖分子、金融詐騙等。
　　第十三章《Seeing Green》：本章以綠色能源的一種——太陽能板——為例子，講述了合適的創業是怎樣的。創業不是根據社會的大方向來模煳行動，而是有一個明確的創業根據，也就是必須有自己的秘密。提出了7個條件，來檢驗創業公司是否能成功。並且以美國太陽能板、Telsa，前者都失敗，後者成功，來對比說明了創業的方式和邏輯。
　　第十四章《The Founder』s Paradox》：本章先以美國大眾藝人為例子講述了藝人們的矛盾存在，一方面被人崇拜，一方面墮落失敗。然後將科技創業名人類比大眾藝人。說明創業中需要注意的問題。不要將創業成功全部當做自己的能力。不然會瘋狂。

轉自巴曙松：

由《創業家》和黑馬學院與中信出版社合作的「2015創投極客論壇」正式開講，京東劉強東、360周鴻禕、真格基金徐小平、創業家牛文文、今日資本徐新等中國創投界大咖與《從0到1》作者彼得.蒂尓同台論道科技創新。彼得.蒂尓是PayPal創始人，

他是Facebook第一位外部投資者，特斯拉投資人。也是Linkedin，SpaceX，Yelp投資人。矽谷真正創投教父，投資界的思想家。

現把現場同學的筆記分享給朋友，供大傢伙兒參考拍磚：）

上午，Peter Thiel在京分享其著作「從0到1」的精髓。提到一個有趣的創新觀點，把原有的碎片的內容經過大量協調重新整合後形成新的服務、能力或一種技術更是一個創新的藍海！古話講如何把閑落的珠子串起來形成新的生命力，值得深思和實踐…

彼得蒂爾說：「市場份額的重要性遠大於市場本身大小。」市場有可能被低估，但份額代表著一個團隊對市場的掌控力。鬼才知道市場明天會怎麼樣，做好現在的，未來就不遠。

1）什麼是一個偉大的公司？達到非競爭狀態（壟斷地位）公司是偉大的公司 2）如果一個創業項目有十個公司在爭投，我們就退出 3）錯失一個偉大公司的系統性盲點和成見是什麼？也許是固有的經驗和流程 4）企業不要看所在領域市場有多大，要看你的市場佔有率是多少

今天他強調，創業方向的選擇從壟斷小市場開始，不要選擇大而競爭激烈的市場，他不贊成破壞式創新的零和遊戲。其實看《從0到1》這本書講了3個互聯網的底層法則，也是殘酷甚至冷血的法則，也是傳統企業互聯網轉型的必修課。

Peter今天重新解讀「競爭是留給失敗者」的觀點：失敗是留給沉迷於競爭而忽略了更有價值的獨特性的公司。強調獨特性外，今天他還反覆提及「沉迷」與「偏見」兩詞，沉迷會讓我們在目前看似非常重要但最終卻是毫無價值的競爭中失敗，偏見會讓我們低估或高估很多東西。

呵呵，恰巧剛看完《zero to one》，把我認為的精華摘出來

本讀書筆記摘要僅供學習使用，原書版權歸其作者所有，特此說明。

Contents Preface: Zero to One

1 The Challenge of the Future

2 Party Like It』s 1999

3 All Happy Companies Are Different

4 The Ideology of Competition

5 Last Mover Advantage

6 You Are Not a Lottery Ticket

7 Follow the Money

8 Secrets

9 Foundations

10 The Mechanics of Mafia

11 If You Build It, Will They Come?

12 Man and Machine -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 22-33. Accessed: 2/11/2015

13 Seeing Green 14 The Founder』s Paradox Conclusion: Stagnation or Singularity? -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 33-35. Accessed: 2/11/2015

Zero to One is about how to build companies that create new things. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 56-56. Accessed: 2/11/2015

Indeed, the single most powerful pattern I have noticed is that successful people find value in unexpected places, and they do this by thinking about business from first principles instead of formulas. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 60-61. Accessed: 2/11/2015

Brilliant thinking is rare, but courage is in even shorter supply than genius. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 72-73. Accessed: 2/11/2015

No one can predict the future exactly, but we know two things: it』s going to be different, and it must be rooted in today』s world. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 82-83. Accessed: 2/11/2015

At the macro level, the single word for horizontal progress is globalization—taking things that work somewhere and making them work everywhere. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 90-91. Accessed: 2/11/2015

China is the paradigmatic example of globalization; its 20-year plan is to become like the United States is today. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 91-92. Accessed: 2/11/2015

The single word for vertical, 0 to 1 progress is technology. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 95-95. Accessed: 2/11/2015

But I don』t think that』s true. My own answer to the contrarian question is that most people think the future of the world will be defined by globalization, but the truth is that technology matters more. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 105-107. Accessed: 2/11/2015

This book is about the questions you must ask and answer to succeed in the business of doing new things: what follows is not a manual or a record of knowledge but an exercise in thinking. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 130-132. Accessed: 2/11/2015

The Mosaic browser was officially released in November 1993, -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 159-159. Accessed: 2/11/2015

Dot-com mania was intense but short—18 months of insanity from September 1998 to March 2000. It was a Silicon Valley gold rush: there was money everywhere, and no shortage of exuberant, often sketchy people to chase it. Every week, dozens of new startups competed to throw the most lavish launch party. (Landing parties were much more rare.) Paper millionaires would rack up thousand-dollar dinner bills and try to pay with shares of their startup』s stock—sometimes it even worked. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 181-184. Accessed: 2/11/2015

we wanted to create a new internet currency to replace the U.S. dollar. Our first product let people beam money from one PalmPilot to another. However, nobody had any use for that product except the journalists who voted it one of the 10 worst business ideas of 1999. PalmPilots were still too exotic then, but email was already commonplace, so we decided to create a way to send and receive payments over email. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 196-199. Accessed: 2/11/2015

Globalization replaced technology as the hope for the future. Since the 』90s migration 「from bricks to clicks」 didn』t work as hoped, investors went back to bricks (housing) and BRICs (globalization). The result was another bubble, this time in real estate. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 219-221. Accessed: 2/11/2015

The entrepreneurs who stuck with Silicon Valley learned four big lessons from the dot-com crash that still guide business thinking today: 1. Make incremental advances Grand visions inflated the bubble, so -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 222-225. Accessed: 2/11/2015

they should not be indulged. Anyone who claims to be able to do something great is suspect, and anyone who wants to change the world should be more humble. Small, incremental steps are the only safe path forward. 2. Stay lean and flexible All companies must be 「lean,」 which is code for 「unplanned.」 You should not know what your business will do; planning is arrogant and inflexible. Instead you should try things out, 「iterate,」 and treat entrepreneurship as agnostic experimentation. 3. Improve on the competition Don』t try to create a new market prematurely. The only way to know you have a real business is to start -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 225-231. Accessed: 2/11/2015

with an already existing customer, so you should build your company by improving on recognizable products already offered by successful competitors. 4. Focus on product, not sales If your product requires advertising or salespeople to sell it, it』s not good enough: technology is primarily about product development, not distribution. Bubble-era advertising was obviously wasteful, so the only sustainable growth is viral growth. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 231-234. Accessed: 2/11/2015

It』s true that there was a bubble in technology. The late 』90s was a time of hubris: people believed in going from 0 to 1. Too few startups were actually getting there, and many never went beyond talking about it. But people understood that we had no choice but to find ways to do more with less. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 240-242. Accessed: 2/11/2015

We still need new technology, and we may even need some 1999-style hubris and exuberance to get it. To build the next generation of companies, we must abandon the dogmas created after the crash. That doesn』t mean the opposite ideas are automatically true: you can』t escape the madness of crowds by dogmatically rejecting them. Instead ask yourself: how much of what you know about business is shaped by mistaken reactions to past mistakes? The most contrarian thing of all is not to oppose the crowd but to think for yourself. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 244-247. Accessed: 2/11/2015

Actually, capitalism and competition are opposites. Capitalism is premised on the accumulation of capital, but under perfect competition all profits get competed away. The lesson for -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 271-272. Accessed: 2/11/2015

entrepreneurs is clear: if you want to create and capture lasting value, don』t build an undifferentiated commodity business. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 272-273. Accessed: 2/11/2015

tend to do whatever they can to conceal -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 283-284. Accessed: 2/11/2015

If that doesn』t seem dominant enough, consider the fact that the word 「google」 is now an official entry in the Oxford English Dictionary—as a verb. Don』t hold your breath waiting for that to happen to Bing. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 287-288. Accessed: 2/11/2015

In contrast to the competitive local restaurant market, PayPal was at that time the only email-based payments company in the world. We employed fewer people than the restaurants on Castro Street did, but our business was much more valuable -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 310-312. Accessed: 2/11/2015

than all of those restaurants combined. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 312-312. Accessed: 2/11/2015

The competitive ecosystem pushes people toward ruthlessness or death. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 336-337. Accessed: 2/11/2015

A monopoly like Google is different. Since it doesn』t have to worry about competing with anyone, it has wider latitude to care about its workers, its products, and its impact on the wider world. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 337-338. Accessed: 2/11/2015

Monopolists can afford to think about things other than making money; non-monopolists can』t. In perfect competition, a business is so focused on today』s margins that it can』t possibly plan for a long-term future. Only one thing can allow a business to transcend the daily brute struggle for survival: monopoly profits. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 340-343. Accessed: 2/11/2015

Monopoly is therefore not a pathology or an exception. Monopoly is the condition of every successful business. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 374-375. Accessed: 2/12/2015

All happy companies are different: each one earns a monopoly by solving a unique problem. All failed companies are the same: they failed to escape competition. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 376-377. Accessed: 2/12/2015

competition is an ideology—the ideology—that pervades our society and distorts our thinking. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 382-383. Accessed: 2/12/2015

Why do people compete with each other? Marx and Shakespeare provide two models for understanding almost every kind of conflict. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 411-412. Accessed: 2/12/2015

According to Marx, people fight because they are different. The proletariat fights the bourgeoisie because they have completely different ideas and goals (generated, for Marx, by their very different material circumstances). The greater the differences, the greater the conflict. To Shakespeare, by contrast, all combatants look more or less alike. It』s not at all clear why they should be fighting, since they have nothing to fight about. Consider the opening line from Romeo and Juliet: 「Two households, both alike in dignity.」 The two houses are alike, yet they hate each other. They grow even more similar as the feud escalates. Eventually, they lose sight of why they started fighting in the first place. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 412-417. Accessed: 2/12/2015

In the world of business, at least, Shakespeare proves the superior guide. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 417-418. Accessed: 2/12/2015

Inside a firm, people become obsessed with their competitors for career advancement. Then the firms themselves become obsessed with their competitors in the marketplace. Amid all the human drama, people lose sight of what matters and focus on their rivals instead. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 418-420. Accessed: 2/12/2015

Winning is better than losing, but -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 446-446. Accessed: 2/12/2015

everybody loses when the war isn』t one worth fighting. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 446-447. Accessed: 2/12/2015

But a great business is defined by its ability to generate cash flows in the future. Investors expect Twitter will be able to capture monopoly profits over the next decade, while newspapers』 monopoly days are over. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 490-491. Accessed: 2/12/2015

Most of a tech company』s value will come at least 10 to 15 years in the future. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 499-500. Accessed: 2/12/2015

the most important question you should be asking: will this business still be around a decade from now? -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 518-519. Accessed: 2/12/2015

What does a company with large cash flows far into the future look like? Every monopoly is unique, but they usually share some combination of the following characteristics: proprietary technology, network effects, economies of scale, and branding. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 521-523. Accessed: 2/12/2015

As a good rule of thumb, proprietary technology must be at least 10 times better than its closest substitute in some important dimension to lead to a real -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 530-531. Accessed: 2/12/2015

monopolistic advantage. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 531-531. Accessed: 2/12/2015

Software startups can enjoy especially dramatic economies of scale because the marginal cost of producing another copy of the product is close to zero. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 560-561. Accessed: 2/12/2015

Apple has a complex suite of proprietary technologies, both in hardware (like superior touchscreen materials) and software (like touchscreen interfaces purpose-designed for specific materials). It manufactures products at a scale large enough to dominate pricing for the materials it buys. And it enjoys strong network effects from its content ecosystem: thousands of developers write software for Apple devices because that』s where hundreds of millions of users are, and those users stay on the platform because it』s where the apps are. These other monopolistic advantages are less obvious than Apple』s -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 574-578. Accessed: 2/12/2015

sparkling brand, but they are the fundamentals that let the branding effectively reinforce Apple』s monopoly. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 578-579. Accessed: 2/12/2015

Therefore, every startup should start with a very small market. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 590-590. Accessed: 2/12/2015

Any big market is a bad choice, and a big market already served by competing companies is even worse. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 599-600. Accessed: 2/12/2015

Jeff Bezos』s founding vision was to dominate all of online retail, but he very deliberately started with books. There were millions of books to catalog, but they all had roughly the same shape, they were easy to ship, and some of the most rarely sold books—those least profitable for any retail store to keep in stock—also drew the most enthusiastic customers. Amazon became the dominant solution for anyone located far from a bookstore or seeking something unusual. Amazon then had two options: expand the number of people who read books, or expand to adjacent markets. They chose the latter, starting with the most similar markets: CDs, videos, and software. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 604-609. Accessed: 2/12/2015

Sequencing markets correctly is underrated, and it takes discipline to expand gradually. The most successful companies make the core progression—to first dominate a specific niche and then scale to adjacent markets—a part of their -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 619-621. Accessed: 2/12/2015

founding narrative. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 621-621. Accessed: 2/12/2015

As you craft a plan to expand to adjacent markets, don』t disrupt: avoid competition as much as possible. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 640-641. Accessed: 2/12/2015

Perhaps these guys are being strategically humble. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 656-656. Accessed: 2/12/2015

Ralph Waldo Emerson captured this ethos when he wrote: 「Shallow men believe in luck, believe in circumstances.… Strong men believe in cause and effect.」 -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 669-670. Accessed: 2/12/2015

If you treat the future as something definite, it makes sense to understand it in advance and to work to shape it. But if you expect an indefinite future ruled by randomness, you』ll give up on trying to master it. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 679-681. Accessed: 2/12/2015

a definite person determines the one best thing to do and then does it. Instead of working tirelessly to make herself indistinguishable, she strives to be great at something substantive—to be a monopoly of one. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 687-688. Accessed: 2/12/2015

The indefinite pessimist can』t know whether the inevitable decline will be fast or slow, catastrophic or gradual. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 698-699. Accessed: 2/12/2015

A definite pessimist believes the future can be known, but since it will be bleak, he must prepare for it. Perhaps surprisingly, China is probably the most definitely pessimistic place in the world today. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 701-702. Accessed: 2/12/2015

In the late 20th century, indefinite philosophies came to the fore. The two dominant political thinkers, John Rawls and Robert Nozick, are usually seen as stark opposites: on the egalitarian left, Rawls was concerned with questions of -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 798-800. Accessed: 2/12/2015

fairness and distribution; on the libertarian right, Nozick focused on maximizing individual freedom. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 800-800. Accessed: 2/12/2015

But unlike Spencer or Marx, Rawls and Nozick were indefinite optimists: they didn』t have any specific vision of the future. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 801-802. Accessed: 2/12/2015

progress without planning is what we call 「evolution.」 -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 849-850. Accessed: 2/13/2015

Long-term planning is often undervalued by our indefinite short-term world. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 871-871. Accessed: 2/13/2015

In 1906, economist Vilfredo Pareto discovered what became the 「Pareto principle,」 or the 80-20 rule, when he noticed that 20% of the people owned 80% of the land in Italy—a -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 898-900. Accessed: 2/13/2015

but everyone needs to know exactly one thing that even venture capitalists struggle to understand: we don』t live in a normal world; we live under a power law. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 907-908. Accessed: 2/13/2015

This is because venture returns don』t follow a normal distribution overall. Rather, they follow a power law: a small handful of companies radically outperform all others. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 923-925. Accessed: 2/13/2015

Our results at Founders Fund illustrate this skewed pattern: Facebook, the best investment in our 2005 fund, returned more than all the others combined. Palantir, the second-best investment, is set to return more than the sum of every other investment aside from Facebook. This highly uneven pattern is not unusual: we see it in all our other funds as well. The biggest secret in venture capital is that the best investment in a successful fund equals or outperforms the entire rest of the fund combined. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 928-931. Accessed: 2/13/2015

This implies two very strange rules for VCs. First, only invest in companies that have the potential to return the value of the entire fund. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 932-933. Accessed: 2/13/2015

This leads to rule number two: because rule number one is so restrictive, there can』t be any other rules. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 934-935. Accessed: 2/13/2015

「it doesn』t matter what you do, as long as you do it well.」 That is completely false. It does matter what you do. You should focus relentlessly on something you』re -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 982-983. Accessed: 2/13/2015

good at doing, but before that you must think hard about whether it will be valuable in the future. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 984-984. Accessed: 2/13/2015

There are two kinds of secrets: secrets of nature and secrets about people. Natural secrets exist all around us; to find them, one must study some undiscovered aspect of the physical world. Secrets about people are different: they are things that people don』t know about themselves or things they hide because they don』t want others to know. So when thinking about what kind of company to build, there are two distinct questions to ask: What secrets is nature not telling you? What secrets are people not telling you? -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 1122-1125. Accessed: 2/15/2015

Now when I consider investing in a startup, I study the founding teams. Technical abilities and complementary skill sets matter, but how well the founders know each other and how well they work together matter just as much. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 1189-1190. Accessed: 2/15/2015

Unlike corporate giants, early-stage startups are small enough that founders usually have both ownership and possession. Most conflicts in a startup erupt between ownership and control—that is, between founders and investors on the board. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 1225-1227. Accessed: 2/15/2015

A company does better the less it pays the CEO—that』s one of the single clearest patterns I』ve noticed from investing in hundreds of startups. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 1246-1247. Accessed: 2/15/2015

Giving everyone equal shares is usually a mistake: every individual has different talents and responsibilities as well as different opportunity costs, so equal amounts will seem arbitrary and unfair from the start. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 1263-1265. Accessed: 2/16/2015

The only good answers are specific to your company, so you won』t find them in this book. But there are two general kinds of good answers: answers about your mission and answers about your team. You』ll attract the employees you need if -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 1325-1326. Accessed: 2/16/2015

you can explain why your mission is compelling: not why it』s important in general, but why you』re doing something important that no one else is going to get done. That』s the only thing that can make its importance unique. At PayPal, if you were excited by the idea of creating a new digital currency to replace the U.S. dollar, we wanted to talk to you; if not, you weren』t the right fit. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 1326-1329. Accessed: 2/16/2015

hoodie -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 1341-1341. Accessed: 2/16/2015

The best thing I did as a manager at -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 1355-1355. Accessed: 2/16/2015

PayPal was to make every person in the company responsible for doing just one thing. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 1355-1355. Accessed: 2/16/2015

Like acting, sales works best when hidden. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 1410-1410. Accessed: 2/24/2015

People who sell advertising are called 「account executives.」 People who sell customers work in 「business development.」 People who sell companies are 「investment bankers.」 And people who sell themselves are called 「politicians.」 -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 1411-1413. Accessed: 2/24/2015

The challenge here isn』t about how to make any particular sale, but how to establish a process by which a sales team of modest size can move the product to a wide audience. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 1454-1455. Accessed: 2/26/2015

Whoever is first to dominate the most important segment of a market with viral potential will be the last mover in the whole market. At PayPal we didn』t want to acquire more users at random; we wanted to get the most valuable users first. The most obvious market segment in email-based payments was the millions of emigrants still using Western Union to wire money to their families back home. Our product made that effortless, but the transactions were too infrequent. We needed a smaller niche market segment with a higher velocity of money—a segment we found in eBay 「PowerSellers,」 the professional vendors who sold goods online through eBay』s auction marketplace. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 1509-1514. Accessed: 2/26/2015

Your company needs to sell more than its product. You must also sell your company to employees and investors. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 1523-1524. Accessed: 2/26/2015

Selling your company to the media is a necessary part of selling it to everyone else. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 1527-1528. Accessed: 2/26/2015

We don』t trade with computers any more than we trade with livestock or lamps. And that』s the point: computers are tools, not rivals. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 1582-1583. Accessed: 2/26/2015

EVER-SMARTER COMPUTERS: FRIEND OR FOE? -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 1654-1654. Accessed: 2/27/2015

Most cleantech companies crashed because they neglected one or more of the seven questions that every business must answer: 1. The Engineering Question Can you create breakthrough technology instead of incremental improvements? 2. The Timing Question Is now the right time to start your particular business? 3. The Monopoly Question Are you starting with a big share of a small market? 4. The People Question Do you have the right team? 5. The Distribution Question Do you have a way to not just create but deliver your product? 6. The Durability Question Will your market position be defensible 10 and 20 years into the future? 7. The Secret Question Have you identified a unique opportunity that others don』t see? -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 1681-1692. Accessed: 2/27/2015

Companies must strive for 10x better because merely incremental improvements often end up meaning no improvement at all for the end user. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 1705-1706. Accessed: 2/27/2015

At Founders Fund, we saw this coming. The most obvious clue was sartorial: cleantech executives were running around wearing suits and ties. This was a huge red flag, because real technologists wear T-shirts and jeans. So we instituted a blanket rule: pass on any company whose founders dressed up for pitch meetings. Maybe we still would have avoided these bad investments if we had taken the time to evaluate each company』s technology in detail. But the team insight—never invest in a tech CEO that wears a suit—got us to the truth a lot faster. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 1750-1754. Accessed: 2/27/2015

The best sales is hidden. There』s nothing wrong with a CEO who can sell, but if he actually looks like a salesman, he』s probably bad at sales and worse at tech. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 1754-1755. Accessed: 2/27/2015

Every entrepreneur should plan to be the last mover in her particular market. That starts with asking yourself: what will the world look like 10 and 20 years from now, and how will my business fit in? -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 1775-1776. Accessed: 2/27/2015

Great companies have secrets: specific reasons for success that other people don』t see. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 1803-1804. Accessed: 2/27/2015

corporations have great power, but they』re shackled to the profit motive; nonprofits pursue the public interest, but they』re weak players in the wider economy. Social entrepreneurs aim to combine the best of both worlds and 「do well by doing good.」 Usually they end up doing neither. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 1808-1809. Accessed: 2/27/2015

The best projects are likely to be overlooked, not trumpeted by a crowd; the best problems to work on are often the ones nobody else even tries to solve. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 1816-1817. Accessed: 2/27/2015

An entrepreneur can』t benefit from macro-scale insight unless his own plans begin at the micro-scale. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 1862-1863. Accessed: 2/27/2015

Could successful energy startups be founded after the cleantech crash just as Web 2.0 startups successfully launched amid the debris of the dot-coms? The macro need for energy solutions is still real. But a valuable business must start by finding a niche and dominating a small market. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 1867-1869. Accessed: 2/27/2015

But it happens all the time to founders: startup CEOs can be cash poor but millionaires on paper. They may oscillate between sullen jerkiness and appealing charisma. Almost all successful entrepreneurs are simultaneously insiders and outsiders. And when they do succeed, they attract both fame and infamy. When you plot them out, founders』 traits appear to follow an inverse normal distribution: -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 1893-1896. Accessed: 2/27/2015

Celebrities are supposedly 「American royalty.」 We even grant titles to our favorite performers: Elvis Presley was the king of rock. Michael Jackson was the king of pop. Britney Spears was the pop princess. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 1946-1948. Accessed: 2/27/2015

Our task today is to find singular ways to create the new things that will make the future not just different, but better—to go from 0 to 1. -- XXXX@sohu.com, zero to one. Kindle Edition. loc. 2050-2051. Accessed: 2/27/2015

他在這次大會上的演講內容基本還是Zero to One 中的觀點。只是他把他覺得重要的部分再拿出來重申一次。Zero to One當中的觀點非常有意思，而且不是普通的快餐式文章，值得不斷地拿出來思考和討論，所以我覺得即使Peter Thiel這次大會是重申觀點，也是正常的。

這次大會離Zero to One的出版時間(去年9月份)不算太久，如果他有什麼重要的有價值的看法，應該早就會寫入書中。所以，這次大會他重申書中觀點是在意料之中。