如何看待6月24日弗朗西斯·福山發表的『美國政治崩潰或復興』？

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亨廷頓學生哈佛政治學教授發表於最新一期外交雜誌。
全文翻譯：福山：美國政治的衰敗和復興 - 李傾城的文章 - 知乎專欄

福山這篇分析還是很有料的，他指出結構性失業是不可能靠什麼掩耳盜鈴式的培訓來解決。

人力資本的流動也遠遠不如資本流動來的迅速無門檻。

不過他的藥方仍然是縫縫補補，說不出口的一句話無非還是要靠收割全球其他地區，讓美國依然佔據全球金字塔的頂端，才有分蛋糕的能力。

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大家不能接受現實，真正的競爭必然會帶來淘汰，而淘汰就真的會完蛋，否則就不叫淘汰。

只不過過去的淘汰要麼是時間比較漫長，要麼就是被邊緣化了，群眾們沒看見只當作不知道，而今，這躲也躲不開，未免有點良心過不去------------太膈應。

你想連科學進步都是靠著舊時代專家的去世而誕生新的話語權。

不管如何去緩解陣痛，最終只有靠時間把失敗者們都送走，倖存者們才可以鬆口氣謝天謝地坐下來享受。

全球化必然帶來更激烈的競爭，過去的小圈子女神，現在哪裡能看呢？勝者全得啊！

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他以前說歷史的終結，哪裡有什麼終結呢？

哪一個新朝代的誕生不都是想總結經驗教訓，終結歷史輪迴，從此一世二世乃至於萬世。

刀槍入庫馬放南山。

最後太平日久，物腐蟲生，不管多小的縫隙都會被沖刷成鴻溝。

美國也不例外。

前面幾百年裡面，美國度過了一個漫長的青春期而已。所有一些問題，在發育期都不是問題，因為有速度就不怕自行車只有兩個輪子。

生於憂患死於安樂，當世界只有一個超級大國的時候，美國的衰亡就開始了。

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我還要說另外一個觀點，真正的民主是必然帶來分裂的。因為怎麼解決不同的意見？願賭服輸不是最後解決的方法，分家才是。當然你也可以鎮壓，肉體消滅，不過這和民主是背道而馳的。

我舉個例子，美國有AMISH人，這個奇怪的群體在美國就是絕對民主制度。他們的辦法就是靠分裂。比如從小洗腦，但是肯定有洗不了的，青春期請出去晃兩年，決定了再回來，不行就走人---------------六字真言啊！（愛乾乾不幹滾）

然後小國寡民扁平化直接民主，人數維持在鄧巴數150人左右。多了就分家。

分家按照不同的保守程度可以繪製一長條光譜，你自己覺得該在哪裡都能去，或者直接建立新群體都行。

amish人從最保守的到最接近現代社會的都有。他們最接近現代社會的人群，也就是基本等同於現代社會中最保守群體的最保守分子。

他們靠分裂保證了全體的團結。

任何一個群體大了就會產生不同見解不同利益，硬要維持就得加強控制力然後統治力量加強就會變成正反饋了。

美國立國之戰，驅逐了親英派。大批親英派不是回了英國就是出走加拿大。留下的人建立了志同道合的美國。

今天這樣的用腳投票依然有，肯定有大量美國人打算移民加拿大（不是墨西哥）。英國公投之後也有英國人打算移民加拿大的。

當年整個歐洲的異見者都投奔了新大陸。而今天哪裡還有新大陸呢?

火星？

@黃繼續指出

quote 同樣的情景放在美國，就是川普指責中國人搶了美國老百姓的工作，要求中國商品增加關稅，製造業重回美國。石油等資源美國應該本土開採，給美國的工人階級創造就業機會。川普深刻清醒地認識到了美國底層民眾生活水平下降正是由於全球化導致的，但他也無法給出一個完美的對策，只能提出貿易保護主義與孤立主義來安撫民心。如果川普能夠想出更好的解決辦法，一定能俘獲桑德斯支持者的歡心，得到更高的支持率。

英國脫歐會對美國大選造成什麼影響？ - 唐納德·特朗普（Donald Trump）

在一個深刻全球化的時代。或者說全球化剛開始退潮的時代孤立主義絕對是錯誤的。Trump必須也和Boris一樣發言。

quote 英國脫歐了但是英國一直都是歐洲的國家。英國從來都是開放的並一直會開放，英國歡迎歐洲人來英國旅遊，學習，投資，工作，英國也會和歐洲國家積極進行經濟，貿易往來。

在這個國際環境下。李明博提出並實踐成功的朴槿惠繼承的『國家能力』『國家經營』才是真正可行方向，策略。要實現這個目標必須建立一個高效精簡的聯邦政府技術官僚團隊。就像韓國，新加坡一樣。這個政府必須透明，專業，清廉。並且得到廣泛的民意支持。在美國同時還需要限制聯邦法院，地方法院，國會，地方議會職能。美國的司法系統，立法系統現在侵犯行政系統職能問題太嚴重。導致國會內耗政府停擺，國稅條文臃腫收稅低效普通百姓納稅還得求助律師，個人集體訴訟政府案泛濫。

當然反建制。反政治正確也是非常需要。

Two years ago, I argued in these pages that America was suffering from political decay. The country』s constitutional system of checks and balances, combined with partisan polarization and the rise of well-financed interest groups, had combined to yield what I labeled 「vetocracy,」 a situation in which it was easier to stop government from doing things than it was to use govern-ment to promote the common good. Recurrent budgetary crises, stagnating bureaucracy, and a lack of policy innovation were the hall-marks of a political system in disarray.

On the surface, the 2016 presidential election seems to be bearing out this analysis. The once proud Republican Party lost control of its nominating process to Donald Trump』s hostile takeover and is riven with deep internal contradictions. On the Democratic side, meanwhile, the ultra-insider Hillary Clinton has faced surprisingly strong competition from Bernie Sanders, a 74-year-old self-proclaimed demo-cratic socialist. Whatever the issue—from immigration to financial reform to trade to stagnating incomes—large numbers of voters on both sides of the spectrum have risen up against what they see as a corrupt, self-dealing Establishment, turning to radical outsiders in the hopes of a purifying cleanse.

In fact, however, the turbulent campaign has shown that American democracy is in some ways in better working order than expected. Whatever one might think of their choices, voters have flocked to the polls in state after state and wrested control of the political narrative from organized interest groups and oligarchs. Jeb Bush, the son and brother of presidents who once seemed the inevitable Republican choice, ignominiously withdrew from the race in February after having blown through more than $130 million (together with his super PAC). Sanders, meanwhile, limiting himself to small donations and pledging to disempower the financial elite that supports his opponent, has raised even more than Bush and nipped at Clinton』s heels throughout.

The real story of this election is that after several decades, American democracy is finally responding to the rise of inequality and the economic stagnation experienced by most of the population. Social class is now back at the heart of American politics, trumping other cleavages—race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, geography—that had dominated discussion in recent elections.

The gap between the fortunes of elites and those of the rest of the public has been growing for two generations, but only now is it coming to dominate national politics. What really needs to be explained is not why populists have been able to make such gains this cycle but why it took them so long to do so. Moreover, although it is good to know that the U.S. political system is less ossified and less in thrall to monied elites than many assumed, the nostrums being hawked by the populist crusaders are nearly entirely unhelpful, and if embraced, they would stifle growth, exacerbate malaise, and make the situation worse rather than better. So now that the elites have been shocked out of their smug complacency, the time has come for them to devise more workable solutions to the problems they can no longer deny or ignore.

THE SOCIAL BASIS OF POPULISM

In recent years, it has become ever harder to deny that incomes have been stagnating for most U.S. citizens even as elites have done better than ever, generating rising inequality throughout American society. Certain basic facts, such as the enormously increased share of national wealth taken by the top one percent, and indeed the top 0.1 percent, are increasingly uncontested. What is new this political cycle is that attention has started to turn from the excesses of the oligarchy to the straitened circumstances of those left behind.

Two recent books—Charles Murray』s Coming Apart and Robert Putnam』s Our Kids—lay out the new social reality in painful detail. Murray and Putnam are at opposite ends of the political spectrum, one a libertarian conservative and the other a mainstream liberal, yet the data they report are virtually identical. Working-class incomes have declined over the past generation, most dramatically for white men with a high school education or less. For this group, Trump』s slogan, 「Make America Great Again!」 has real meaning. But the pathologies they suffer from go much deeper and are revealed in data on crime, drug use, and single-parent families.

Supporters greet Sanders at a rally in Carson, California, May 2016.

Lucy Nicholson / Reuters

Supporters greet Sanders at a rally in Carson, California, May 2016.

Back in the 1980s, there was a broad national conversation about the emergence of an African American underclass—that is, a mass of underemployed and underskilled people whose poverty seemed self-replicating because it led to broken families that were unable to transmit the kinds of social norms and behaviors required to compete in the job market. Today, the white working class is in virtually the same position as the black underclass was back then.

During the run-up to the primary in New Hampshire—a state that is about as white and rural as any in the country—many Americans were likely surprised to learn that voters』 most important concern there was heroin addiction. In fact, opioid and methamphetamine addiction have become as epidemic in rural white communities in states such as Indiana and Kentucky as crack was in the inner city a generation ago. A recent paper by the economists Anne Case and Angus Deaton showed that the death rates for white non-Hispanic middle-aged men in the United States rose between 1999 and 2013, even as they fell for virtually every other population group and in every other rich country. The causes of this increase appear to have been suicide, drugs, and alcohol—nearly half a million excess deaths over what would have been expected. And crime rates for this group have skyrocketed as well.

American democracy is finally responding to the economic stagnation of most of the population.

This increasingly bleak reality, however, scarcely registered with American elites—not least because over the same period, they themselves were doing quite well. People with at least a college education have seen their fortunes rise over the decades. Rates of divorce and single-parent families have decreased among this group, nei**orhood crime has fallen steadily, cities have been reclaimed for young urbanites, and technologies such as the Internet and social media have powered social trust and new forms of community engagement. For this group, helicopter parents are a bigger problem than latchkey children.

THE FAILURE OF POLITICS

Given the enormity of the social shift that has occurred, the real question is not why the United States has populism in 2016 but why the explosion did not occur much earlier. And here there has indeed been a problem of representation in American institutions: neither political party has served the declining group well.

In recent decades, the Republican Party has been an uneasy coalition of business elites and social conservatives, the former providing money, and the latter primary votes. The business elites, represented by the editorial page of The Wall Street Journal, have been principled advocates of economic liberalism: free markets, free trade, and open immigration. It was Republicans who provided the votes to pass trade legislation such as the North American Free Trade Agreement and the recent trade promotion authority (more commonly known as 「fast track」). Their business backers clearly benefit from both the import of foreign labor, skilled and unskilled, and a global trading system that allows them to export and invest around the globe. Republicans pushed for the dismantling of the Depression-era system of bank regulation that laid the groundwork for the subprime meltdown and the resulting financial crisis of 2008. And they have been ideologically committed to cutting taxes on wealthy Americans, undermining the power of labor unions, and reducing social services that stood to benefit the less well-off.

This agenda ran directly counter to the interests of the working class. The causes of the working class』 decline are complex, having to do as much with technological change as with factors touched by public policy. And yet it is undeniable that the pro-market shift promoted by Republican elites in recent decades has exerted downward pressure on working-class incomes, both by exposing workers to more ruthless technological and global competition and by paring back various protections and social benefits left over from the New Deal. (Countries such as Germany and the Netherlands, which have done more to protect their workers, have not seen comparable increases in inequality.) It should not be surprising, therefore, that the biggest and most emotional fight this year is the one taking place within the Republican Party, as its working-class base expresses a clear preference for more nationalist economic policies.

The Democrats, for their part, have traditionally seen themselves as champions of the common man and can still count on a shrinking base of trade union members to help get out the vote. But they have also failed this constituency. Since the rise of Bill Clinton』s 「third way,」 elites in the Democratic Party have embraced the post-Reagan consensus on the benefits of free trade and immigration. They were complicit in the dismantling of bank regulation in the 1990s and have tried to buy off, rather than support, the labor movement over its objections to trade agreements.

But the more important problem with the Democrats is that the party has embraced identity politics as its core value. The party has won recent elections by mobilizing a coalition of population segments: women, African Americans, young urbanites, gays, and environmentalists. The one group it has completely lost touch with is the same white working class that was the bedrock of Franklin Roosevelt』s New Deal coalition. The white working class began voting Republican in the 1980s over cultural issues such as patriotism, gun rights, abortion, and religion. Clinton won back enough of them in the 1990s to be elected twice (with pluralities each time), but since then, they have been a more reliable constituency for the Republican Party, despite the fact that elite Republican economic policies are at odds with their economic interests. This is why, in a Quinnipiac University survey released in April, 80 percent of Trump』s supporters polled said they felt that 「the government has gone too far in assisting minority groups,」 and 85 percent agreed that 「America has lost its identity.」

The Democrats』 fixation with identity explains one of the great mysteries of contemporary American politics—why rural working-class whites, particularly in southern states with limited social services, have flocked to the banner of the Republicans even though they have been among the greatest beneficiaries of Republican-opposed programs, such as Barack Obama』s Affordable Care Act. One reason is their perception that Obamacare was designed to benefit people other than themselves—in part because Democrats have lost their ability to speak to such voters (in contrast to in the 1930s, when southern rural whites were key supporters of Democratic Party welfare state initiatives such as the Tennessee Valley Authority).

THE END OF AN ERA?

Trump』s policy pronouncements are confused and contradictory, coming as they do from a narcissistic media manipulator with no clear underlying ideology. But the common theme that has made him attractive to so many Republican primary voters is one that he shares to some extent with Sanders: an economic nationalist agenda designed to protect and restore the jobs of American workers. This explains both his opposition to immigration—not just illegal immigration but also skilled workers coming in on H1B visas—and his condemnation of American companies that move **ts abroad to save on labor costs. He has criticized not only China for its currency manipulation but also friendly countries such as Japan and South Korea for undermining the United States』 manufacturing base. And of course he is dead set against further trade liberalization, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership in Asia and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with Europe.

All of this sounds like total heresy to anyone who has taken a basic college-level course in trade theory, where models from the Ricardian one of comparative advantage to the Heckscher-Ohlin factor endow-ment theory tell you that free trade is a win-win for trading partners, increasing all countries』 aggregate incomes. And indeed, global output has exploded over the past two generations, as world trade and investment have been liberalized under the broad framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and then the World Trade Organization, increasing fourfold between 1970 and 2008. Globalization has been responsible for lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty in countries such as China and India and has generated unfathomable amounts of wealth in the United States.

Yet this consensus on the benefits of economic liberalization, shared by elites in both political parties, is not immune from criticism. Built into all the existing trade models is the conclusion that trade liberalization, while boosting aggregate income, will have potentially adverse distributional consequences—it will, in other words, create winners and losers. One recent study estimated that import competition from China was responsible for the loss of between two million and 2.4 million U.S. jobs from 1999 to 2011.

The standard response from trade economists is to argue that the gains from trade are sufficient to more than adequately compensate the losers, ideally through job training that will equip them with new skills. And thus, every major piece of trade legislation has been accompanied by a host of worker-retraining measures, as well as a phasing in of new rules to allow workers time to adjust.

In practice, however, this adjustment has often failed to materialize. The U.S. government has run 47 uncoordinated federal job-retraining programs (since consolidated into about a dozen), in addition to countless state-level ones. These have collectively failed to move large numbers of workers into higher-skilled positions. This is partly a failure of implementation, but it is also a failure of concept: it is not clear what kind of training can transform a 55-year-old assembly-line worker into a computer programmer or a Web designer. Nor does standard trade theory take account of the political economy of investment. Capital has always had collective-action advantages over labor, because it is more concentrated and easier to coordinate. This was one of the early arguments in favor of trade unionism, which has been severely eroded in the United States since the 1980s. And capital』s advantages only increase with the high degree of capital mobility that has arisen in today』s globalized world. Labor has become more mobile as well, but it is far more constrained. The bargaining advantages of unions are quickly undermined by employers who can threaten to relocate not just to a right-to-work state but also to a completely different country.

The American political system will not be fixed unless popular anger is linked to good policies.

Labor-cost differentials between the United States and many developing countries are so great that it is hard to imagine what sorts of policies could ultimately have protected the mass of low-skilled jobs. Perhaps not even Trump believes that shoes and shirts should still be made in America. Every industrialized nation in the world, including those that are much more committed to protecting their manufacturing bases, such as Germany and Japan, has seen a decline in the relative share of manufacturing over the past few decades. And even China itself is beginning to lose jobs to automation and to lower-cost producers in places such as Bangladesh and Vietnam.

And yet the experience of a country such as Germany suggests that the path followed by the United States was not inevitable. German business elites never sought to undermine the power of their trade unions; to this day, wages are set across the German economy through government-sponsored negotiations between employers and unions. As a result, German labor costs are about 25 percent higher than their American counterparts. And yet Germany remains the third-largest exporter in the world, and the share of manufacturing employment in Germany, although declining, has remained consistently higher than that in the United States. Unlike the French and the Italians, the Germans have not sought to protect existing jobs through a thicket of labor laws; under Chancellor Gerhard Schr?der』s Agenda 2010 reforms, it became easier to lay off redundant workers. And yet the country has invested heavily in improving working-class skills through its apprenticeship program and other active labor-market interventions. The Germans also sought to protect more of the country』s supply chain from endless outsourcing, connecting its fabled Mittelstand, that is, its small and medium-size businesses, to its large employers.

In the United States, in contrast, economists and public intellectuals portrayed the shift from a manufacturing economy to a postindustrial service-based one as inevitable, even something to be welcomed and hastened. Like the buggy whip makers of old, supposedly, manufac-turing workers would retool themselves, becoming knowledge workers in a flexible, outsourced, part-time new economy, where their new skills would earn them higher wages. Despite occasional gestures, however, neither political party took the retooling agenda seriously, as the centerpiece of a necessary adjustment process, nor did they invest in social programs designed to cushion the working class as it tried to adjust. And so white workers, like African Americans in earlier decades, were on their own.

A voter arrives to cast their ballot in the Wisconsin presidential primary election at a voting station in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, April 2016.

Jim Young / Reuters

A voter arrives to cast their ballot in the Wisconsin presidential primary election at a voting station in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, April 2016.

The first decade of the century could have played out very differently. The Chinese today are not manipulating their currency to boost exports; if anything, they have been trying recently to support the value of the yuan in order to prevent capital flight. But they certainly did manipulate their currency in the years following the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 and the dot-com crash of 2000–2001. It would have been entirely feasible for Washington to have threatened, or actually imposed, tariffs against Chinese imports back then in response. This would have entailed risks: consumer prices would have increased, and interest rates would have risen had the Chinese responded by not buying U.S. debt. Yet this possibility was not taken seriously by U.S. elites, for fear that it would start a slide down the slippery slope of protectionism. As a result, more than two million jobs were lost in the ensuing decade.

A WAY FORWARD?

Trump may have fastened onto something real in American society, but he is a singularly inappropriate instrument for taking advantage of the reform moment that this electoral upheaval represents. You cannot unwind 50 years of trade liberalization by imposing unilateral tariffs or filing criminal indictments against American multinationals that outsource jobs. At this point, the United States』 economy is so interconnected with that of the rest of the world that the dangers of a global retreat into protectionism are all too real. Trump』s proposals to abolish Obamacare would throw millions of working-class Americans off health insurance, and his proposed tax cuts would add more than $10 trillion to the deficit over the next decade while benefiting only the rich. The country does need strong leadership, but by an institutional reformer who can make government truly effective, not by a personalistic demagogue who is willing to flout established rules.

Nonetheless, if elites profess to be genuinely concerned about inequality and the declining working class, they need to rethink some of their long-standing positions on immigration, trade, and investment. The intellectual challenge is to see whether it is possible to back away from globalization without cratering both the national and the global economy, with the goal of trading a little aggregate national income for greater domestic income equality.

Clearly, some changes are more workable than others, with immigra-tion being at the top of the theoretically doable list. Comprehensive immigration reform has been in the works for more than a decade now and has failed for two reasons. First, opponents are opposed to 「amnesty,」 that is, giving existing undocumented immigrants a path to citizenship. But the second reason has to do with enforcement: critics point out that existing laws are not enforced and that earlier promises to enforce them have not been kept.

The idea that the government could deport 11 million people from the country, many of them with children who are U.S. citizens, seems highly implausible. So some form of amnesty appears inevitable. Immigration critics are right, however, that the United States has been very lax in enforcement. Doing this properly would require not a wall but something like a national biometric ID card, heavy investment in courts and police, and, above all, the political will to sanction employers who violate the rules. Moving to a much more restrictive policy on legal immigration, in which some form of amnesty for existing immigrants is exchanged for genuine efforts to enforce new and tougher rules, would not be economically disastrous. When the country did this before, in 1924, the way was paved, in certain respects, for the golden age of U.S. equality in the 1940s and 1950s.

It is harder to see a way forward on trade and investment, other than not ratifying existing deals such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership—which would not be extremely risky. The world is increasingly popu-lated with economic nationalists, and a course reversal by Washington—which has built and sustained the current liberal international system—could well trigger a tidal wave of reprisals. Perhaps one place to start is to figure out a way to persuade U.S. multinationals, which currently are sitting on more than $2 trillion in cash outside the United States, to bring their money home for domestic investment. U.S. corporate tax rates are among the highest in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; reducing them sharply while eliminating the myriad tax subsidies and exemptions that corporations have negotiated for themselves is a policy that could find support in both parties.

Another initiative would be a massive campaign to rebuild American infrastructure. The American Society of Civil Engineers estimates that it would take $3.6 trillion to adequately upgrade the country』s infrastructure by 2020. The United States could borrow $1 trillion while interest rates are low and use it to fund a massive infrastructure initiative that would create huge numbers of jobs while raising U.S. productivity in the long run. Hillary Clinton has proposed spending $275 billion, but that number is too modest.

But attempts to accomplish either goal would bump into the more routine dysfunctions of the American political system, where vetocracy prevents either tax reform or infrastructure investment. The American system makes it too easy for well-organized interest groups to block legislation and to 「capture」 new initiatives for their own purposes. So fixing the system to reduce veto points and streamline decision-making would have to be part of the reform agenda itself. Necessary changes should include eliminating both senatorial holds and the routine use of the filibuster and delegating budgeting and the formulation of complex legislation to smaller, more expert groups that can present coherent packages to Congress for up-or-down votes.

This is why the unexpected emergence of Trump and Sanders may signal a big opportunity. For all his faults, Trump has broken with the Republican orthodoxy that has prevailed since Ronald Reagan, a low-tax, small-safety-net orthodoxy that benefits corporations much more than their workers. Sanders similarly has mobilized the backlash from the left that has been so conspicuously missing since 2008.

「Populism」 is the label that political elites attach to policies supported by ordinary citizens that they don』t like. There is of course no reason why democratic voters should always choose wisely, particularly in an age when globalization makes policy choices so complex. But elites don』t always choose correctly either, and their dismissal of the popular choice often masks the nakedness of their own positions. Popular mobilizations are neither inherently bad nor inherently good; they can do great things, as during the Progressive era and the New Deal, but also terrible ones, as in Europe during the 1930s. The American political system has in fact suffered from substantial decay, and it will not be fixed unless popular anger is linked to wise leadership and good policies. It is still not too late for this to emerge.

從香港Occupy Central的年輕人，到台灣的向日葵運動；從美國體制外的造反派桑德斯和川普的逆襲，到英國中老年窮人投票要退歐；全球化在全球發達經濟體基本都遇上了大麻煩，反建制反establishment的呼聲在這一兩年內徹底爆發出來了。

一個世紀前，列寧就抱著解放全歐洲的想法潛回俄國。很多人指責列寧得到了當時德國政府的資助形同俄奸，但列寧本來就不是俄羅斯族人，也沒有興趣建立一個沙俄的替代品。他們那一代人的想法是在歐洲的舊房子上踢一腳，讓大戰中所有的政府都倒台，然後建立XXXX社會。

但是列寧踢到了鐵板，在比俄羅斯更發達的國家裡，左翼的革命被國家主義和右翼輕易的鎮壓了。最後的結果是布列斯特-立陶夫斯克條約的簽署和先天畸形的USSR的誕生。

發達國家的勞動階級，長期以來都依賴於緊閉的國境線和貿易保護主義，從大航海時代/殖民時代/帝國主義時代的遺產中分肥。要他們隔著千萬里對著「野蠻人」表達一下同情，獻獻愛心是可以的；要讓他們去支持「全世界無產者聯合起來！」，他們只會讓你去死。他們實際上連大規模的合法移民都不會接受。

過去一個世紀里，因為科學技術發展水平有限，以及國際意識形態的高度對立，導致資本只能在有限的國度/區域里僱傭工人。這使得很大一批只能從事無技術含量簡單工作的工人，居然也能在流水線上取得不錯的薪酬，堂而皇之的以中產階級自居。

但冷戰的結束將資本從國境的瓶子里放了出來，缺乏技術含量的藍領工人的工作非常容易off-shore。白左工會既然反對廉價勞動力的自由遷徙，那麼白左精英階層就讓資本自由遷徙。於是以固定美元價格計價，美國勞動階層的中線收入自從70年代起就沒有變化過（當然考慮到婦女解放因素，有完整婚姻的雙職工美國家庭的收入還是上升了），於是台灣香港甚至日本就像被用過的手紙一樣被拋棄了，於是腐國大規模的去工業化，只剩下the city的金融業。

發達國家的藍領本來就是活在借來的時光里，當然也會全部還回去。只吃下資本主義的糖衣，卻妄想把炮彈退回去，天底下哪裡有這樣的好事。

前兩天剛把《文明的衝突》，《歷史的終結》這兩本書讀完。有些心得分享一下。

這兩本書買了很久了，文明的衝突居然是09年買的，一直沒看，因為我對這兩本書一直是有偏見的。
看完之後才發現，對他的一些成見是不正確的。

這兩本書都有可取之處，但也都有錯誤之處。

亨廷頓是福山的老師，但是，福山的歷史終結的思想，是先於亨廷頓的文明衝突提出的。文明的衝突，在一定程度上就是反對歷史的終結所寫。而且一開始，亨廷頓就明確的把福山的思想列為靶子。

總體來看，這兩本書不分伯仲，而且緊密相關。他們的分歧只是在視角不同。他們的可取之處就在於，以西方的觀點分析西方和當代社會。他們的幼稚之處在於，不了解中國，缺乏歷史厚度，

對歷史的理解是錯誤的。

亨廷頓認為，二戰以來的，非西方社會的歐美化是表層，非西方社會根本不接受西方的文化。左右他們的還是他們的本土文化，傳統文化。他們在技術上接受現代化，但在文化上拒絕、排斥西化、歐美化。

亨廷頓在文化上把全球社會，分成3個集團。一個是西方，也就是歐美，他的文化基礎是基督教，包括天主教和新教。一個集團是中東，他的文化基礎是伊斯蘭教。一個集團是中國、東亞。他的文化基礎是儒家。

世界的未來，是基督教，伊斯蘭教，儒家，3個集團的衝突、對抗。
最有意思的是，他經常把儒家和伊斯蘭教，連起來，看成一個伊斯蘭-儒家集團。這樣世界就是西伊斯蘭-儒家兩個集團的衝突。

亨廷頓的這個觀察是很有洞察力的。看似強大的西方文化，實際上是膚淺的。儘管已經傳播到全球，但是很難深入人心，引起反感，仇視和反抗。

恐怖主義只是一個極端表現。在這一點上，他的學生福山，就遠不如他，膚淺得多。
但福山的歷史終結的思想，絕非一無是處。

答：要回答這個問題，必須先明白這3個文明的來龍去脈，明白他們的歷史，他們怎麼產生的。這些恰恰是亨廷頓的弱項。

問:哪個文明能夠勝出？

答：當真正研究明白了這3個文明的歷史之後，你會發現這個問題本身是一個偽問題。因為是不存在，獨立的孤立的文明的。所有的文明之間是相互交流和影響的。所以，基督教，儒家伊斯蘭教，這3個並不是獨立的實體。

如果說存在文明的衝突的話，人類的歷史一直是文明衝突的，並非現在才出現。並非，冷戰結束之後才出現。我先說一個結論，最後勝出的是中國文化，是儒家思想。因為基督教和伊斯蘭教都是在儒家思想的影響下產生的。都有儒家思想的成分。

答：儒家思想的核心是心性自由，心性獨立。在這一點上已經做到了極致。不存在青出於藍的問題。事實上，就是中國自身。也經常偏離心性自由心性獨立。不過對中國來講它是一個不斷偏離和不斷回歸的過程。而中國之外的文明是一個不斷接近儒家的過程，但是從未達到過中國儒家的程度。

這就像說身體的健康，就是一個天然的，正常的狀態。當你生病的時候是偏離這種，天然的正常的狀態。所以健康它是有一個極致的標準的，健康的程度是不可以一直在提高的。你可以一直提高恢復健康手段的技術水平，但是健康本身的水平是永恆的。

心性自由心性獨立，實際上就是指的一種心性的自然的，正常的狀態。心性的健康的狀態。

中國心性自由的標準，唯有儒家思想是健康的，其他任何的宗教，和思想流派，都是，病態的。當然，他們在一直趨向於健康，這就是西方歷史的進步。

所以在這個意義上來講，福山所提出的歷史的終結是有道理的。歷史的終結點就是心性健康，心性自由，就是中國的儒家，而非西方文化。

當然歷史的終結在西方是一個歷史悠久的思想，並非福山首創。它的完整版本應該是黑格爾，所以福山花了大量的時間去分析黑格爾。這也是我對這本書感興趣的地方。

站在歐洲的角度，福山的這本書還是有文化深度和思想深度的。鄧小平的前秘書，張維為極力貶低福山，認為現在是歷史終結的終結。他曾經和福山有過一場辯論。從淺層看張維維是正確的，事實上他的觀點和亨廷頓一致。但從更深一層看，張維為錯誤，歷史是有終結的，歷史是有一個永恆的東西在，是有常道的。而張維為僅僅注意到當前的利益爭奪，而看不到歷史的恆常。

本文整理自「新心性書院」群7月6日的討論。

（微信公共號：新心性主義。微信群「新心性書院」請加微信：xxxzy15 ）

川普上台了，福山自己又發了文章作為回應，我覺得完全可以回答這個問題：

Trump and American Political Decay —— After the 2016 Election

Donald Trump』s impressive victory over Hillary Clinton on November 8 demonstrates that American democracy is still working in one important sense. Trump brilliantly succeeded in mobilizing a neglected and underrepresented slice of the electorate, the white working class, and pushed its agenda to the top of the country』s priorities.

He will now have to deliver, though, and this is where the problem lies. He has identified two very real problems in American politics: increasing inequality, which has hit the old working class very hard, and the capture of the political system by well-organized interest groups. Unfortunately, he does not have a plan to solve either problem.

Inequality is driven first and foremost by advances in technology and second by globalization that has exposed U.S. workers to competition from hundreds of millions of people in other countries. Trump has made extravagant promises that he will bring jobs back to the United States in sectors such as manufacturing and coal simply by renegotiating existing trade deals, such as NAFTA, or relaxing environmental rules. He does not seem to recognize that the U.S. manufacturing sector has in fact expanded since the 2008 recession, even as manufacturing employment has decreased. The problem is that the new on-shored work is being performed in highly automated factories. Meanwhile, coal is being squeezed out not so much by outgoing President Barack Obama』s environmental policies as by the natural gas revolution brought about by fracking.

What policies could the Trump administration implement to reverse these trends? Is he going to regulate the adoption of new technologies by corporate America? Is he going to try to ban U.S. multinationals from investing in plants overseas, when much of these multinationals』 revenue comes from foreign markets? The only real policy instrument he will have at his disposal is punitive tariffs, which are likely to set off a trade war and cost jobs in the export sector for companies such as Apple, Boeing, and GE.

The problem of the capture of the U.S. government by powerful interest groups is a real one, a source of the political decay I wrote about in my recent article for Foreign Affairs, 「American Political Decay or Renewal?」 Yet Trump』s primary solution to this problem is simply his own person, someone too rich to be bribed by special interests. Leaving aside the fact that he has a history of manipulating the system to his own advantage, this is hardly a sustainable fix. He also has proposed measures such as banning revolving-door employment of federal officials as lobbyists. This will scratch at the symptom of the problem and not address the root cause, which is the enormous volume of money in politics. There, he has put no real plans forward, any of which would inevitably require somehow reversing the Supreme Court decisions of Buckley v. Valeo and Citizens United that argue that money is a form of free speech and is therefore constitutionally protected.

The decayed American political system can be fixed only by a strong external shock that will knock it off its current equilibrium and make possible real policy reform. Trump』s victory does indeed constitute such a shock but, unfortunately, his only answer is the traditional populist-authoritarian one: trust me, the charismatic leader, to take care of your problems. As in the case of the shock to the Italian political system administered by Silvio Berlusconi, the real tragedy will be the waste of an opportunity for actual reform.