巴菲特給股東的信有學習價值么？

12-31

巴菲特給股東的信里我們可以學到什麼？有什麼價值么？

伯克希爾紡織廠廠主席巴菲特同志致股東信，一個編年的簡史

我已選擇了一條路，將要終身實行；我要繼續我的事業，任何事都不能加以阻擋。 —— 康德

最近巴老新出爐的股東信非常火。在下懸樑刺股研究了這一篇股東信，也頗得一些頓悟與啟發。我也想把股東信去轉發分享，無奈民間其實並沒有翻譯精良的版本，看了一些譯作，譯者擺明了不了解伯克希爾紡織廠和巴菲特廠主席。思前想後，突發奇想，打算把巴菲特這些年來發給股東的信，以編年的方式，每一年整理出一兩句有時代代表性的警世箴言，自己來翻譯一下。其中內容涉及到架子投資，衍生品，槓桿，市場風險，風險管理，黃金，石油，繼任者等等等等，可以捉摸著這一條清晰的脈絡，看出巴老投資哲學的連貫性和持續性。我相信股東信應該是獲取巴老投資哲學的第一手資料，其他的很多信息，無論是傳記，還是引用，還是什麼巴菲特之道巴菲特之超級大作手巴菲特之大戰索羅斯云云，說白了都是二手甚至三四手資料，更甭提一些漂浮於躁動與喧嘩之中的所謂「巴菲特曾經說過」的市井之言，根本無從考證。本人才疏學淺，翻譯肯定會有許多不足之處，請大家包涵斧正。並且我也會附上英文原文，如果讀我的翻譯讀到要吐，也可以看看原文的真面目，get巴老的真意。不多扯淡，請您往下讀，如在下有時間，在下會不斷進行補充；如果在下有時間到不行，我還會分門別類出點論題集，比如巴老論槓桿，巴老論黃金。還請各位多多鼓勵。

「Our performance, relatively, is likely to be better in a bear market than in a bull market. In a year when the general market had a substantial advance, I would be well satisfied to match the advance of the averages.」（Buffett Partnership 1958 Letter）

1958年合伙人信：相對而言，我們的表現在熊市總是比在牛市好。在一個市場的豐年，如果能取得市場的平均收益，那我將相當滿足。

「Most of you know I have been very apprehensive about general stock market levels for several years. To date, this caution has been unnecessary. By previous standards, the present level of "blue chip」; security prices contains a substantial speculative component with a corresponding risk of loss. Perhaps other standards of valuation are evolving which will permanently replace the old standard. I don"t think so. I may very well be wrong; however, I would rather sustain the penalties resulting from over-conservatism than face the consequences of error, perhaps with permanent capital loss, resulting from the adoption of a 「New Era" philosophy where trees really do grow to the sky.」（Buffett Partnership 1959 Letter）

1959年合伙人信：你們大多數人知道近年來我對股票市場憂心忡忡。以曾經的的標準來衡量，目前藍籌股的價格水平已經包含了太多的投機成分，而投機成分會帶來損失的風險。也許一些新的估值的標準將代替老標準。但我不這樣認為。我也許會錯，但是我寧願去接受過於保守的懲罰，也不願承擔犯錯的後果。如果我們去擁抱新時代的哲學——「樹能長到天上去」——那麼我們將有可能面臨永久性的資本損失。

An irresistable footnote: in 1971, pension fund managers invested a record 122% of net funds available in equities — at full prices they couldn』t buy enough of them. In 1974, after the bottom had fallen out, they committed a then record low of 21% to stocks. （1978 Chairman』s Letter）

1978年股東信：一個無法質疑的註腳：在1971年退休基金經理投資了創紀錄的122%的資金在股票上，在最高位的價格上他們大膽買買買。而到了1974年，當市場已經跌出底部，他們卻以創紀錄新低的資金——12%——投資在股票上。

Both our operating and investment experience cause us to conclude that 「turnarounds」 seldom turn, and that the same energies and talent are much better employed in a good business purchased at a fair price than in a poor business purchased at a bargain price. （1979 Chairman』s Letter）

1979年股東信：我們的運營和投資經驗，都告訴我們公司翻轉極少發生。如果你有精力和天賦，那還是用在以公允價格買入一個好公司，而不是用在以折扣低價買入一個爛公司。

We have tried occasionally to buy toads at bargain prices with results that have been chronicled in past reports. Clearly our kisses fell flat. We have done well with a couple of princes — but they were princes when purchased. At least our kisses didn』t turn them into toads. And, finally, we have occasionally been quite successful in purchasing fractional interests in easily-identifiable princes at toad-like prices.（1981 Chairman』s letter）

1981年股東信：從歷史來看，我們總是偶爾可以以好價格買到一些蛤蟆（譯者按：巴老在之前舉了一個公主親蛤蟆，蛤蟆變王子的例子，其中公主是收購方，蛤蟆是被收購方，親是併購行為。比喻收購方溢價收購，期待奇蹟發生）。但是很顯然我們親的並不多。當然我們也搞到過王子，但在我們去親他們之前，這些哥們就已經是王子了。至少我們沒有把他們親成蛤蟆。並且，我們總算也偶爾可以以蛤蟆的價格買到一些驗明正身的王子的部分權益。

It』s simply to say that managers and investors alike must understand that accounting numbers is the beginning, not the end, of business valuation.（1982 Chairman"s Letter）

1982年股東信：簡單的說，管理者和投資者都應該明白會計數字只是公司估值的起點，並非終點。

When returns on capital are ordinary, an earn-more-by-putting-up-more record is no great managerial achievement. You can get the same result personally while operating from your rocking chair. Just quadruple the capital you commit to a savings account and you will quadruple your earnings. You would hardly expect hosannas for that particular accomplishment. Yet, retirement announcements regularly sing the praises of CEOs who have, say, quadrupled earnings of their widget company during their reign — with no one examining whether this gain was attributable simply to many years of retained earnings and the workings of compound interest. (1985 Chairman』s Letter)

1985年股東信: 當資本收益率比較平庸，一個「以投入更多而賺錢更多」的戰績，最多就是差強人意。個人而言，你可以一邊搖搖椅，一邊取得同樣的結果：你只需要在你的儲蓄賬戶里投入四倍的錢，你就會有四倍的收益。對於這種成就，你不會高興地唱支山歌給黨聽。然而，經常有人為了快退休的CEO唱讚歌——就因為他在任內把公司的收益翻了四番——而不去檢視，這收益是否僅僅是因為多年來在留存收益上讓複利翻滾的結果。

Ben"s Mr. Market allegory may seem out-of-date in today"s investment world, in which most professionals and academicians talk of efficient markets, dynamic hedging and betas. Their interest in such matters is understandable, since techniques shrouded in mystery clearly have value to the purveyor of investment advice. After all, what witch doctor has ever achieved fame and fortune by simply advising "Take two aspirins」? (1987 Chairman』s Letter)

1987年股東信: 本傑明·格雷厄姆的市場寓言也許看起來已經過時了。現在大多數專業人士或者學者只討論有效市場假說，動態對沖和beta。這都可以理解，神秘主義籠罩下的技術分析對投資建議批發戶而言很有市場。畢竟，哪個巫師會因為只建議「吃兩片阿司匹林」而名聲大噪？

Over the years, Charlie [Munger, Berkshire Hathaway Vice Chairman] and I have observed many accounting-based frauds of staggering size. Few of the perpetrators have been punished; many have not even been censured. It has been far safer to steal large sums with pen than small sums with a gun.（1988 Chairman』s Letter）

1988年股東信：多年來，查理·芒格（老巴的基友）和我都見證了超級大規模的會計詐騙。騙子幾乎不會受懲；很多甚至根本就從來沒被譴責過一下。用筆來偷大資金遠比用*來搶幾塊錢安全得多。

In fact, when we own portions of outstanding businesses with outstanding managements, our favorite holding period is forever.

1988年股東信：事實上對於一個投資，當我們同市擁有牛掰的公司和牛掰的管理層，我們最傾向於永久持有。

My most surprising discovery: the overwhelming importance in business of an unseen force that we might call 「the institutional imperative」; In business school, I was given no hint of the imperative"s existence and I did not intuitively understand it when I entered the business world. I thought then that decent, intelligent, and experienced managers would automatically make rational business decisions. But I learned over time that isn』t so. Instead, rationality frequently wilts when the institutional imperative comes into play.

For example: (1) As if governed by Newton『s First Law of Motion, an institution will resist any change in its current direction; (2) Just as work expands to fill available time, corporate projects or acquisitions will materialize to soak up available funds; (3) Any business craving of the leader, however foolish, will be quickly supported by detailed rate-of-return and strategic studies prepared by his troops; and (4) The behavior of peer companies, whether they are expanding, acquiring, setting executive compensation or whatever, will be mindlessly imitated.(1989 Chairman』s Letter)

1989年股東信: 我最驚人的發現，就是一種看不見但是相當重要相當牛的原力，我們可以把它稱作「制度性強制力」（institutional imperative）。在商學院我從來不知道這種原力的存在，在剛涉足商界的時候我也不能在直覺上去認知它。我以為那些體面睿智經驗超群的管理者會自發做出理性的決定。我錯了。理性往往干不過「制度性強制力」。

比如說： 1. 就像牛頓第一定律一樣，「制度性強制力」會使得一個機構去抗拒任何影響現方向的改變； 2. 就像我們的工作會慢慢擴展而佔據掉我們能利用的時間，公司項目和收購會慢慢侵佔所有資金；3. 任何領導人指向型的公司，不管這領導人有多二，都會很快得到下屬的支持，進行詳細的收益率和戰略研究。4.同行公司的行為，無論他們是擴張，是收購，是制定管理層薪資，不管是什麼，都會被無腦地模仿下來。

After 25 years of buying and supervising a great variety of businesses, Charlie and I have not learned how to solve difficult business problems. What we have learned is to avoid them. To the extent we have been successful, it is because we concentrated on identifying one-foot hurdles that we could step over because we acquired any ability to clear seven-footers.（1989 Chairman"s Letter）

1989年股東信：就算經過25年的經歷，買入和監管各種各樣的公司，查理（基友）和我也沒能學會怎麼解決棘手的經營問題。我們學會了去避開它們。我們之所以能略有小成，是因為我們專註於去辨識出一英尺高的障礙，這樣我們可以輕鬆躍過。因為七英尺高的障礙是會要了我們親命的。

The most common cause of low prices is pessimism — some times pervasive, some times specific to a company or industry. We want to do business in such an environment, not because we like pessimism but because we like the prices it produces. It』s optimism that is the enemy of the rational buyer.(1990 Chairman』s Letter)

1990年股東信: 造成資產低價格最常見的原因，就是悲觀絕望。時而籠罩全宇，時而針對某個公司或者行業。我們非常想在這種氛圍中做生意，不是因為我們喜歡悲觀絕望，而是因為我們喜歡悲觀絕望帶來的超低價格。樂觀鼓舞才是理性買家的大敵。

Our stay-put behavior reflects our view that the stock market serves as a relocation center at which money is moved from the active to the patient.（1991 Chairman』s Letter）

1991年股東信：我們這種龜縮不動的行為，是因為我們認為股市就是一個收容中心，錢就是從主動型投資者流向有耐心的投資者。

We『ve long felt that the only value of stock forecasters is to make fortune tellers look good. Even now, Charlie and I continue to believe that short-term market forecasts are poison and should be kept locked up in a safe place, away from children and also from grown-ups who behave in the market like children.(1992 Chairman』s Letter)

1992年股東信 : 長久以來，我們感覺到股票先知跳大神的價值就是讓算命先生們看起來不像傻X。即使到如今我和查理仍然認為對股市的短期預測有毒，需要被鎖起來藏起來，以防兒童或者市場中表現的像兒童的成年人去染指。

The strategy we』ve adopted precludes our following standard diversification dogma. Many pundits would therefore say the strategy must be riskier than that employed by more conventional investors. We disagree. We believe that a policy of portfolio concentration may well decrease risk if it raises, as it should, both the intensity with which an investor thinks about a business and the comfort-level he must feel with its economic characteristics before buying into it. In stating this opinion, we define risk, using dictionary terms, as # 34;the possibility of loss or injury.」 (1993 Chairman『s Letter)

1993年股東信: 我們的策略讓我們不必去遵循「投資多樣化」的教條。許多大拿會說，所以，這種策略會比傳統投資者的策略更有風險。我們不敢苟同。我們認為，只要能強化投資者將投資標的視為生意的觀念，並且能讓投資者在掏錢之前就對此門生意的經濟屬性舒心滿意，一個投資組合集中化的策略其實會降低風險。為了闡明這個觀點，我們要講風險以字典的含義定義成「損失或者受傷的可能」（譯者按：而不是商學院教科書中將風險定義為「標準差」）。

In a bull market, one must avoid the error of the preening duck that quacks boastfully after a torrential rainstorm, thinking that its paddling skills have caused it to rise in the world. A right-thinking duck would instead compare its position after the downpour to that of the other ducks on the pond.（1997 Chairman』s Letter）

1993年股東信：在牛市中，我們必須要避免成為暴雨後在池子里自得意滿地嘎嘎叫的鴨子，它們以為它們卓越的划水技術導致了池水的上漲。一個有腦子的鴨子應該在雨後去和其他鴨子比較各自的位置。

But now for the final exam: If you expect to be a net saver during the next five years, should you hope for a higher or lower stock market during that period? Many investors get this one wrong. Even though they are going to be net buyers of stocks for many years to come, they are elated when stock prices rise and depressed when they fall. In effect, they rejoice because prices have risen for the 「hamburgers」; they will soon be buying. This reaction makes no sense. Only those who will be sellers of equities in the near future should be happy at seeing stocks rise. Prospective purchasers should much prefer sinking prices.(1997 Chairman『s Letter)

1997年股東信: 來看看咱的期末考試：如果你期望在之後的五年變為一個凈存者（譯者按：net saver, 相對於net borrower而言，消費者分為net saver凈存方（出超）和net borrower凈借方（入超）），那麼在此段時間內，你會去希望一個更高的還是更低的股票市場？許多投資者在這點上沒搞對。就算他們會成為凈買股票的多頭，他們還是會在股票漲時彈冠相慶在股票跌時心有戚戚。（作為買方）他們在慶祝肉夾饃價格飆漲，但是他們知道不久後他們就要去買這個肉夾饃，這尼瑪實在不合理。只有把自己在未來一段時間內定位成空頭的人才會因為價格上漲而開心，因為他們不必掏更多錢去買。而未來的購買者應該更喜歡一個不斷下跌的價格。

Our future rates of gain will fall far short of those achieved in the past. Berkshire』s capital base is now simply too large to allow us to earn truly outsized returns. If you believe otherwise, you should consider a career in sales but avoid one in mathematics (bearing in mind that there are really only three kinds of people in the world: those who can count and those who can』t. (1998 Chairman"s Letter)

1998年股東信: 我認為我們未來的收益率會遠遠低於過去的收益率。伯克希爾的資本實在太大，導致我們不能獲得超常的收益。如果你不這樣認為，那麼你應該去做銷售人才，但千萬別去當數學家。請記住世界上永遠只有三種人：會算數的，和不會算數的。

Those who attended [the annual meeting] last year saw your Chairman pitch to Ernie Banks. This encounter proved to be the titanic duel that the sports world had long awaited. After the first few pitches — which were not my best, but when have I ever thrown my best? — I fired a brushback at Ernie just to let him know who was in command. Ernie charged the mound, and I charged the plate. But a clash was avoided because we became exhausted before reaching each other.(1999 Chairman』s Letter)

1999年股東信: 那些去年出席股東會的哥們應該看到了你們的主席朝著厄尼·班克斯（譯者按：美國職業棒球聯盟小熊隊的球員，特別能擊球）投球。這是體育界翹首以盼的精彩對決。在幾次發揮不太好的投球之後，哥們我投出了一記近身球（譯者按：差點打到擊球者的投球），就是為了讓他知道誰是老大。然後厄尼沖向投手丘，我沖向本壘（互相衝向對方）。但是我們在衝到半路，還沒有夠著對方的時候就已經精疲力盡了。衝突被避免。(譯者按：這其實只是關於股東會噱頭的一段講述，無關乎投資。大家知道1999年是科技股泡沫不斷膨脹的時刻，而伯克希爾也吃到了有史以來最差的投資回報表現，以及最差的對比標普500的相對表現。所以基本上這次股東信老巴也沒有什麼太多的好講，講了也沒人聽。）

There is only one combination of facts that makes it advisable for a company to repurchase its shares: First, the company has available funds -- cash plus sensible borrowing capacity -- beyond the near-term needs of the business and, second, finds its stock selling in the market below its intrinsic value, conservatively-calculated. To this we add a caveat: Shareholders should have been supplied all the information they need for estimating that value. Otherwise, insiders could take advantage of their uninformed partners and buy out their interests at a fraction of true worth. (1999 Chairman"s Letter)

1999年股東信: 只有一種事實的組合才能讓公司回購顯得明智：第一，除去滿足短期經營需要的以外，公司要有充足資金——現金和理性的槓桿。第二，經過保守計算後，發現市面上公司的股價低於內在價值。當然我們也要加一個警告：股東應該有足夠的信息來判斷公司價值。要不然內部人士就可以占股東的便宜，從股東手中低價回收股票，大敲一筆（譯者按：如陳歐之流，可恥的回購）。

The line separating investment and speculation, which is never bright and clear, becomes blurred still further when most market participants have recently enjoyed triumphs. Nothing sedates rationality like large doses of effortless money. After a heady experience of that kind, normally sensible people drift into behavior akin to that of Cinderella at the ball. They know that overstaying the festivities—that is, continuing to speculate in companies that have gigantic valuations relative to the cash they are likely to generate in the future—will eventually bring on pumpkins and mice. But they nevertheless hate to miss a single minute of what is one helluva party. Therefore, the giddy participants all plan to leave just seconds before midnight. There『s a problem, though: They are dancing in a room in which the clocks have no hands.（2000 Chairman『s Letter）

2000年股東信：投資和投機的分界線，從來就不清楚，而且在大多數市場參與者都為勝利歡欣鼓舞之時會更加模糊。巨大的不勞而獲的收益，深深地抑制了理性。在市場的瘋狂中，許多在正常情況下都保持理智的人也慢慢變為華麗舞會中的灰姑娘。他們知道遲遲不願意離去這場盛宴——也就是說繼續投機，去賭那些估值相對於未來現金流而言高上天的公司——最終會讓他們灰頭土臉。但是他們唯恐錯過這場荒宴的每一分鐘。所以，這些暈頭轉向的參與者都打算在午夜前的幾秒鐘離場。然而有一個問題，在他們跳舞縱情的房間里，那口鐘上沒有指針。

But a pin lies in wait for every bubble. And when the two eventually meet, a new wave of investors learns some very old lessons: First, many in Wall Street — a community in which quality control is not prized — will sell investors anything they will buy. Second, speculation is most dangerous when it looks easiest. (2000 Chairman』s Letter)

2000年股東信: 對於每一個泡沫，總有一根針在旁邊守候。當兩者合體之時，新韭菜會上到老一課：第一，作為一個沒有質量控制的地方，華爾街會賣給你任何東西，只要你想買；第二，投機這檔子事，在最容易做時，也最危險。

After all, you only find out who is swimming naked when the tide goes out. 2001 Chairman』s Letter. (2000 Chairman』s Letter)

2000年股東信: 畢竟，當大潮退去，才知道誰在裸泳。（譯者按：老巴最有名的名言，說在大泡沫最終破後的一刻，揚眉吐氣。可惜朱力安·羅伯森最終沒有挺到黎明。）

I view derivatives as time bombs, both for the parties that deal in them and the economic system. Basically these instruments call for money to change hands at some future date, with the amount to be determined by one or more reference items, such as interest rates, stock prices, or currency values. For example, if you are either long or short an SP 500 futures contract, you are a party to a very simple derivatives transaction, with your gain or loss derived from movements in the index. Derivatives contracts are of varying duration, running sometimes to 20 or more years, and their value is often tied to several variables.

Unless derivatives contracts are collateralized or guaranteed, their ultimate value also depends on the creditworthiness of the counter-parties to them. But before a contract is settled, the counter-parties record profits and losses – often huge in amount – in their current earnings statements without so much as a penny changing hands. Reported earnings on derivatives are often wildly overstated. That』s because today』s earnings are in a significant way based on estimates whose inaccuracy may not be exposed for many years. (2002 Chairman』s Letter)

2002年股東信: 我把衍生品看成定時炸彈，無論是對進行衍生品交易的人，還是對整個經濟體而言。基本上，這些工具都是在未來的時間點交換現金流。這種現金流的數量和走向取決於很多因素，諸如利率，股價或者匯率。舉例說，如果你做多或賣空標普500的期貨合約，你就是在參與簡單的衍生品交易，你的收益或虧損取決於指數走勢。衍生品合約會有多種多樣的久期，有時甚至超過20年。他們的價值捆綁於許多變數。

除非衍生品合約有抵押或者保證能執行，它們的價值還取決於合約對手方是否誠信靠譜。在合約交割之前，交易的各方都會在當期利潤表上記錄利潤或者虧損——常常數目巨大——哪怕根本沒有現金易手。在衍生平上的利潤往往被超級誇大。因為今天的利潤其實極大程度取決於對未來的估計，即使這種估計的不準確很多年都不會暴露。（譯者按：老巴把衍生品說成洪水猛獸就如同成年人教小孩不要玩火。老巴其實自己衍生品不要玩得太溜，在伯克希爾的資產負債表中期權投資佔有很大比重。）

Investors should remember that excitement and expenses are their enemies. And if they insist on trying to time their participation in equities, they should try to be fearful when others are greedy and greedy when others are fearful. (2004 Chairman"s Letter)

2004年股東信: 投資者需要記住興奮躁動和開支花銷是他們打大敵。如果他們堅持要去選擇參與股票市場的最佳時間，那麼他們應該在別人貪婪時恐懼，在別人恐懼時貪婪。（譯者按: 說來容易，行之甚難！）

Long ago, Sir Isaac Newton gave us three laws of motion, which were the work of genius. But Sir Isaac』s talents didn』t extend to investing: He lost a bundle in the South Sea Bubble, explaining later, "I can calculate the movement of the stars, but not the madness of men』s;」 If he had not been traumatized by this loss, Sir Isaac might well have gone on to discover the Fourth Law of Motion: For investors as a whole, returns decrease as motion increases. (2005 Chairman"s Letter)

2005年股東信: 許多年以前，艾薩克·牛頓爵士給了我們三大運動定理，這是天才的工作。但是牛頓爵士的天才不足以影響到他的投資：他在南海泡沫之時大賠了一筆。他之後說到「我能計算星辰的運動，但是不能計算人的瘋狂。」如果他沒有被損失傷到心，那麼牛頓爵士很可能發現第四大運動定理：總體而言，投資者的回報隨著運動的增加而減少。

The worst sort of business is one that grows rapidly, requires significant capital to engender the growth, and then earns little or no money. Think airlines. Here a durable competitive advantage has proven elusive ever since the days of the Wright Brothers. Indeed, if a farsighted capitalist had been present at Kitty Hawk, he would have done his successors a huge favor by shooting Orville down. (2007 Chairman』Letter)

2007年股東信: 最差的生意，就是超速發展，需要大量資金去支持其成長，而且還不怎麼賺錢的公司。（譯者按：這不是在罵京東么？）想一想航空公司。自大萊特兄弟發明飛機以來，航空公司就沒有過持久性競爭優勢。確實，如果在Kitty Hawk（北卡小鷹鎮，懷特兄弟發明飛機的地方）有一個有遠見的資本家，那他直接*斃掉奧維爾·萊特可能會幫到他的繼任者大忙。

Long ago, Ben Graham taught me that 「Price is what you pay; value is what you get.」 Whether we』re talking about socks or stocks, I like buying quality merchandise when it is marked down. (2008 Chairman"s Letter)

2008年股東信: 許多年以前，本·格雷厄姆教導我「價格是你支付的，價值是你獲得的。」無論我們是談論古票或是谷票或是股票，我喜歡在打折的時候買好貨。

Home ownership is a wonderful thing. My family and I have enjoyed my present home for 50 years, with more to come. But enjoyment and utility should be the primary motives for purchase, not profit or refi possibilities. And the home purchased ought to fit the income of the purchaser… Putting people into homes, though a desirable goal, shouldn』t be our country』s primary objective. Keeping them in their homes should be the ambition. (2008 Chairman』s Letter)

2008年股東信：有房產是件爽事。過去的50年，我的家人和我一直非常享受我們的家，我們的房子。但是享受和實用應該是買房的首要目標，而不是獲利或者再融資的可能性。買入的房子也應該與購買者的收入相符……給人們提供住房，雖然這是件好事，但不應該成為我們國家的首要目標。給人們提供各種機會讓他們能保持住在他們的房子中，才是我們的目標。

In my view a board of directors of a huge financial institution is derelict if it does not insist that its CEO bear full responsibility for risk control. If he』s incapable of handling that job, he should look for other employment. And if he fails at it – with the government thereupon required to step in with funds or guarantees – the financial consequences for him and his board should be severe.

It has not been shareholders who have botched the operations of some of our country』s largest financial institutions. Yet they have borne the burden, with 90% or more of the value of their holdings wiped out in most cases of failure. Collectively, they have lost more than $500 billion in just the four largest financial fiascos of the last two years. To say these owners have been 「bailed-out」 is to make a mockery of the term. （2009 Chairman』s Letter)

2009年股東信：在我的觀點中，如果不督促CEO去承擔風險控制的全責，那大型金融機構的董事就是玩忽職守。如果他不能勝任工作，那麼他應該去干別的。如果他根本就沒做到，而要政府介入注資或者擔保，那麼這個CEO和董事會應該吃到嚴重的經濟後果。

在我國最大的金融機構中，股東並沒有胡作非為。但是他們卻要承擔此後果。他們持倉的90%或者更多的價值灰飛煙滅。在過去兩年的四次大型金融機構的慘滅中，他們一共損失了5000億美金。你如果說他們被政府救贖了，就是無情地嘲笑他們。

Cultures self-propagate. Winston Churchill once said, 「You shape your houses and then they shape you.」 That wisdom applies to businesses as well. Bureaucratic procedures beget more bureaucracy, and imperial corporate palaces induce imperious behavior. (As one wag put it, 「You know you』re no longer CEO when you get in the back seat of your car and it doesn』t move.」) At Berkshire』s 「World Headquarters」 our annual rent is $270,212. Moreover, the home-office investment in furniture, art, Coke dispenser, lunch room, high-tech equipment – you name it – totals $301,363. As long as Charlie and I treat your money as if it were our own, Berkshire』s managers are likely to be careful with it as well. (2010 Chairman』s Letter)

2010年股東信：文化是自我傳播的。溫斯頓·丘吉爾曾說：「汝先掃屋，屋自會掃汝。」這種智慧通也通用於商業界。官僚程序會促生更多的官僚。皇宮式的公司建築會培養皇宮式的行為。（有人說，當你鑽到車后座後車不會自己走，你就知道自己不再是CEO了。）在伯克希爾的世界總部，我們一年的租金是270,212美金。我們總部所有投資在傢具、藝術裝飾、飲料販賣機、午餐坊間和高科技設備上的資金，大概是301,363美金。只要查理和我能視你的錢為我們自己的錢，伯克希爾的管理者就會非常小心謹慎地對待它們。

When leverage works, it magnifies your gains. Your spouse thinks you』re clever, and your neighbors get envious, But leverage is addictive. Once having profited from its wonders, very few people retreat to more conservative practices. And as we all learned in third grade — and some relearned in 2008 — any series of positive numbers, however impressive the numbers may be, evaporates when multiplied by a single zero. History tells us that leverage all too often produces zeroes, even when it is employed by very smart people.（2010 Chairman』s Letter)

2010年股東信：當槓桿工作得好的時候，它會加倍你的收益。你老婆會覺得你帥爆了，你的鄰居會羨慕嫉妒恨。但是槓桿是會讓人上癮的。當嘗到甜頭之後，非常少的人會退回到原先保守的策略。我們小學三年級都學過了（某些人在2008年學到），任何美好的投資回報數字，任憑她有多美，乘以一個零以後都會灰飛煙滅。歷史一再解釋了即使是天才少年在使用它，槓桿總是會製造很多個零。（譯者按：從歷史記錄而看，伯克希爾的槓桿率大約為60%（浮存金以及其他低息貸款）。所以老巴仍然是在教小孩子不要玩火。當然，槓桿是會上癮的，相信諸位中很多人都能深切明白。）

Today the world』s gold stock is about 170,000 metric tons. If all of this gold were melded together, it would form a cube of about 68 feet per side. (Picture it fitting comfortably within a baseball infield.) At $ 1,750 per ounce -- gold』s price as I write this -- its value would be $9.6 trillion. Call this cube pile A.

Let』s now create a pile B costing an equal amount. For that, we could buy all U.S. cropland (400 million acres with output of about $ 200 billion annually), plus 16 Exxon Mobils (the world』s most profitable company, one earning more than $40 billion annually). After these purchases, we would have about $ 1 trillion left over for walking-around money (no sense feeling strapped after this buying binge). Can you imagine an investor with $9.6 trillion selecting pile A over pile B?

A century from now the 400 million acres of farmland will have produced staggering amounts of corn, wheat, cotton, and other crops -- and will continue to produce that valuable bounty, whatever the currency may be. Exxon Mobil will probably have delivered trillions of dollars in dividends to its owners and will also hold assets worth many more trillions (and, remember, you get 16 Exxons). The 170,000 tons of gold will be unchanged in size and still incapable of producing anything. You can fondle the cube, but it will not respond.」 (2011 Chairman』s Letter)

2011年股東信: 現在世界上大概有170,000噸黃金。如果所有的黃金被融化，可以鑄成一個邊長為68英尺（譯者按：20.7米）的立方體。想像可以舒舒服服地放入一個棒球內場的立方體。如果以1750美金一盎司計價——我撰寫此文時的進價——這個立方體大概值9.6兆億。我們把它稱為甲堆。

然後讓我們以同樣的價格，來塑建一個乙堆。在乙堆中，我們可以買下所有的美國可種植耕地（4億英畝，年產2000億美元），再加上16個美孚公司（這個世界最賺錢的公司之一，每一個年產收益400億美元（譯者按，現在估計沒那麼多了，油價那個跌。））。買下了這兩筆之後，你還可以留下1兆億美元的零花錢，不必在瘋狂血拚之後手頭拮据。你能夠想像一個手握9.6兆億的投資者會選澤甲堆還是乙堆？

一個世紀之後，這4億英畝的土地會產出天量的玉米、小麥、棉花和其他作物，而且它會繼續產出。16個美孚估計已經發放了幾個兆億的分紅股利，而且你照樣手持價值數兆億的資產（記得，你買了16個）。而170,000噸黃金仍然在那裡巋然不動，也不能多產生一毛錢。你可以愛撫挑逗這個立方體，但是它不會回應你。

Our confidence is justified both by our past experience and by the knowledge that society will forever need massive investment in both transportation and energy. It is in the self-interest of governments to treat capital providers in a manner that will ensure the continued flow of funds to essential projects. And it is in our self-interest to conduct our operations in a manner that earns the approval of our regulators and the people they represent. (2012 Chairman』s Letter)

2012年股東信：我們的信心來自於過去的經驗：整個社會總是需要對交通和能源展開極大的投資。政府應該對資金提供者予以支持，以確保對重要項目的資金持續流入。這也符合政府的自我利益。而贏得政府和他們所代表的人民的認同，也符合我們經營的公司的自我利益。（譯者按：所以老巴現在開始大場面布局能源股？）

I won』t explain all of the adjustments – some are tiny and arcane – but serious investors should understand the disparate nature of intangible assets: Some truly deplete over time while others in no way lose value. With software, for example, amortization charges are very real expenses. Charges against other intangibles such as the amortization of customer relationships, however, arise through purchase-accounting rules and are clearly not real costs. GAAP accounting draws no distinction between the two types of charges. Both, that is, are recorded as expenses when earnings are calculated – even though from an investor』s viewpoint they could not be more different. (2013 Chairman』s Letter)

2013年股東信：我不會去解釋所有的調整數——有些很細小，有些很晦澀——但是正經的投資者應該理解無形資產的迥然不同性質：有些是要隨時間而折耗的，而另一些不會損失價值。比如軟體，攤銷成本是真實的開支。另外一些無形資產的攤銷，比如客戶關係，只是因為會計規則的需要而產生，並不是真實的開支。GAAP（美國會計準則）並不區分這些不同的性質。所有的攤銷都被記錄成開支，來計算收益，儘管從投資者的角度兩者天差地別。

Character is crucial: A Berkshire CEO must be 「all in」 for the company, not for himself. (I』m using male pronouns to avoid awkward wording, but gender should never decide who becomes CEO.) He can』t help but earn money far in excess of any possible need for it. But it』s important that neither ego nor avarice motivate him to reach for pay matching his most lavishly-compensated peers, even if his achievements far exceed theirs. A CEO』s behavior has a huge impact on managers down the line: If it』s clear to them that shareholders』 interests are paramount to him, they will, with few exceptions, also embrace that way of thinking.

My successor will need one other particular strength: the ability to fight off the ABCs of business decay, which are arrogance, bureaucracy and complacency. When these corporate cancers metastasize, even the strongest of companies can falter. The examples available to prove the point are legion, but to maintain friendships I will exhume only cases from the distant past. (2014 Chairman』s Letter)

2014年股東信：人品很重要：一個伯克希爾的CEO必須為公司赴湯蹈火在所不惜。他必須不為己。（我用「他」而沒用「她」是為了避免行文尷尬，但是性別應該與誰來做CEO無關。）他必須是一個情不自禁賺錢賺到不能停的人，必須大大地超過他可能的需求。但是就算他的業績比他的同行做得更出色，他也不能讓「自我」和「貪財」驅動他去追求同行的豐厚報酬（譯者按：活幹得要更好，但錢賺得不能更多，要求相當高啊。）。一個CEO的行為對下屬管理者的影響巨大：如果CEO表現出以股東利益為第一要務，那麼手下人也不會例外地去追隨這樣的思維方式。

我的繼任者還需要有一個特殊的長處：與讓公司腐化的元素——傲慢、官僚和自滿——做不懈鬥爭的能力。當這些公司的癌症轉移擴散，最牛的公司也會跪掉。有超級多的例子可以證明這個觀點，但為了保持友誼我只會去引用久遠以前的案例。

The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate or near-term demands for sums that are of significance to our cash resources. This structure is by design and is a key component in the strength of Berkshire』s economic fortress. It will never be compromised. If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income our float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it. (2015 Chairman』s Letter)

2015年股東信：保險合同的屬性，保證了我們不會因為在近期內需要巨量的現金，而對我們的現金儲備大動干戈。我們人為設計了這種結構，它也是伯克希爾經濟堡壘中的重要一環。我們永遠不會侵害這種結構。如果我們的保險金超過我們的開支和事件性損失的總和，我們會計入承保收益，將其增加到我們的浮存金帶來的投資收益中。當賺到這樣的收益時，我們享受免費的資金，而且還不止，別人還付錢給我們讓我們保管免費的資金。

最後，送您一張巴老一生的凈資產曲線，如果您還沒到65歲，恭喜了。

跟有智慧的人學習智慧有什麼價值？

何況巴菲特還有錢。。。

就我閱讀所及，關於巴菲特的所有資料都有學習價值。窮人的話，買不一定合算，但看是一定值得花時間的。

巴菲特的老師格雷厄姆，以及索羅斯，也是如此。這都是真正有見識有水平的人。

大師的書！都有一定的價值！雖然每個人的成功不能百分百的複製！但是得道的人分享的東西！總能給人啟發！有些時候！我們其實就差一點點就悟到了！世間大師多！總有一款適合我們得道！

剛看到一篇蓋茨的文章

寫自己受益於巴菲特的三件事

其二就見到了給股東的信的內容。

沒有翻譯，隨便看看吧。

原文link：https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20130612065727-251749025-three-things-i-ve-learned-from-warren-buffett?trk=mp-reader-card

節錄：

A lot of business leaders write letters to their shareholders, but Warren is justly famous for his. Partly that』s because his natural good humor shines through. Partly it』s because people think it will help them invest better (and they』re right). But it』s also because he』s been willing to speak frankly and criticize things like stock options and financial derivatives. He』s not afraid to take positions, like his stand on raising taxes on the rich, that run counter to his self-interest. Warren inspired me to start writing my own annual letter about the foundation』s work. I still have a ways to go before mine is as good as Warren』s, but it』s been helpful to sit down once a year and explain the results we』re seeing, both good and bad.