為什麼休克療法在玻利維亞成功但卻在俄羅斯失敗？
像林毅夫在中國經濟專題中批評休克療法，但沒有分析為什麼在別的地方成功，難道玻利維亞的企業有自生力嗎？
可以參看Jeffrey D. Sachs的自述：What I did in Russia
大致總結一下，就是Jeffrey Sachs在玻利維亞和波蘭使用休克療法，兩次成功在經濟危機中拯救了國家，因此成名。俄國人請他去幫助轉型，但實際上並不太把他當回事。俄國的失敗，主要歸因於貨幣政策的失敗，IMF和美國拒絕援助，和糟糕的私有化過程。
Jeffrey Sachs來到玻利維亞的時候，當地通貨膨脹年率達到驚人的24000%。他的措施主要包括，將油價提高至國際市場水平，暫停支付外債，稅務改革和建立社會保障機制。說來奇怪，提升油價怎麼會降低通貨膨脹呢？這是因為提高油價增加了政府收入，政府赤字減少，也就是不需要再印票子。暫停支付外債也是同樣的效果。有效的貨幣政策實施後，通脹在幾個月內就降至10%-20%。改革收到奇效。在如此嚴重的經濟危機中，未發生大規模的暴力事件，經濟和平轉型，殊為可貴。
在波蘭，Jeffrey Sachs協助瓦文薩制定轉型計劃，從計劃經濟轉向市場經濟。他的手段依然是取消價格控制，讓市場發揮作用。由於社會主義國家農業和輕工業水平低，往往出現食品和輕工業產品價格上漲。此時他使用強力的貨幣和財政政策對抗通脹。計劃體制下的低效企業，在市場經濟下必然存在競爭失敗破產的現象。他遊說西方國家取得援助，削減和暫停支付外債，用這筆錢建立社會保障機制，讓失敗者有飯吃。改革完成之後，波蘭在幾年內都是歐洲經濟發展最快的國家。用中國人的話說，Jeffrey Sachs就是波蘭改革開放的總設計師，或者至少是總設計師之一。
改革前夕的俄國同樣處於內憂外患之中。80年代石油價格狂跌，俄國的油田接近枯竭，政府的石油收入銳減，外債堆積如山，盧布的黑市價格一落千丈。經濟高通脹，日用品短缺，生產停滯。時任總理的蓋達爾意識到，如果不立即放開價格控制，農民很可能不願賣糧，城市立即會陷入斷糧的局面。
然而放開價格控制可能是俄國做對了的最後一件事，除此之外，俄國基本上沒有實施Sachs所倡導的休克療法。這裡面有幾個原因：首先腐敗嚴重，官員只想從改革中撈錢，把經濟學家的話當耳旁風。如果收緊貨幣，就不方便撈錢了。其次西方國家拒絕大規模援助。根據Sachs計算，波蘭需要10億美元援助，這筆錢波蘭拿到了。而俄國需要150億美元援助，西方國家不願出這筆錢，並且不允許俄國暫停償還外債。據Sachs個人講述，IMF在其中起到了相當壞的作用。最後，在十五個前蘇聯成員國之間居然實行了一個盧布區，各國使用統一的貨幣盧布。這導致各國競相印票子，因為印了票子是自己的，通貨膨脹是大家的。最終通脹高企，社保崩潰，大型企業被各級官員瓜分。但是這些東西不能賴在休克療法上。
一個休克了，有醫生治療輸血，
一個休克了，有路人等著他死，好器官摘取
先問是不是,再問為什麼
「休克療法」包含幾個重要措施，1、解除價格管制，實行價格自由化，2、減少政府支出以達到預算平衡，嚴格控制貨幣和信貸增長，降低通貨膨脹3、國營企業私有化、4、實行國際貿易和投資自由。
需要指出的是，「休克療法」與經濟衰退的關係，直到現在還是個有爭議的問題。有學者指出，與波蘭、捷克、匈牙利等國相比，俄羅斯的「休克療法」既不堅決也不徹底，但是俄國的經濟衰退卻比前者嚴重得多。有像白俄羅斯這樣的獨聯體國家，對「休克療法」抱有強烈的抵觸，結果其經濟困境比俄羅斯還嚴重。總之，不管是否採行「休克療法」、實施的力度如何，蘇聯東歐各國全都出現過一段經濟滑坡，就連有西德大力扶助的前東德也不例外。這或許可以說明，「休克療法」與經濟衰退的相關性並不明顯。據一些經濟學家分析，1991年至1995年間，獨聯體各國的經濟滑坡幅度中約有50%以上是以前的統一經濟空間瓦解的後果
總體上看，儘管還有種種問題，但經過了1993年到1998年五年的低迷後，從1999年開始復甦，俄羅斯通貨膨脹率逐年下降，經濟已趨於穩定。
讓我們來看一下休克療法之父、薩克森本人對這件事情是怎樣看待的吧。他本人是親歷這件事情的全部過程的，他的話應該算是比較有說服力的。
他這篇名為《Viewpoint: Why the shadow of WW1 and 1989 hangs over world events》的文章於2014年12月16日發表在BBC上，中文翻譯為《1914重臨:休克療法之父談今日俄羅斯》。
話不多說，直接上文章。
今年是兩個重大地緣政治事件的周年紀念：第一次世界大戰於一百年前爆發，深遠地改變了人類歷史進程;二十五年前柏林牆的倒塌，則為蘇聯帝國暴斃和冷戰結束埋下伏筆。
而我們沉重地發現，它們的意義絕不止於紀念。
正如福克納所說："過去從不消亡，甚至不曾過去"，一戰和柏林牆的倒塌直到今天仍在影響著世界：敘利亞和伊拉克的烽火是一戰結束的政治遺產;而在1989年的陰影籠罩下，烏克蘭局勢動蕩。
1914年和1989年是歷史的"關鍵時刻"，是決定性的轉折點。大國小國都無法獨善其身，它們在此時的表現將決定其未來的命運：戰爭或和平，崛起或衰敗。
我作為經濟顧問親身參與了1989年的一系列事件，坦白說，那時我不住地擔憂1914年重演。結果是，我看到波蘭走出衰敗，也看到俄羅斯陷入歷史的泥淖。
一戰即將結束的1919年，偉大的英國經濟學家凱恩斯曾向世人闡述對"關鍵時刻"的見解，字字珠玉、歷久彌新。他告訴我們戰勝國的決定會如何徹底改變戰敗國的經濟體系，也告訴我們大人物的失策會如何讓戰禍重現。
在其辭藻華美、洞見卓越的巨著《和約的經濟後果》中，凱恩斯做出了精準的預言：凡爾賽和約的犬儒與短視，特別是對德國強加懲罰性戰爭賠款和對債務國金融危機惡化不管不顧，註定讓歐洲經濟走向持續的危機，也註定讓一個滿懷復 天才們流露的某些靈光是可以跨越代際的，凱恩斯在1919年的哀鳴無疑屬於此類。在我擔任政策顧問和分析師的那些歲月里，這本書的卓見成為我思路的框架。
三十年前，我作為一個初出茅廬的經濟學家被臨時起用，負責幫助玻利維亞這個幾乎被遺忘的小國從大崩潰中走出來。凱恩斯的著作啟示我在社會和政治層面考量玻利維亞的經濟危機，而它的債務國美國，也應對其負起責任。
鑒於我在玻利維亞的工作經歷，1989年春天，波蘭朝野雙方——末任共產黨政府和團結工會都向我發出了邀請。當時的波蘭，和玻利維亞一樣，已陷入財政破產;而當時的歐洲，和1919年的歐洲一樣，已走入歷史的"關鍵時刻"。
彼時主政蘇聯的戈爾巴喬夫預見到歐洲將會在和平與民主之下重新團結起來，這位偉大人物同樣希望民主制度能在自己國家落地生根。
在關鍵的1989年，波蘭是第一個開啟民主化進程的東歐國家。我在波蘭新一屆政府甫成立之時擔任其主要外部經濟顧問。我堅定主張合理的國際援助對波蘭平穩順利轉型至後共產主義民主體制至關重要，亦是脫胎於凱恩斯思想。
我向白宮、唐寧街十號、愛麗舍宮和德國總理府發出了呼籲：請明智地選擇援助波蘭，這是構建民主團結新歐洲的關鍵一步。
那段日子，作為經濟顧問的我可謂意氣風發。
很多時候，我都在指望著白宮的決策。1989年9月的一個早上，我為波蘭的貨幣穩定問題向美國政府申請十億美元援助，當天晚上白宮就批准了這筆錢。不是開玩笑，從申請到批准來回一共八個小時。而說服白宮大幅減免波蘭的債務稍微多花了點時間——高層間的談判拉扯了一年左右。上述兩者都被證明卓有成效。
其餘的，便是大家熟知的歷史了：波蘭推行了一系列非常重大的改革——我參與設計了部分決策，而美國與歐洲用及時而慷慨的援助支持這些改革措施——波蘭的經濟開始重建與復甦。十五年以後，波蘭成長為成熟的歐盟成員。
我多希望能把追憶停在這個美好的結局上，但是很可惜，西方在終結冷戰時的表現並不純是成功的。他們對波蘭的舉措是成功的，而對俄羅斯的舉措則是巨大的失敗。美國和歐洲慷慨而富有遠見地幫助波蘭，而對解體後的俄羅斯卻再版了凡爾賽的可怕錯誤——我們今天正在為此付出代價。
1990年和1991年，戈爾巴喬夫政府注意到了波蘭表現出來的積極跡象，邀請我協助其推行經濟改革。那時俄羅斯面臨著與1985年的玻利維亞和1989年的波蘭相同的經濟災難。
1991年春天，我與哈佛和麻省理工的同事協助戈爾巴喬夫向西方國家請求經濟援助，這是他所嘗試政治改革和經濟整頓的重要步驟。然而我們的努力落空了，確切地說是徹底失敗了。
1991年夏天，當戈爾巴喬夫從G7峰會空手而歸時，等待他是一場陰謀政變，其政治生涯就此終結。葉利欽上位後，蘇聯解體被擺到了檯面上。
葉利欽的經濟團隊也向我請求幫助，既為了諮詢維持經濟的技術問題，亦為了從美國和歐洲獲得至關重要的經濟援助。
我告訴葉利欽總統和他的團隊：援助很快就會來。畢竟對波蘭的緊急援助都是在幾周甚至幾小時內到位的，對一個獨立民主的新俄羅斯也理應會如此。然而事態發展讓我愈漸迷惑，繼而驚恐地發現——急需的援助並沒有來。
波蘭獲得了債務減免，俄羅斯卻面臨著美國和歐洲的全額催債。波蘭得到了及時而慷慨的經濟援助，俄羅斯卻只接到幾批國際貨幣基金組織的專家團。我一再懇求美國多做些實事，強調在波蘭的成功經驗，都沒有用，美國政府沒有讓步。
最終，俄羅斯經濟崩盤碾碎了一切試圖穩定和改革的努力，葉利欽政府失去了尊嚴也失去了權力。兩年的無功忙碌後，我辭職了。再過幾年，普京政府上台。
對於這場大崩潰，美國學術權威更多地批評俄羅斯的改革者而不是美國和歐洲的殘忍忽視。誠然，歷史是由勝利者書寫的。美國很自然地把自己看作冷戰的勝利者，也很自然地認為1991年後俄羅斯的不幸與己無關，直到今天依然如此。
我花了二十年時間，想了很多，讀了很多，慢慢明白為什麼當時美國對於波蘭事務如此高瞻遠矚，對俄羅斯卻殘忍地忽視：西方世界之所以在經濟和外交上如此提攜波蘭，是因為它能變成北約在東歐擴張的橋頭堡，波蘭是西方陣營的一員，因此是值得幫助的;而美國的領導人看待俄羅斯，正如勞埃德喬治和克萊蒙梭在凡爾賽看待德國一樣——被擊敗的敵人就應該被碾過，何談幫助?
北約前司令官韋斯利克拉克在最近出版的書里提到，1991年，時任五角大樓政策主管保羅沃爾夫沃茲對他說：沒有了俄羅斯的干涉威脅，美國現在可以在中東隨心所欲地行動了，在別的地方似乎也是一樣。
簡單來說，美國表現得像個得勢霸主，不惜以戰爭手段保住冷戰的勝利果實。美國將統馭群雄，俄羅斯將無力阻攔。
普京最近在莫斯科的一場演講中，如沃爾夫沃茲一樣形容美國的行為："冷戰結束了，但我們並沒有簽訂一份清晰透明的和約，一份尊重既有規則或創造了新的規則和標準的和約。相反它讓所謂的冷戰勝利者要求世界適應他們的利益。
我並不是試圖為普京對俄羅斯最近在烏克蘭非法、偏激和危險的暴力行為應負的責任開脫。我是想去解釋它。1989年的陰雲正籠罩我們、愈漸濃重。而北約最近又接受了烏克蘭的加盟，將勢力範圍推至俄羅斯的邊境，這是非常不明智的挑釁行為。
1914、1989、2014，我們正在見證歷史——在烏克蘭，我們看到俄羅斯對1991年後北約擴張和美國欺凌的積怨;在中東，我們看到一戰中被摧毀的奧斯曼帝國的廢墟上，生長著對歐洲殖民統治和美國帝國做派的憤恨，
最重要的是，我們面對著我們自己的時代選擇。
我們要不要自私地使用力量?用力量來控制?相信領土、北約擴張、石油和其他戰利品是對力量的獎賞?
還是負責任地使用力量，謹記慷慨與仁慈才能構建信任與繁榮——在此前提下才有和平可言?
每一代人，都要重新選擇。
附上英文原文：
This has been a year of great geopolitical anniversaries. We are at the 100th anniversary of the start of World War One, an event that more than any other shaped world history during the past century. We are at the 25th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the opening chapter of the demise of the Soviet empire and the end of the Cold War. Yet we know that painfully we observe something far more than a mere remembrance.
As William Faulkner remarked, "The past is never dead. It"s not even past." WW1 and the fall of the Wall continue to shape our most urgent realities today. The wars in Syria and Iraq are the legacy of the closure of WW1, and dramatic events in Ukraine are unfolding in the long shadow of 1989.
1914 and 1989 are "hinge moments", decisive points of history on which subsequent events turn. How nations both great and small behave at such hinge moments determine the future course of war and peace.
I participated directly and personally in the events of 1989, and saw this lesson in play - positively in the case of Poland and negatively in the case of Russia. And I can tell you that as I carried out my own tasks as an economic adviser during 1989-92, I kept a constant and always worried gaze on 1914. I carry that same sense of worry today.
In 1919, at the end of WW1, the great British economist John Maynard Keynes taught us invaluable and lasting lessons about such hinge moments, how decisions of victors impact the economies of the vanquished, and how missteps by the powerful can set the course of future wars.
With uncanny insight, prescience, and literary flair, Keynes"s 1919 The Economic Consequences of the Peace predicted that the cynicism and shortsightedness at the core of the Versailles Treaty, especially the imposition of punitive war reparations on Germany, and the lack of solutions to the roiling financial crises of the debtor countries, would condemn the European economies to continuing crisis, and would in fact invite the rise of another vengeful tyrant in the coming generation.
Keynes"s cri de coeur is one of those remarkable outpourings of genius that speaks across generations. That book and its lessons proved to be a formative guide for me in my own career as policy adviser and analyst.
As a newly minted economist some 30 years ago, I suddenly found myself charged with helping a small and largely forgotten country, Bolivia, to find a way out of its own unmitigated economic disaster. Keynes"s writings helped me to understand that Bolivia"s financial crisis should be viewed in social and political terms, and that Bolivia"s creditor, the US, had a shared responsibility of resolving Bolivia"s financial anguish.
My experience in Bolivia in 1985-86 soon brought me to Poland in the spring of 1989, at a dual invitation of Poland"s final communist government and the Solidarity trade union movement that strongly opposed it. Poland, like Bolivia, was financially bankrupt. And Europe in 1989, like Europe in 1919, was at a great hinge-moment of history.
Mikhail Gorbachev was in power in the Soviet Union, and was prepared to see Europe reunited in peace and democracy. This great man desired similarly to move his own country to a new democratic order. Poland was the first country in the region to move towards democracy in that momentous year. I quickly became the main outside economic adviser to the new Polish government. Once again, drawing from Keynes, I championed the kind of international assistance that I felt to be vital for Poland to make a peaceful and successful transition to post-communist democratic rule.
Specifically, I appealed to the White House, 10 Downing Street, the Elysee and the German Chancellery, for enlightened aid to Poland as a key step in building a new united and democratic Europe.
These were heady days for me as an economic adviser. My wish, it seemed on some days, was the White House"s command. One morning, in September 1989, I appealed to the US Government for $1bn for Poland"s currency stabilisation. By evening, the White House confirmed the money. No kidding, an eight-hour turnaround time from request to result. Convincing the White House to support a sharp cancellation of Poland"s debts took a bit longer, with high-level negotiations stretching out for about a year, but those too proved to be successful.
The rest, as they say, is history. Poland undertook very strong reform measures, based in part on recommendations that I had helped to design. The US and Europe supported those measures with timely and generous aid. Poland"s economy began to restructure and grow, and 15 years later it became a full-fledged member of the European Union
I wish that I could stop my reminiscing here, with this happy story. But alas, the story of the end of the Cold War is not only one of Western successes, as in Poland, but also one of great Western failure vis-a-vis Russia. While American and European generosity and the long view prevailed in Poland, American and European actions vis-a-vis post-Soviet Russia looks were much more like the horrendous blunders of Versailles. And we are paying the consequences to this day.
In 1990 and 1991, Gorbachev"s government, seeing the emerging positive results in Poland, asked me to help advise it on economic reforms. Russia at the time was facing the same kind of financial calamity that had engulfed Bolivia in the mid-1980s and Poland by 1989.
In the spring of 1991, I worked with colleagues at Harvard and MIT to assist Gorbachev to obtain financial support from the West as part of his efforts at political reform and economic overhaul. Yet our efforts fell flat - indeed they failed entirely.
Gorbachev left the G7 summit that summer of 1991 and returned to Moscow empty-handed. When he returned to Moscow with no results, a conspiracy attempted to oust him in the notorious August Putsch, from which he never recovered politically. With Boris Yeltsin ascendant, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union now on the table, Yeltsin"s economic team again asked me for assistance, both in the technical challenges of stabilisation, and in the quest to obtain vital financial assistance from the US and Europe.
Moscow 1991: The attempted "August putsch" against GorbachevI predicted to President Yeltsin and his team that help would soon be on the way. After all, emergency help for Poland was arranged in hours or weeks. Surely the same would happen for the newly independent and democratic Russia. Yet I watched in puzzlement and growing horror that the needed aid was not on the way.
Where Poland had been granted debt relief, Russia instead faced harsh demands by the US and Europe to keep paying its debts in full. Where Poland had been granted rapid and generous financial aid, Russia received study groups from the IMF but no money. I begged and beseeched the US to do more. I pleaded the lessons of Poland, but all to no avail. The US government would not budge.
In the end, Russia"s malignant financial crisis overwhelmed the efforts at reform and normality. The reform government of Yegor Gaidar fell from grace and from power. I resigned after two hard years of trying to help, and of accomplishing very little indeed. A few years later, Vladimir Putin replaced Yeltsin at the helm.
Throughout this debacle, the US pundits blamed the reformers rather than the cruel neglect by the US and Europe. Victors write the history, as they say, and the US felt very much the victor of the Cold War. The US would therefore remain blameless in any accounts of Russia"s mishaps after 1991, and that remains true today.
Vladimir Putin and Barack ObamaIt took me 20 years to gain a proper understanding of what had happened after 1991. Why had the US, which had behaved with such wisdom and foresight in Poland, acted with such cruel neglect in the case of Russia? Step by step, and memoir by memoir, the true story came to light. The West had helped Poland financially and diplomatically because Poland would become the Eastern ramparts of an expanding Nato. Poland was the West, and was therefore worthy of help. Russia, by contrast, was viewed by US leaders roughly the same way that Lloyd George and Clemenceau had viewed Germany at Versailles - as a defeated enemy worthy to be crushed, not helped.
A recent book by a former Nato commander, General Wesley Clark, recounts a 1991 conversation he had with Paul Wolfowitz, who was then the Pentagon"s policy director. Wolfowitz told Clark that the US had learned that it could now act with impunity in the Middle East, and ostensibly in other regions as well, without any threat of Russian interference.
In short, the US would behave like a victor and a bully, claiming the fruits of Cold War victory through wars of choice if necessary. The US would be on top, and Russia would be unable to stop it.
In a recent speech in Moscow, Putin has described US behaviour in almost the same terms as Wolfowitz. "The Cold War ended," said Putin, "but it did not end with the signing of a peace treaty with clear and transparent agreements on respecting existing rules or creating new rules and standards. This created the impression that the so-called "victors" in the Cold War had decided to pressure events and reshape the world to suit their own needs and interests."
Russian tanks arrive in the Crimean capital, March 2014By making these observations I do not mean to exonerate Putin of responsibility for Russia"s recent illegal, cynical, and dangerous acts of violence in Ukraine. But I do mean to help explain them. The shadow of 1989 looms large. And Nato"s continued desire, expressed again just recently, to add Ukraine to its membership, thereby putting Nato right up on the Russian border, must be regarded as profoundly unwise and provocative.
1914, 1989, 2014. We live in history. In Ukraine, we face a Russia embittered over the spread of Nato and by US bullying since 1991. In the Middle East, we face the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, destroyed by WW1, and replaced by the cynicism of European colonial rule and US imperial pretentions.
We face, most importantly, choices for our time. Will we use power cynically and to dominate, believing that territory, Nato"s long reach, oil reserves, and other booty are the rewards of power? Or will we exercise power responsibly, knowing that generosity and beneficence builds trust, prosperity, and the groundwork for peace? In each generation, the choice must be made anew.
波蘭是東歐民主的櫥窗，可以用波蘭向其他國家宣傳民主的好。
蘇聯是破壞民主世界的強盜，改名叫俄羅斯聯邦也不能讓他好過。
按照休克療法設計者薩克斯自己的說法，主要歸因於貨幣政策的失敗。俄羅斯的改革過程中IMF和美國拒絕援助，而在玻利維亞休克療法的實施過程中有大量的外部支援，他還舉出了另外一個成功的案例波蘭。
對玻利維亞改革過程不是很清楚，我個人覺得俄羅斯的失敗還有如下幾個原因。
1、私有化過程中存在大規模的腐敗，大量國有企業資產流失。我們知道俄羅斯的私有化過程中是「分」的政策，但是到最後變成了「白送」。
2、國家財政負擔過重。在蘇聯解體之前蘇聯的福利體系很完備，即使是生活在農村的農民也有很好的福利保障，這一點要和天朝的農村政策天壤之別。
3、由計划到市場，大量的企業面臨著特別是外部市場的優勝劣汰和內部的資源配置混亂的後果。而不幸的是蘇聯解體前是一個真正的計劃經濟，而且整個經濟結構很完整。
4、休克療法的私有化過程伴隨著政治民主化的過程，穩定的政體遲遲沒有搭建好，這為穩定的政策執行埋下了隱患。
休克是危症，哪裡是療法。沒有IMF貨幣支援就等死吧，北約想搞蘇聯都多少年頭了，肯定是落井下石的幹活，這叫政治的慣性，跟經濟學有什麼關係？
就像當年石達開向曾國藩投降時要求不要傷害他的將士，結果那些手下還不是該被殺的都被殺了？
拋開地緣政治談經濟的都是耍流氓。波蘭為什麼改革成功？那是因為北約需要這個反俄橋頭堡。為什麼北約選擇波蘭？看看地圖和歐洲歷史就明白了。沒有波蘭自身的經濟，駐紮在那兒的美軍喝西北風嗎？一切都是政治
作為經濟學家還是不懂政治
援助波蘭讓他倒向西方
為其意識形態輸出樹立樣板
所以申請援助有能成功
而俄羅斯則不行
不管俄羅斯是不是倒向西方
哪怕完全西化 加入北約都不行
因為俄羅斯太大
始終是美國的威脅
小國家可以給美國做狗
大國想做狗都不要
要不起也不敢要
存在就是威脅
哪怕受自己控制也不行
最好就是讓他死去。
所以俄羅斯怎麼改都美國都不會真幫他
除非俄羅斯全都分裂成波蘭大小
同理 中國也一樣
前輩們提出獨立自主 自力更生
早就看透這一切了我想說，待會兒要去接Sachs,這兩天都和他在一起，有問題我可以代為問下。
...話說 真的成功了么?
誰說休克療法在波蘭成功了？只是沒有在俄國那樣惡化罷了。波蘭的經濟整個被外資控制，國家去工業化，金融和高端服務業為外人所有，犧牲兩代女人，這就是成功？
一袋米，可以釀成酒，也可以化成翔
酒變成啥，主要看內外區別：
1，外部區別，密封好還是蒼蠅蚊子漫天飛
2，內部區別，微生物是酒麴還是腐敗
所以，都是米，都開始釀，要注意區別
換到俄羅斯，並沒有準確執行，變成了貪腐的契機
所以，此休克不正宗。
所謂的用私有券換酒，應該是不實之言，但真實情況可能更殘酷，就是根本沒有好的企業可供老百姓分，好企業在可供認領前就因為腐敗被權貴瓜分了，剩下的都是一些奄奄一息的企業。所以造成寡頭集團林立，因為換酒喝這種行為肯定並非普遍，卻造成幾乎沒有老百姓受益，國有資產卻被迅速掠奪一空。可見私有券好像公平，實際上因為資源分派權在權貴手中，造成了更大的不公，多數都是由原前蘇聯的廠長，經理們重新把持，形成人人痛恨的「新俄羅斯人」。所以俄國的失敗，並不是休克療法的失敗，是因為首鼠兩端的行政政策所致。
建議去看看commanding heights episode 1，2，3。 其中會有詳細講解！！
以下是commanding heights具體類容 詳細講述了如何改變波蘭和玻利維亞的。然後大體的介紹為什麼沒有在俄羅斯成功。
「 Onscreen title: La Paz, Bolivia
NARRATOR: One of the poorest countries in Latin America and with a history of 189 military coups, Bolivia was also one of the most unstable.
JORGE QUIROGA, President, Bolivia: When I was going through college in Texas, the first question you"d be asked is "Who"s the president of Bolivia this week?" Second question down the road was "You"re from Bolivia -- what"s the inflation rate in Bolivia this week?," because we had galloping hyperinflation that destroyed our economic base.
GONZALO "GONI" SANCHEZ DE LOZADA, President, Bolivia, 1993-1997: We found that Bolivia was the seventh highest inflation in the history of man.
JUAN CARIAGA, Finance Minister, Bolivia, 1986-1988: Twenty-three thousand, five hundred percent. Prices increased by the hour.
NARRATOR: The cost of food and clothes kept increasing. Before it was all over, the total inflation averaged 1 percent every 10 minutes.
JORGE QUIROGA: Seven out of 10 Bolivians live in poverty. The poor people get hurt even more. They see their pockets being eaten away by inflation that is galloping around.
GONZALO SANCHEZ DE LOZADA: It"s like a tiger, hyperinflation: If you don"t kill it and you only have one bullet, it"ll eat you.
NARRATOR: The root of the problem was government finances. The government was spending 30 times more than it received in taxes.
Across the continent, Latin America"s uncompetitive economies had been piling up debt. In the 1970s, a massive hike in world oil prices left foreign banks awash with petrodollars.
ARNOLD HARBERGER: So here were the international banks with billions of dollars and nowhere to earn interest on it. They discovered Latin America.
GONZALO SANCHEZ DE LOZADA: We were offered unreasonable amounts of money. These banks who were very unwise in their lending policy came to the happy conclusion that countries don"t go broke. It"s true, but sometimes they don"t pay.
MOISES NAIM: Guess what? One day, these countries could no longer afford to repay the debts.
NARRATOR: In 1982 a financial crisis in Mexico triggered a chain reaction that caused the 1980s to be known as Latin America"s "lost decade".
JOSEPH STANISLAW, Author, Commanding Heights:Bolivia was probably the most severe case of how things had gone wrong in Latin America. For decades they just printed money. They collected no taxes in the country. If you can"t collect taxes, you"ve got to make the money up somehow, so they just printed it.
GONZALO SANCHEZ DE LOZADA: Bolivia was a basket case. We were considered hopeless. We had help from nobody. We were totally alone. The World Bank had closed its office, the IMF had pulled out its representative, and the American government and other friendly nations wouldn"t answer the telephones.
Onscreen title: Harvard University, USA
NARRATOR: At 29, economist Jeff Sachs had just become one of Harvard"s youngest full professors ever.
JEFFREY SACHS: In 1985, some former students sent me a note asking whether I would be ready to come to a meeting with a group of visiting Bolivians.
NARRATOR: The Bolivians had come to Harvard to take part in a seminar on the hyperinflation that was ravaging their country.
JEFFREY SACHS: I was absolutely fascinated, made a few observations. Somebody in the back of the room piped up and said, "Well, if you think you know what to do, you come to La Paz."
When I got to La Paz in July 1985, the inflation rate was about 60,000 percent. It was an extraordinary and terrifying thing to see, actually. It was a society at the edge of the precipice.
NARRATOR: Bolivia"s politicians were paralyzed. Only one man seemed to know what to do.
JEFFREY SACHS: I met a man at a cocktail party one of the evenings at work. I didn"t know him at all. I introduced myself. He said, "What are you doing?" I said, "Oh, I"m writing an economic plan for the next government."
GONZALO SANCHEZ DE LOZADA: And I said, "I"m very, very pleased that you"re studying this, because we"re going to beat these guys, and you can come and work for us." So they all laughed.
JEFFREY SACHS: He said: "Oh, that"s very interesting. What do you have in mind?" And I described a few elements, basically how to stop hyperinflation. And he said: "No, no, you have to go much beyond that. You don"t understand. We need so much more. You"re just going on the surface. This country needs a complete overhaul. We"ve got to get out of the mess that we"re in." I wasn"t sure whether he was provoking me, whether he was kidding, whether he was sober, whether he knew what he was doing. It turned out that this was Goni, Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada -- a genius.
Chapter 11: Shock Therapy Applied [4:48]
NARRATOR: Goni"s party did win the election, and he became minister of planning. He told the president that Bolivia was running out of time.
JUAN CARIAGA: We told him, "You have 90 days before Bolivia"s hyperinflation becomes the highest inflation in world history." So he told us, "Okay, you have 20 days; you have to start working now."
GONZALO SANCHEZ DE LOZADA: There was a big discussion whether you could stop a hyperinflation or an inflation period by taking gradualist steps. In this Jeff Sachs was influential. He said: "All this gradualist stuff just doesn"t work. When it really gets out of control you"ve got to stop it, like a medicine. You"ve got to take some radical steps; otherwise your patient is going to die."
NARRATOR: To avoid leaks, they worked at home. Every few days, Goni reported to the president.
GONZALO SANCHEZ DE LOZADA: We said: "Look, boys, you"ve got one chance. And remember, as Machiavelli said, "It"s all the bad news at once, the good news little by little."" So he said, "Get it all done." Shock therapy is get it over, get it done, stop hyperinflation, and then start rebuilding your economy so you achieve growth.
NARRATOR: In August 1985, Goni went public with a program called "shock therapy."
JUAN CARIAGA: It caught everybody by surprise. It had great credibility. It was a shock.
NARRATOR: Shock therapy spelled the death of dependency theory. Government spending was slashed. Price controls were scrapped. Import tariffs were cut. Government budgets were balanced.
JUAN CARIAGA: We didn"t use highly sophisticated economic theory to deal with hyperinflation. We just used very simple things, such as from now on the government will only spend what it gets. You get one peso, spend one peso; you get two pesos, spend two pesos. If we don"t have it, we don"t spend it. No borrowing from the Central Bank, and therefore the Central Bank did not have to print money.
NARRATOR: Shock therapy meant that the price of essentials -- transport, food, fuel -- all shot up. Until then people had thought that only a military dictatorship like Chile"s could impose such tough measures without tearing society apart.
DANIEL YERGIN: Bolivia may be a small country, but it had a very big impact in terms of kick-starting reform throughout Latin America. In Brazil, a professor, who actually used to teach the dependency theory, launched a program of economic reform that looked a lot like shock therapy.
DANIEL YERGIN: Argentina was suffering from 20,000 percent inflation and the new president of that country said, you know, we"ve seen this movie before.
DOMINGO CAVALLO, Economy Minister, Argentina, 2001: Pro-market reforms could be implemented under a democracy, and we demonstrated that it was possible here in Argentina.
NARRATOR: All across Latin America, governments began to sit up and take notice.
GONZALO SANCHEZ DE LOZADA: I think the Bolivian experience did have influence. The fact that we did it in democracy, we did it without great social violence, had impact on economic thinkers and on politicians.
JEFFREY SACHS: In late 1985, as we were struggling late into the night with a problem, he said, "You know, this is extraordinarily hard, but what"s happening here, this is going to have to happen all through Latin America." I watched it unfold, one country after another.
NARRATOR: It is a curious fact of history that what happened in Bolivia was to have a direct impact on the frozen economies of Eastern Europe.
JEFFREY SACHS: I was approached by a Polish government official who had watched the Bolivian reforms, and then had seen the work I had done in Argentina and Brazil. He finally asked me would I go to Poland and help.
Onscreen title: Warsaw, Poland
The Poles themselves feared that they were descending into starvation. The shops were utterly empty for miles. I would see a woman just standing on the street sobbing: "There"s no milk in this city. I can"t find any milk for my child. What am I going to do?" It was terrifying.
NARRATOR: Sachs arrived on the very day that roundtable talks agreed there should be free elections in Poland.
LECH WALESA: The situation was more than dramatic. One can change a political system overnight, but an economic system needs years.
DANIEL YERGIN: Whenever Soviet power was challenged in Eastern Europe, the response was very clear. It was tanks; it was the Red Army. That was the case in Berlin in 1953, Budapest in 1956, Prague 1968. But the answer was different in Warsaw in 1989. Solidarity won 99 out of 100 seats. The head of the Polish Communist Party called Moscow for directions. Mikhail Gorbachev"s answer was stunning: "Do nothing; accept the outcome of a free election." And that was really the phone call that ended the Cold War. And of course, the great symbol of the end of the Soviet empire was the fall of the Berlin Wall. One country after another broke free of communism -- Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania. 1989 was truly a miracle year.
NARRATOR: Poland was free now. Solidarity had to liberate the Polish economy. Late one night Sachs met the Solidarity economist Jacek Kuron in a Warsaw apartment.
JEFFREY SACHS: I was trying to explain how you get out of this mess that the communist system had left behind. Every couple of minutes he would pound on the table, "Pah, pah, pah" -- "Yes, yes, yes, I understand." And we"d gone on -- "Pah, pah" -- and it was very, you know... it was really exciting. We went on for a few hours like this. I was exhausted. The room was filled with smoke, and he said: "Okay, clear. Write up the plan." We got up. I said: "Well, this will be a great honor. We"ll send you something just as soon as we can." "No, tomorrow morning I need the plan." I laughed, and he said, "I"m absolutely serious; I need this written down now."
We wrote up a plan that night and delivered it the next morning. They distributed it to the Solidarity members of the Parliament.
NARRATOR: Like Sachs, Solidarity"s new finance minister, Leszek Balcerowicz, believed transition had to be rapid and massive.
LESZEK BALCEROWICZ, Finance Minister, Poland, 1989-1991: Just after breakthrough, there is a short period, a period of extraordinary politics. By definition, people are ready to accept more radical solutions because they are pretty euphoric of freshly regained freedom. One could use it only in one way, by moving forward very, very quickly.
JOSEPH STANISLAW: Poland decided to do what Bolivia did, to introduce shock therapy, cut back on government expenditure and try and introduce a market system and see if it could work.
NARRATOR: Prices almost doubled, and shortages didn"t end. All Balcerowicz could do was chew his nails and wait for the law of supply and demand to kick in. But then, after a few days, farmers began to bring their produce to market.
LESZEK BALCEROWICZ: I was going for a walk, and we were looking at the prices in the shops, the prices of eggs.
NARRATOR: His aides told him to concentrate on the price of eggs. If eggs appeared, if eggs got cheaper, the market would be working. Eggs did appear. And then the price of eggs began to fall.
LESZEK BALCEROWICZ: And I remember that very important day when the prices of eggs are falling. This was one of the signals that the program, the stabilization program, is working.
JEFFREY SACHS: I of course had the Poland experience in mind. Russia turned out to be something quite different.
NARRATOR: The Parliament was dominated by Communists and other parties who opposed reform.
JEFFREY SACHS: Gaidar was under remarkable political attack from the first moment. It wasn"t seven days after the start of reform that the head of the Parliament called for the resignation of the government, for example.
YEGOR GAIDAR: It is a pseudo market utopia.
The only thing I want to ask is understanding the gravity of the situation.
NARRATOR: Gaidar and his team wanted to use economic reform as a political weapon to smash the old communist system before it destroyed them.
BORIS JORDAN: It was more a survival tactic -- how can we destroy the communist, centrally controlled economy? Let"s destroy the army, let"s destroy the KGB, and let"s destroy centrally controlled planning, rather than how are we going to build an economy?」
玻利維亞多少人口俄羅斯多少人口
發達國家給了玻利維亞多少扶持給了俄羅斯多少扶持
先下結論:一個國家經濟的成功都是集大成者，早期的蘇聯靠德國美國技術資金，美國靠全球的資本人才技術，包括後期的日韓，都是靠歐美特別是美國的資金技術援助，對於韓國的發展有興趣的同學去翻翻檔案。
「休克療法」可以拯救一個國家的經濟，在我看來就是一個笑話。現代工業體系的門類成百上千種，每個種類又有數不清的技術和專利，光靠一個國家的力量來發展壯大幾乎是不可能的。就說中國的例子，很多國外屁民看不懂中國高速發展的原因，一臉的不屑與迷惑。
其實認真研究中國經濟發展崛起的歷史，你都會發現關鍵時期國外資本技術，乃至世界市場的身影。簡單從改革開放來算，中美蜜月十年，中國從歐美日本獲得了多少核心技術，以發展中國家身份蹭了多少國際援助，特別是日本給中國的貸款和補助。
還是那句話，集大成者方能傲視群雄，閉門搞工匠精神多半自我感動。其實認真會研究中國技術核心的突破，多多少少能看到國外的身影。
舉一個最簡單的例子，中國高鐵大躍進。http://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MjM5NjEyMTE5NA==mid=400313468idx=3sn=fdb278a38589fc59f9d1553ea2958144scene=2srcid=1031eh3m6drwIlEgqqERYWqSfrom=timelineisappinstalled=1#wechat_redirect
不是有同樣的問題嗎？問的是波蘭為什麼成功。答案裡面有休克療法設計者的回憶錄，大意就是美國養的起老鼠，養不起老虎，而且不敢養，就等著餓成貓了。
樹典型誰還不會啊 各種養生電台還要張羅幾個熱線觀眾現身說法呢
您太小看體量了， 一千萬人口的南美小國也敢拿來質問五大流氓了……
我願意買狗糧養條寵物犬，但不會花大把錢買肉養老虎。
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