美國的反智主義是如何形成與發展的？

12-19

//突然間有好多贊，好開心啊~

//謝謝大家~

//大家一起快樂的學習新知識吧~

在美國，有大學文憑的人的平均工資遠高於沒有文憑的。所以為什麼很多美國人傾家蕩產背老鼻子債還要讀大學（學費對於老美來說也是超級貴的）。這一點上，美國不反智。

在美國，有著Dr頭銜就一定是要印出來告訴大家的，因為這是榮耀，這一點上美國不反智。

在美國，一夜暴富的土豪真的不多，暴富的（矽谷那些）都是受過良好教育的（雖然有不少是輟學，但是人家輟的那些大學很多人都是沒有資格上的）。其實這一點來說，美國不反智。

至於旁邊那個關於「美國中學反智主義」的問題，回答都比較片面。美國的教育系統和中國一樣，學校與學校之間差距很大。好的學校都是非常鼓勵學生學習，發明，創新的。就像國內的省重點高中一樣。至於差點的學校，也和國內一樣，學生自己愛幹嘛幹嘛吧。

wiki了反智主義，典型例子貌似是文化@革$命呢貌似。

美國不反智，雖然確實有點反智傾向，但，誰沒有呢？國內的「知識分子」低工資待遇，國人普遍不相信「教授」「專家」之言，日本核泄漏了我們瘋狂搶鹽什麼的，這麼說來不都是「反智」的苗頭嗎？

其實老是這樣扣帽子，貼標籤，宣傳別人多不好，真的不太好

我認為這是後現代主義運動的結果，後現代主義運動導致了當代主義的產生，在當代主義里平等是核心。現代主義像是印第安圖騰柱，而當代主義就像是一張撐開的網，現代主義里一切都是分上下尊卑的，而在當代主義里一切都平等。美國有一個心理學家叫珞洛梅(是不是這麼翻譯的忘了，差不多是這個發音)，她在一本書(書名忘了，她的書太多)里講過美國的一個情況，那是一本寫在七十年代的書。裡面講在美國由於受到當代精神的影響比較嚴重，所以產生了新的鄙視鏈，區別於現代主義時期的鄙視鏈。現代主義的鄙視鏈是精英鄙視下層人民，而當代主義的鄙視鏈是多數鄙視少數。由於存在這種多數對少數的鄙視情況，導致人們不敢變得特殊。她在書中提到在一個班級里，任何特殊的人都會被群體鄙視，包括最胖和最瘦、最高和最矮、最聰明和最笨等等，而這種情況在現代主義時期是沒有的。現代主義的鄙視是強壯鄙視瘦弱、高鄙視矮、聰明鄙視愚笨等等。那麼我想反智主義的盛行應該也是這種情況導致的，任何秀高智商的行為都是主動把自己與廣大人民群眾區分的行為，就是讓自己變成異類，進入鄙視鏈的下層。我們知道沒人喜歡被鄙視，所以解決問題的辦法就是讓自己變成普通人民群眾的一員，一起鄙視那些秀高智商的人。

呃，以前寫過關於American Anti-intellectualism 的paper。這是其中一個reference. 我覺得解釋的還算全面。一言兩語很難解釋清楚這個關乎美國傳統的問題，題主可以細細閱讀下這篇文章。

A Brief History of Anti-intellectualism in American Media

The June 2008 cover of the Washington Post Magazine featured reporter Liza Mundy"s article "The Amazing Adventures of Supergrad." Under this title ran the teaser, "The most sophisticated, accomplished, entitled graduates ever produced by American colleges are heading into the workplace. And employers are falling all over themselves to vie for their talents."
The lengthy piece portrays Emma Clippinger, then a Brown University junior who was double-majoring in developmental studies and comparative literature, serving as captain of the equestrian team, and helping run Gardens for Health International, an organization she cofounded that focuses on the nutrition of HIV-positive Rwandans. Clippinger also is noted for having worked on Martin Scorsese"s The Departed, having interned with the Clinton Foundation, and being fluent in French (along with speaking some Kinyarwanda and Wolof, languages in Rwanda and Senegal, respectively).
Mundy then breathlessly tells her readers that millennials are "one of the most heavily recruited cohorts to enter the American workforce, their hearts and minds incessantly battled over." This generation, made up of perhaps "the best-credentialed graduates ever produced by American colleges," is "computer-literate, well-traveled, hyper-groomed and accustomed to competing for what they want."
It isn"t until nearly halfway through that Mundy pauses to ask, "Is this generation of graduates really more qualified for entry-level management jobs than, say, World War II veterans?" She spends several more paragraphs answering that question with a huge yes. As the several-thousand-word article continues, Mundy adds in numerous other unsupported assertions: this is a "generation of achievers" who "like working in teams," "like to exercise," "are unusually oriented toward public service," and so on.

That "employers report that members of this generation are poorer writers" and "their face-to-face skills are sometimes lacking" comes two-thirds of the way through the article, and these criticisms are glossed over as if unimportant. "That not every student feels coveted and wined and dined and solicited and cosseted" appears near the article"s end and is similarly not explored. Neither is mention of specific employers looking for new workers who are "patient," have a "sense of urgency," "can work in ambiguous situations," and have majored in "math and computer science," none of these claims seeming well supported by the article.
Mundy"s article--while not the standard higher education media fare--is not unique. For decades, national newspapers and magazines, elite ones such as the New York Times and large-circulation ones such as the old Life weekly, have celebrated a tiny upper crust of students: the Rhodes scholar, the literature student publishing her first novel at twenty-one, the computer science student who started a company at nineteen or obtained a patent at twenty. Ostensibly, such articles applaud intellect and education, as well as ancillary circumstances, among them self-discipline, supportive (and often well-off) parents, and creativity.
More significant from a cultural standpoint, though, is the degree to which such stories, long a media staple, represent a freak show of a certain kind, a nonfiction version of a current television show such as The Big Bang Theory. Perhaps the best known earlier case was that of William James Sidis, who entered Harvard in 1909 at age eleven and was profiled in 1937 by the New Yorker under the headline, "Where Are They Now?" Sidis lost an invasion-of-privacy suit against the magazine, which unsurprisingly he filed, since he had long been living in obscurity and the New Yorker was rather gleefully reporting the sad adult lives of child prodigies.
Articles such as "The Amazing Adventures of Supergrad" are unlikely to inspire other young people, should they see such stories (few teenagers read the Washington Post or New York Times). The college students profiled are so superlative that they almost surely would discourage other young people. Very late in Mundy"s article, she cites a student who says, "There"s too much competition. … I know people who did internships freshman year. … I feel like I"m behind the game. … Oh, man, it"s so hard."
Finally, while "supergrads" assign some credit to their college education, such students had often been high achievers in high school, and educational institutions played little role in their accomplishments; sometimes it is suggested that educational institutions are actual or potential hindrances--witness the print and broadcast stories noting that Bill Gates dropped out of Harvard (among other high-tech geniuses who also quit college).
LITTLE TEACHING AND LEARNING
By offering up its periodic freak show of child prodigies such as Sidis or today"s supergrads--turning such students, in social scientific terms, into deviants--the US news media engage in anti-intellectualism, here not by failing to cover or hire intellectuals (although they do this, too) but by portraying intellectuals in ways that are explicitly or implicitly negative. In this, the US news media are in the mainstream of American culture.
That anti-intellectualism is mainstream was documented by Richard Hofstadter"s Anti-intellectualism in American Life, which won a 1964 Pulitzer Prize. It remains the landmark work on the topic, even though a few significant books and articles on anti-intellectualism preceded it (most notably Merle Curti"s The Growth of American Thought in 1943), and even though it has been followed, in recent years, by well-known books from the Left and Right, including Russell Jacoby"s The Last Intellectuals, Allan Bloom"s The Closing of the American Mind, Richard Posner"s Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline, and Susan Jacoby"s The Age of American Unreason. The list lengthens if one adds in broader books about the "dumbing down" of American society.
With the exception of its quite dated chapters 1 and 15, Hofstadter"s book remains immensely useful (as well as an enjoyable read). Daniel J. Rigney, now professor emeritus in sociology of knowledge at St. Mary"s University, developed a theory of American anti-intellectualism based on Hofstadter"s history and other sources. (Hofstadter"s book detailed anti-intellectualism in US religion, politics, education, and business back to the early nineteenth century, omitting the anti-intellectualism in the news media that had already been identified by George S. Hage"s 1956 doctoral dissertation, "Anti-intellectualism in Newspaper Comment of the Elections of 1828 and 1952.") Briefly, and at the risk of oversimplifying and overgeneralizing, Rigney (and Hofstadter) found three types of anti-intellectualism: (1) "religious antirationalism," the view that emotion is warm (that is, good) and reason cold (bad), an outlook often complemented by absolute systems of belief (primarily conservative Protestantism); (2) "populist anti-elitism," public skepticism first of the patrician class of "gentlemen politicians" and old money (which still flares up, as against George H. W. Bush) and later public hostility toward progressive politics and support of such figures as Joe McCarthy or George Wallace; and (3) "unreflective instrumentalism," beliefs and behavior indicating that knowledge is worthless unless it immediately and directly leads to material gain, such as profits or higher salaries and wages.
The national magazine coverage of higher education that I studied for my 2004 book, Anti-intellectualism in American Media, spanned from 1944 (when the GI Bill was passed) to 1996. I organized evidence that the US news media both were and were not anti-intellectual using the individual manifestations of Rigney"s three major types as a theoretical framework. Hence, for antirationalism, I looked to examples of news coverage that were either opposed to reason or not, opposed to science or not, defending authority or not, and favoring or opposing deintellectualized curricula. For populist anti-elitism, I similarly looked for evidence of advocating "common people"s" interests, support for right-wing populism, support for left-wing populism, devaluation of book learning and academic standards, and beliefs that intellectuals are snobs. For unreflective instrumentalism, I covered suppression of ethics questions, impatience with theory and ideas, pressure for vocationalism in the humanities and social sciences, and advocacy of less autonomy in education.
The amount and quality of coverage of each of these three topics varied greatly, of course. In general, I concluded that the national magazines studied were mostly anti-intellectual, although none of them was entirely so at any time, and certainly not always or in all ways.

But what was perhaps even more damning was that the magazines devoted almost no attention at all to the core functions of higher education: teaching, learning, researching, thinking, debating, studying, and writing. Instead, what I found was the "college years": coverage overwhelmingly portraying colleges and universities as places where students play and watch sports, date and possibly marry, drink and take drugs, protest, join fraternities and sororities, go on vacation, avoid the draft, escape their parents, and network and apply for jobs.
Overall, I would not be surprised--based on national media coverage spanning decades--if Americans who have not been to college have very little idea what college is like (except for something a lot like high school, whether it is or not), and Americans who do attend college might be excused if they think that learning is not the top priority in higher education.
WHERE ARE THE CORE FUNCTIONS?
Although I have not done a formal follow-up study, I see little if any reason to believe that news media coverage of higher education has substantively changed since 1996 or that the tone of coverage is now substantially different in newspapers or on television, radio, or the World Wide Web from what it was in major national magazines from the 1940s until the 1990s. In addition to the higher education topics that magazines cover, newspapers" coverage of higher education includes a high percentage of articles about university budgets, tuition increases, faculty salary increases, appointments to boards of regents and trustees, national and international rankings of local universities, localized national stories such as endowment sizes and university presidents" salaries, crime on or near campuses, celebrity graduation speakers, and health issues on campus such as epidemics of communicable diseases. News coverage of higher education on local and national television, whether broadcast or cable, is minimal and certainly does not include topics not covered by newspapers and magazines. In any case, the common denominator is that what is not getting covered is the education part of "higher education."
For this Academe article, I read scores of higher education articles in major national magazines published since 2005, overrepresenting Time magazine, the middlebrow periodical that figured prominently in my book, and skipping coverage purely of sports. Emphasized in coverage have been elite US universities" deals with foreign universities (in the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, China, and India), big tuition hikes and changes in federal student loan and grant programs, underrepresentation of minorities and the poor, booming community colleges, and--in right-wing publications--complaints about liberal campuses and useless degrees.
New since my original study are the international agreements, but also coverage of for-profit institutions (accredited and not--see Barry Yeoman"s article in this issue of Academe); college graduation rates (an area in which the United States is falling behind other countries); application coaching; learning assessment; online degrees; colleges "going green"; college rankings; university presidents not as public intellectuals but as quasi-politicians (for example, Gordon Gee of Ohio State University) or as crooks; skyrocketing textbook costs; security (especially after the Virginia Tech massacre); early admissions; and the dishonesty of institutions in marketing themselves and higher education generally, particularly by not collecting or not sharing with prospective students information on completion times, graduation rates, total costs, evidence of learning, employment prospects, job placement rates, campus crime rates, and so on. (An American Association of Collegiate Registrars official says college marketing materials should be marked "buyer beware," as reported in the September 2009 American Prospect.)
I found a little more attention to college drop-out rates and the number of graduates in jobs that don"t require a college degree--but on that basis alone the United States has had an oversupply of graduates since the 1960s.
The only mentions of curriculum in this coverage were a few anti-intellectual sentences in some articles and a very few articles on whether university education is too impractical (or at least not practical enough) for today"s jobs, on assessment, or on the fact that "anywhere from a third to a half [of college students] require remediation of basic skills," as Diane Ravitch put it, because "our K-12 system is not up to it."
Extremely rare are statements such as those made in the New Yorker (June 7, 2010) by Rebecca Mead, who wrote that "an argument might be made in favor of a student"s pursuing an education that is less, rather than more, pragmatic," or in Time (February 24, 2010) by Ramesh Ponnuru, who wrote that "the purpose of a liberal-arts education is to produce well-rounded citizens rather than productive workers."
Also as rare as ever are quotes from students, who supposedly are the reason why colleges and universities exist in the first place; any criticism by higher education institutions of how the news media cover them; or any sense that all students (not only Emma Clippinger) have a great deal of responsibility for their own learning. In other words, lacking is recognition that it is not the sole responsibility of colleges and universities to make students "learn to love learning," as Bates College president Elaine Tuttle Hansen put it.
Two questions are immediately obvious here. The first is how and why the US news media manage to cover an industry and profession as huge and important as higher education without reporting much on its core functions (granted, a small percentage of the medical and other scientific research on campuses gets covered, but such coverage only underscores the lack of news media attention to all other faculty research). The second, more cynical question is whether it is in the best interest of the news media to encourage the general population to be anti-intellectual.

Either question can be answered quickly and too easily from one of several perspectives. If, for example, one believes that the news media are just another hegemonic institution, one can claim that it is in journalists" interest to do whatever they can to retain and exercise their own power while limiting that of higher education. Or one could say that the general-interest, mass-audience news media aren"t very good at covering anything, so why would higher education be any different? Or one could suggest that higher education news may not be very popular with consumers, and even news media, let alone other mass media, are interested only in maximizing satisfied audiences these days. I might float the idea that most US news media are so anti-intellectual that they don"t know how anti-intellectual they are (certainly they make no attempt to compare themselves with the staff of, say, the United Kingdom"s Guardian--one of many intellectual newspapers and magazines for a mass audience across the Atlantic). There"s at least some truth to each of these arguments, to be sure.
But, of course, it"s more complex than that. Rank-and-file journalists in the United States are far less political or ideological than either the American Right claims they are or than American liberals sometimes would like them to be. And consider that print media and wire services still are not very good at giving consumers more of what they want and less of what they are getting too much of. One also must think about the conventions of journalism. As Edward Caudill explains in Darwinism in the Press: The Evolution of an Idea, ideas and theories are not easy for journalists to report on. Ideas "may have little inherent newsworthiness. [A theory] lacks both timeliness and immediate significance for the audience. … Although a theory may pertain to all things at all times, it does not have the urgency, event-of-the-moment aura, that news favors. Proximity is another common news standard that ideas fail to meet."
"Even if such a theory entered the news process," Caudill concludes, "the reporter still has the problem of converting the information into "news," … [of making information] fit into an appropriate news category. Stories about ideas and theories lose potential impact by being categorized as "soft" or feature news rather than hard news. … Just because an idea is important does not mean that it is exciting or even interesting by news standards." (Thus the number of university press releases that go right into the trash can, deservedly or not.)
But what is more fascinating, if not also more troubling, about the relationship between higher education and the news media in the United States is that it consists of a series of paradoxes, if not outright hypocrisy: US mass media over the past fifteen years have increasingly wanted to sell a "class," not "mass," audience to their advertisers, but have done little to attract, develop, or retain an educated audience. US news media, having spent centuries trying to deliver news and information that audiences would find difficult or impossible to obtain anywhere else, have since the advent of the World Wide Web essentially given up that role without really trying to preserve, let alone enhance, it. (In fact, the US news media--despite being in the information and ideas business--are just another industry in which it is relatively easy to not be hired because one is "overqualified," that is, because one has, in a manager"s opinion, too many college degrees.) News media companies have claimed that they need journalists who are more technologically trained than ever, but these companies do almost nothing--in terms of equipment, training, or money--to help university journalism professors teach advanced technological skills. Perhaps most strangely, US news media executives are still likely to criticize journalism schools while overwhelmingly relying on them for new employees and often being J-school graduates themselves.
THE TROUBLE WITH J-SCHOOL
US news media could not maintain their anti-intellectualism without widespread public acceptance, but schools of journalism must accept their share of the blame. US journalists historically came from blue-collar backgrounds; nineteenth-century newspapers were staffed by one or two college-graduate editors and high school-dropout reporters. The percentage of US journalists with college degrees did not reach 50 percent until about 1970 but has kept increasing since then. Today, close to 100 percent of journalists have bachelors" degrees and well over 50 percent have journalism degrees. J-schools thus had a historic opportunity to become a pro-intellectual force in US mass media. They largely failed.
Both because of and despite an increase in the percentage of J-school professors holding terminal degrees, mutual suspicion held sway for decades between "chi-squares" (faculty members with terminal degrees) and "green eyeshades" (retired journalists on the faculty). Even today, most mass-media textbooks are written by eyeshades who cite little (if any) scholarly research, while chi-squares publish research that is, for the most part, not useful to the media industry and does not push the envelope of theory. J-schools, still balancing the two groups, often have research requirements for tenure that are low, ignored, or differentiated, resulting in mean numbers of scholarly journal articles and books of about one and close to zero, respectively. And recently, J-school curricula have become more anti-intellectual, as courses in media history, media management, and public-affairs reporting have been marginalized or eliminated. In their place have come an explosion of courses, majors, and endowed chairs in sports journalism, sports information and public relations, sports marketing, and even sports management; in e-commerce; and in web design, animation, computer games, and other fields that involve both communication and technology.
If US higher education"s future is dependent on mass public opinion, that mass public opinion is largely dependent on the news media, and journalism is a counterintuitively anti-intellectual profession staffed primarily by graduates of anti-intellectual journalism schools, it is no surprise that public funding of higher education was declining before the Great Recession, that graduation rates barely creep up, and that what members of the general public know about universities is usually limited to their semiprofessional sports programs (which are incorrectly assumed to be profitable). US colleges and universities, including their J-schools, need to improve their products: their curricula and their graduates.
Richard Hofstadter

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Claussen, Dane S. "A Brief History Of Anti-Intellectualism In American Media." Academe 97.3 (2011): 8-13. ERIC. Web. 25 Feb. 2014.

詳見：2004全國研究生入學考試英語（一）text4。

套用一句不問是不是就問為什麼的統統是耍流氓

我覺得題主認為歐美反智是一種錯覺
數學教育中國並不遠強於歐美

近來，英國引入上海的數學教育體系以及乘法口訣，似乎又證明華語地區數學教育的優越性。但其實中國的數學培育體系只在某些方面佔有較大優勢，綜合來看並不格外優越。

根據《中美初中數學教材難度的比較研究》等文獻，英美中學水平的數學教科書並不比中國容易，有些部分難度甚至更高

2008年的論文《中美初中數學教材難度的比較研究》從知識含量、推理、運算、背景、探究多個維度，通過難度公式系統比較了中美典型初中教材的難度。

結果顯示，和人教版教科書相比，美國的教科書在代數上的內容難度顯著高於中國，在概率統計等實踐性較強的分支差距更為明顯。在幾何上內容難度相差不多。之所以產生中國教材難而美國教材簡單的印象，一方面在於之前用於比較的教材比較陳舊，另一方面在於中國的「習題」難度更高，同樣的知識點出題更難，而不是在知識深度上有更多要求。這在數學教育比美國初中多出將近1/3課時的基礎上才能做到。

另外，根據論文《中英高中數學教材概率與統計內容的比較研究》，英國的A-Level基礎數學科目，有專門的概率統計教材與考試。其中涉及到的泊松分布、中心極限定理等內容在中國的高中數學教材中也鮮有提及；對正態分布的介紹與應用標準也高於中國教材，考試難度要求也比較高。

根據中科院博士生導師胡衛平教授2004年發表在心理學報上的研究：中國學生在和英國學生對比時，除問題解決一項技能外都不佔優勢

中國學生引以為豪的運算能力的確強過美英的學生。但這也部分出於教育理念的差距。美國和英國的數學教育並不排斥、甚至鼓勵使用帶編程的計算器進行運算。因為美英對數學的看法更強調其解決實際問題的方面，並不特別看重運算技巧。例如，中國的教科書中使用計算器、網路等綜合手段解決實際問題的案例並不多。以高中教科書為例，使用計算器的例題不超過2.4%，而美國超過13%，使用互聯網不超過3.6%，而美國超過40%。

這種教育理念的差距一方面體現為中國學生超強且牢固的技能，另一方面也使得他們在「提出問題、分析問題、設計整體解決方案」上不如英美學生。Edward等人1997年的研究認為，中國學生提出問題的能力明顯低於解決問題的能力，也低於美國學生提出問題的能力。中科院博士生導師胡衛平教授2004年發表的研究指出，除解決問題一項能力之外，中國學生在發現問題能力、想像能力、實驗設計能力、技術開發能力、產品改進能力和應用能力的得分都低於英國學生。

國際權威教育評估統計發現，華語地區學生的數學能力是通過增加更多課時和延長課外學習時間實現的

根據「國際數學與科學技術教育成就去勢調查」（TIMSS）的數據，台灣學生在數學上有信心的比例學生顯著低於國際平均，在個別年級甚至是倒數第一，而美國學生普遍對數學樂觀。PISA是經濟合作與發展組織（OECD）每年都進行的針對15歲~16歲學生在數學、閱讀和科技等學力進行的廣泛測試。PISA的調查發現，上海學生每周課內課外的學習時間大致為35小時，超過美國和芬蘭10小時以上。換言之，華語區學生的數學應試能力和計算能力很強，但這是以喪失學習信心和增加高強度的學習時間為代價的。

有國際聲譽的頂尖華裔數學家幾乎沒人在1949年後於中國接受完整的學術訓練並開展研究

進入高等教育階段，中國的數學學術環境很難和國外比肩。有兩位獲得沃爾夫獎的華裔數學家：陳省身和丘成桐。其中陳省身在民國完成數學教育，在美國普林斯頓完成其最主要學術著作，丘成桐的本科以上數學教育和主要學術貢獻都在美國完成。去年因為在解決孿生素數難題上做出開創性貢獻而名聲大噪的中國數學家張益唐，在北大完成本科教育後就去美國繼續深造、研究。他在採訪中明確表示，假如自己留在中國，「絕對不可能」取得如此的數學突破。

國外獲得菲爾茨獎的頂端數學家有很多人在青少年時代曾獲國際數學奧賽獎牌；但中國大量的奧賽獎牌獲得者沒有一個獲得菲爾茨獎或阿貝爾獎等重量級國際數學大獎

以國際奧林匹克數學競賽（IMO）為例可以一窺中國高端數學領域的浮躁風氣：IMO是歷史最悠久的中學水平學科競賽，目的是培養和促進青少年對數學興趣。國外的IMO獲獎者中有很多最終都在數學上做出極大成就，例如俄羅斯/前蘇聯九位菲爾茨獎獲得者中，有五位拿過IMO獎牌；著名澳大利亞華裔數學家陶哲軒參加過三次IMO，全部有所斬獲，他在2006年獲得獲得菲爾茨獎。

中國自1985年開始，幾乎次次不落參加國際數學奧賽，並且成績很好。截至2008年，中國在國際奧賽上獲得超過130枚獎牌，其中超過100枚是金牌。但是其中沒有一位菲爾茨獎或阿貝爾獎獲得者——這兩個獎項被認為是數學界的諾貝爾獎，是青年數學家的最高榮譽——連從事數學行業的人數都寥寥無幾。這和中國採取組建奧賽「國家隊」、獲獎保送名牌大學等手段將IMO過度競賽化、功利化不無關係。

我覺得我男朋友也哪裡都好，最不好的地方就是四肢發達頭腦簡單，這在美國特別普遍，教育使然，隨便你們怎麼替美國人說好話。

不請自來，美國反智主義還來自於，社會階層的隔離。現在中國網路上這種啥都敢說，啥都一知半解的傢伙，在美國是沒有的。在美國，有統治階級，這些傢伙們接受的是精英教育，有高度，有深度，有廣度，完全是人類文明的完美體現。有中產階級，專業知識精通，但是對於其他非其專業的基本不懂。還有就是社會底層，與主流社會基本隔絕，專業知識基本不會，視野狹窄，文化層次低。這個階層的人才是反智主義的完全體現。

寫著寫著跑題了，深表歉意。內容有些幼稚，就給大家作參考了。

考研狗一枚，看了幾篇關於反智的文章。說說我自己的理解。
所謂美國反智，說的是美國輕視純學術型人才，輕視那些為了科學而科研的純粹的科學家，像物理學家，他們的研究成果大多不能直接產生價值。而在越來越多如蓋茨，巴菲特這樣非學術人才暴富的影響下，人們更願意相信應用類學科以及金融學科更亦或是投機理財才這種個人英雄主義的學科才是體現社會價值、提高個人資產有效途徑。
相比而言，我覺得國內表現更加反智，人們通常認識馬雲，王建林等風雲人物卻很少知道幾個院士。（這點上，羞愧的承認我個人一個院士的名字都叫不上）。家庭教育方面，幾乎沒有家長會將孩子向一個科學家方面培養。社會上科研人員普遍沒有良好的科研條件，以及合適的生活待遇。我認為這才是純粹的反智行為。
說美國反智，美國敢把這件事提出來並商討，而國內是如何表現的？
這些都是我們畸形的民族自尊心在作祟！
都是點個人見解，用詞不當，並且見識淺薄。怕被噴太慘就膩了，求各位大神輕噴！